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FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
- Purpose, system, history, and terminology
- I. Context
- II. Commentary i.e.S.
- III. Implementation
- IV. Effectiveness as a constitutional principle?
- Recommended further reading
- Bibliography
- Materials
Purpose, system, history, and terminology
1 Purpose. Article 170 of the FC mandates the Federal Assembly to ensure that the effects of government measures are reviewed. The effects are to be measured using method-based studies (effectiveness reviews or evaluations). This is intended to provide the constitutional bodies with the necessary basis for performing their state governance tasks (in particular Art. 163-173 of the FC, Art. 180-187 of the FC) as effectively as possible. Effectiveness assessments are intended to trigger learning processes by incorporating the findings into future decisions, in particular legislation. The effectiveness of government action should contribute to its legitimacy (“output legitimacy”; on the functions: N. 6 f.). From an institutional perspective, Art. 170 FC aims to assign ultimate responsibility for this task in the sense of a guarantee mandate (norm type: N. 17 and N. 21) (for the specific purpose in relation to supreme supervision: N. 2). The Federal Assembly may delegate the implementation of the mandate to the Federal Council and call on auxiliary bodies (for implementation, see N. 20 and 21). The fulfillment of the mandate remains non-justiciable (low normativity: N. 22 and N. 51).
2 Systematically, Art. 170 FC is located in Section 3 (“Competencies”) of Chapter 2 on federal authorities. The provision establishes a competence and a mandate of the Federal Assembly. The mandate overlaps with the supreme supervision under Art. 169 FC in terms of the standard (effectiveness) and the subject matter (in particular the Federal Council and the Federal Administration). In relation to supreme supervision, Art. 170 FC aims, on the one hand, to emphasize the criterion of effectiveness (to which Art. 169 of the FC is not limited). On the other hand, the provision aims to extend the Federal Assembly's audit mandate beyond the subject matter of Art. 169 of the FC, in particular with regard to measures taken by the constitutional and legislative authorities (N. 23 ff., N. 40). Although Art. 180 ff. does not contain a corresponding mandate, the Federal Council may also initiate effectiveness reviews at any time (N. 18). Art. 170 FC refers to provisions that oblige the state to act in a manner that is proportionate and geared towards public interests and the realization of fundamental rights (Art. 5, 35, and 36 FC), equal before the law (Art. 8 FC), or rational (Art. 9, Art. 43a para. 5, Art. 126 para. 1, Art. 178 para. 1 FC) (N. 49). In legal doctrine, these systematically related provisions are sometimes used to derive a “constitutional principle of the effectiveness of state measures.” However, the specific legal consequences of such a principle remain largely undefined (N. 50 ff.).
3 Historically, Art. 170 has no equivalent in the aBV (1874). The explicit anchoring of the effectiveness review was only included late in the revision process for the new FC; the draft constitutions of 1995/96 did not yet contain a corresponding provision. After the expert commission of both SPK had proposed the creation of an independent body for the evaluation of state measures, the SPK instead linked the effectiveness review in its supplementary report (1997) to the supervisory authority of the Federal Assembly. This concept remained in the Councils, but effectiveness testing was removed as a separate provision from the current Art. 169 of the FC.
4 In terms of terminology, the German version of the FC uses the constitutional term “Wirksamkeit”, while the French and Italian versions use ‘efficacité’ and “efficacia” respectively. The term is to be understood in a broad sense: effectiveness assessments examine the extent to which a government measure is being implemented, its objectives are being achieved, and what resources are necessary to do so (cost-benefit; for the assessment standard: N. 29 ff.). Both the mandate (“ensures that” or “ensure that”) and the assessment standard (‘effectiveness’ or " effective“) are also used in the German version in Art. 35 para. 3 of the FC (realization of fundamental rights among private individuals). The wording limits the mandate to measures ”of the Confederation," which also includes measures taken by the Federal Assembly itself, the constitutional legislator, or federal courts, or measures that are not implemented by the Confederation itself (N. 23 ff.). According to the German version, effectiveness is to be “reviewed.” The Italian version uses the similar term “verificare.” In contrast, the French version requires “que l'efficacité [...] fasse l'objet d'une évaluation,” thus using the term “evaluation,” which is commonly used in practice.
I. Context
A. Fundamentals
5 Definition. Effectiveness reviews or evaluations are method-driven investigations based on scientific criteria with the aim of identifying, measuring, and assessing the effects of government action. They analyze the extent to which government measures contribute to the achievement of legally established goals and to public welfare.
6 Function. The main purpose of effectiveness assessments is to enable authorities to account for government action, gain insights into causal relationships, enable optimization through better decision-making bases and learning processes, and improve the strategic orientation of government action. Effectiveness assessments are therefore both past- and future-oriented. They are intended to provide accountability for past measures in the present and promote confidence in future measures. They are intended to allow a better understanding of the effects of government action and thereby optimize the strategic orientation of future measures. This is intended to ensure that government action is geared toward the constitutional and statutory goals of the common good and does not become entangled in its own logic, divorced from reality.
7 Output legitimacy. The legitimacy of government action is increasingly based not only on constitutional principles (“input”) and democratic procedures (‘throughput’), but also on its effects (“output”). Traditionally, the law determines the conditions for legality and legitimizes government action that follows the prescribed procedure (cf. Niklas Luhmann: “Legitimacy through procedure”). This understanding of law is rooted in the legal philosophy of deontological ethics (Immanuel Kant). With the shift toward the effectiveness of measures, ideas of consequentialist ethics, namely utilitarianism (Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill), are finding their way into the discourse on legitimacy. The intended consequences of a measure thus gain importance as a yardstick for legitimate state action. Rule utilitarianism in particular, which applies the criterion of the greatest general happiness to rules of action rather than to individual actions, shares certain basic convictions with the effectiveness test. However, the output legitimacy of state action must not come at the expense of input legitimacy. The basis and limit of state action remains the law (Art. 5 para. 1 of the FC). Effectiveness considerations are intended to ensure that legally enshrined goals do not remain a dead letter.
8 Effectuation of powers. From a state theory perspective, the focus on effectiveness is an expression of an understanding of the separation of powers that emphasizes cooperation (“model of cooperating powers”) rather than the separation and inhibition of powers. State power should not only be limited, but also exercised effectively and efficiently. The state should be organized in such a way that the tasks assigned to it by the constitution and the law are fulfilled as effectively as possible, whereby the tasks can also be fulfilled cooperatively or by third parties (guarantee state).
9 Impact-oriented administrative management. Instruments for planning, implementing, and reviewing impact-oriented administrative management are therefore an expression of the demand for effective state action. From the 1990s onwards, the New Public Management school of thought was particularly influential, introducing business management elements into public administration with the aim of reducing costs and increasing efficiency. Instruments such as integrated task and financial planning, legislative programs, final legal provisions, and global budgets are intended to give governments entrepreneurial freedom with regard to the means (not the objectives) of task fulfillment. The New Management Model for the Federal Administration (NFB) implements aspects of impact-oriented administrative management across the board for the central administration, in particular control through performance mandates and global budgets. In academic discourse, schools of thought have since gained importance which, although also impact-oriented, place greater emphasis on the public value of government task fulfillment rather than its economic efficiency.
10 Empirical legal research. The increasing impact orientation of government action is also reflected in jurisprudence. Effectiveness reviews are a form of legal fact-finding. While jurisprudence understands and analyzes legal norms as components of a normative order (“law-in-books”), empirical legal research descriptively examines the causes and effects of legal norms (legal facts, “law-in-action”). In practice, data collection sometimes serves as the basis for both an effectiveness assessment with primarily practical interest and a scientific contribution. Legal fact research is now conducted in particular in social science disciplines such as sociology, economics, and political science, as well as in the interdisciplinary fields of law and economics, empirical legal studies, criminology, and sociology of law. The trend toward impact-oriented law is thus introducing social science methods into legal discourse. While it is undisputed that empirical findings should be incorporated into the drafting of new legislation, it has not yet been clarified in detail what significance findings from legal fact research should and can have in terms of legal methodology when it comes to the application of law.
11 Evaluation research. In addition to research on the causes and effects of legal norms, there is extensive empirical literature on the functioning of effectiveness assessments themselves. These studies examine, for example, how often and in what contexts evaluations are carried out, the influence and use of evaluation results for policy-making, and the influence of clients on the independence and results of external evaluators.
B. Evaluation and lawmaking
12 All government measures require a sufficient legal basis. Therefore, effectiveness testing is particularly closely related to lawmaking. Considerations regarding effectiveness can and should be made both before and after the enactment of a legal provision: while prospective evaluation (ex ante) examines the expected consequences of a legislative project, retrospective evaluation (ex post) analyzes the actual effects of the legal provision (for specific forms of retrospective and prospective evaluation: N. 35 and 36 ff.). Prospective evaluation is often carried out as part of the work on a draft decree. Ideally, the results can provide information on whether a planned decree should be pursued at all and facilitate the choice between different forms of government action, in particular legislation and legally non-binding forms of action (“soft law”) such as information or warnings. However, prospective evaluations can also serve as a basis for the design of a decree, for example when choosing between different regulatory options such as rules of conduct, licensing and reporting requirements, or criminal or liability provisions, or when implementing “differentiated regulation” that is as economically friendly as possible through instruments such as exemption clauses and options (“opting out” and “opting down”) and regulatory incentive structures for the voluntary adoption of regulations (“opting in” and “opting up”). Retrospective evaluation is aimed at revising and improving the legislation in question and effectively designing other future legislation. The two forms of evaluation are complementary to each other: The findings from the prospective evaluation, which serve as a basis for decisions on the enactment, must later be incorporated into the retrospective evaluation of the same enactment. Conceptually, in the sense of an evidence-based “better regulation” approach, (prospective and retrospective) evaluations are to be understood as an integral element of the legislative process and quality assurance in legislation. This is illustrated in legislative theory by the concept of the legislative cycle and in political science by the analogous concept of a “policy cycle.” However, this does not always correspond to reality. In practice, prospective evaluations in particular are often of low quality, and the influence of evaluations on the legislative process is generally rather limited.
C. Comparative law
13 International. Art. 170 is the world's first provision on effectiveness testing at the constitutional level. In 2008, policy evaluation (“évaluation des politiques publiques”) was enshrined in Art. 47 and 48 of the French Constitution. Switzerland and France remain special cases with their constitutional evaluation requirements. In Germany, however, there is a selective evaluation clause in the area of financial assistance. According to Art. 104b para. 2 GG, federal financial assistance to the states is to be granted for a limited period and reviewed at regular intervals with regard to its use.
14 Cantonal. The cantons have comparable provisions on effectiveness testing in their constitutions: e.g., Art. 27 para. 2 KV AR, § 16 KV BS, Art. 151 KV GE, Art. 78 KV GR, § 13 and 15 KV LU, Art. 30 SG Constitution, Art. 95 para. 2 and 3 ZH Constitution. These provisions typically define effectiveness testing as a task of the canton without specifically assigning the task to the legislature (exception: Art. 55 para. 3 SH Constitution). In the canton of Geneva, specialized authorities are responsible for effectiveness testing in the form of a court of auditors and an independent evaluation commission (Art. 128 para. 3 in conjunction with Art. 151 KV GE). Various cantons provide for (additional) effectiveness assessments specifically for the area of financial regulation: e.g., § 116 para. 3 KV AG, § 129 para. 3 KV BL, Art. 101 para. 4 KV BE, Art. 82 para. 2 KV FR, Art. 93 para. 1 KV GR, § 76 para. 1 KV LU, Art. 82 para. 2 KV SG, Art. 34 para. 3 KV TI, Art. 166 KV VD.
15 European. The EU treaties provide for effectiveness reviews in numerous areas. As a Schengen state, Switzerland is affected by the evaluations of the application of the Schengen acquis pursuant to Art. 70 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (so-called Schengen evaluations). Under this provision, the Member States, in cooperation with the Commission, must carry out an objective and impartial evaluation of the implementation of Union policies in the area of freedom, security, and justice. The basis for evaluations in other sectoral policies of the EU can be found, for example, in Article 85 TFEU (“evaluation of Eurojust's activities”) for activities of the Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation; in Article 156 TFEU (“periodic monitoring and evaluation”) for social policy; in Article 168 TFEU (“periodic monitoring and evaluation”) for health policy; in Article 173 (“periodic monitoring and evaluation”) for industrial policy; in Article 181 TFEU (“periodic monitoring and evaluation”) for research, technological development, and space. The Commission is also required to submit an evaluation report on the Union's finances to the European Parliament and the Council (Article 318 TFEU). Finally, the European Commission's Better Regulation Guidelines 2021 contain recommendations on the development and implementation of new regulations (including fitness checks), impact assessments, and monitoring. The idea of impact orientation also underlies the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) consistent effet utile case law, according to which the Court interprets Community law in such a way as to give it the greatest possible practical effect.
16 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Since the OECD Council Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance (2012), the OECD has regularly published best practice principles for regulatory impact assessments, with the particular aim of reducing regulatory costs for SMEs.
II. Commentary i.e.S.
A. Addressee (“The Federal Assembly...”)
17 Federal Assembly as addressee. The constitutional mandate is addressed to the Federal Assembly. This emphasizes the democratic dimension of the effectiveness review. The representatives of the people in Parliament bear the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that government measures serve the people and promote the common good. The organs of the Federal Assembly (Art. 31 ParlA) are tasked with ensuring that effectiveness assessments are carried out. To this end, they may instruct the Federal Council to carry out effectiveness assessments (including on the basis of statutory evaluation clauses: see N. 46), review assessments carried out by the Federal Council, or commission effectiveness assessments themselves, in particular with regard to their auxiliary bodies (Art. 27 ParlA). The parliamentary committees are responsible for effectiveness assessments in their areas of competence (Art. 44 para. 1 lit. e ParlA) and take the results of effectiveness assessments into account (Art. 44 para. 1 lit. f ParlA).
18 Evaluations by the Federal Council. Although Art. 170 of the FC is addressed to the Federal Assembly, the Federal Council also has the power to initiate effectiveness reviews at any time and without a specific legal basis. This follows from its constitutional powers: the Federal Council “proactively, independently, and continuously” manages the entire state (Art. 174 FC), plans and coordinates state activities (Art. 180 para. 1 FC), can submit draft legislation to the Federal Assembly on its own initiative (Art. 181 FC), issues ordinances and ensures the implementation of legislation (Art. 182 FC), takes measures to maintain internal and external security (Art. 184 and 185 FC), and supervises the federal administration and other bodies responsible for federal tasks (Art. 187 para. 1 lit. a FC). The Federal Council would hardly be able to perform these tasks effectively if it did not have the power to evaluate the effectiveness of government measures. This is particularly evident in the embedding of effectiveness testing in the government's legislative function (N. 12). The administrative units of the federal government subordinate to the Federal Council also have the authority to initiate effectiveness assessments in their respective areas of responsibility without an independent legal basis. In practice, the Federal Council and the federal administration play a much more active role than Parliament and its committees.
19 Auxiliary bodies. The Swiss Federal Audit Office (EFK) and the Parliamentary Control Committee (PVK) are permanent auxiliary bodies that help to ensure effectiveness testing. In its audits, the EFK focuses on the aspect of economic efficiency and clarifies whether (a) funds are being used sparingly, (b) costs and benefits are in a favorable ratio, and (c) financial expenditures are having the expected effect (Art. 5 para. 2 Financial Control Act [FKG, SR 614.0]). The Parliamentary Administrative Control (PAC) carries out evaluations on behalf of the Audit Commissions within the framework of parliamentary supervision and draws the Audit Commission's attention to issues that require clarification (Art. 10 para. 1 lit. a Parliamentary Administration Ordinance [ParlVV, SR 171.115]). It also reviews the evaluations carried out by the Federal Administration and their use in decision-making processes (Art. 10 para. 1 lit. b ParlVV). On behalf of the relevant parliamentary committee, the PVK may carry out evaluations within its area of responsibility and review evaluations carried out by the Federal Administration and their use in decision-making processes, provided that the Business Audit Commissions agree (Art. 10 para. 2 ParlVV).
20 Use of experts. Federal bodies regularly commission external bodies such as private firms or university institutes to carry out evaluations. This has the particular advantage that external experts have a high level of methodological expertise and greater independence, which gives the evaluation increased credibility. An external evaluation is particularly appropriate when the issue is politicized and there is a risk that the office concerned may not be entirely impartial in its evaluation. In contrast, internal evaluations can usually be carried out more quickly and with less effort. In addition, internal administrative staff typically have more expertise and experience in relation to the subject matter being evaluated. If an administrative unit decides to conduct an external evaluation, it is crucial that a contractor without any conflicts of interest is selected and that the client does not unduly influence the outcome of the evaluation when communicating the assignment, supporting the evaluation process, and making any requests for additions or improvements. To this end, it is crucial that the commissioning office formulates the questions for the contractor precisely and at the same time in an open-ended manner in the specifications. Careful preparation, supervision, and follow-up of the evaluation are also central to external commissioning.
B. Mandate (“...ensures that ...”)
21 Warranty mandate and delegation. The wording of the Constitution (“ensures that”) expresses that although the Federal Assembly is responsible for ensuring that the effectiveness of federal measures is reviewed, it does not have to carry out the reviews itself, but can delegate them. The Federal Assembly may assign a task to the Federal Council (Art. 27 lit. a ParlA), review effectiveness assessments carried out on behalf of the Federal Council (Art. 27 lit. b ParlA) or commission effectiveness reviews itself (Art. 27 lit. c ParlA). In addition, the Federal Assembly regularly fulfills its guarantee mandate by enacting evaluation clauses (see N. 46), which oblige the Federal Council under special law to carry out effectiveness reviews. Evaluation clauses may also be used in the context of temporary experimental legislation (so-called “sunset legislation”) (N. 39) . Furthermore, the Federal Assembly has obliged the Federal Council to explain, among other things, the planned implementation and evaluation of the decree, the cost-benefit ratio, and the effects on the economy, society, the environment, and future generations in messages on draft decrees (Art. 141 para. 2 lit. d, f, and g ParlA). Finally, the Federal Assembly uses political initiatives such as postulates to request evaluation reports from the Federal Council.
22 Justiciability. As a norm of competence, the guarantee mandate is legally binding on the Federal Assembly. However, the norm is not justiciable. Consequently, individuals cannot derive any direct subjective claim to the performance of effectiveness reviews from Art. 170. The Federal Assembly therefore has considerable discretion in deciding whether, when, and for what purpose a measure should be reviewed for effectiveness. In its judgment 1C_104/2017, the Federal Supreme Court did not address the complainant's allegation that the effectiveness of the Walchwil double track approved by the FOT for SBB had not been reviewed in accordance with Art. 170 of the FC due to the late complaint. It thus left the question open and did not comment on the complaint regarding the lack of effectiveness of the double track. However, legal doctrine unanimously rejects the claim to demand effectiveness reviews, citing a lack of justiciability (N. 51). Such an individual claim would not be practicable, particularly in view of economic considerations. Whether the lack or inadequate implementation of effectiveness reviews could have direct legal consequences, for example in the specific review of a Federal Council ordinance, has not been conclusively clarified (see N. 47 ff. on the question of a constitutional principle of effectiveness).
C. Subject matter (“...the measures of the Confederation...”)
23 All government action. The subject matter of effectiveness reviews is the measures taken by the Confederation. These may be general measures or measures taken in individual cases. The legal form of government action is irrelevant in this context. The wording implies that measures taken by all branches of government are covered (“of the Confederation”/“par la Confédération”/“della Confederazione”). The constitutional mandate to review effectiveness includes legislation (including the enactment of constitutions and the conclusion of international treaties), but is not limited to this. The term “measures taken by the Confederation” covers all government action by the Confederation.
24 Case law and measures taken by other independent bodies. This also includes all measures taken by the judiciary, including case law, and the activities of other federal bodies that are guaranteed legal independence (e.g., Swiss National Bank (SNB), Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC), Supervisory Authority for the Office of the Attorney General (AB-BA)). However, it must be ensured that impact assessments do not impair the independence of the judiciary or other bodies. The substantive review of court decisions is excluded (Art. 26 para. 4 ParlA).
25 Own actions of the Federal Assembly. With regard to the object of evaluation, it is clear that Art. 170 of the FC goes beyond Art. 169 of the FC: the Federal Assembly should not only evaluate the other powers, but also its own measures. Art. 170 of the FC therefore obliges Parliament not only to evaluate others, but also to evaluate itself.
26 Implementation by cantons and private entities. The implementation and enforcement of federal measures by cantons and private entities also falls within the scope of effectiveness reviews pursuant to Art. 170 FC. However, measures taken by cantons and private entities are only subject to effectiveness reviews pursuant to Art. 170 FC insofar as they can be classified as the enforcement or implementation of federal measures. Measures that enforce cantonal law are excluded. Cantonal law regularly provides for effectiveness reviews for such measures (see N. 14).
27 Failure to act. Failure to act, i.e., the absence of measures, may also be subject to an effectiveness review. This applies in particular to the failure to take mitigating measures (so-called accompanying measures) for particularly affected or vulnerable groups of people, for example in the case of crisis management. The wording of the FC therefore defines the subject matter (“measures taken by the Confederation”) too narrowly. It encompasses any behavior or inaction that can be attributed to the Confederation. Breaches of duty can have just as serious consequences as actions, given their impact. However, evaluating omissions is challenging because it is (even) more difficult to estimate what effect a hypothetical measure would have had than to measure the (causal) effects of a measure that was actually taken. In this respect, there is a certain similarity to prospective evaluation in terms of the uncertainty of the expected effects.
28 Measures without measurable effects. Art. 170 should not be understood to mean that every government action must have a specific, measurable effect. Measures that do not intend to have a measurable effect are also constitutionally permissible (and, in some cases, required by law). These include measures of a symbolic nature, whose effect is primarily emotional. Recognized examples of symbolic legislation include programmatic declarations in the Constitution, legal recognition of historical injustices, or measures that have intrinsic value regardless of their effect. As an example, under the Federal Act on the Reappraisal of Compulsory Social Measures and Placements before 1981 (AFZFG, SR 211.223.13), the federal government recognizes “that injustice was done to the victims, which had an impact on their entire lives” (Art. 3 AFZFG). In addition, victims are entitled to a solidarity contribution, which is “a sign of recognition of the injustice inflicted” and is intended to “contribute to redress” (Art. 4 para. 1 AFZFG). It is necessary to determine, through interpretation, whether the objectives of a measure are measurable according to its ratio and whether its effects can be evaluated methodically or not.
D. Standard (“...on their effectiveness...”)
29 Effectiveness as a standard. The German version of the FC refers to the “effectiveness” of the measure as an evaluation standard. In the French and Italian versions, the FC refers to ‘efficacité’ and “efficacia” respectively. The term is to be understood broadly, because the standard for effectiveness assessments varies depending on the context, as will be shown below. The history of the term's development also points to a broad understanding of the term.
30 Subcriteria. The benchmark for effectiveness assessments is not uniformly defined in the implementing legislation (see, for example, Art. 26 para. 3 lit. d and e ParlA; Art. 5 para. 2 FKG; Art. 58 para. 3 FHG; Art. 5 and Art. 36 para. 3 GAOA). In practice, the relevant evaluation criterion often results from a special legal evaluation clause (see N. 46) and is therefore context-dependent. The variety of assessment criteria used in practice can be grouped into three sub-criteria, all of which fall under the constitutional concept of “effectiveness”:
a. Implementation status (or effectiveness): The extent and manner of implementation of a measure are examined. The criterion refers to the extent to which a measure is actually implemented, a legal rule or recommendation is followed, or a service is used, for example by comparing the implementation status in the cantons or through surveys.
b. Degree of target achievement (or effectiveness in the narrower sense): This criterion refers to the extent to which the regulatory objective to be achieved through the implementation of the measure is actually achieved. The intended effect must be determined in each individual case, in particular by interpreting the relevant legal basis and overarching purposes and constitutional objectives. For example, the provision of a service is not usually an end in itself, but pursues a specific goal, such as improving the quality of life of the people who use the service. The aim is to compare the intended effect of a measure with the actual effect in order to assess the appropriateness of the measure. In addition to the intended main effects of a measure, any (undesirable) side effects must also be taken into account. The degree to which the objective has been achieved is at the heart of evaluations.
c. Economic efficiency (or efficiency): This criterion refers to the regulatory costs of the measure and their relationship to the effect achieved (cost-benefit analysis). In addition to direct and indirect financial costs, regulatory costs also include lost profits and lost benefits (known as opportunity costs) as well as costs to society as a whole. Regulatory costs can arise for different actors (e.g., companies) and can be one-time or recurring.
31 Context dependency. What these criteria have in common is that effectiveness should be based on a regulatory objective to be determined by interpretation. Which test criteria an evaluation uses as a benchmark and how they are weighted depends on the context. For example, cost considerations are likely to play a more important role in a policy area with a stronger economic and financial focus than in policy areas with a stronger ideological focus (although financial aspects can also be central here, for example in the case of fundamental rights that confer entitlement to benefits). Not all public tasks have the same priority in terms of economic fulfillment. Basic services (service public) must be available to all persons in a comparable manner (cf. Art. 43a para. 4 of the FC). The fulfillment of public tasks in line with needs is decisive here, which means that economic efficiency or efficiency cannot be used as the sole criterion in this area.
E. Scope (“...be reviewed.”)
1. Methods and instruments
32 Review authority. The mandate grants the Federal Assembly review and investigation powers without conferring additional decision-making powers or rights to information. The FC does not specify the methods and instruments to be used to carry out effectiveness reviews. Nor does it comment on the frequency (regular or only in special cases), the level of aggregation (policies, laws, programs, projects), or the depth of the review (summary or detailed). Impact reviews can be conducted before the measure (ex ante), after the measure (ex post), or alongside the measure. The timing of the evaluation determines its objectives and influences the methods and instruments to be used.
33 Methods. Evaluation research essentially uses traditional social science methods of data collection and analysis. Document analysis, interviews, surveys, and analysis of existing or newly collected quantitative data are among the most common research techniques. Controlled experiments are methodologically attractive but demanding: a randomly selected group of people is exposed to the measure and compared with a control group that is not exposed to the measure in order to assess its effects. Examples include a group of people with and without flu vaccinations, restaurants with and without night or Sunday work, or companies with and without incentive taxes. Depending on the research design, analyzing variations in measures in different countries or regions can also provide insights into causal relationships. However, the findings from international or intercantonal studies cannot be readily transferred to federal measures.
34 Instruments. The primary instrument for testing effectiveness is the implementation of a method-based investigation, not unlike a scientific study (see also N. 11 on evaluation research). Depending on the context, other instruments may also be used. Observation, control, and investigation instruments can be used in particular to gather information: Monitoring is an observation instrument for continuously collecting data. It allows the implementation status and implementation difficulties to be identified. Reporting obligations on implementation and statistics are important cornerstones. Policy field observation is a specific form of monitoring. Controlling is a control instrument that management uses to accompany, control, and further develop projects. It allows the implementation of measures to be monitored. An audit, on the other hand, is an investigative tool used in quality management to improve organizational structures and processes. It focuses on the internal organization and processes (internal relationships) that are decisive for the impact of the measure on third parties (external relationships).
2. Timing
35 Retrospective evaluation (ex post). Retrospective evaluation focuses in particular on the implementation status, the degree to which objectives have been achieved, and the cost-effectiveness (N. 30) of a measure that has already been implemented. It can be divided into the following phases: Ideally, a concept for effectiveness testing is first developed in collaboration with the agencies responsible for implementation and enforcement. The concept includes considerations regarding the impact model of the measure or decree, the affected parties and their involvement (consultation of interest groups), the information tools to be used (monitoring and controlling), as well as the target audience (e.g., Federal Assembly) and the objective of the effectiveness assessment (e.g., steering implementation). Data collection and controlling are then ensured during the implementation of the measure before the evaluation is carried out or commissioned, so that the controlling and evaluation data can ultimately be used.
36 Prospective evaluation (ex ante). Art. 170 also covers the prospective prediction of the effectiveness of a measure, even though the French version refers to “mesures prises.” The purpose of prospective evaluations is to create a descriptive, fact-based basis for decision-making in order to inform the decision on the measure to be taken. To this end, the various consequences of a measure are compared with each other so that, in addition to deciding on the measure itself, the political decision-maker can also determine any measures to offset the consequences and thus distribute the costs and benefits of the regulation as fairly as possible. Prospective evaluation is therefore closely related to the state function of lawmaking and is often carried out as part of the work on a draft decree (N. 12). According to Art. 141 para. 2 ParlA, the Federal Council is obliged to include information on the effects on the economy, society, the environment, and future generations (letter g) or gender equality (letter i) in its messages to Parliament on draft legislation. This requires the implementation of prospective evaluations. The basis for a prospective evaluation is the creation of an impact model that conceptualizes the presumed effects of a measure by analyzing, for example, the administrative bodies responsible for implementation, the directly addressed addressees of the standard, other affected groups, and the side effects and costs for the federal government and the economy associated with the regulation. Naturally, evaluating measures that are still in the future involves considerable uncertainty and methodological challenges.
37 Regulatory impact assessment (RIA). RIA is a prospective evaluation tool that focuses specifically on compliance costs, the need for regulation, and the economic impact on individual groups and the economy as a whole. In addition to their primary intended effect (e.g., product safety and protection of public health), regulations often have secondary consequences (e.g., production delays, trade barriers, regulatory costs for obtaining permits and training employees, etc.) that can restrict the economic activity of companies. An RIA is intended to measure these side effects and weigh them against the intended effects. The Business Relief Act of September 29, 2023 formally enshrines aspects of the RIA that were previously regulated in an RIA guideline, as well as new review obligations. Among other things, the Act lays down principles and review obligations for lawmaking (Articles 1 and 4 UEG), namely obligations to estimate the regulatory costs and economic efficiency of a decree, both during its drafting and in the context of regular reviews (Articles 3 and 5 UEG).
38 Other instruments of prospective evaluation. In addition to RFA, there are other instruments of prospective evaluation that have specific content and methodological focuses. Human rights impact assessments are becoming increasingly important for analyzing the effects of government measures on human rights. Against the backdrop of uncertain causal chains and new technologies, they can help to ensure compliance with human rights due diligence and protection obligations. The Federal Council is obliged to address the impact on fundamental rights in its messages on legislation (Art. 141 para. 2 lit. a ParlA). Specific forms of human rights impact assessments are data protection impact assessments and gender equality impact assessments. Another form of prospective evaluation is the environmental impact assessment. According to Art. 10a of the Environmental Protection Act (EPA), before deciding on the planning, construction, or modification of facilities, an authority must assess their environmental compatibility at the earliest possible stage. Anyone wishing to construct or modify a facility must submit an environmental impact report to the authority, which forms the basis for the authority's environmental impact assessment. In future, greater attention could be paid to crisis compatibility assessments. Government measures and regulations are regularly based on normal situations; however, the recent past has been marked by experiences of crisis. Notable examples include the UBS recapitalization in 2008, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Axpo bailout in 2022, and the CS emergency merger in 2023. In these cases, the Federal Council resorted to constitutional emergency powers under Art. 184 para. 3 and Art. 185 para. 3 of the FC to overcome the crisis. Against this background, government measures should also be assessed for their crisis resilience.
39 Accompanying evaluation. Accompanying evaluations take place during the drafting or implementation phase. Examples of such test regulations are pilot projects and regulatory sandboxes. Trial regulations are temporary decrees that are linked to an evaluation clause. Based on a sufficient legal basis, they allow for a temporary deviation from the legal framework in order to test the regulation in question through impact assessments and optimize it if necessary. Such pilot projects thus provide a suitable information basis for the subsequent, definitive legislative solution, for example in the regulation of new technologies. Closely related to the experimental regulation is the idea of regulatory sandboxes, which can be used, for example, to facilitate market entry for start-ups and SMEs and to remove regulatory barriers to innovation. However, the promotion of innovation must not lead to unjustified unequal treatment and abusive distortion of competition.
3. Relationship to supreme supervision
40 Effectiveness reviews pursuant to Art. 170 of the FC constitute a form of supreme supervision pursuant to Art. 169 of the FC. This follows from the systematics (see N. 2) and legislative history (see N. 3) of the FC and from the ParlA (see N. 17). With regard to the standard by which the Federal Assembly is to exercise supervision, the mandates under Art. 169 and 170 of the FC overlap, with supreme supervision involving a greater variety of control standards. Art. 26 para. 3 of the ParlA cites legality, regularity, appropriateness, effectiveness, and economic efficiency as standards of supreme supervision. In this respect, the Federal Assembly is also obliged under Art. 169 of the FC to ensure that the effectiveness of federal measures is assessed. However, Art. 170 of the FC places particular emphasis on the specific standard of effectiveness. With regard to the subject matter to be supervised by the Federal Assembly, the mandate under Art. 170 of the FC goes further than supreme supervision. While supreme supervision is limited to the management of the Federal Council and the Federal Administration, the federal courts, the supervisory authority over the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Attorney General, and other bodies performing federal tasks (cf. Art. 26 para. 1 ParlA), the effectiveness review potentially covers all federal measures (cf. Art. 27 para. 1 ParlA). This also includes measures taken by Parliament itself, measures taken by the people or by the people and the cantons, and measures taken by the cantons that are financed by the federal government (see N. 23 ff.).
III. Implementation
A. Forms of evaluation
41 Diversity. Effectiveness reviews can take various forms, depending on who carries out the evaluation (Federal Assembly, Federal Council, external parties), when it is carried out (prospective, retrospective, ongoing), which methods and instruments are used (monitoring, controlling, auditing, etc.), how detailed it is (summary or detailed), and what its primary purpose is (accountability, knowledge gain, optimization, strategy).
42 Complexity. The added value of evaluations is undisputed; however, they are methodologically complex. (“L'évaluation, une nécessité évidente mais lourde”). For evaluations to add value, they need to have clear objectives. The more precisely the objective of the measure and the objective of the evaluation are defined, the more concrete and useful the evaluation can be. With clear objectives, evaluations can successfully complete a policy cycle and provide the impetus for a new cycle (see N. 12). In this way, they contribute to a continuous optimization process.
43 Effort. Conducting evaluations involves a considerable amount of personnel, financial, and time resources. The necessary personnel and financial resources depend in particular on whether an evaluation is carried out by the state itself or commissioned externally. While implementation analyses can usually be carried out within a period of six months and with a budget of around CHF 60,000, impact analyses generally cost at least CHF 100,000 and take at least a year. In the case of cost-effectiveness analyses, the costs and time required vary greatly depending on whether only an analysis of the optimization potential (approx. CHF 30,000 within 3–6 months) or a detailed comparison of the costs and benefits (more than CHF 100,000, more than one year) is desired.
44 Network Evaluation in the Federal Administration. Various organizational units within the Federal Administration are involved in evaluations. Since 1995, the Network Evaluation in the Federal Administration has served as a forum for the exchange of experience and information among evaluators, clients, and users in the Federal Administration. More than 110 employees from all departments, the Parliamentary Control Committee, and the Swiss Audit Office take part in the meetings, which are held twice a year.
B. Evaluation standards
45 The Swiss Evaluation Society (SEVAL), a private association, publishes SEVAL standards, which are aimed at evaluators and their clients. They are intended to provide assistance in the planning and implementation of evaluations, the awarding of contracts (in particular tenders and evaluation agreements), and the accompanying assurance or subsequent assessment of the quality of evaluations. The SEVAL standards specify criteria for assessing the quality of evaluations, general basic principles, standards for the planning, implementation, and evaluation of evaluations, and standards for communicating results. In addition to ethical principles, they also contain practical recommendations for the various evaluation phases that can be applied regardless of the institutional context, approach, or subject area.
C. Evaluation clauses
46 Evaluation clauses are legal norms that oblige the addressee to review the impact of a particular law or specific measures. The Federal Assembly regularly fulfills its constitutional mandate to review effectiveness by enacting such special legal evaluation clauses. There are different types of evaluation clauses. Even without an evaluation clause, the Federal Council and the Federal Administration are authorized and required to carry out evaluations when necessary (N. 18). However, evaluation clauses enable the legislature to oblige the Federal Council, for example, to carry out evaluations at a specific time or at specific intervals, to provide for an independent, external implementing body and specific methods, subjects of investigation or evaluation criteria, or to regulate the consequences to be drawn from specific evaluation results.
IV. Effectiveness as a constitutional principle?
47 Definition. There is controversy in legal doctrine as to whether the FC contains a constitutional principle that requires the effectiveness of state measures. “Constitutional principles” (also: “constitutional foundations”) without their own legal source character are constitutional contents that are not expressly designated as such in the text of the Constitution, but can be derived interpretatively from several constitutional norms as the guiding principles underlying the FC. In this respect, they are similar to the “structural principles” or “fundamental decisions determining structure” of the FC, but do not need to run through the entire FC and may therefore be less abstract.
48 Derived from Art. 170 FC. According to Flückiger and Mastronardi, a constitutional principle of effectiveness can be derived from Art. 170 FC: According to Flückiger, the provision implicitly contains a “principe d'efficacité” which obliges the addressees to review state measures using the evaluation method; however, the resulting findings are recommendations and not legally enforceable. According to Mastronardi, the mandate to review effectiveness only makes sense if output legitimacy is a goal recognized by the Federal Constitution. Uhlmann/Bussmann take the opposite view. They argue, among other things, that Art. 170 FC is not justiciable. Furthermore, from a systematic point of view, it is not convincing to derive a principle of such general scope from a competence norm. Finally, a constitutional principle that is limited to federal measures makes little sense. In our opinion, the negative doctrine should be agreed with, according to which the competence norm of Art. 170 FC alone does not give rise to a constitutional principle of the effectiveness of state measures.
49 Derivation from related provisions. In addition to Art. 170 FC, a constitutional principle of effectiveness could also be based on systematically related provisions. For example, Lienhard/Mächler/Zielniewicz argue that effectiveness and efficiency have become “actual constitutional principles” that are given concrete form in financial and organizational law (Art. 12 para. 4 FHG and Art. 5 para. 2 lit. c FKG). Several provisions of the FC are indeed based (at least in part) on the requirement that government measures must be effective. Uhlmann/Bussmann and Flückiger cite the principle of public interest and the principle of proportionality (Art. 5 para. 2 FC), equality before the law (Art. 8 FC) and the prohibition of arbitrariness (Art. 9 FC), the realization of fundamental rights (Art. 35 para. 1 and 3 FC), the requirement that state tasks be performed in a needs-based and economical manner (Art. 43a para. 5, Art. 126 para. 1, Art. 178 para. 1 of the FC) and the competence to apply the law. In our opinion, the principle of legality (Art. 5 para. 1 of the FC) should also be mentioned. Insofar as the principle of legality requires the substantive realization of the law, it necessarily also includes a requirement for the substantive effectiveness of the law. The question arises as to whether a constitutional principle of effectiveness can be derived from an overall view of these systematically related provisions.
50 Independent content in relation to other constitutional principles. In our opinion, the aforementioned provisions, which are systematically related to the requirement of effectiveness, clearly reflect the common guiding principle that state measures should, in principle, be as effective as possible: once the substantive scope of protection of a fundamental right has been established, there is a justiciable claim that restrictive state measures must be appropriate and necessary for the realization of a public interest. The principle of equality before the law, the prohibition of arbitrariness, and the requirement that state tasks be performed in accordance with needs also contain postulates related to the effectiveness of state measures in all areas of state task performance. Together with Art. 170 of the FC, these provisions contribute to a “culture of justification” of legislation based on considerations of effectiveness. However, it is not yet clear what specific constitutional content a constitutional principle of the effectiveness of state measures would have. If ineffective state measures always prove to be disproportionate or non-compliant with the principle of legality or equality before the law, for example, the normative added value of an independent constitutional principle of effectiveness, whose constitutional content does not go beyond the content of other constitutional principles, would be low and dispensable. This raises the question of what specific constitutional consequences an unwritten constitutional principle of the effectiveness of state measures could have. It is conceivable, for example, that such a constitutional principle could confer a justiciable right to have effectiveness reviews carried out, that it could justify the unconstitutionality of certain state measures, or that it could at least be taken into account in the interpretation of the constitution.
51 Justiciable right to an effectiveness review. Art. 170 of the FC does not confer an enforceable right on individuals to demand an effectiveness review in a specific case (on this question, see N. 22). If the text of the Constitution does not confer an enforceable right to have effectiveness reviews carried out, it is hardly conceivable that such a right could arise from an interpretatively derived, relatively abstract constitutional principle that has not yet been recognized in practice or by prevailing doctrine. However, other provisions and principles of the FC are also not justiciable, or at least not in every constellation, and are implemented through channels other than judicial review, but nevertheless claim validity as part of substantive constitutional law.
52 Unconstitutionality of ineffective measures. If there is a constitutional principle of the effectiveness of state measures, the question arises as to whether ineffective state measures must be considered unconstitutional. Uhlmann/Bussmann discuss the question on the basis of a recent landmark decision by the Federal Supreme Court (BGE 147 I 16) concerning a fee. In this case, the Federal Supreme Court upheld the legality of a connection fee, the effectiveness of which was in doubt, on the grounds that the legislature had only introduced the regulation on a trial basis and had made it subject to an evaluation requirement. Uhlmann/Bussmann therefore conclude that a legal norm is also provisionally proportionate and thus constitutional even if its effectiveness is doubtful, at least as long as it is subject to an evaluation requirement. So far, no cases can be identified in which a measure that had proven ineffective in an effectiveness test has been classified as unconstitutional by a law enforcement authority solely for this reason and therefore not applied or at least criticized from a constitutional point of view (without there having been, for example, a violation of fundamental rights due to non-compliance with the principle of proportionality). This cannot be solely due to the fact that federal laws must be applied even if they are unconstitutional (Art. 190 FC). This is because even federal laws are not exempt from review by the Federal Supreme Court, whereas the Federal Supreme Court could sanction any unconstitutionality due to a violation of the principle of effectiveness in the case of federal ordinances and cantonal implementing decrees. If even ineffective measures are constitutional, a constitutional principle of the effectiveness of state measures could still be given the meaning that it contains a procedural requirement for the legislative process, according to which a legal basis is only constitutional if its effectiveness (depending on the context, ex ante, ex post, and/or accompanying) is reviewed to an appropriate extent. In fact, in its recent decision in KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and others v. Switzerland (53600/20 of April 9, 2024), the ECtHR derived from Article 8 of the ECHR an actual quality standard for legislative quality in the area of climate protection, particularly with regard to the quantitative data bases as a rational basis for Swiss climate policy. However, this is not a requirement arising from a fundamental right or other norm of the FC. On the contrary, Swiss courts have so far been very reluctant to derive requirements from the Constitution with regard to the effectiveness tests (and other quality assurance measures) required in the legislative process, which could call into question the constitutionality of a decree if they are not complied with.
53 Effectiveness orientation as a method of interpretation. The guiding principle that government measures should be as effective as possible could be put to good use in legal methodology. An effectiveness-oriented element of interpretation would consist of interpreting a norm in such a way that it achieves the greatest possible effectiveness. This element of interpretation would be closely related to the teleological element. While the teleological method established in Swiss law is primarily directed inward, toward the ratio legis underlying the norm, effectiveness orientation would mean opening up the method to the external effects of the norm. In international and European law, the effet utile principle (efficiency requirement) establishes a corresponding requirement, according to which a norm must be interpreted and applied in such a way that its objective is achieved in the best and simplest way possible. Such an element of interpretation would also be related to the economic theory of law established in the US methodological discourse, according to which legal norms must be interpreted in such a way that the greatest possible efficiency in the economic sense is achieved. In Swiss methodology, an element of interpretation of maximum effectiveness has not yet been established. Nevertheless, in BGE 140 II 384, the Federal Supreme Court referred to the “constitutional concern for the effectiveness of substantive law” and referred to Art. 170 of the FC in order to prevent the protection of the parties to the proceedings from becoming absolute in connection with the procedural guarantees under Art. 6 of the ECHR. In doing so, it brought the two concerns of protecting the parties to the proceedings (procedural guarantees under Art. 29 of the FC) and the effectiveness of substantive law (effectiveness reviews under Art. 170 of the FC) into practical concordance. However, it is not yet clear from previous case law whether the concern for the effectiveness of state measures has an independent significance in the interpretation of the constitution, or whether, like other public interests, it is taken into account in the weighing of interests or, like other constitutional provisions, in the establishment of practical concordance, and is thus absorbed by established methodological figures, in particular proportionality, public interest, and ratio legis. An impact-oriented element of interpretation could, for example, serve as a “gateway” for empirical findings from evaluations and the social sciences into legal methodology when concretizing open constitutional provisions. However, many methodological questions remain unresolved, for example with regard to the relationship between an impact-oriented and a teleological element of interpretation, with the result that a constitutional principle of the effectiveness of state measures has so far had little concrete legal impact in the context of interpretation.
54 Limits of output legitimacy. The above considerations show that the assessment of the effectiveness of measures and decrees in Switzerland is primarily left to political discretion. For several reasons, this is to a certain extent inherent in the system. On the one hand, evaluations are rarely able to provide reliable findings on complex social chains of effects. Even in social science disciplines, which in recent decades have prioritized methodological advances in measuring causal relationships, such research results are usually subject to considerable uncertainty. In practice, evaluations often do not correspond to the ideal type of a comprehensive ex post evaluation with scientific quality standards, but are limited in their questions and methods to process-oriented implementation analyses. Even if evaluations could measure the effects of government measures with absolute certainty, deriving political consequences would still require political judgment. Assuming that an evaluation could reliably show that a government measure, excluding other factors, has reduced unemployment by 0.5%, the result would not answer the normative question of whether the effect justifies the costs (financial and otherwise) associated with the measure. The Constitution establishes a procedure that transfers the authority to answer such evaluative questions to certain constitutional bodies, in particular the Federal Assembly. These bodies are also free to take purely symbolic measures that are unsuitable from the outset for achieving a measurable effect (N. 28). As a result of the democratic “input procedure,” which involves the political assessment of evaluation results, the “output legitimacy” of state action is limited. “Output legitimacy” must not relativize or even undermine the guarantees of the rule of law and democracy. The latter themselves form a benchmark for the achievement of objectives and require the realization of the democratic constitutional state.
55 Conclusion. Art. 170 of the FC and several systematically related provisions share the guiding principle that state measures should be as effective as possible (N. 49). The question of whether it is justified to interpret this common concern of various constitutional provisions as an independent constitutional principle of the effectiveness of state measures should, in our opinion, be decided primarily with a view to the specific constitutional consequences of this constitutional principle (N. 50). It is undisputed that the constitutional principle does not confer a justiciable right to have effectiveness reviews carried out (N. 51). Nor are there any known cases to date in which a law enforcement authority has classified a measure as unconstitutional solely on the grounds that it had no effect or that its effectiveness had not been sufficiently reviewed (N. 52). It is conceivable that the trend toward effectiveness-oriented law could find its way into legal methodology, in the sense of interpreting norms with a view to maximizing their effectiveness. One development in this direction is the incorporation of the efffet utile principle of European and international law into Federal Supreme Court case law. The recognition of effectiveness as an independent element of interpretation has not yet been achieved, but could possibly contribute to a fair, realistic, and legitimizing application of the law (N. 53). Ultimately, the assessment of the effectiveness of measures and decrees in Switzerland remains primarily a matter of political discretion. Otherwise, the principle of effectiveness would take precedence over the constitutional and democratic “input legitimacy” of state action (N. 54). It would be conceivable to describe effectiveness as a purely programmatic constitutional principle, similar to narrative declarations or appeals in the constitution. Other elements of the FC referred to in the literature as “constitutional principles” also exhibit a high degree of normativity. Given these developments, the practical effectiveness of substantive law as a whole can be understood as an emerging constitutional principle.
About the authors
Carl Jauslin, MLaw, BA, is an LL.M. candidate at the College of Europe in Bruges and a doctoral student at the Faculty of Law of the University of Basel, as well as a former lawyer in the Legislative Projects I department at the Federal Office of Justice in Bern.
Dr. sc. Gabriel Gertsch is the delegate for the Switzerland-EU treaty package at the Federal Office of Justice and deputy head of the Legislation Support I department, lecturer in federal constitutional law at the University of St. Gallen, and associate researcher at the Center for Law & Economics at ETH Zurich.
The views expressed here reflect the personal opinions of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to those of the Federal Office of Justice. The authors would like to thank Bertrand Bise, Kaspar Ehrenzeller, Simone Füzesséry, and Jeanne Ramseyer for their valuable comments. Carl Jauslin would also like to thank Johanna Jean-Petit-Matile and Lukas Gysin for their stimulating discussions on this topic (normative – a legal think tank).
Recommended further reading
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Müller Georg/Uhlmann Felix/Höfler Stefan, Elemente einer Rechtssetzungslehre, 4. Aufl., Zürich/Genf 2024.
Sager Fritz/Widmer Thomas/Balthasar Andreas (Hrsg)., Evaluation im politischen System der Schweiz: Entwicklung, Bedeutung und Wechselwirkungen, Zürich 2017.
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Materials
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