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- Art. 3 FC
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 73 PRA
- Art. 73a PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
- I. Introduction
- II. Reference to the supervisory instruments under Art. 29–37 FINMASA (para. 1)
- III. Order of dissolution or deletion from the commercial register (para. 2)
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. Introduction
A. Background
1 Until the FinIA and the FinSA came into force on January 1, 2020, financial intermediaries within the meaning of Article 2, para. 3 AMLA had the choice of joining a recognized self-regulatory organization or obtaining a license from FINMA to carry out their activities (Article 14 of the old AMLA). Financial intermediaries that opted for the latter were directly supervised by FINMA (directly subordinated financial intermediaries, so-called DSFI). With the entry into force of the FinIA and the FinSA, the DSFI status was abolished. Art. 20 of the old AMLA, which regulated the consequences of the withdrawal of a license, was also repealed. The previous option of either joining a recognized self-regulatory organization or being directly supervised by FINMA was replaced by the obligation to join a recognized self-regulatory organization (Art. 14 para. 1 AMLA).
2 In contrast to financial intermediaries under other financial market laws, who require a license from FINMA to carry out their activities, financial intermediaries under Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA are not supervised entities within the meaning of Art. 3 FINMASA. Article 20 AMLA, which has been in force since January 1, 2023, therefore expressly states that FINMA may take the supervisory measures provided for in FINMASA against financial intermediaries in accordance with Article 2 para. 3 AMLA who violate their duty to join a recognized self-regulatory organization in accordance with Article 14 para. 1 AMLA. This makes it clear that even after the abolition of DSFI status, FINMA still has the authority to take action against financial intermediaries that do not require a license from FINMA but operate without being affiliated to a self-regulatory organization as required by supervisory law.
B. Purpose
3 The supervisory instruments applicable under Article 20 AMLA supplement Article 44 FINMASA, which makes the unauthorized practice of an activity on the financial markets a criminal offense. By enabling FINMA to take supervisory measures under FINMASA against financial intermediaries within the meaning of Article 2 para. 3 AMLA, the proper state of affairs should be restored and a level playing field ensured in the financial markets. Art. 20 AMLA thus ensures that unlicensed financial intermediaries can be effectively prosecuted, even if they are not supervised persons or entities in accordance with Art. 3 FINMASA.
C. International standard and division of responsibilities in Switzerland
4 The FATF Recommendations require that state authorities take action against providers of money or value transfer services (MVTS) that operate without a license: “Countries should take action to identify natural or legal persons that carry out MVTS without a license or registration, and to apply appropriate sanctions.” The relevant finance ministries or supervisory authorities therefore have corresponding powers in many countries.
5 The solution chosen by Switzerland is in line with the international standard. On the one hand, FINMA, as the supervisory authority, takes action under supervisory law against unauthorized providers based on Article 20 of the AMLA. This approach aims to restore compliance and prevent the risk of recurrence. For example, unauthorized providers are to cease their activities (Art. 31 FINMASA) or be liquidated (Art. 20 para. 2 AMLA), and the public is to be warned about unauthorized providers (Art. 34 FINMASA). Since operating without a license or without being affiliated to a self-regulatory organization also constitutes a criminal offense under Article 44 FINMASA, FINMA files a criminal complaint at the end of its investigation or proceedings (Art. 38 para. 3 FINMASA). The Federal Department of Finance (FDF) is the prosecuting authority in such cases (Art. 50 FINMASA). The FDF then conducts administrative penalty proceedings. Thus, in addition to the procedure under supervisory law, the responsible persons are also penalized for the past unauthorized activity in order to prevent and restore the proper state of affairs.
II. Reference to the supervisory instruments under Art. 29–37 FINMASA (para. 1)
A. Registered financial intermediaries
6 The provision of Article 20 AMLA applies to financial intermediaries who violate the duty to join a recognized self-regulatory organization in accordance with Article 14, para. 1 AMLA. Article 14, para. 1 AMLA refers in this regard to Article 2, para. 3 AMLA. The provision thus applies to persons who, on a professional basis, accept or hold assets belonging to third parties or assist in the investment or transfer of such assets without the required SRO affiliation.
7 In practice, payment service providers, e.g. persons who carry out money transfers for third parties, such as operators of a local payment system or a hawala system, as well as debt reschedulers, are likely to be included as typical examples of this. It also includes payment instrument issuers, e.g. issuers of payment tokens in an ICO or issuers of local currencies. Other examples could be creditors who exceed the professional threshold, commodity dealers acting on behalf of third parties or money changers.
8 The scope of application of Art. 20 AMLA does not include other persons to whom the Anti-Money Laundering Act applies. In particular, Art. 20 AMLA does not apply to dealers in accordance with Art. 2 para. 1 let. b AMLA. It also does not apply to advisors who may be subject to an SRO affiliation requirement in the future. Financial intermediaries as defined in Art. 2 para. 2 AMLA are also excluded, i.e. in particular all those subject to prudential supervision. However, an analogous provision applies to these in the relevant financial market law.
B. Use of supervisory instruments against AMLA violations
1. As part of preliminary clarifications
9 According to the wording of Article 31 FINMASA, FINMA is obliged to restore compliance with the law if someone “violates” financial market legislation, e.g. carries out an activity requiring a license without the appropriate license. As long as there is insufficient evidence, FINMA may deploy its resources in a needs- and risk-oriented manner within the framework of general constitutional and administrative principles and the principle of discretion. It can further investigate such suspicious circumstances in (preliminary) clarifications.
10 Clarification is an informal administrative act, i.e. the rights and obligations of the Administrative Procedure Act, in particular the right to inspect files or the obligation to bear costs, do not apply. However, the duty to provide information and report under Article 29 FINMASA already applies, since FINMA can also use the supervisory instruments against persons whose subordination requirement is still disputed. The option of demanding information about their business activities from persons who may be subject to an SRO affiliation requirement enables FINMA to investigate the suspicion in the first place. Anyone who refuses to provide information despite suspicion of unlawful activity risks being placed on the public FINMA warning list in accordance with Article 22 para. 2 FINMASA.
11 If the suspicions are confirmed but the restoration of compliance with the law pursuant to Article 31 FINMASA is achieved during the investigation, FINMA may decide not to initiate proceedings. In practice, these cases are by far the most common and require the cooperation of the party concerned: For example, the proper state of affairs can be restored by the financial intermediary joining a self-regulatory organization or permanently and credibly ceasing the activity requiring authorization. However, this restoration of the proper state of affairs does not alter the fact that the previous activity was carried out without a license or without affiliation to a self-regulatory organization, which is punishable under Article 44 FINMASA.
2. In enforcement proceedings
12 Under Article 30 FINMASA, FINMA is entitled to open formal proceedings if there are indications of a violation of supervisory law. It will do so if the proper state of affairs cannot be restored in the clarifications or if a serious violation has occurred (in particular with high levels of assets involved or with numerous clients).
13 The restoration of compliance with the law pursuant to Article 31 FINMASA can also take place as part of enforcement proceedings rather than as part of the clarifications (see above N. 9 ff.). In such cases, FINMA can order the cessation of the activity. It usually does this with respect to the natural persons involved or responsible, while such an order only makes sense with respect to a legal entity if it is not liquidated at the same time (see below N. 18). This cease-and-desist order is often combined with a penalty under Art. 48 FINMASA.
14 Finally, it is also conceivable that the party itself restores compliance during the proceedings, for example by permanently and credibly ceasing the activity only at this stage. In such situations, FINMA can issue a declaratory ruling pursuant to Art. 32 FINMASA. However, mere declaratory rulings are rare after an unlicensed activity, since an injunction (see above N. 13) is practically always necessary to prevent repetition.
15 If there has been a serious breach of supervisory provisions, which is generally to be assumed in the case of unauthorized activities, FINMA may publish its ruling in accordance with Article 34 FINMASA. The publication of a ruling in accordance with the wording of the law takes place after it has become legally enforceable (i.e. the suspension of the suspensive effect is not permitted). It may contain personal data and is to be ordered in the ruling itself. In practice, the instrument of publication is used almost exclusively for proceedings against natural persons who have themselves acted unlawfully or who are responsible for the unlawful actions of a legal entity. Typically, it is not the entire order that is published, but only the operative part of the cease-and-desist order (see above, N. 13), with a time limit being set for the publication. The purpose of the publication is to warn against this person. This should also enable contractual partners, such as banks when opening an account, to recognize that this person has already been involved in unauthorized activities. Such publication is to be distinguished from publications under Art. 22 FINMASA: If there are reasons under Art. 22 FINMASA, i.e. in particular a public interest, FINMA may inform the public outside of an injunction. Publication under Art. 34 FINMASA and publication under Art. 22 FINMASA occur at different points in time: While publication under Art. 34 FINMASA may only occur after the ruling has become legally enforceable, publication under Art. 22 FINMASA is not tied to any particular point in time and usually occurs shortly after the conclusion of proceedings. Occasionally, FINMA has combined publication and disclosure, which is permissible if the requirements of both provisions are met.
16 Pursuant to Art. 35 FINMASA, FINMA may confiscate the profits made by a supervised person or entity or a responsible person in a managerial position as a result of a serious violation of supervisory law. This provision can in principle be used in enforcement proceedings against unlicensed persons. If a person not authorized under the AMLA would have been able to join an SRO, then the (small) saving on the SRO affiliation fee is the only profit that can be causally attributed to the violation of supervisory law. If the AMLA violator is not eligible for a license, however, e.g. because he was involved in a fraud-like construct, the profits from the business activity can also be confiscated. One possibility in the case of legal entities is therefore to order the liquidation under supervisory law (see below N. 18) and to order the confiscation of profits in the event of and in the amount of the liquidation surplus. In the case of responsible persons in a managerial position, the confiscation can be up to the amount of the salary or other remuneration received. However, here too it must be determined whether the unlawful gain is limited to the savings made by joining the SRO. Finally, the confiscation of profits must remain proportionate, which, according to the Federal Council Dispatch, could be the case if it would lead to (private) bankruptcy. In published practice, the confiscation of profits from unlicensed individuals has so far been the exception.
17 Due to the general reference to the supervisory measures of the FINMASA in Article 20 AMLA, professional and activity bans under Article 33 and 33a FINMASA against individuals who are responsible for an unlicensed activity are also possible. However, there are no known cases of this in published practice. This is probably because people operating without a license often have little chance of finding a new job in the licensed sector. These prospects are further diminished by any publication in accordance with Art. 34 FINMASA (see above N. 15).
18 Finally, the reference in Article 20 para. 1 AMLA also includes the provision of Article 37 FINMASA. This allows FINMA to order the liquidation of unlicensed actors under supervisory law. This is explained in more detail in para. 2 of Article 20 AMLA (see the comments below N. 22 et seq.).
19 The measures described here can, in principle, be combined. However, it must always be checked whether the overall proportionality is maintained.
20 As part of the proceedings, FINMA can appoint an investigating agent. In accordance with Art. 36 FINMASA, it can determine that the investigating agent should act in place of the governing bodies of a company. The appointment of an investigating agent is therefore an effective instrument, particularly in the case of unlicensed actors, which allows control over a business activity to be taken despite the lack of coercive measures in administrative proceedings. The provision can also be applied analogously to a sole proprietorship. FINMA will make use of the instrument of the investigating agent in particular when an assessment of a possible unauthorized activity requires an in-depth investigation of the facts or when the funds at hand are to be secured by means of the investigating agent's position. The appointment of the investigating officers is a precautionary measure that often takes place superprovisionally, i.e. without hearing the affected party. If the investigating officer determines during their work that the company is over-indebted and they have been appointed as an organ, they submit the notice of over-indebtedness to the competent civil court in accordance with Art. 725b para. 3 CO. Once bankruptcy proceedings have been initiated, the enforcement proceedings continue, with the bankruptcy taking precedence over a liquidation under supervisory law by FINMA in accordance with Article 37 FINMASA.
3. After enforcement proceedings
21 After the enforcement proceedings have been legally concluded, FINMA enforces the measures ordered in accordance with Article 32 para. 2 FINMASA in conjunction with Article 39 APA. For the typical measures for unauthorized actors, it can carry out the enforcement actions directly: for example, it publishes relevant excerpts from the order or begins the liquidation (see also N. 25). The enforcement of the confiscation of profits takes place, if necessary, by way of SchKG. Finally, a cease-and-desist order (see above N. 13) cannot be enforced in the strict sense: if it is violated and it was issued under threat of a penalty pursuant to Art. 48 FINMASA, FINMA will file a criminal complaint with the FDF and may again open enforcement proceedings (and, if necessary, order more severe measures than in the first proceedings).
III. Order of dissolution or deletion from the commercial register (para. 2)
A. (Complete) liquidation vs. partial liquidation
22 Art. 20 para. 2 AMLA stipulates that FINMA can order the dissolution of legal entities and general and limited partnerships and the deletion of sole proprietorships from the commercial register. Art. 20 para. 2 AMLA provides an explicit legal basis for the most serious measure FINMA can take in the event of a violation of the affiliation requirement under Art. 14 para. 1 AMLA. Before FINMA orders the dissolution or deletion in the commercial register, it must, in application of the principle of proportionality (Art. 5 para. 2 FC), examine whether the restoration of the proper state of affairs can be achieved by less drastic measures (see above N. 9 et seq.). Dissolution or deletion in the commercial register is the ultima ratio.
23 If it is not possible to restore the proper state of affairs, e.g. because the unlicensed financial intermediary does not permanently and credibly cease its activities, behaves uncooperatively and refuses to join a recognized self-regulatory organization or cannot join one because it does not meet the requirements of Art. 14 para. 2 AMLA, FINMA orders the dissolution of or deletion from the commercial register. In particular, FINMA is not required to give the unauthorized financial intermediary the opportunity to convert the unauthorized activity into an activity that is unobjectionable under financial market law in order to avert liquidation.
24 If liquidation is the consequence of the violation of the affiliation requirement, FINMA must regulate the scope of the liquidation by means of a ruling. In this context, the principle of proportionality requires that the liquidation does not exceed what is necessary to restore compliance with the law. This means that in cases in which the financial intermediary also carries out an activity that is unobjectionable under financial market law in addition to the unlawful activity, only the part relating to the unlawful activity needs to be liquidated. However, a partial liquidation is only possible under the following conditions: on the one hand, the partial liquidation must be technically possible. On the other hand, it must be possible to carry out the activity that is unobjectionable under financial market law independently. Furthermore, no financial resources that cannot be distinguished in accounting terms and that were generated by the unauthorized activity may have flowed into the activity that is unobjectionable under financial market law. Finally, it must be possible to assume that there will be no relevant risk of the unauthorized activity being carried out again in the future. If no positive prognosis can be made, which is usually the case in practice with less than reputable business models, a full liquidation is unavoidable.
B. Supervisory liquidation vs. bankruptcy
25 FINMA itself carries out a supervisory liquidation that has been ordered or – which is more usual in practice – appoints a liquidator for this purpose. If an over-indebtedness situation already exists during the proceedings, the investigating agent appointed by FINMA as an official can file a notice of over-indebtedness with the competent civil court (see above N. 20). However, if no bankruptcy proceedings are initiated during the proceedings and FINMA subsequently orders the liquidation under supervisory law, it is conceivable that an over-indebtedness situation may arise after the liquidation has been opened. In this case, the liquidator appointed by FINMA can submit the over-indebtedness report to the competent civil court, which is responsible for opening bankruptcy proceedings and liquidation in the case of financial market participants operating without a license (Art. 173b para. 2 SchKG). If the unlicensed financial intermediary is a sole proprietorship, FINMA may order its deletion from the commercial register in accordance with Article 20 para. 2 AMLA. This order also results in a liquidation under supervisory law. However, it cannot lead to (private) bankruptcy.
C. Waiver of liquidation
26 According to the Federal Supreme Court's case law on Art. 37 para. 2 and 3 FINMASA in conjunction with the relevant financial market law (e.g. Art. 23quinquies para. 1 BankG), liquidation is in principle the mandatory and only legal consequence of an activity carried out without a license in the financial markets. As the authority applying the law, FINMA has no discretion in choosing the legal consequence. However, it must apply the principle of proportionality and regulate the extent of the liquidation by order (see above N. 24) or, if necessary, waive the liquidation (see below N. 27 f.).
27 The wording of individual provisions in the financial market laws already indicates that FINMA has discretion in deciding whether liquidation is to be carried out. In the area of collective investment schemes, for example, the provision of Article 134 CISA is formulated as an “optional” provision. In contrast, Art. 23quinquies para. 1 BankG, Art. 52 VAG, Art. 66 para. 1 FinIA and Art. 87 para. 2 FinMIA, which also regulate the consequences of the withdrawal of a license, are not formulated as “optional” provisions. However, the Federal Supreme Court has already teleologically reduced Art. 20 AACA, which provided for dissolution or deletion from the commercial register as a consequence of the withdrawal of the DSFI license by FINMA, to the effect that no liquidation is carried out if the company or sole proprietorship does not engage in any financial intermediary activities or only to a limited extent. This interpretation corresponds to the original version of this provision from 1998, which expressly stipulated that the legal consequence of liquidation would only apply if the company or sole proprietorship “predominantly acts as a financial intermediary”. The idea behind this proviso was to take into account the principle of proportionality. The Federal Court justified the teleological reduction of Art. 20 aGwG by stating that there were no indications in the materials as to why this reservation had been deleted, and that it should not be readily assumed that the reformulation of this provision is intended to displace the principle of proportionality as a formative principle of the Swiss constitutional order. (
28 Like Art. 134 CISA, Art. 20 para. 2 AMLA is currently formulated as a “discretionary” provision. Violation of the requirement to affiliate with a recognized self-regulatory organization therefore does not necessarily have to lead to dissolution or deletion from the commercial register and liquidation. Rather, the wording of Art. 20 para. 2 AMLA explicitly leaves room for considerations of proportionality. FINMA may thus refrain from liquidation in individual cases. According to the case law on Art. 20 aGwG (see above N. 27), a waiver of liquidation for reasons of proportionality is possible if the company or sole proprietorship has only carried out a minor financial intermediary activity. However, cases in which liquidation is waived for reasons of proportionality are rare in practice.
In this article, the authors express only their personal views.
Bibliography
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Emmenegger Susan, Zulässigkeit eines SRO-Anschlusszwangs für Finanzintermediäre im Sinne von Art. 2 Abs. 3 GwG, Rechtsgutachten zuhanden des Eidg. Finanzdepartements, Bern 2013.
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Materials
Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht vom 1.2.2006, BBl 2006 2829 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2006/303/de, besucht am 22.12.2024 (zit. Botschaft FINMAG 2006).
Botschaft zur Änderung des Geldwäschereigesetzes vom 26.6.2019, BBl 2019 5451 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2019/1932/de, besucht am 22.12.2024 (zit. Botschaft GwG 2019).
FATF Recommendations, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, FATF 2012, letztmals aktualisiert im November 2023, www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html, besucht am 22.12.2024.
Jahresbericht 2019, FINMA 2019, https://www.finma.ch/de/~/media/finma/dokumente/dokumentencenter/myfinma/finma-publikationen/geschaeftsbericht/20200402_finma_jahresbericht_2019.pdf, besucht am 22.12.2024 (zit. FINMA, Jahresbericht 2019).
Leitlinien zum Enforcement, FINMA 2014, https://www.finma.ch/de/~/media/finma/dokumente/dokumentencenter/myfinma/3durchsetzung/leitlinien-zum-enforcement.pdf, besucht am 22.12.2024.
Mutual Evaluation Report Singapore, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, FATF 2016, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-singapore-2016.html, besucht am 22.12.2024.
Mutual Evaluation Report Switzerland, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, FATF 2016, www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-switzerland-2016.html, besucht am 22.12.2024.
Mutual Evaluation Report United Kingdom, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, FATF 2018, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-united-kingdom-2018.html, besucht am 22.12.2024.
Mutual Evaluation Report United States, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, FATF 2016, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-united-states-2016.html, besucht am 22.12.2024.