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- Art. 75b FC
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- Art. 96 para. 1 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
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- Art. 11 CO
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- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Art. 808c CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
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- Art. 10a PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 4 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. d FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 para. 3-5 FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
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- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
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- Art. 35 FADP
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- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
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- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 16 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 18 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 27 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 28 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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- Art. 2 para. 1 AMLA
- Art. 2a para. 1-2 and 4-5 AMLA
- Art. 3 AMLA
- Art. 7 AMLA
- Art. 7a AMLA
- Art. 8 AMLA
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- Art. 26 AMLA
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- Art. 30 AMLA
- Art. 31 AMLA
- Art. 31a AMLA
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- Art. 38 AMLA
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
- I. Suspension of time limits (Art. 145 para. 1 CPC)
- II. Exceptions (Art. 145 para. 2 CPC)
- III. Duty to inform (Art. 145 para. 3 CPC)
- IV. Suspension of time limits for actions under the SchKG (Art. 145 para. 4 CPC)
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. Suspension of time limits (Art. 145 para. 1 CPC)
A. Court recesses
1 In principle, all civil procedure deadlines – both statutory and judicial, calculated in days, weeks, months or otherwise, grace periods as well as extended or reinstated deadlines – must take into account the court recesses listed exhaustively in Art. 145 para. 1 CPC. This contrasts with Art. 46 para. 1 BGG, according to which court holidays in proceedings before the Federal Supreme Court are only to be taken into account for deadlines determined by days.
2 Court holidays last:
From the seventh day before Easter up to and including the seventh day after Easter (a total of 15 days), with Easter Sunday being the decisive date and the holidays therefore beginning on the Sunday before Easter (i.e., Palm Sunday) and running up to and including the Sunday after Easter;
From July 15 up to and including August 15 (a total of 32 days);
From December 18 to and including January 2 (a total of 16 days).
3 Tappy is of the opinion that the court or the presiding judge may expressly provide for the exclusion of the suspension of time limits when setting a court deadline, in particular in the case of setting a short grace period pursuant to Art. 101 para. 3 or Art. 223 para. 1 CPC, or when setting a short emergency deadline upon rejection of a request for an extension of time, expressly provide for the exclusion of the suspension of time limits. The same must also be possible with the consent of the parties and tacitly when setting an hourly deadline. These considerations are not shared in view of the clear wording of Art. 145 para. 1 and 2 and Art. 146 para. 2 CPC and for reasons of legal certainty and user-friendliness of the CPC.
B. Effects
4 During court recesses, the deadlines are suspended, i.e., the start of a deadline is suspended and deadlines that are already running are suspended.
1. Suspension of the start of the deadline
5 Events triggering deadlines may occur without restriction during court recesses. Court deliveries (of notifications and decisions triggering deadlines) are therefore also possible during court recesses. A deadline simply does not begin to run during this period, even though it has already been triggered. The suspension of deadlines therefore only affects the running of a specific deadline – and not its triggering. The first day of a statutory or judicial deadline that begins during the court recess in accordance with Art. 142 para. 1 CPC always falls on the first day after the end of the suspension of deadlines or the recess, regardless of whether it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a recognized public holiday. The same applies if the event triggering the deadline occurs on the last day before the court recess. It is irrelevant whether the deadline is a daily, weekly, monthly, or annual deadline. The parties are generally free to take the required procedural action before the deadline begins.
6 Examples: A notification triggering a deadline is served on the party on July 14. Due to the court recess from July 15 to August 15 and the associated suspension of deadlines, the deadline does not begin to run until August 16, which may also be a Saturday, Sunday, or recognized public holiday. The same would apply if the notification triggering the deadline were served on the parties on July 18.
2. Extension of deadlines already in progress
7 A deadline that began before the court recess is suspended during the recess and is extended by the duration of the suspension.
8 For the calculation of daily deadlines, the days up to the last day before the court recess or the suspension of deadlines are counted, and from the first day after the recess or suspension, the number of days that were still outstanding before the start of the suspension is added. If the deadline calculated in this way falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or recognized public holiday, the deadline shall end on the following working day (Art. 142 para. 3 CPC). Example: The party is served with a notice triggering the deadline on July 11 (Friday). The deadline is 10 days and begins to run on July 12. Three days (July 12–14) have passed until the court recess. On August 16, the deadline continues to run (day 4), with seven days of the deadline still remaining. The deadline is August 22 (Friday). If the last day of the deadline falls on December 17 (Sunday), it is extended to the next working day (Monday, December 18) in accordance with Art. 142 para. 3 CPC. As this day falls during the court recess, the deadline ends on January 3 or, if necessary, on the following working day.
9 Monthly deadlines are calculated in a first step in accordance with Art. 142 para. 2 CPC – initially without taking court holidays into account. The number of days of the court recess during which the deadline was suspended is then added. If the last day calculated in this way falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or recognized public holiday, the deadline ends on the following working day. The same applies analogously to weekly deadlines. Example: A notice triggering the deadline is served on the party on December 13 (Friday). The deadline is three months and begins to run on December 14 (Saturday). Without taking into account the court holidays from December 18 to January 2, the deadline would run until March 13 (Thursday). Taking into account the court recess of 16 days (calculated from March 14), the period would then end on March 29 (Saturday) or, pursuant to Art. 142 para. 3 CPC, on the following working day (Monday, March 31), provided that this date does not fall during the Easter recess.
10 For the calculation of annual deadlines, it does not seem reasonable to extend them by the duration of the court recess, as is the case with monthly and weekly deadlines. However, the associated suspension of the deadline at the beginning and end of the deadline must be taken into account.
11 If the end of the period falls during the court recess, even in the case of periods or annual periods that have been deliberately or accidentally set for a specific calendar day during the suspension of the period, the period is extended until the first day after the end of the suspension of the period, or until the following working day if necessary (Art. 142 para. 3 CPC). The same applies if the deadline expires on a Saturday, Sunday, or public holiday and the following working day falls during the court recess. If the court or the presiding judge sets the deadline for a specific calendar day outside the court recess (e.g., January 5), the court recess has no influence.
II. Exceptions (Art. 145 para. 2 CPC)
12 Art. 145 para. 2 CPC lists exhaustively the proceedings in which the deadlines do not stop during the court recess.
A. Conciliation proceedings
13 During conciliation proceedings pursuant to Art. 202 ff. CPC, there is no court recess. In BGE 138 III 615, the Federal Supreme Court ruled on the scope of the exclusion of the suspension of time limits for conciliation proceedings, limiting it in principle to Art. 202–207 CPC of Chapter 2, which is entitled “Conciliation proceedings.”
14 Based on this, the deadline for filing a lawsuit with the court pursuant to Art. 209 para. 3 and 4 CPC is no longer part of the conciliation proceedings. If this leads to the initiation of ordinary (or simplified) proceedings before the court, the court recesses must be taken into account.
15 According to Federal Supreme Court case law, the suspension of time limits during court recesses must also be taken into account when calculating the time limit for rejecting the conciliation authority's proposed judgment under Art. 211 para. 1 CPC.
16 The decision-making procedure before the conciliation authority at the request of the plaintiff pursuant to Art. 212 CPC is also no longer part of the conciliation procedure. Unless this is a summary procedure, the court recesses must therefore be taken into account.
B. Summary proceedings
17 Court recesses are also excluded in summary proceedings pursuant to Art. 248 ff. CPC. Summary proceedings are applicable, for example, to precautionary measures (including during divorce proceedings), to the protection of marriage and partnerships, to free legal aid (including supplementary payment proceedings), to requests for recusal, to legal protection in clear cases, to court injunctions, and to matters of voluntary jurisdiction.
18 For proceedings before the child and adult protection authority (and before the appeal body against its decisions), the cantons may declare summary proceedings applicable or explicitly exclude the suspension of time limits or the application of court recesses. For example, the canton of Thurgau has declared the provisions of the CPC on summary proceedings to be applicable mutatis mutandis, unless there are special provisions. The CPC thus applies as subsidiary cantonal law and excludes the application of court recesses. Certain cantons, such as Bern and Lucerne, declare the provisions of the cantonal administrative law to be applicable on the basis of the legislative competence granted in Art. 450f of the Swiss Civil Code (CC), which is why these provisions or any regulations contained therein on the suspension of time limits must be consulted first. The cantons of Aargau, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Fribourg, Schaffhausen, St. Gallen, and Zurich, among others, have expressly excluded the suspension of time limits under cantonal law. If the cantons do not provide for any regulations, no court holidays are to be taken into account, particularly in appeal proceedings against decisions of the child and adult protection authority.
19 If, following summary proceedings, a time limit for initiating ordinary (or simplified) proceedings is triggered or set (known as the continuation period), the court recess must be taken into account when calculating the time limit. The court action period for the issuance of precautionary measures prior to lis pendens pursuant to Art. 263 CPC is therefore suspended during court recesses. In contrast, the 30-day objection period for the non-recognition of a court injunction is still part of the summary proceedings, which is why court recesses do not have to be taken into account. It should also be noted that the provisions of the CPC – and thus also Art. 145 CPC – do not apply to substantive time limits under the CC and the CO, even if they concern legal actions. Accordingly, court recesses do not apply in this context.
20 According to Federal Supreme Court case law, the exclusion of the suspension of time limits for summary proceedings under Art. 145 para. 2 lit. b CPC also applies in cantonal appeal proceedings.
III. Duty to inform (Art. 145 para. 3 CPC)
21 Pursuant to Art. 145 para. 3 CPC, the court or the presiding judge is obliged – unlike in the scope of application of the BGG – to inform the parties of the exceptions to the suspension of time limits pursuant to Art. 145 para. 2 lit. a and b CPC. This judicial obligation constitutes a validity provision. If no such notice is given, the parties may not suffer any disadvantages as a result, and the time limits shall be suspended during court recesses as if there were no exception under Art. 145 para. 2 CPC. It is irrelevant whether the addressee is a party with legal knowledge or represented by a lawyer who recognized or should have recognized the deficiency.
22 The relevant notice must generally be given when the specific deadline is set; a general notice that court recesses do not apply in conciliation or summary proceedings is not sufficient. In the case of statutory deadlines, it may be sufficient for the notice to be given with the first procedural order. The parties must at least be able to recognize that their specific case is exempt from the suspension of time limits. An incorrect or incomplete notice has the same effect as if the notice were missing.
IV. Suspension of time limits for actions under the SchKG (Art. 145 para. 4 CPC)
23 Since January 1, 2025, the provisions of the CPC on the suspension of time limits have been applicable to all actions under the SchKG that are to be brought before a court. This new regulation serves to improve the coordination of the suspension of time limits between civil law and debt enforcement proceedings. This affects all limitation periods of the SchKG in the area of ordinary and simplified proceedings, such as the time limit for bringing an action for revocation, the time limits for bringing an action for opposition, joinder or collocation, an action for separation or an action for seizure, and the corresponding time limits for appeals. Contrary to previous Federal Supreme Court case law, it is irrelevant whether the relevant time limit for bringing an action was triggered by a debt enforcement action or not.
24 Particular attention should be paid to summary proceedings under debt enforcement law pursuant to Art. 251 CPC: There is controversy in legal doctrine as to whether Art. 145 para. 4 CPC applies here, since in this case, due to the exception of the suspension of time limits during court recesses in summary proceedings under Art. 145 para. 2 lit. b CPC, time limits in connection with decisions concerning the lifting of the stay of enforcement or the opening of bankruptcy proceedings, for example, would also begin or continue to run during the Easter and New Year holidays or during the summer holidays, and the provisions of Art. 56 ff. SchKG on the suspension of enforcement and the stay of proceedings would not apply. Christmas, and New Year's holidays or during the summer holidays, and the provisions of Art. 56 ff. SchKG (Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act) on debt enforcement holidays and the suspension of legal proceedings would not apply. For reasons of debtor protection, a restrictive, literal interpretation of Art. 145 para. 4 CPC (applying only to “actions” and not to “petitions” within the meaning of Art. 252 CPC) should be assumed. It is not understandable why, of all things, neither court nor debt enforcement holidays should apply to judicial debt enforcement measures such as decisions concerning the lifting of the stay of enforcement or the opening of bankruptcy proceedings, but they should apply to less intrusive debt enforcement measures such as the service of a payment order. This cannot be what the legislature intended. It must be accepted that summary proceedings under debt enforcement law are treated differently from other summary proceedings, such as tenant evictions under Art. 257 CPC, with regard to the suspension of time limits under the SchKG. Consequently, applications in summary proceedings under debt enforcement law pursuant to Art. 251 CPC do not fall under the term “actions under the SchKG” in Art. 145 para. 4 ZPO. For summary proceedings under debt enforcement law pursuant to Art. 251 CPC, the provisions of Art. 56 ff. SchKG on debt enforcement holidays and legal suspension must therefore be observed in the event of a debt enforcement action.
25 The provisions of the CPC on the suspension of time limits do not apply to debt enforcement appeals before the supervisory authority in debt and bankruptcy enforcement matters pursuant to Art. 17 f. SchKG. It should be noted that the CPC does not apply to non-judicial matters of debt enforcement and bankruptcy law anyway. This also applies, for example, to appeals under debt enforcement law pursuant to Art. 17 f. SchKG, which are not directed to a court but to the supervisory authority in debt enforcement and bankruptcy matters. It is irrelevant whether the supervisory authority in debt enforcement and bankruptcy matters is in fact a court.
26 Art. 145 para. 4 CPC is not included in the transitional provision of Art. 407f CPC, which is why this provision only applies to proceedings that became pending on or after January 1, 2025.
Bibliography
Abbet Stéphane, Kommentierung zu Art. 145 und 146 ZPO, in: Chabloz Isabelle/Dietschy-Martenet Patricia/Heinzmann Michel (Hrsg.), Petit commentaire Code de procédure civile, Basel 2020.
Benn Jurij, Kommentierung zu Art. 145 und 146 ZPO, in: Spühler Klaus/Tenchio Luca (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, 4. Aufl., Basel 2024 (zit. BSK-Benn).
Ernst Wolfgang/Oberholzer Serafin/Sunaric Predrag, Fristen und Fristberechnung im Zivilprozess (ZPO – BGG – SchKG), 2. Aufl., Zürich/St. Gallen 2021.
Frei Nina J., Kommentierung zu Art. 145 ZPO, Berner Kommentar, Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, Art. 1–149 ZPO, Band I, Bern 2012 (zit. BK-Frei).
Fuchs Nicolas, Kommentierung zu Art. 145 und 146 ZPO, in: Sutter-Somm Thomas/Lötscher Cordula/Leuenberger Christoph/Seiler Benedikt (Hrsg.), Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), 4. Aufl., Zürich 2025 (zit. ZK-Fuchs).
Gasser Dominik/Rickli Brigitte/Josi Christian, Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung Kurzkommentar, 3. Aufl., Zürich/St. Gallen 2024.
Hoffmann-Nowotny Urs H./Brunner Katrin, Kommentierung zu Art. 145 und 146 ZPO, in: Oberhammer Paul/Domej Tanja/Haas Ulrich (Hrsg.), Kurzkommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, 3. Aufl., Basel 2021.
Hurni Baptiste/Hofmann David, Délais, faits nouveaux et réplique dans le CPC révisé, Anwaltsrevue 5 (2023), S. 209 ff.
Jenny Reto M./Abegg Mike, Kommentierung zu Art. 145 und 146 ZPO, in: Gehri Myriam A./Jent-Sørensen Ingrid/Sarbach Martin (Hrsg.), Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung, 3. Aufl., Zürich 2023 (zit. OFK-Jenny/Abegg).
Maranta Luca, Kommentierung zu Art. 450f ZGB, in: Geiser Thomas/Fountoulakis Christiana (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Zivilgesetzbuch I, 7. Aufl., Basel 2022 (zit. BSK-Maranta).
Reusser Ruth E., Kommentierung zu Art. 450b ZGB, in: Geiser Thomas/Fountoulakis Christiana (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Zivilgesetzbuch I, 7. Aufl., Basel 2022 (zit. BSK-Reusser).
Sarbach Martin, Kommentierung zu Art. 56 SchKG, in: Hunkeler Daniel (Hrsg.), Kurzkommentar Schuldbetreibungs- und Konkursgesetz, 3. Aufl., Basel 2025.
Spühler Karl, Kommentierung zu Art. 145 und 146 ZPO, in: Spühler Karl (Hrsg.), Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung Kurzkommentar, Zürich/Genf 2023.
Staehelin Daniel/Von Mutzenbecher Florence, Die Revision der ZPO vom 17.3.2023, in: SJZ 119 (2023), S. 815 ff.
Sutter-Somm Thomas/Seiler Benedikt, Kommentierung zu Art. 145 ZPO; in: Sutter-Somm Thomas/Seiler Benedikt (Hrsg.), Handkommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung, Zürich 2021 (zit. CHK-Sutter-Somm/Seiler).
Tanner Martin, Kommentierung zu Art. 142, 145 und 146 ZPO, in: Brunner Alexander/Schwander Ivo/Vischer Moritz (Hrsg.), Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, 3. Aufl., Zürich/St. Gallen 2024.
Tappy Denis, Kommentierung zu Art. 142, 145 und 146 ZPO, in: Bohnet François/Haldy Jacques/Jeandin Nicolas/Schweizer Philippe/Tappy Denis, Commentaire romand Code de procédure civile, 2. Aufl., Basel 2019 (zit. CR-Tappy).
Materials
Protokoll der Sondersession des Nationalrats vom 10.5.2022 (Zweitrat), Amtliches Bulletin 2022 S. 669 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=56920, besucht am 14.9.2025.