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FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. Characteristics of the legal process guarantee
- II. Contexts of Art. 29a FC
- III. Scope of Application of the Legal Remedies Guarantee
- IV. Partial content of the guarantee of legal recourse
- V. Exceptions, limitations and waiver
- Recommended further reading
- About the author
- Materials
- Bibliography
I. Characteristics of the legal process guarantee
1 In its scope of application, the guarantee of legal recourse opens access to justice and includes the constitutional right to submit the factual and legal questions associated with a "legal dispute" to a court with full power of review. Thus, Art. 29a FC guarantees qualified legal protection in two respects. On the one hand, an independent court must examine the matter. On the other, judicial review is to cover all relevant aspects of a "legal dispute". However, the guarantee of legal recourse leaves open what constitutes a "legal dispute" (cf. n. 15 ff.), just as it is silent on the concrete form of judicial legal protection (cf. n. 32 ff.). It is the task of the legislature (cf. n. 2), but also of case law and academia, to clarify these open aspects of the guarantee of legal recourse. The present commentary attempts to draw elements for accomplishing this task from four contexts of Art. 29a FC (historical context [cf. n. 5 ff.], human rights context [cf. n. 9 f.], comparative law context [cf. n. 11 f.], constitutional theory context [cf. n. 13]).
2 Systematically, the guarantee of legal recourse is one of the fundamental procedural rights. However, it differs from other procedural guarantees in that it does not guarantee rights in proceedings, but the right to (judicial) proceedings. This right takes concrete form at the level of laws and ordinances, i.e. through provisions on the organisation of the court, the course of proceedings and the requirements for appeal. In this sense, the guarantee of legal recourse needs to be shaped and remains dependent on legislation in order to become effective in everyday legal life. It is true that the legislature enjoys considerable leeway in shaping the system of legal protection (cf. n. 32 ff.). However, Article 29a FC provides a binding constitutional framework for this: Judicial legal protection must be effective. Any concretisation of the guarantee of legal recourse by law or ordinance must be measured against whether and to what extent it contributes to effective judicial legal protection.
3 As a fundamental procedural right, the guarantee of legal recourse has two dimensions. On the one hand, it grants persons entitled to fundamental rights a justiciable right to qualified and effective legal protection (cf. n. 1 f.). On the other hand, in an objective-legal dimension, it obliges all state organs to work towards efficient and effective legal protection that is accessible to all persons. In this objective dimension, it is a directive for legislation and guides the future design of the legal protection system (cf. n. 11 f.). Furthermore, it forms a point of reference for the authorities applying the law when it comes to the interpretation of indeterminate legal concepts and the concretisation of general clauses. One can think of precautionary legal protection, which must be handled in such a way that Art. 29a FC is not undermined (cf. n. 43), or the principle of good faith in procedural law.
4 According to the concept of judicial reform (cf. n. 6), the lower courts of the Federal Supreme Court implement the guarantee of legal recourse. Article 29a FC is therefore embedded in a complex network of federal law requirements for legal protection by cantonal courts and federal courts of first instance. These requirements are "authoritative" for the authorities applying the law in the sense of Art. 190 FC. The guarantee of legal recourse cannot have any direct legal effects to the extent that it is formulated under federal law, because the authorities applying the law are bound by the specifications of the federal legislature under Article 190 FC. This is why the doctrine calls it a "limping fundamental right". Where the national guarantee of legal recourse overlaps with Article 6 para. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the supremacy of the ECHR over federal law must be observed. A violation of Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR can be established and remedied here by the judiciary despite Art. 190 FC.
II. Contexts of Art. 29a FC
A. Historical background
5 Neither the first Federal Constitution of 1848 nor that of 1874 contained a fundamental right comparable to Art. 29a FC. Art. 113 para. 1 no. 3 FC 1874 did guarantee access to the Federal Supreme Court in the event of constitutional violations. However, this did not guarantee judicial protection in general, but only in specific legal disputes. Switzerland's ratification of the ECHR in 1974 fundamentally changed this situation. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), influenced by the Anglo-American idea of "due process", derived numerous procedural guarantees from Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR, including the right to judicial protection in criminal charges and disputes over civil claims. The concept of a civil right is defined autonomously and broadly by the ECtHR. Numerous public law matters fall under it, for example expropriation cases and social security disputes. This broad scope of application of Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR created the basis for an actual "procedural convention administrative law". This was a challenge for the Swiss legal system. By no means all legal disputes that had to be adjudicated by a court under international law could be submitted to a court under national law (cf. n. 7). In order to eliminate such contradictions with higher-level law, the Federal Council proposed the introduction of a general guarantee of legal recourse in the 1990s. It used Article 6 para. 1 ECHR and the guarantee of legal recourse in the German Basic Law (Article 19 para. 4 GG) as models.
6 The Federal Council's proposal was part of the reform of the judiciary, which in turn was embedded in the project of a total revision of the Federal Constitution. The judicial reform pursued two main goals: the improvement of legal protection and the relief of the Federal Supreme Court. These priorities, which were in themselves contradictory, were to be achieved by expanding the lower courts of the Federal Supreme Court – namely by establishing a new Federal Criminal Court and Federal Administrative Court. The corresponding organisational foundations were the subject of the total revision of the administration of federal justice. The interconnections between the reform of the judiciary and the total revision of the administration of federal justice led to a remarkable state of limbo with regard to the guarantee of legal recourse. Both the electorate and the cantons clearly approved the judicial reform (and with it the guarantee of legal recourse) in the referendum of 12 March 2000. However, its effectiveness was postponed until the completion of the total revision of the federal administration of justice. Art. 29a FC did not enter into force until 1 January 2007, together with the Federal Supreme Court Act (FCA) and the Federal Administrative Court Act (FAC). Beyond this date, a transitional provision of the Federal Supreme Court Act additionally relativised the guarantee of legal recourse. Only after a two-year grace period (Art. 130 para. 3 FSCA), which was intended to give the cantons time to adapt their court organisation, did Art. 29a FC become a justiciable fundamental procedural right. In retrospect, the characterisation of the guarantee of legal recourse as a "fundamental right in instalments" thus proves to be extremely accurate.
7 In civil and criminal law, judicial protection was already largely guaranteed before the guarantee of legal recourse came into force. The most important effects of Article 29a FC were in public law. The implementation of the guarantee of legal recourse completed a development process that entailed the change from the model of a judicial system primarily exercised within the administration to the model of administrative jurisdiction. Roughly speaking, three stages can be identified in this development:
At the beginning of the 20th century, the administration of justice within the administration was the "dominant form" of legal protection in public law disputes. At the cantonal level, legal recourse usually led to the government council (executive), if necessary via an internal administrative complaint or appeal procedure. At the federal level, since the enactment of the Administrative and Disciplinary Justice Act (VDG, which entered into force on 1 March 1929), access to the Federal Supreme Court was limited to a few matters. In many matters of federal public law, the Federal Council remained the final instance of appeal.
Part of the German-speaking administrative law doctrine was critical of this legal situation. Fritz Fleiner (1867–1937) stated clearly: "The citizen who wants to complain about maladministration and arbitrariness on the part of the administrative authorities (...) currently finds only very imperfect legal protection". The unease articulated by Fleiner about the administration of justice within the administration is in the tradition of a polemical debate about the "correct" control of administrative activity that already took place in the 19th century. While the administration of justice within the administration was suspected of not being independent, the administrative judiciary was considered the "crowning glory of the rule of law" or the "keystone" in its "vault". After the Second World War, this discussion gradually became more objective and there was a growing awareness of the importance of the administration of justice within the administration for the rule of law. At the Swiss Jurists' Conference in 1947, Max Imboden (1915–1969) and Henri Zwahlen (1911–1974) pointed out the connection between the democratic structure of the Swiss state and the model of the administration of justice within the administration.
Initially in the cantons, then from the 1960s also at the federal level, legal protection by courts in administrative disputes gradually became established. The jurisdiction of the administrative courts was based either on a general clause with a list of exceptions or on an enumerative list of contestable disputes. Where the broad scope of application of the guarantees of the ECHR (cf. n. 5) overlapped these jurisdictions, gaps in legal protection in Swiss law became visible and noticeable. Only the implementation of Art. 29a FC (cf. n. 6) alleviated these problems of legal protection by means of practically comprehensive judicial review.
8 The fact that judicial control of administrative activity largely prevailed with the guarantee of legal recourse may tempt one to equate legal protection with judicial legal protection. However, especially in administrative law, the practical implementation of judicial legal protection has its limits. In very technical matters, the lower courts of the administrative courts have a knowledge advantage that makes full judicial review difficult (cf. n. 41 f.). The tradition of the administration of justice within the administration in Switzerland makes it clear that comprehensively understood legal protection must already begin at the stages preceding court proceedings. The administrative procedure, any internal administrative appeal procedure and the subsequent judicial review should each be considered as an element of a holistically understood system of legal protection. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the judicial review required by Article 29a FC must be assessed with regard to the entire chain of instances and not in isolation for the judicial proceedings (cf. n. 41 f.).
B. International guarantees of legal process, appeal and legal protection
9 Effective legal protection is a fundamental concern of international human rights protection. Several international treaties ratified by Switzerland enshrine a corresponding right in one form or another. Guarantees of legal recourse comparable to Art. 29a FC are found in Art. 14 para. 1 UN Covenant II and Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR. The appeal guarantees of Art. 5 para. 4 ECHR and Art. 9 para. 4 UN Covenant II go further, guaranteeing an arrested person the right to have the arrest reviewed by a court within a short period of time. Outside the material scope of application of these guarantees of legal recourse and remedies under international law, the general guarantee of legal protection of Art. 13 ECHR must be observed. This obliges the Convention states to provide for a possibility of appeal against encroachments on Convention rights. It is sufficient if an administrative authority ensures this legal protection.
10 If the material scope of application of one of these international guarantees coincides with that of Art. 29a FC, both fundamental procedural rights are applicable and the legal protection must meet the requirements of both national and international law. The most significant overlap in practice is with Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR (cf. n. 4 on the hierarchy). As a rule, a criminal charge or a civil dispute within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 ECHR should also constitute a "legal dispute" under Article 29a FC (cf. n. 18 ff.). The connection between the two guarantees of legal recourse can be explained by the history of their development: The case-law of the ECtHR on Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR was, on the one hand, an essential innovation factor for Swiss procedural law, and, on the other hand, the national guarantee of legal recourse is modelled on Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR (cf. n. 5). This historical connection suggests a harmonised interpretation of Article 29a FC and Article 6 no. ECHR. Where the national guarantee of legal recourse raises a question of interpretation, the case law of the ECtHR on Article 6 para. 1 ECHR should be consulted.
C. Basic concepts of effective judicial remedy
11 The design of judicial legal protection moves between different objectives. In a nutshell, the judiciary should protect an individual legal position quickly, with little effort and fairly, as well as realise objective law. Hardly any court can meet all these requirements in every case, especially since there are conflicts between them. For example, a speedy trial carries the risk of wrongful convictions, and an outcome that is fair from the parties' point of view is not necessarily objectively correct. Such conflicts of goals make it clear that the establishment of a legal protection system must be understood as an "optimisation and distribution problem". From a comparative law perspective, two typical basic orientations can be discerned: legal protection can focus on the protection of individual legal positions or on the enforcement of objective law. German law, for example, is based on a fundamental decision in favour of the protection of individual rights. According to Article 19 para. 4 of the Basic Law, legal action is open against the violation of subjective rights. French law, on the other hand, attaches great importance to the realisation of objective rights and, with the "recours pour excès de pouvoir", also allows a legal act to be challenged for disregard of the principle of legality. The Swiss legal system does not show a clear system decision for or against one of the two basic types. It presents itself as a "mixed system" that combines subjectivised and objectivised legal protection. Against this background, it seems more fruitful not to compare national peculiarities, but preliminary or basic understandings of effective legal protection. In the international discussion, two of these can be discerned, the comparison of which provides a more precise idea of what characterises effective legal protection in Swiss constitutional law.
12 According to the basic continental European understanding, the effectiveness of (judicial) legal protection depends on a number of organisational factors: Which authority grants it? How are the requirements for action and appeal structured? What objections can be raised? How intensive is the control by the body called upon to hear the case? There is also the time factor: legal protection is only effective if it can be obtained within a reasonable period of time. The guarantee of legal recourse in Art. 29a FC and the case-law on it are tacitly based on this comparative formal understanding, which is also apparent in the practice of the ECtHR (see n. 32 ff). In contrast, the Anglo-American basic understanding does not only include "technical" aspects of legal protection. Rather, it should guarantee equality of results. The judiciary is called upon to even out economic power imbalances, to prevent structural disadvantages of vulnerable groups and to ensure social justice. For Swiss constitutional law, this substantive understanding of the problem is probably too broad insofar as no subjective claim to equality of outcome in judicial proceedings can be derived from Art. 29a FC. The problem facets associated with the Anglo-American understanding are instead to be assigned to the objective dimension of the legal process guarantee (cf. n. 3). Art. 29a FC requires the legislature to work towards effective and efficient legal protection that is easily accessible to every person. Material barriers to access, which can manifest themselves in formal requirements, linguistic communication difficulties and information deficits, are to be eliminated in the short and medium term through appropriate legislative measures.
D. Guarantee of legal recourse and the rule of law
13 Art. 29a FC marks a crystallisation point of the Swiss principle of the rule of law, because judicial protection of the law and the rule of law are mutually dependent. In the rule of law, access to an independent court forms the flip side of the state's monopoly on the use of force and the making of law. Accessibility, independence and effectiveness of judicial review are therefore important indicators of the rule of law. In this context, the guarantee of legal recourse is first and foremost in the service of the protection of individual rights. In addition, under Swiss constitutional law, courts fulfil three functions of the rule of law that extend beyond the resolution of bilateral legal disputes (cf. on the Swiss "mixed system" already n. 11). Firstly, the judiciary ensures the realisation of objective law. In contrast to the executive and the legislature, it must base its decisions exclusively on the applicable law and therefore guarantees the neutral implementation of constitutional, statutory and ordinance law. Secondly, the courts have the task of further developing the applicable law and adapting it to the needs of everyday legal practice. In court practice, this creates an actual "law of application", which makes the legal system more flexible. Thirdly, thanks to its constitutionally guaranteed independence, the judiciary ensures "checks and balances" in relation to other state organs. Through its decisions, it is able to correct developments that are problematic in terms of the rule of law within the framework of the applicable law and to take "catch-up consideration of interests" where legislation has not balanced a conflict of interests or has done so too generally. These three functions of the judiciary under the rule of law should guide the interpretation of Article 29a FC just as much as the protection of individual rights. The guarantee of legal recourse must be concretised in such a way that the judiciary can also perform its functions in a democratic constitutional state. An understanding of fundamental rights that focuses exclusively on the protection of individual rights would be too narrow (cf. n. 14, n. 16, n. 55).
III. Scope of Application of the Legal Remedies Guarantee
A. Personal scope of application: "Every person
14 Natural and legal persons under private law can invoke Article 29a FC without further ado. Moreover, holders of state functions benefit from the guarantee of recourse to the courts if they do not act in a sovereign capacity, operate on the basis of private law and are affected by the contested act in the same way as a private person. It has not been clarified by supreme court rulings and is disputed in the doctrine whether legal persons under public law, state authorities and municipalities can invoke the guarantee of legal recourse in the sovereign area. Some doctrine wants to limit the personal scope of application to private individuals and does not consider holders of state tasks in the sovereign area to be entitled to fundamental rights, insofar as they are not themselves affected like a private individual. In view of the constitutional functions of the judiciary (cf. n. 13), this interpretation proves to be too restrictive. In order to enforce objective law, legal persons under public law, state authorities and municipalities should also be able to invoke Article 29a FC in the area of sovereign acts.
B. Substantive scope of application: "legal dispute
1. Conceptual elements
a. Constitutionally autonomous definition
15 The material scope of application of the guarantee of legal recourse is linked to the concept of "legal dispute" ("cause", "controversie giuridiche"). What is to be understood by this? A vote by the rapporteur of the Committee of States in Parliament and a working paper of the Subcommittee on the Total Revision of the Federal Judiciary indicate that this indeterminate constitutional term is to be interpreted on the basis of the procedural laws. Accordingly, Art. 29a FC would refer to state acts that are also contestable under the respective procedural law. In other words, the "legal dispute" would have to be concretised based on the object of challenge, which is advocated by some of the doctrine. However, the case law of the Federal Supreme Court and, following it, another part of the doctrine understand the term "legal dispute" in a constitutionally autonomous way. According to the practice of the highest courts, the procedural qualification of the object of challenge remains irrelevant for the factual scope of application of Art. 29a FC.
16 This constitutionally autonomous understanding of "legal dispute" is preferable to an interpretation oriented towards procedural law for three reasons. Firstly, Art. 29a FC and Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR are linked to each other historically. In case of doubt about the guarantee of legal recourse, it is therefore advisable to consult the practice of the ECtHR (cf. n. 10). The ECtHR interprets Article 6 para. 1 FC in isolation from the legal systems of the Member States (cf. n. 5), which argues for an autonomous interpretation of Article 29a FC in this sense. Secondly, access to justice in a democratic constitutional state creates an important counterweight to other state organs (cf. n. 13). Against this background, a constitutionally autonomous understanding is also to be preferred from the point of view of the powers. This allows the judiciary to influence the scope of the guarantee of legal recourse, thus enabling it to "think against" the legislature and contributes to the moderation of the powers in the sense of time-honoured state-theoretical wisdom. A third argument, based on the theory of fundamental rights, follows on from this. Fundamental rights selectively remove particularly important areas of life from the unconditional access of state organs. This also applies to the guarantee of legal recourse, which provides a constitutional framework for access to justice (cf. n. 2). Legislation must also respect this framework. If the legislature could definitively determine the scope of judicial review by defining the object of challenge, Article 29a FC would ultimately be at its disposal.
17 A constitutionally autonomous understanding of "legal dispute" does not mean that a court must always fully exhaust its power of review (cf. n. 41 f.), nor that every state act is amenable to judicial review. Only those matters that have certain characteristics fall within the material scope of Art. 29a FC. According to the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, the guarantee of legal recourse covers every dispute in connection with an individual legal position worthy of protection. Three conceptual elements, which must be fulfilled cumulatively, thus characterise the material scope of application: (1) the person seeking legal redress must be able to invoke a legal position to which he or she is entitled (cf. n. 18 ff.); (2) this legal position must be the subject of an individual dispute (cf. n. 21 ff.); (3) the legal position must prove to be worthy of protection (cf. n. 25 ff.).
b. Conceptual element (1): Legal position
18 The legal position that opens up the factual scope of application of Art. 29a FC is not derived from the guarantee of legal recourse itself. On the contrary, the constitutional right to judicial protection presupposes a pre-existing position in the applicable law. This can arise from the entire legal order: from constitutional, statutory and ordinance law. It is also irrelevant which area of law (e.g. criminal law, civil law or public law) it originates from. Thus, if the assignment of the legal position to a normative level or a subject area remains without significance under constitutional law, it must, in return, have a specific nature: It must be sufficiently concrete. At the constitutional level, it is above all the fundamental rights that guarantee sufficiently concrete legal positions, be it in the form of a defensive claim against state action, be it in the form of a state guarantee or duty to protect. At the level of laws and ordinances, a legal position within the material scope of application of the legal remedy guarantee is to be assumed if the person concerned is expressly granted a claim or if the applicable regulatory concept has condensed into a justiciable position.
19 According to the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, for example, the right to freedom of expression vis-à-vis the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SRG), the obligation to dispose of municipal waste under Art. 31b para. 3 of the Environmental Protection Act (EPA), the right to adequate (sports) education, the principle of non-discrimination under public procurement law pursuant to Art. 2 para. 7 of the Federal Act on the Internal Market (FC) and the principle of transparency pursuant to Art. 3a of the Electricity Supply Act (StromVG) constitute legal positions within the material scope of Art. 29a FC. However, according to the practice of the highest courts, no sufficiently concrete legal position exists if individuals wish to take action against the effects of global warming.
20 Contractual legal positions in civil and public law are also subject to Art. 29a FC. However, since the theoretical penetration of the contractual form in public law is less advanced than in private law, legal protection in the environment of the public law contract proves to be problematic. It is indisputable that after the successful conclusion of a contract, the fundamental right of good faith (Art. 9 FC) provides the private individual with a legal position within the scope of Art. 29a FC. If the conclusion of the contract has already failed, the private party whose trust has been disappointed can in principle take legal action on the basis of pre-contractual liability ("culpa in contrahendo"). However, this principle suffers setbacks where the public authority has not yet limited the contract negotiations to a specific private person or enjoys actual "freedom of choice", such as in public personnel law. The rejected job applicant cannot challenge her non-inclusion. It is unclear whether a third party can also defend itself against an unlawful offer by the administration in the run-up to the conclusion of the contract.
c. Conceptual element (2): Individual dispute
21 The legal position thus described must be the subject of an individual dispute. A substantive understanding of the dispute is to be assumed. A dispute within the meaning of Art. 29a FC exists if the scope or the modalities of a legal position are disputed. The conceptual element of a dispute excludes in particular administrative clarification and approval procedures, which precede an individual concrete act of application of the law, from the scope of application of Art. 29a FC. Thus, the initiation of the preliminary investigation procedure pursuant to Art. 32 of the Cartel Act (KG) is not contestable, and the approval of a partial liquidation regulation by the supervisory authority of a pension foundation does not directly affect the legal position of the beneficiaries. In both cases, acts of application of the law vis-à-vis private individuals will take place at a later date, if necessary, and on the basis of the results of the clarification or the approval decision. The same applies to the legislative procedure. Being virtually affected by a decree does not yet constitute a (current) dispute. Accordingly, the guarantee of legal recourse does not require either the Confederation or the cantons to provide for an abstract review of norms.
22 The individual character of the dispute results from its specific proximity to the legal sphere of the person concerned. It is true that individual disputes can typically be mapped into pre-existing legal relationships. However, the material scope of application of Art. 29a FC does not necessarily require a legal relationship that already exists at the time of the dispute. For example, it is sufficient if a private individual's legal position is only accidentally affected by a real act (on real acts, cf. n. 28 f.).
23 Until now, constitutional practice has approached the individual character of the legal dispute negatively and in distinction to the popular complaint. The criterion used is that the person seeking justice is affected. This person's legal position must be affected at least minimally. An actual encroachment is not necessary to open the scope of application of Art. 29a FC. Thus, residents living in the vicinity of a waste collection point were able to challenge its abolition on the basis of the guarantee of legal recourse and have it reviewed by the courts. Legal protection was also available to vocational school students who challenged the cancellation of sports lessons. Finally, the Federal Supreme Court affirmed that the Roman Catholic Church was sufficiently affected when it defended itself against the financial support of the organisation "adebar" with Fr. 15,000.00 by the Catholic National Church of the Grisons.
24 Especially acts with a general-abstract or general-concrete regulatory structure cause delimitation problems. The more persons are affected by them, the more difficult it is to speak of an individual dispute. Only if the legal position of the person seeking justice is more affected by the act in question than that of the general public can the guarantee of legal recourse be invoked. This applies, for example, to a state information campaign. Numerous organisational orders with an open circle of addressees do not give rise to an individual dispute, either because they cannot be classified as a dispute or because they do not affect the legal position of a person with sufficient intensity. Thus, no individual dispute arises from the reallocation of a house address, the change in the routing of a postbus route and the drawing up of train timetables. The closure of a post office is controversial.
d. Conceptual element (3): Worthy of protection
25 The last conceptual element of "litigation" ("worthy of protection") requires that the court decision affects the legal position of the person concerned. The latter must have a current and practical interest in judicial legal protection. Doctrine and case law are oriented towards the current and practical interest in legal protection according to Art. 48 para. 1 of the Federal Act on Administrative Procedure (VwVG). However, because the scope of application of Art. 29a FC is defined in a constitutionally autonomous manner, it is not possible to fall back unquestioningly on the appeal requirements of the administrative appeal procedure. The third conceptual element of "legal dispute" must rather be interpreted with a view to Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR.
26 In this context, the practical interest hardly poses any problems. This is always to be affirmed if a court decision has a legal or factual impact on the legal position of the person concerned. The circumscription of the actual interest is more problematic. According to the case law on Art. 48 para. 1 VwVG, the actuality of the interest in legal protection ceases to exist as soon as the disadvantage can no longer be remedied if the appeal is upheld. However, a constitutional and convention law claim to legal protection may also exist if the disadvantage is irreversible and only the illegality of a state act can be established. Particularly in the case of real acts, the impairment has usually already ended at the time of legal protection (cf. n. 28 f.). In such constellations, there is nevertheless an interest in legal protection under Article 29a FC, which is at least directed towards establishing an infringement of rights. Thus, a rejected job applicant should have the possibility to have the arbitrary or legally unequal consideration of another person by the appointing authority determined by the courts, even if the disputed position has been filled in the meantime.
27 Based on the requirement of current and practical interest, interim decisions are excluded from the factual scope of application of Art. 29a FC if they can still be challenged with the final decision without disadvantage. At least for the time being, the current and practical interest is lacking in such cases. This corresponds in principle to the practice of the ECtHR, which does not subject interim measures to Article 6 para. 1 ECHR. However, in the Micallef judgment, the Court changed and extended its case law. If an administrative order already affects a "civil right" in the run-up to a decision on the merits, the guarantees of Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR must be observed. In exceptional cases, the ECtHR accepts that not all elements of Article 6 para. 1 ECHR can be realised at an early stage of the proceedings. According to Swiss court practice, super-provisional decisions in child and adult protection law as well as orders restoring or withdrawing the suspensive effect of an appeal fall under this exception. The Micallef jurisprudence does not apply to the provisional determination of a value added tax amount by the Federal Tax Administration; the corresponding ruling cannot be appealed to a court that is independent of the administration.
2. Real acts
28 Public procedural law is order-centred: Only the order opens the way to legal protection. The guarantee of legal recourse breaks this iron rule. Whether a legal position worthy of protection is affected depends neither on the form of the act in question nor on the regulatory intention of the state organ. The material scope of application of Art. 29a FC extends to every official act or omission that affects legal positions defined by the legal order (cf. n. 18 ff.). Therefore, actual action in the form of a real act can also give rise to a "legal dispute".
29 At federal level, legal protection against real acts is based on Art. 25a VwVG. Accordingly, a person may request a ruling on a real act if he or she is personally affected by it and can prove an interest worthy of protection. Federal law thus guarantees legal protection for real acts via the "diversions" of an order on demand. This solution is compatible with Article 29a FC, because the guarantee of legal recourse does not require the direct contestability of real acts. Insofar as cantonal law does not provide for comparable legal protection, the cantons are obliged directly on the basis of Art. 29a FC to guarantee legal protection by the courts where real acts affect legal positions that are worthy of protection. Art. 29a FC does not specify how the cantons fulfil their legal protection mandate. They can adopt the solution of Art. 25a VwVG, raise the real act itself to the object of challenge (as the canton of Graubünden does) or provide for an upstream obligation to issue an order.
3. Internal administrative orders
30 Internal administrative orders ("actes internes") are among the non-appealable forms of action under general administrative law. According to the traditional understanding, they are addressed exclusively to the administration, therefore do not affect the legal status of persons outside the administration and are limited in the internal relationship to organisational orders without actual legal effects. Since the term "legal dispute" in Art. 29a FC is to be defined autonomously (cf. n. 16), an internal administrative order that cannot be challenged in itself can also constitute a "legal dispute". In particular, service orders in a public-law employment relationship are likely to affect legal positions that are worthy of protection. If the order affects the fundamental rights of the addressee, legal protection must be available in court. The case law of the highest courts affirms the applicability of Art. 29a FC, e.g. in the case of transfer decisions with significant effects on private life and orders on the visible wearing of religious symbols.
31 Comparable legal protection problems are posed by general-abstract service orders (so-called enforcement-directing administrative orders). These summarise an administrative practice and are intended to ensure the uniform and equal enforcement of substantive law. If the administrative order affects a legal position of a person outside the administration that is worthy of protection, that person must be able to take legal action against it. In many cases, it is possible in the context of administrative ordinances to obtain a concrete act of application of the law, which can then in turn be challenged. The direct contestability of the administrative order only comes into question if the private individual cannot obtain an order from the outset. This restriction is compatible with Art. 29a FC. The legal protection of addressees of the administrative order within an authority must be assessed analogously. They must be able to defend themselves in court against a specific official order that affects a legal position worthy of protection. On the other hand, the possibility of abstract challengeability of the administrative order cannot be derived from Article 29a FC (on abstract review of norms, cf. also n. 21).
IV. Partial content of the guarantee of legal recourse
32 The requirements for judicial protection flowing from Art. 29a FC can be divided into three parts. Firstly, the adjudicating body – the court within the meaning of Art. 29a FC – must guarantee effective legal protection (organisational content, cf. n. 33 ff.). Secondly, the legislation must not obstruct the way to this court by technical legal hurdles (procedural content, cf. n. 37 ff.). Thirdly, effective legal protection is defined by a certain finality: the court seised must be in a position to actually improve the legal situation of the person seeking justice (final content, cf. n. 40 ff.).
A. Organisational partial content: legal protection by a court
33 Within its scope of application, Art. 29a FC gives persons entitled to fundamental rights a right to a single judicial assessment of their "legal dispute". The minimum constitutional requirements for the organisation of a court are primarily derived from Art. 29 FC to 32 FC, Art. 191 FC, Art. 191c FC and Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR. A court within the meaning of Art. 29a FC must be independent of other state organs, decide without being influenced by the parties and base its judgement on the standard of law. The name of the court is irrelevant; special judicial authorities (e.g. cantonal appeal commissions) can also be courts within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The Federal Supreme Court Act, which entered into force at the same time as the guarantee of legal recourse, concretises Art. 29a FC in this context: the cantons are obliged to set up courts with comprehensive cognition as (direct) lower courts of the Federal Supreme Court.
34 These cantonal lower courts implement the guarantee of legal recourse where no federal court of first instance (federal criminal court, federal administrative court, federal patent court) has jurisdiction. In intercantonal relations, the cantons must ensure the requirements of the guarantee of legal recourse by means of a concordat or designation of a cantonal court. The legal protection by the Federal Supreme Court in itself does not meet the requirements of Art. 29a FC, because the Federal Supreme Court does not have comprehensive cognition of the facts and only examines the application of cantonal law for arbitrariness. If the applicable procedural law does not provide for a judicial body, the person concerned must be given a constitutionally compliant legal remedy directly on the basis of Art. 29a FC.
35 The effectiveness of judicial protection depends in its practical implementation on the material and human resources available to the judiciary. Without a needs-based infrastructure, a court cannot effectively fulfil its legal protection mandate. Accordingly, the financial resources of the judiciary must be aligned with the constitutional requirements. In terms of personnel, too, it must be endowed in such a way that a "legal dispute" is decided within a reasonable period of time. In this context, the lay judgeship, which is still widespread in the cantons, poses problems. At least the person presiding over a court should therefore have legal training and, if necessary, further qualifications.
36 The broad scope for legislative action (cf. n. 2) means that Art. 29a FC can hardly be used to elicit more far-reaching requirements for the organisation of the legal protection system. Thus, according to the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, it is irrelevant for the effectiveness of legal protection whether the legislature provides for civil or public law legal recourse. It is also compatible with the guarantee of legal recourse if access to the Federal Supreme Court is not open, especially since according to the basic concept of Art. 29a FC the judicial lower courts of the Federal Supreme Court ensure legal protection (cf. n. 4). Finally, the guarantee of legal recourse does not require any possibility of challenge within the administration, no specific instance of appeal and also no abstract review of norms (cf. n. 21).
B. Procedural partial content: access to a court of law
37 Even within the scope of application of Art. 29a FC, access to justice remains linked to procedural requirements. The guarantee of legal recourse does not provide the entitled person with a procedural "passe-partout". The person must prove the usual entry and process requirements, pay an advance on costs if necessary and conduct the proceedings in accordance with the applicable procedural law. In the doctrine, it is disputed whether these procedural provisos are restrictions of the guarantee of legal recourse or a permissible legislative arrangement. The discussion is largely theoretical, since it is undisputed that at least the usual entry and process requirements do not lead to a disproportionate restriction of Art. 29a FC (n. 53). However, a restriction requiring justification would have to be assumed if the legislation creates new formal requirements or combines existing formal hurdles in such a way that access to the court exists only on paper (cf. n. 2). Less tangible than these procedural framework conditions of access to justice, but equally relevant under constitutional law, are factual barriers on the way to court. These include information deficits on the part of those seeking justice, linguistic communication difficulties and legal costs. The latter can - in the form of procedural costs - directly impede access to the court or - in the form of non-procedural and procedural party costs - indirectly impede the enforcement of a claim. Prohibitive legal costs in any case violate Art. 29a FC. However, the financial consequences of legal enforcement can only be weakly controlled by constitutional principles. The guarantee of legal recourse at least requires the legislature to carefully assess the interests affected by court costs (cf. n. 54 f.). In contrast, a person seeking justice cannot derive an unconditional right to free administration of justice from Art. 29a FC.
38 Within the scope of application of the Federal Code of Criminal and Civil Procedure, practically all procedural acts can be referred to a court by law. Isolated gaps in legal protection can still be found in the cantonally regulated correctional system. In addition, the criminal summons procedure raises some legal protection problems related to its basic conception. The penalty order procedure places a great deal of procedural responsibility on the accused. Unlike in ordinary criminal proceedings, the facts of the case and the application of the law are largely at their disposal. The public prosecutor's office has the option of submitting a proposal for a verdict, which the accused can accept or reject by means of an objection. If the accused does not object to the penalty order within 10 days, it becomes formally binding. This procedural order is problematic from the point of view of the rule of law if the addressee of the penalty order is not aware of the decision issued against him or does not understand it. The case law of the Federal Supreme Court rightly shows itself to be strict with regard to the service of a penalty order. The fiction of service is in principle not applicable in penalty order proceedings. Otherwise, there could be an accumulation of two fictions - the fiction of service and the fiction of waiver of objection - which would be incompatible with the guarantee of legal recourse. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the penalty order procedure of the Code of Criminal Procedure is compatible with the ECHR if the public prosecutor imposes a custodial sentence. As far as can be seen, the ECtHR has not yet ruled on the issue, but the legal situation in Switzerland contradicts the recommendations of the Council of Europe. Moreover, doctrine points to the questionable transfer of procedural responsibility to the accused person, which leads to an idling of the guarantee of legal recourse and the constitutional functions of the judiciary associated with it.
39 In the area of public law, the cantons are obliged, based on Art. 29a FC, to provide for judicial review in "legal disputes" in connection with administrative action that is not subject to an injunction (cf. n. 28 f.). The same applies to internal administrative orders with effects on a legal position worthy of protection (cf. n. 30 f.). If the applicable procedural and organisational law does not provide access to a court that meets the requirements of Article 29a FC, the entitled person must be given the opportunity to challenge the order directly on the basis of the guarantee of legal recourse in accordance with fundamental rights. The person entitled to fundamental rights may not be referred to supervisory appeal proceedings. This does not meet the constitutional requirements because the person reporting the case does not enjoy party status and the proceedings are not aimed at restoring the lawful situation.
C. Final partial content: Effective legal protection
40 Art. 29a FC requires the judiciary to comprehensively review the "legal dispute" in fact and in law. If a court limits its review density to arbitrariness without factual justification, it violates the guarantee of legal recourse. In criminal and civil law, where the court usually decides as the first instance within the meaning of Art. 29a FC, this partial content of the guarantee of legal recourse can be realised comparatively easily. The situation is different in public law.
41 In public law, courts generally rule as second or third instances and review a pre-existing decision. Where the lower administrative courts have a knowledge advantage, the question arises as to how far judicial review should extend. According to the clear case law of the Federal Supreme Court in this respect, the review required by Article 29a FC does not extend to the reasonableness of an administrative decision; discretionary powers are thus excluded from judicial review. This practice has two main consequences. First, it is constitutionally permissible for legislation itself to reduce the density of judicial review by a provision.... Second, the withdrawal formulas widespread in the practice of the administrative courts in connection with various discretionary facts are at least compatible with Art. 29a FC as long as they are factually justifiable and do not amount to a mere arbitrary control (cf. n. 41). On the one hand, the judiciary typically holds back when the lower court has technical expertise that the court lacks. Here, the so-called expert discretion of the administration is at issue. This aims at making specialized expertise fruitful in the implementation of the legislative normative program. On the other hand, the administrative courts grant the lower courts discretion in the assessment of distinctly local circumstances. This so-called adaptation discretion ensures that (full) legal control is exercised by a body that is particularly close to the subject matter of the regulation.
42 From the perspective of the protection of individual rights, discretionary decisions by the administration represent an intrusion into the constitutionally required level of judicial control. However, the tradition of administration-internal administration of justice in Switzerland (cf. n. 6) makes it clear that legal protection should not be understood exclusively as judicial protection. The demand for "more" judicial control runs the risk of "judicializing" the factually justifiable decision-making scope of lower instances. Also, the expertise of the administration would remain largely unused if a court were to substitute itself for the lower instance in the expert and adjustment discretion. The effectiveness of the legal remedy guarantee should instead be assessed with a view to the entire proceedings (cf. n. 8). A factually justifiable reduction of the control density is therefore constitutionally permissible, provided that the legal protection is still effective over the entire range of instances. In practice, compensation mechanisms can be found in this context, which start with the lower instances of the administrative courts and compensate for the reduced density of review. First and foremost, there are internal administrative appeal and recourse options. Both allow for expert review at a distance from the deciding authority. Where such an internal administrative review is not available, the Federal Supreme Court requires a particularly carefully conducted administrative procedure in certain disputes. A third way is through organizational law. Effective legal protection can be ensured through intra-court specialization. Thanks to specialization, a court can meet the lower courts on an equal footing in terms of expertise and carry out more intensive review than non-specialized courts.
43 Effective legal protection has to start where a legal position has been violated. From the point of view of those affected, it is a matter of restoring the lawful state of affairs. This partial content of the guarantee of legal recourse can initially be impaired by the time factor. Short limitation periods, for example, entail the risk that a claim can no longer be enforced due to the passage of time before those affected become aware of it. This violates the guarantee of legal recourse. In the run-up to a court decision, the parties must also have the possibility to bring about a situation through official intervention that is at all still accessible to effective judicial review at a later point in time. Under certain circumstances, the guarantee of legal recourse requires the suspensive effect of an appeal or the issuing of precautionary measures. In addition to the time factor, the powers of the court seised also play a role in the effectiveness of legal protection. Only a court that can reverse a contested decision and remedy an unlawful situation meets the constitutional requirements. The applicable procedural and substantive law determines in advance what powers a court is entitled to (e.g. determination of a violation of the law, payment of compensation, restoration of the previous legal status). If the judiciary is not given effective instruments, or is given insufficient instruments, a court may directly rely on Art. 29a FC to effectively restore the lawful state of affairs. However, the "authoritativeness" of federal law must be taken into account. The judiciary cannot correct a preliminary decision of the federal legislature on the basis of Art. 29a FC (cf. n. 4).
V. Exceptions, limitations and waiver
44 The guarantee of legal recourse is not absolute. First of all, acts of the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council are in principle not subject to appeal (cf. n. 45 ff.). Moreover, Art. 29a sentence 2 FC allows the legislature to deviate from the guarantee of legal recourse. Such area-specific exceptions require special justification (cf. n. 48 ff.). Restrictions of Art. 29a FC are to be distinguished from this. While area-specific exceptions concern the organisational content of Art. 29a FC, restrictions relate to its procedural and final content (cf. n. 52 ff.).
A. Acts of the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council
45 According to Art. 189 para. 4 sentence 1 FC, acts of the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council cannot be challenged before the Federal Supreme Court. This provision links the exclusion of contestability to the deciding body. It is based on the French theory of "actes de gouvernement", which postulates that all acts of the government and parliament are political and therefore non-justiciable. Against this background, Art. 189 para. 4 sentence 1 FC excludes not only – as the wording would suggest – contestability in the Federal Supreme Court, but in all courts.
46 The theory of "actes de gouvernement" is hardly tenable in the generality as realised in Art. 189 para. 4 sentence 1 FC. Decisions of the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly that affect individual legal positions can certainly be subject to judicial review, even if only with regard to how they were reached under procedural law. Furthermore, Switzerland is obliged to ensure judicial protection against those decisions of the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly that fall within the scope of the international guarantees of legal recourse (Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR; Art. 14 para. 1 UN Covenant II). This circumstance, as well as the content of Art. 29a FC, must be taken into account when drafting counter-exceptions to Art. 189 para. 4 sentence 1 FC based on sentence 2 of this provision. The review of acts of parliament and government with effects on individual legal positions worthy of protection (cf. n. 18 ff.) should be entrusted to the judiciary.
47 The examples of application of Art. 189 para. 4 sentence 1 FC present a colourful picture: The Federal Council's explanatory memoranda on voting, the Federal Council's decision to approve a tariff structure for service providers of compulsory health insurance, Federal Council decisions in the field of the internal and external security of the country, acts of major administration and the guarantee of a cantonal constitution by the Federal Assembly cannot be challenged. In the area of political rights, Art. 189 para. 4 sentence 1 FC precludes direct challenges to acts of the Federal Council; however, by way of exception, the Federal Supreme Court grants direct judicial protection on the basis of Art. 29a FC if irregularities are subsequently discovered in federal votes or elections which were likely to distort the formation of the will. Federal court review is directed at the "information situation in the run-up to a referendum". Because in this specific constellation the legal question is in the foreground as to whether the freedom of election and voting has been violated, it seems justifiable, at least in the result, for the Federal Supreme Court to ensure legal protection as the sole judicial instance, even if the Federal Supreme Court's cognition does not in itself meet the requirements of Art. 29a FC. Measured against constitutional criteria, however, this legal situation remains unsatisfactory and should be adapted to the requirements of the guarantee of legal recourse. One possible solution is to open the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court in certain cases, i.e. in federal voting rights cases.
B. Statutory exceptions (Art. 29a sentence 2 FC)
48 According to Art. 29a sentence 2 FC, the Confederation and the cantons may exclude judicial assessment by law in exceptional cases. This exception clause only applies within the factual scope of Art. 29a FC. A dispute that does not fulfil the conceptual elements of a "legal dispute" does not fall under the guarantee of legal recourse from the outset. The doctrine speaks here of non-genuine exceptions to Art. 29a FC. A genuine exception in the sense of Art. 29a sentence 2 FC excludes judicial assessment, although this would be required in principle. To be admissible, a genuine exception must be based on a clear legal foundation. The exclusion must be in the form of a law in the formal sense (aspect of norm level) and sufficiently clear (aspect of norm definiteness). As a substantive requirement, a qualified public interest is presupposed that justifies the exclusion of judicial review.
49 The exception clause in Art. 29a sentence 2 FC must be applied restrictively. Genuine exceptions are mainly considered in matters with a strong political character. The political character of a dispute must be clearly in the foreground and must clearly override any private interests that may be affected. A discretionary power granted to the deciding authority does not yet establish a political dispute. At least the limits of the exercise of discretion (abuse, exceeding or falling short of the discretion) are justiciable. Whether the political coloration of a matter can ultimately justify the exclusion of judicial review must be decided in an overall assessment of the constitutional interests affected. In this context, the legislature must deal specifically with individual "legal disputes." A general exclusion of certain categories of cases on the basis of abstract criteria - e.g. the deciding body - would not be compatible with Art. 29a FC.
50 At the federal level, Art. 29a sentence 2 FC has limited independent significance for two reasons. Firstly, Art. 189 para. 4 sentence 1 FC removes acts of the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly from judicial review (cf. n. 45). Secondly, federal law provisions are "authoritative" for the courts under Art. 190 FC. Thus, Art. 32 VGG excludes judicial protection in individual factual matters. Although the provision is too restrictive according to some doctrine, it remains binding on the basis of Article 190 FC, unless a dispute also falls under Article 6 para. 1 FC (cf. n. 4).
51 In the area of jurisdiction of the cantons, the exception clause of Art. 29a sentence 2 FC is concretised by Art. 86 para. 3 BGG. The cantons may provide for non-judicial authorities as direct lower courts of the Federal Supreme Court for "decisions of a predominantly political character". The predominantly political character may result from the content of the decision or from its political environment; in any case, it must be obvious and allow private interests to recede into the background. Decisions of a predominantly political character include, for example, the election of a cantonal administrative judge, the exercise of parliamentary superintendence, a pardon, the refusal to authorise the prosecution of a magistrate, the decision to merge communes and school districts; by contrast, the decision of the cantonal government of Geneva to exempt a foundation from the so-called single-registration and inheritance tax, and the award of a water rights concession, if the rights and obligations of the concessionaire are regulated in detail, do not.
C. Restrictions
52 Procedural fundamental rights establish procedural "minimum guarantees" that may neither be restricted nor undercut. However, this does not apply to all of their elements. On closer inspection, the guarantee of legal recourse is also at least partially restrictable. Such restrictions must be distinguished from genuine exceptions under Article 29a sentence 2 FC. If the requirements for a genuine exception (cf. n. 48) are fulfilled, legislation can completely remove a "legal dispute" from judicial review. The organisational content of Art. 29a FC is affected. Restrictions, on the other hand, affect the procedural and final content of Art. 29a FC. Access to the court is made more difficult, but not excluded.
53 Restrictions of Art. 29a FC are subject to less stringent requirements than genuine exceptions under Art. 29a sentence 2 FC. Although they must also be based on a legal foundation, the need for flexibility in lawmaking must be taken into account in the level and definiteness of the norm. Furthermore, restrictions on the guarantee of legal recourse must serve a public interest and be proportionate. Legitimate public interests exist in particular in an efficient course of proceedings and the prevention of unnecessary court proceedings. Both are so important that they can justify a restriction of the procedural and final content of Art. 29a FC. A number of procedural institutes that serve to streamline proceedings are therefore also considered unobjectionable under constitutional law (such as the "usual" entry and process requirements, provisions on form and time limits, and the obligation to advance costs). In the medium and long term, the digitalisation of the judiciary will raise the question of the extent to which exclusively computer-based communication with and through the courts will restrict access to justice. For persons without the corresponding technical and linguistic skills, the switch to digital communication can in fact undermine the guarantee of legal recourse. In this context, digitalised access to the courts is subject to the same constitutional criteria as analogue access. In addition to the requirement of general accessibility, the prohibition of excessive formalism must be observed.
54 Court costs represent a practically very significant restriction of Art. 29a FC. According to a study published in 2021, the court fee for enforcing a civil law claim of CHF 100,000.00 amounts to an average of CHF 8,189.00 throughout Switzerland. In addition, there are further legal costs (own lawyer's fees, costs of an evidentiary procedure, possibly opposing lawyer's fees). The cost risk is likely to be around CHF 34,330.00. These legal costs are considerable, make it difficult to enforce the claim and are problematic in the light of Art. 29a FC. The court costs are the cost factor that the state can directly influence. Their collection is in the public interest for two main reasons. Firstly, court costs represent the remuneration for the activities of the judiciary and are therefore of fiscal importance. Secondly, court costs can prevent unnecessary court proceedings as a preventive measure, because a party does not lightly risk costly proceedings. As constitutional criteria for the amount of court costs, the aspect of effective protection of individual rights and the functions of the judiciary under the rule of law (cf. n. 13) are to be taken into account. In addition, the principles of cost recovery and equivalence must be considered. While the principle of cost recovery is of little importance in the case of court fees, because experience has shown that the judiciary cannot cover its costs through its own revenue, the principle of equivalence requires a reasonable relationship between the value of the state service rendered and the fee charged for it.
55 The functions of the judiciary under the rule of law (n. 13) play a stronger role in public procedural law than in civil law. Such proceedings may, for example, be about the protection of future generations. The public interest in the outcome of proceedings speaks for low-threshold – and that also means: low-cost – legal protection. Against this background, legislation should distinguish more strongly than hitherto between different types of proceedings and base the court costs on the extent to which a proceeding also serves the realisation of public interests.
D. Waiver
56 The person entitled to fundamental rights may waive judicial protection and submit to private arbitration. According to the practice of the highest courts, the fact that there is no entitlement to free legal assistance in arbitration proceedings is compatible with Art. 29a FC. The case-law of the ECtHR further differentiates according to whether the person concerned voluntarily submitted to arbitration or was forced ("forcé[e]") to do so. A forced arbitration clause in the sense of the case law can be assumed, for example, in the case of non-negotiable arbitration provisions in the statutes of a sports association. The voluntarily accepted arbitration clause is in principle unproblematic in the light of Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR. Enforced arbitration must meet the procedural standard of Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR.
Status of the commentary: July 2023.
Recommended further reading
Bickel Jürg/Oeschger Magnus/Stöckli Andreas, Die verfahrensfreie Verfügung, ZBl 2009, S. 593–624.
Corboz Bernard, La protection des droits ou la justice en question, ZSR 1988 II, S. 159–213.
Martin Pierre, Probleme des Rechtsschutzes, ZSR 1988 II, S. 9–153.
Müller-Graf Thomas, Entrechtlichung durch Informalisierung?, Diss. Basel, Basel/Genf/München 2001.
Pfenninger Hanspeter, Rechtliche Aspekte des informellen Verwaltungshandelns: Verwaltungshandeln durch informell-konsensuale Kooperation unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Umweltschutzrechts, Diss. Freiburg 1996.
Plattmann-Steiner Roland, Tatsächliches Verwaltungshandeln, Diss. Basel, Zürich 1990.
Richli Paul, Rechtsschutz gegen verfügungsfreies Staatshandeln, AJP 1998, S. 1426–1442.
Rhinow René, Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit im Wandel, in: Georg Müller/René A. Rhinow/Gerhard Schmid/Luzius Wildhaber (Hrsg.), Staatsorganisation und Staatsfunktionen im Wandel, Festschrift für Kurt Eichenberger zum 60. Geburtstag, Basel/Frankfurt a. M. 1982, S. 657–672.
Rohner Christoph, Probleme des Rechtsschutzes, ZSR 1988 II, S. 220–299.
Rütsche Bernhard, Was sind öffentliche Rechte und Pflichten? Überlegungen zum Rechtscharakter der Verfügung, in: Markus Rüssli/Julia Hänni/Reto Häggi Furrer (Hrsg.), Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht auf vier Ebenen, Festschrift für Tobias Jaag, Zürich/Basel/Genf 2012, S. 69–79.
Tschopp-Christen Marianne, Rechtsschutz gegenüber Realakten des Bundes (Art. 25a VwVG), Diss. Zürich, Zürich/Basel/Genf 2009.
About the author
PD Dr. iur. Matthias Kradolfer, attorney-at-law, is a senior judge, part-time federal judge and private lecturer in public law at the University of Zurich.
Materials
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