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- Art. 3 FC
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 13 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 26 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 31 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 45 FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 69 FC
- Art. 74 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 81 FC
- Art. 96 para. 1 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123a FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 130 FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 164 FC
- Art. 166 FC
- Art. 170 FC
- Art. 178 FC
- Art. 189 FC
- Art. 191 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 97 CO
- Art. 98 CO
- Art. 99 CO
- Art. 100 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 633 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 713 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Art. 808c CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 60 PRA
- Art. 60a PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 64 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 73 PRA
- Art. 73a PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Art. 1 IMAC
- Art. 1a IMAC
- Art. 3 para. 1 and 2 IMAC
- Art. 8 IMAC
- Art. 8a IMAC
- Art. 11b IMAC
- Art. 16 IMAC
- Art. 17 IMAC
- Art. 17a IMAC
- Art. 32 IMAC
- Art. 35 IMAC
- Art. 47 IMAC
- Art. 54 IMAC
- Art. 55a IMAC
- Art. 63 IMAC
- Art. 67 IMAC
- Art. 67a IMAC
- Art. 74 IMAC
- Art. 74a IMAC
- Art. 80 IMAC
- Art. 80a IMAC
- Art. 80b IMAC
- Art. 80c IMAC
- Art. 80d IMAC
- Art. 80h IMAC
- Art. 80k IMAC
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 4 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. c FADP
- Art. 5 lit. d FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 para. 3-5 FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 18 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 52 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 55 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 16 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 18 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 27 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 28 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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- Art. 2 para. 1 AMLA
- Art. 2a para. 1-2 and 4-5 AMLA
- Art. 2 para. 2 AMLA
- Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA
- Art. 3 AMLA
- Art. 7 AMLA
- Art. 7a AMLA
- Art. 8 AMLA
- Art. 8a AMLA
- Art. 11 AMLA
- Art. 14 AMLA
- Art. 15 AMLA
- Art. 20 AMLA
- Art. 23 AMLA
- Art. 24 AMLA
- Art. 24a AMLA
- Art. 25 AMLA
- Art. 26 AMLA
- Art. 26a AMLA
- Art. 27 AMLA
- Art. 28 AMLA
- Art. 29 AMLA
- Art. 29a AMLA
- Art. 29b AMLA
- Art. 30 AMLA
- Art. 31 AMLA
- Art. 31a AMLA
- Art. 32 AMLA
- Art. 33 AMLA
- Art. 34 AMLA
- Art. 38 AMLA
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
FEDERAL ACT ON DIRECT FEDERAL TAX
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
FEDERAL ACT ON MEDICINAL PRODUCTS AND MEDICAL DEVICES
TAX HARMONISATION ACT
- I. Introduction, Theoretical Background, and Practical Significance
- II. Harmonization Requirements
- III. Constitutional Requirements
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. Introduction, Theoretical Background, and Practical Significance
1 Historically, the wealth tax was of great importance because income was either not taxed at all or only to a limited extent. Its imposition was justified, among other things, by the state’s protection of wealth. In the present day, the wealth tax plays merely a supplementary role in relation to the income tax, which is why it is also referred to as a supplementary tax to the income tax.
2 The principle of subsidiarity implies that only the cantons (or, at most, the municipalities through further delegation) possess the constitutional authority to levy a wealth tax. However, the cantons are not free to decide whether to levy a wealth tax; rather, they are obligated to do so under federal law via the StHG (but not under the Constitution). With regard to its structure, they must adhere to the provisions of the StHG.
II. Harmonization Requirements
3 Pursuant to Art. 129 of the FC, the Confederation establishes the principles governing the harmonization of direct taxes levied by the Confederation, the cantons, and the municipalities. This includes the wealth tax, from which the Confederation derives the authority to enact Articles 13–14a of the StHG.
4 The StHG is a framework law. According to the highest court’s case law, the basis for the assessment of cantonal taxes—such as the wealth tax—is, in principle, the cantonal tax laws. If a canton fails to fulfill its implementation obligations, the relevant provision of the StHG is directly applicable in any case if it is sufficiently specific. In this case, the harmonization provision of the StHG becomes the directly applicable tax norm.
5 The harmonization requirements regarding wealth tax are limited to the establishment of a few provisions set forth in Art. 13, 14, and 14a of the StHG. The aforementioned articles bear the headings “Tax Object,” its “Valuation,” and, as lex specialis, the “Valuation of Employee Shareholdings.”
6 In its case law on wealth tax, the Federal Supreme Court occasionally emphasizes “that the cantons have considerable discretion.” This formulation is regularly found in decisions regarding the valuation of assets under Art. 14 et seq. StHG. In contrast, in decisions concerning Art. 13 StHG—i.e., the definition of the taxable object—the Federal Supreme Court interprets the cantons’ discretion much more narrowly and derives far-reaching, sometimes detailed requirements from the harmonized definition of assets. The Federal Supreme Court notes in this regard that the “discretion […] is limited to the valuation rules and does not permit the taxation of items that do not fall under the definition of assets pursuant to Art. 13 StHG.”
7 With regard to Art. 13 para. 1 StHG, the Federal Supreme Court further states that taxable assets consist of the totality of assets, insofar as these are not explicitly exempt from asset taxation under a special statutory provision. According to the highest court’s case law, this generally includes all rights of monetary value. These are rights that are economically exploitable and thus realizable, in particular because they can be transferred in exchange for consideration. Para. 13 of StHG thus obliges the cantons to subject all monetary rights defined in this manner—and only these—to wealth tax. Rights that do not meet this definition may not be taxed as assets, nor may the items expressly listed in Art. 13 para. 4 StHG.
8 This strict definition of the subject matter is in a certain tension with the legislative objective as explained in the message on tax harmonization: According to this, Art. 13 and 14 StHG should not supplant the existing (in some cases differing) cantonal wealth taxes, but rather preserve their basic structure. In contrast, the Federal Supreme Court’s case law runs counter to this legislative objective insofar as the Federal Supreme Court repeatedly intervenes to correct and clarify which rights are to be attributed to the “total net assets” and which are not.
9 In contrast, the Federal Supreme Court has been more cautious in its decisions regarding the issue of valuation under Art. 14 et seq. StHG. In this area, as mentioned, the cantons are regularly granted broad discretion, particularly in shaping valuation practices and operationalizing market value. In summary, the Federal Supreme Court appears to derive clear and binding guidelines for the cantons from the concept of net assets within the meaning of Art. 13 StHG, whereas in its cautious case law—depending on the nature of the asset being assessed—it derives only general guidelines from the concept of market value pursuant to Art. 14 StHG.
10 From a tax system perspective, this asymmetry is only partially convincing. Both sets of provisions concern the wealth tax and thus a tax that is not vertically harmonized. If cantonal tax legislators are indeed to retain considerable discretion regarding the wealth tax, this would logically have to be reflected in an open interpretation of the concept of net assets. If, by contrast, the Federal Supreme Court interprets the StHG as an instrument for materially harmonizing the wealth tax, it would be consistent to not only “consolidate” the harmonization regarding the tax object but also to align the individual cantonal valuation practices at the same time. In its current form, the Federal Supreme Court’s case law thus appears fraught with tension and, in parts, even contradictory.
III. Constitutional Requirements
A. Economic Capacity
11 With regard to constitutional requirements, the structure of the wealth tax must, in principle, satisfy the principle of economic capacity. In this regard, the Federal Supreme Court holds that taxation of net wealth complies with this principle. Conversely, it would be unconstitutional to tax an asset “that does not actually exist.”
12 However, this does not yet address the extent to which net wealth can substantiate economic capacity. The justification for the wealth tax is primarily based on the fundus theory, according to which income from wealth is considered “well-founded” and the wealthy therefore possess a higher economic capacity. Legal scholars criticize this, among other things, because of the wealth tax burden on non-income-generating assets and the sometimes higher volatility of such investment returns. The Federal Supreme Court nevertheless continues to rely on it.
13 Alongside this stands the theory of asset ownership. According to this theory, the mere possession of wealth constitutes a form of economic capacity in itself (e.g., independence, creditworthiness) and justifies taxation even in the absence of income.
14 If guidelines were indeed to be derived from the principle of economic capacity, it would be more convincing to understand wealth as solvency and not to use net income as a benchmark. The prevailing view in Switzerland, however, is caught in the contradiction that, on the one hand, net income and, on the other hand, net assets (net worth) serve as measures of ability to pay. This is—in the view expressed here—an irresolvable contradiction. Furthermore, it has already been explained in detail elsewhere why the ability-to-pay principle only supposedly leads to greater fairness. Rather, it conveys a moral illusion.
15 Further requirements for the design of the wealth tax arise from the prohibition of confiscatory taxation derived from the guarantee of property rights, as well as the prohibition of intercantonal double taxation enshrined in Art. 127 para. 3 of the FC.
B. Guarantee of Property Rights
16 The wealth tax is limited by the guarantee of property rights—in particular, the guarantee of the institution of property. A confiscatory tax burden that makes it impossible to preserve the substance of one’s assets or to accumulate assets in a reasonable manner is prohibited. No abstract threshold can be established in this regard.
17 The Federal Supreme Court sets a high bar for finding confiscatory taxation and, in doing so, assesses in particular the tax rate, the tax base, the duration and intensity of the burden, as well as the accumulation with other levies and the possibilities for passing on the burden. Even if net worth must be temporarily used to pay the tax, such taxation does not automatically constitute confiscatory taxation according to its practice. Such taxation has been affirmed only in exceptional cases.
18 In the Federal Supreme Court’s recent case law, the following is stated regarding the wealth tax: “Consequently, since the wealth tax is levied on the substance of wealth and since the ability to pay is determined precisely by the amount of that wealth, and since taxation is to be characterized as confiscatory only if the returns on the wealth are insufficient to cover the tax burden over time, it cannot be concluded that the constitutional guarantee of property has been violated merely because, in a single tax period, the tax burden exceeds the return on the assets».
Accordingly, what is decisive is not whether the return on assets covers the tax burden in a single tax period, but whether the wealth tax remains bearable over time from the assets themselves or from the returns (including those that may be generated in the future). Only a sustained shortfall can have a confiscatory effect. Consequently, the taxation of shares as assets is not per se unconstitutional even without a dividend distribution—particularly not when profits are retained and reflected in the asset value.
C. Prohibition of Intercantonal Double Taxation
19 The constitutional prohibition of intercantonal double taxation within the meaning of Art. 127 para. 3 of the FC also applies to wealth tax. The prohibition of intercantonal double taxation not only expressly and unconditionally prohibits such taxation; that is, it must not merely be limited but completely prevented. It is thus to be understood as a limit on cantonal tax sovereignty.
20 This principle is particularly significant when special tax domiciles exist outside the canton, as is the case, for example, with real estate. Real estate and its income fall exclusively under the tax sovereignty of the canton in which the property is located. This also has implications for the deduction of interest on debt. In intercantonal situations, this deduction is generally determined by the location of the assets. This shift does not result from the harmonization provisions in Art. 13–14a StHG, but directly from the case law on the prohibition of intercantonal double taxation.
Bibliography
Behnisch Urs R./Opel Andrea, Bemerkungen zu degressiven Steuertarifen Besprechung von BGE 2P.43/2006 vom 1. Juni 2007 in Sachen Kanton Obwalden, BGE 133 I 206 (ASA 76, S. 406), ASA 76 (2008), S. 363–382.
Blumenstein Ernst/Locher Peter, System des schweizerischen Steuerrechts, 8. Aufl., Zürich 2023.
Cavelti Luzius/Behnisch Urs R., Kommentierung zu Art. 129 BV, in: Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Egli Patricia/Hettich Peter/Hongler Peter/Schindler Benjamin/Schmid Stefan G./Schweizer Rainer J. (Hrsg.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, Art. 73 – 197 (Band II), St. Galler Kommentar, 4. Aufl., Zürich 2023.
Grieder Nicolas/Hongler Peter, Kommentierung zu Art. 13 StHG, in: Hongler Peter/Sutter Fabian (Hrsg.), Onlinekommentar zum Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgesetz über die Harmonisierung der direkten Steuern der Kantone und Gemeinden (Steuerharmonisierungsgesetz, StHG), St.Gallen/Zürich 2026 [https://onlinekommentar.ch/de/kommentare/sthg13].
Grieder Nicolas/Hongler Peter, Kommentierung zu Art. 14 StHG, in: Hongler Peter/Sutter Fabian (Hrsg.), Onlinekommentar zum Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgesetz über die Harmonisierung der direkten Steuern der Kantone und Gemeinden (Steuerharmonisierungsgesetz, StHG), St.Gallen/Zürich 2026 [https://onlinekommentar.ch/de/kommentare/sthg14].
Herzog Thomas, Funktion und Verfassungsmässigkeit der Vermögenssteuer, Basel 1985.
Höhn Ernst/Waldburger Robert, Steuerrecht, Band I, 9. Aufl., Bern 2002.
Hongler Peter, Das Leistungsfähigkeitsprinzip – eine moralische Illusion, in: Jusletter vom 4.11.2019.
Hongler Peter, Kommentierung zu Art. 127 BV, in: Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Egli Patricia/Hettich Peter/Hongler Peter/Schindler Benjamin/Schmid Stefan G./Schweizer Rainer J. (Hrsg.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, Art. 73 – 197 (Band II), St. Galler Kommentar, 4. Aufl., Zürich 2023.
Hongler Peter/Kempny Simon/Valta Matthias, Thesen zur gleichheitsgrundrechtlichen Bedeutung des Leistungsfähigkeitsprinzips – Eine gemeinsame Anregung zur verfassungsrechtsdogmatischen Rückbesinnung von bundesdeutscher und schweizerischer Warte, FStR 2024, S. 166–171.
Marantelli Adriano, Berner Gedanken zur konfiskatorischen Besteuerung, in: Peter V. Kunz/Jonas Weber/Andreas Lienhard/Iole Fargnoli/Jolanta Kren Kostkiewicz (Hrsg.), Berner Gedanken zum Recht, Bern 2014, S. 245–288.
Mäusli-Allenspach Peter, § 3 Verbotene Doppelbesteuerung, in: Zweifel Martin/Beusch Michael/de Vries Reilingh Daniel (Hrsg.), Interkantonales Steuerrecht. Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Steuerrecht, 2. Aufl., Basel 2021.
Oechslin Hanspeter, Die Entwicklung des Bundessteuersystems in der Schweiz von 1848–1966, Einsiedeln 1967.
Opel Andrea, Zur Zulässigkeit von Reichensteuern, StR 78 (2023), S. 193–216.
Reich Markus, Steuerrecht, 3. Aufl., Zürich/Basel/Genf 2020.
Reich Markus/Beusch Michael, Vorb. zu Art. 1–2 StHG, in: Zweifel Martin/Beusch Michael (Hrsg.), Bundesgesetz über die Harmonisierung der direkten Steuern der Kantone und Gemeinden, Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Steuerrecht, 4. Aufl., Basel 2022.
Richner Felix, Ist die Vermögenssteuer gerechtfertigt?, ZStP 1999, S. 181–211.
Teuscher Hannes/Lobsiger Frank, Vorb. zu Art. 13–14a StHG, in: Zweifel Martin/Beusch Michael (Hrsg.), Bundesgesetz über die Harmonisierung der direkten Steuern der Kantone und Gemeinden, Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Steuerrecht, 4. Aufl., Basel 2022.
Zuppinger Ferdinand, Grundstückgewinn- und Vermögenssteuer, ASA 61 (1992), S. 309–326.
Materials
Botschaft zu Bundesgesetzen über die Harmonisierung der direkten Steuern der Kantone und Gemeinden sowie über die direkte Bundessteuer (Botschaft über die Steuerharmonisierung) vom 25.5.1983, BBl 1983 III 1 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1983/3_1_1_1/de, besucht am 29.1.2026.