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- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. Overview of the purpose of the norm
- II. Jurisdiction
- III. Procedure
- IV. Disputed applicability of the VwVG to the procedure
- Materials
- Bibliography
I. Overview of the purpose of the norm
1 Art. 58 KG is the jurisdictional norm for action by Swiss authorities in the case of competition violations originating in Switzerland and whose incompatibility with an international agreement is asserted by a contracting party. The provision specifies the authorities that are competent to deal with such matters and the procedure to be followed in this regard.
II. Jurisdiction
2 In contrast to the ordinary procedure under the Cartel Act, Art. 58 of the Cartel Act does not designate the Competition Commission as competent to determine the facts, but the Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER). The reason for this division of competences is that the EAER negotiates and concludes international agreements - such as the Free Trade Agreement - and is thus closer to the contracting parties. This division of competences makes sense, particularly in view of the diplomatic purpose of Chapter 6 of the KG.
3 As a rule, the EAER is represented by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). Pursuant to Art. 58 para. 1 KG, the EAER may instruct the Secretariat of the Competition Commission to conduct a preliminary investigation. This is intended to guarantee the transfer of knowledge from the competition authority when clarifying the facts. However, the Competition Commission itself is not involved in the proceedings. In contrast to the ordinary competition proceedings pursuant to Art. 23 of the Competition Act, the Secretariat is therefore not subordinate to the Competition Commission, but to the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, and only becomes active at the latter's request. In addition, the EAER can only instruct the Secretariat to carry out a preliminary investigation, but not an investigation as under Art. 27 of the Competition Act. The Secretariat cannot therefore open an investigation as it can under Art. 27 KG.
III. Procedure
4 Art. 58 KG can be divided into the following procedural steps:
A. Initiation
5 The procedure in the sense of Chapter 6 is not initiated by the EAER on its own initiative, but the competition violation must be asserted by a party to an international agreement. In other words, the EAER only becomes active when one of the contracting parties to the agreement complains of an incompatible restriction of competition. If there is an official complaint, i.e. if the contracting party to the international agreement claims a restriction of competition that is incompatible with the international agreement, it is at the discretion of the EAER to decide whether it wishes to initiate a preliminary investigation at all. This discretion is available to the EAER, as Art. 58 para. 1 of the Act on the Protection of Competition is an "optional provision". However, if the allegations made by the foreign party are not completely unfounded, the EAER would normally instruct the Secretariat of the Competition Commission to conduct a preliminary investigation. In general, however, it is open to the authority to also resolve the disagreement through diplomatic negotiations. In this respect, the EAER has considerable room for manoeuvre.
B. Preliminary clarifications and submission of applications
6 If the Department has decided within its discretion to initiate a preliminary clarification, it may instruct the Secretariat to determine the facts of the case. The purpose of the preliminary clarifications is to brief the representatives of the competent bodies appointed by the international agreement on the factual situation in Switzerland. Specifically, they serve to provide the Swiss representatives in the competent body with a basis for decision-making on how to proceed.
7 Once the preliminary clarifications have been completed, the Secretariat submits a request to the EAER to decide on the further course of action (Art. 58 para. 2 KG). This request does not require a legal assessment of the admissibility of the competitive conduct with the international agreement; rather, this legal assessment is within the competence of the bodies named in the agreement. The reason for this is that the compatibility of the conduct with the competition provisions of the international agreement is not being examined.
C. Enactment of measures
8 Finally, the Department decides, taking into account the Secretariat's clarification of the facts, which measures are to be taken to remedy the offending practices and to avoid possible retaliatory measures. In general, it is open to the EAER either to remedy the conflict situation by informal means or to apply the measures listed in Art. 59 KG.
IV. Disputed applicability of the VwVG to the procedure
9 It has not been conclusively clarified whether the procedural provisions of the VwVG are applicable to the preliminary clarification procedure of the Secretariat and the hearing of the parties by the EAER.
10 Part of the doctrine is in favour of the application of the VwVG, subject to Art. 39 KG. This approach is justified by the extensive protection of the parties and the observance of their rights, which are guaranteed by the established procedural rules. In contrast, another part of the doctrine argues that Art. 58 KG should be interpreted as establishing a procedural law sui generis, which takes precedence over the application of the VwVG. According to this doctrine, the special procedural provisions on Art. 58 KG thus take precedence over the application of the procedural provisions under the KG and the VwVG. Finally, they serve a fast and, if necessary, informal negotiation mechanism, which is necessary for the enforcement of international obligations. Accordingly, according to this view, the preliminary clarification does not take place in the sense of an "ordinary preliminary clarification" pursuant to Art. 26 KG. However, such an interpretation of the procedure also has the consequence that the Secretariat's request to the EAER is not a formal request, but rather a kind of communication against which no appeal can be filed. Accordingly, according to this view, an appeal could only be lodged once an order has been issued pursuant to Art. 59 para. 2 KG regarding the measures that are capable of eliminating the incompatibility. However, the EAER can only issue such an order if efforts to reach an amicable settlement have failed. Another argument against the primacy of special procedural provisions and in favour of the applicability of the VwVG is that - if in the end an order is issued under the VwVG - it makes sense in principle to conduct the entire procedure according to these provisions.
11 The disagreement regarding the procedural rules to be applied appears unavoidable in view of the special international and extra-political context in which Chapter 6 operates and underlines the dilemma that Chapter 6 attempts to solve: On the one hand, the Swiss authorities are to be provided with a flexible instrument that can also be used in cases of temporal urgency, thus protecting the diplomatic purpose of Chapter 6. On the other hand, the judicial legal protection of the parties should be guaranteed. However, a wholly satisfactory solution that encompasses both the necessary temporal flexibility and the extensive legal protection of the parties is probably not possible due to these two conflicting goals.
Materials
Botschaft zu einem Bundesgesetz über Kartelle und ähnliche Organisationen (KG) vom 13.5.1981, BBl 1981 S. 1293 (zit. Botschaft KG 1981).
Botschaft zu einem Bundesgesetz über Kartelle und andere Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen vom 23.11.1994, BBl 1995 I S. 468 (zit. Botschaft KG 1994).
Bibliography
Baldi Marino, Die Wettbewerbsbestimmungen internationaler Abkommen der Schweiz und die Art. 42/43 des Kartellgesetzes (KG), in: Wirtschaft und Recht, Jg. 41, Heft 1, 1989, S. 54–69.
Borer Jürg, Orell Füssli Kommentar, Wettbewerbsrecht I: Schweizerisches Kartellgesetz (KG) mit den Ausführungserlassen sowie einschlägigen Bekanntmachungen und Meldeformularen der WEKO, 3. Aufl., Zürich 2011 (zit. OFK-Borer).
Drolshammer Jens Ivar, Wettbewerbsrecht: Vom alten (KG 85) zum neuen Recht (KG 95), Bern 1996.
Ducrey Patrik, Kommentierung zu Art. 58 KG, in: Homburger Eric/Schmidhauser Bruno/Hoffet Franz/Ducrey Patrik (Hrsg.), Kommentar zum schweizerischen Kartellgesetz vom 6. Oktober 1995 und zu den dazugehörenden Verordnungen, Zürich 1997 (zit. Kommentar zum KG-Ducrey).
Freund Benedikt, Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 58–59 KG und Kommentierung zu Art. 58 KG, in: Zäch Roger et al. (Hrsg.), KG Kommentar, Kartellgesetz, Zürich 2018 (zit. Dike Kommentar-Freund).
Mamane David/Amberg Karin, Kommentierung zu Art. 58 KG, in: Amstutz Marc/Reinert Mani (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Kartellgesetz, 2. Aufl., Basel 2021 (zit. BSK-Mamane/Amberg).
Merkt Benoît/Metzger Philippe, Kommentierung zu Art. 58 KG, in: Martenet Vincent/Bovet Christian/Tercier Pierre (Hrsg.), Commentaire Romand, Droit de la concurrence, 2. Aufl., Basel 2013 (zit. CR-Merkt/Metzger).
Nüesch Sabina, Kommentierung zu Art. 58 KG, in: Amstutz Marc/Reinert Mani (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Kartellgesetz, 1. Aufl., Basel 2010 (BSK-Nüesch).
Reinert Peter, Kommentierung zu Art. 58 KG, in: Baker & McKinzey (Hrsg.), Stämpflis Handkommentar, Kartellgesetz, Zürich 2007 (zit. SHK-Reinert).
Zurkinden Philipp/Trüeb Hans R., Das neue Kartellgesetz: Handkommentar, Zürich 2004.