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FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
- I. History
- II. Context
- III. Commentary in the narrow sense
- Recommended further reading
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. History
1 The content of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution largely corresponds to Art. 21 of the 1848 Federal Constitution. Paragraph 1 of the latter regulated the right of the Confederation to construct or support the construction of public works at the expense of the Confederation in the interests of the Confederation or a large part thereof. Paragraph 2 provided for a specific right of expropriation in return for full compensation. Paragraph 3 allowed the Federal Assembly to prohibit the construction of public works if they violated the military interests of the Confederation. The background to this constitutional article included the planned watercourse corrections, as the Linth correction some 30 years earlier had not been based on a sufficient legal basis. The materials, on the other hand, primarily mention the construction of railway lines as the subject of the article.
2 The provision was transferred to Art. 23 of the 1874 Constitution with minor adjustments to the wording, but otherwise unchanged.
3 During the total revision, the content of para. 1 of Art. 23 of the 1874 Constitution was incorporated into the 1999 Constitution, with only the linguistic reference to the Confederation and its bearing of costs being omitted. In addition, the “operation” of the facilities is now also mentioned alongside their “construction,” although this was already covered by the 1874 Constitution. Paragraphs two and three, on the other hand, were not adopted, as they were considered dispensable, firstly because of the right of expropriation already associated with the relevant responsibilities and secondly because of federal legislation in the military field. From a systematic point of view, the provision was moved from the general provisions, where it was located between provisions on the military and higher education (1848 Federal Constitution) and on spatial planning and water and forest protection (1874 Federal Constitution), to a separate section on public works and transport. Overall, the systematic classification of the norm proved difficult in the context of the total revision.
4 The predecessor provisions of the 1848 and 1874 Federal Constitutions initially gained practical significance primarily with regard to waterway corrections and the construction of mountain passes. In 1897, the Federal Act on the Acquisition and Operation of Railways on Behalf of the Confederation and the Organization of the Administration of the Swiss Federal Railways was enacted. This was based not only on Art. 26 of the 1874 Federal Constitution on the construction and operation of railways, but also on Art. 23 on public works. Similarly, individual railway lines were apparently built on the basis of Art. 23 of the 1874 Federal Constitution. Even mere financial assistance to a railway line in economic difficulties was provided on the basis of Art. 23 of the 1874 Federal Constitution. In 1902, in the absence of federal competence in the field of energy, the Electricity Act was enacted on the basis of, among other things, Art. 23 of the 1874 Federal Constitution.
5 In some cases, the federal legislature additionally based infrastructure legislation on Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution (or its predecessor provisions), even though the federal government had specific jurisdiction in the area in question. This applies, for example, to the Pipeline Act of 1962, which, in addition to the pipeline article of Art. 26bis, which had only recently been inserted into the Federal Constitution, also referred to Art. 23 of the 1874 Federal Constitution. Why the federal legislature also refers to the constitutional provision on public works in cases where it would have had jurisdiction can only be speculated. In some cases, these could be legislative measures which, from the point of view of the federal legislature, are no longer fully covered by its jurisdiction. In that case, these would be additionally based on the provision on public works “as a precaution.” In the previous versions, however, their additional mention could also be justified by the fact that these versions still contained their own expropriation regulations. The extent to which the current version also contains at least an implicit right of expropriation is explained below in N. 33.
II. Context
6 The purpose of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution is to enable the construction of infrastructure that would exceed the power of the cantons or that would not be built by individual cantons due to its significance for the entire country. As the historical example of the railway lines shows, the norm can also become relevant where – regardless of the capacity and will of the cantons – nationwide planning and coordination appears necessary.
7 Despite its systematic position at the beginning of Section 5, Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution does not constitute an “overarching” provision on infrastructure. This is all the more true given that a corresponding addition in the form of a paragraph 2, which would have generally obliged the federal government to provide efficient infrastructure, was rejected. Rather, it is a subsidiary catch-all provision for works whose construction by the federal government would otherwise have no specific legal basis, as opposed to the more specific bases of competence of the federal government.
8 In view of the specific competences of the Confederation that exist in many areas today, the provision is considered superfluous in some cases. However, since legislation and, even more so, constitutional amendments tend to lag behind technical progress (“legal lag”), the provision may continue to be relevant in the future. For example, the federal government based the Federal Act on Underground Goods Transport (UGüTG) on Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution in addition to Art. 87. Since such projects differ from existing above-ground railways, it would have been questionable to what extent this law could have been based solely on Art. 87 (see N. 23 below).
9 Another example is the construction of a CO2 transport pipeline infrastructure, which could be used as part of the “net zero” greenhouse gas target to capture unavoidable CO2 emissions (e.g., from waste incineration plants or certain industrial facilities) locally and then either use them elsewhere (e.g., for the purpose of producing synthetic gases based on renewable energy sources) or (much more controversially) store them underground. However, a CO2 pipeline infrastructure cannot be subsumed under the federal jurisdiction over pipelines under Art. 91 para. 2 of the Federal Constitution, as CO2 is not a fuel or propellant. It has already been argued in academic circles that the construction of a corresponding pipeline infrastructure by the federal government could be based on Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution (in conjunction with Art. 74 of the Federal Constitution).
10 Despite some criticism, the provision may therefore continue to gain significance in view of constant technological change. In this respect, the finding in the literature that the rare invocation of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution does not detract from its significance, but rather follows from its purpose of serving as a catch-all provision, seems very apt.
III. Commentary in the narrow sense
A. Type of federal competence
11 According to the prevailing interpretation, Art. 81 FC is intended to enable the federal government to provide corresponding services directly on the basis of the Constitution – i.e., without prior legislation. In this respect, it is a (direct) administrative competence. This is being questioned in recent doctrine with reference to the principle of legality. However, the form in which the federal government must decide on measures under Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution cannot be answered in abstract terms, but depends in each specific case on the extent to which law is enacted (or only applied) and on the requirements to be imposed on the level and density of norms in accordance with general and (e.g., in tax law) specific principles (see N. 39 ff.). Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution does not contain any mandate for the federal government to create such works, but leaves the decision on whether to take action to the discretion of the federal government.
12 Despite the lack of a reference to the Confederation bearing the costs, in contrast to Art. 23 para. 1 of the 1874 Federal Constitution, it is clear that funds from the federal budget can be made available to the extent necessary to exercise administrative powers.
13 It is questionable to what extent Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution grants the Confederation legislative powers beyond this. Since the support and, in particular, the possible operation of larger works can often only be regulated sensibly by means of appropriate legislation, it can be assumed that Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution confers limited legislative powers in addition to administrative powers. This is also in line with the statements in the materials. Furthermore, the creation of suitable legal foundations can be an essential support service provided by the Confederation.
14 In the absence of federal competence for the railway system (which was only created two years later as Art. 26 of the 1874 Federal Constitution), the Railway Act of 1872 was apparently based solely on the predecessor provision of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution, namely Art. 21 of the 1848 Federal Constitution. However, a law enacted solely on the basis of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution must be limited in content to those provisions that are necessary for the implementation of the specific project. This will be the case above all in the first variant (“construct and operate”) with regard to maintenance. Requirements and conditions for financial support could also be regulated here. In contrast, the literature argues that, according to Art. 81 BV, the federal government may only enable success-oriented works, but not regulate them. Whether this approach could be sustained in practice at all seems questionable given the complexity of novel infrastructures in particular. In any case, the variant in which construction is supported by third parties would be considered inadmissible if it regulated subsequent operation.
B. Construction and support of public works
1. Concept of “public works”
15 The linchpin of the provision is the concept of “public works.” The materials relating to the 1999 Federal Constitution do not explain this concept. The wording appears to be very open in this respect. The word “work” alone does not necessarily imply the requirement of physicality, as shown by the concept of work in copyright law, which includes computer programs (Art. 2 para. 3 URG). At first glance, the connection with the verb “to construct” in the German wording of the provision suggests a restriction to physical works. However, it should be noted that the other language versions contain wording that would also apply to intangible works (“réaliser,” ‘realizzare’).
16 Compared to the German and Italian versions, the French version also uses two different terms (“travaux” and “ouvrages”). However, it is not apparent that this is intended to make any kind of conceptual distinction, especially since both terms can be translated as “work.”
17 A historical interpretation of the provision shows that it covers large infrastructure projects such as railway facilities and other technical works. It is clear here that “works” under the 1848 and 1878 Federal Constitutions primarily referred to “structures.” However, work such as repairing damage or restoring a previous condition should also be included. Under Art. 23 of the 1874 Constitution, the transformation of the ground was often emphasized as an essential feature of the “work.”
18 The systematic interpretation points in the direction of (transport-related) structures, because Art. 81 of the Constitution is regulated in a joint section with transport infrastructure. At the same time, the significance of the systematic position for interpretation must be relativized insofar as the classification of the provision within the framework of the total revision caused difficulties. The comparison with the terms “work” and related terms in other areas of law is also not very meaningful, as these differ greatly both from each other and in comparison with Art. 81 BV.
19 Thus, a structural understanding brings the concept of a work closer to “buildings and facilities” within the meaning of Art. 22 of the Federal Act on Planning and Development (RPG), but this cannot be used to interpret Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution. The civil law concept of a work in contract law (Art. 363 CO) differs significantly from the concept in Art. 81 BV, as it can even cover purely intellectual works, at least in some cases. It seems more obvious to refer to the liability of the owner of a work under Art. 58 CO. However, due to its reference to at least a temporary fixed connection with the ground, this concept of a work appears too narrow in view of a modern understanding of Art. 81 BV, as will be shown below.
20 A teleological interpretation argues in favor of a broad understanding of the concept of a work. Since Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution is intended to serve as a catch-all provision for areas in which the federal government has no specific jurisdiction, the definition of a work must not be too narrow and should be open to technical developments in particular. There is therefore a legitimate debate as to whether satellites (as non-earthbound installations) or virtual or digital infrastructures could fall under the concept of a work. The importance of the latter becomes clear in light of the events of July 2024, when a faulty software update caused damage worldwide and led to the cancellation of thousands of flights, among other things. Ultimately, it is irrelevant to the population whether the aircraft remains on the ground because the runway is damaged or because there has been a disruption to the airport's IT infrastructure. Extending the scope to include such infrastructure would be particularly in line with the purpose of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution if its construction exceeded the powers of the cantons but did not fall within the specific competence of the federal government. An understanding that remains stuck in the 19th century concept of relevant infrastructure would contradict the confirmation of the article in the context of the total revision of 1999. It cannot be assumed that the constitutional legislator at that time wanted to retain an article, or to reintroduce it in a new form, which would be meaningless from the outset in view of the specific competences existing in the infrastructure sector. In its message on the Federal Act on Electronic Identity (E-ID), the Federal Council endorsed an interpretation according to which the provision of a digital “trust infrastructure” as part of a “uniform electronic administrative landscape” could also be covered by the concept of “works” in Article 81 of the Federal Constitution.
21 Nevertheless, structural infrastructure can continue to play a role, for example in coping with the effects of climate change. In order not to violate the division of powers under the Federal Constitution through an overly broad interpretation, the application of Art. 81 FC must in any case be limited to works that have a connection to infrastructure, albeit in a broad sense. Purely intellectual achievements such as patents or other intellectual property are also not covered, as long as they are not reflected in a specific infrastructure. In addition, the scope of application is limited by the requirement that the work must be in the interest of the whole or a large part of the country (see N. 25 ff. below).
22 It is questionable when a work can be considered “public.” In any case, this must be assumed for works that are operated by the state itself in the public interest. However, historical analysis shows that, based on this provision, private railway companies, for example, were also supported. Ownership is therefore likely to be less decisive, especially since, according to the wording of the provision, the federal government does not have to operate the works itself, but can also simply support their construction. The “public nature” of a work must therefore depend (solely) on whether it serves the public interest. As in the context of Art. 36 para. 2 of the Federal Constitution, police assets such as public safety can be protected, as would be the case, for example, with facilities used for flood protection. However, as the systematic classification in Section 5 shows, the transport infrastructure of parts of the country, for example, must also constitute a relevant public interest. According to one view, works abroad should also be able to be of public interest within the meaning of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution, as long as their benefits are at least partially felt domestically. This is certainly true for projects near the border that serve to connect Switzerland to foreign infrastructure. Ultimately, the relevant public interests cannot be definitively defined, and the federal government has considerable discretion in this regard. However, projects that primarily serve particular interests (especially of a financial nature) would be excluded.
23 Some point out that, given its subsidiary nature and low density of norms, Art. 81 BV is only tailored to individual cases, which is why the construction of an entire category of works cannot be based on it. However, particularly in the case of large-scale infrastructure such as the aforementioned underground transport facilities or CO2 pipelines, it can be assumed that these can only be designed in a meaningful way if they extend across the entire country or at least a large part of it in a network-like manner. In such a constellation, one could at best envisage the establishment of an entire “category” of such works. If this were not covered by the provision, its practical relevance would be significantly reduced. The historical example of railway lines also clearly shows that it would be difficult in practice to distinguish between individual works and categories of works. Here, numerous projects had been established by the federal government on the basis of predecessor provisions of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution. Overall, therefore, it is hardly possible to speak of individual cases, but according to the materials, the construction of railway lines in particular should be covered by the constitutional provision on public works (see above N. 1).
24 On the other hand, it is likely to be true that the limited legislative competence granted by Art. 81 BV (see above N. 11 ff.) may not be used to create general legal framework conditions for entire categories of works, regardless of the specific construction of a work. Against this background, given its comprehensive approach (see Articles 1 and 2 of the Act), the Federal Act on Underground Goods Transport is only unproblematic in terms of competence if Article 87 of the Federal Constitution, which is additionally cited therein, is regarded as a suitable basis for competence.
2. “In the interest of the whole or a large part of the country”
25 The provision requires that the federal government's action be in the interest of the whole or a large part of the country. It is particularly questionable what is meant by a “large part” of the country. In any case, it cannot be required here that the majority of cantons be affected, since there is no mention of a “large part” of the country. At the same time, the interests of more than one canton (even if it covers a large area or has a large population) must be affected, as the provision is intended to enable public works that are not only in the interest of a single canton. Works of purely local or regional interest therefore do not fall within its scope. The federal government is therefore prohibited from promoting the construction of school buildings, multi-purpose halls, or similar facilities on the basis of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, the federal government may only intervene where the private sector or the cantons do not already provide adequate infrastructure. This follows from the principle of subsidiarity, which is only partially standardized in Art. 5a and 43a of the Federal Constitution.
26 The significance of the interest is not determined by the size and spatial extent of the project, but by its actual impact on the public good. Thus, for example, a project limited to a single canton may be of significance to other cantons. For example, a tunnel system built in the territory of a single canton may provide transport links to several cantons. If the project is part of a larger network of facilities, the contribution of the specific project to this network should be taken into account; however, the overall significance of the network as a whole cannot be used to justify the required interest.
27 Overall, the requirements for interest must not be excessive. From the federal government's point of view, even smaller projects such as individual bridges may be in the interest of “the whole country” under certain circumstances. In this respect, the federal government has considerable discretion. However, purely fiscal interests of the federal government do not justify the application of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution.
3. “Construct and operate”
28 According to the first variant, the federal government may construct and operate the work itself. The conjunction “and” is to be understood to mean that if the federal government constructs a work itself (and does not merely support its construction), it must then (at least in principle, according to the materials) also operate it itself. In the literature, however, this variant is sometimes understood to refer primarily to the bearing of costs. According to this interpretation, it should be possible to transfer the actual operation to third parties, e.g., within the framework of a public-private partnership, as long as the federal government retains ultimate responsibility for the operation. In any case, it is reasonable to agree with the view that the Confederation does not have to act directly as the operator itself and that, in particular, transfer to a federal administrative unit or outsourcing to a private-law company is also possible.
29 Some argue that the federal government should only be allowed to build and operate a facility itself if operation by the cantons (with mere support from the federal government) is ruled out. In the case of the Linth enterprise, a facility built and initially operated by the federal government was later transferred by law to an institution established by the cantons concerned. In addition, the principle of economic freedom sets certain limits on the construction of federal facilities in competition with the private sector. With regard to the principle of subsidiarity, this first option raises a more specific question: in the context of the interests of “the whole or a large part of the country” (see N. 25 ff. above), the question arises as to whether, according to the principle of subsidiarity, federal action is necessary at all. In connection with the option of establishing and operating, on the other hand, it must be examined whether it is necessary for the federal government itself to operate the facility, or whether, for example, operation by the canton could be considered, with the federal government merely providing financial support for the establishment of the facility (see below for the second option). It remains to be seen whether the hitherto low relevance of the “construction and operation” option could increase in the future in the context of digital infrastructures (see above N. 20).
4. “Supporting its construction”
30 As a much more practical “minus” to its own construction and operation by the federal government, the latter can limit itself to supporting construction by third parties. This support can be financial, but also logistical, planning, or coordination-related, for example. In addition, the federal government can provide expert knowledge, for example through its specialist authorities. In addition to the cantons, private individuals are the primary third parties that can be considered for constructing and operating the facility, provided that the facility is in the public interest (see above N. 22). Even foreign countries can be potential beneficiaries. This may be relevant, for example, if railway facilities across the border that serve to connect Switzerland are to be promoted.
31 According to the wording, only the construction of the facility can be subsidized, not its operation and maintenance. However, federal support for the acquisition of an existing facility by the cantons or third parties is covered by Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution. The amount of support is largely at the discretion of the federal government, although the principle of equal treatment (Art. 8 FC), the principle of economic freedom (Art. 94 FC), and the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 5a FC) set certain limits.
5. Borderline cases between the two variants
32 In relation to the first variant, it should be possible for the federal government to first support the construction by third parties and then later take over the facility for its own operation. It is difficult to subsume the case in which the federal government wishes to support an already constructed facility or take it over – e.g., in the event of financial difficulties on the part of the private operator – under the German and Italian wording of the two variants. With regard to the latter takeover by the federal government, some argue that this is included as a “minus” in the construction variant. In fact, it would seem overly formalistic to prohibit the takeover by the federal government if a hypothetical demolition and subsequent new construction by the federal government were permissible. Ultimately, one can be guided by the principle that where the federal government is committed to long-term operation, it should also bear the costs, but in the form of its own operation and not permanent subsidization of third parties. The French language version, with the variant “exploiter des ouvrages publics,” offers the best possibility of subsuming these cases under the wording of the article.
C. Right of expropriation
33 The previous version expressly provided for the federal government's right to carry out expropriations for the purpose of constructing the facility (Art. 23 para. 2 BV 1874). The reason given for not adopting this part of the provision was that the federal government already had the right of expropriation due to its numerous areas of competence and that the special provision was therefore superfluous. However, since the provision is intended to serve as a catch-all provision in cases where the federal government has no actual competence, this view is certainly open to question. In view of the history of the provision, it seems preferable to allow expropriation on the basis of Art. 81 BV, at least in cases where the federal government has no specific competence that includes the right of expropriation.
D. Relationship to other powers
34 Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution is subsidiary to the specific powers regulated in the Federal Constitution. Although Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution is particularly relevant where the federal government has no specific powers, its application should not serve to circumvent the requirements of such more specific powers. It may be difficult in individual cases to correctly distinguish between a permissible catch-all function and a violation of the constitutional division of powers.
35 The spatial planning article in Art. 75 of the Federal Constitution does not usually give rise to any further powers for the federal government, as the fundamental legislative competence there is not compatible with the case-by-case approach of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution. In the past, however, the legislature has occasionally invoked the spatial planning competence of Art. 22quater of the 1874 Federal Constitution to promote infrastructure projects in the broadest sense.
36 A possible violation of the constitutional division of powers through an overly extensive interpretation of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution was discussed above (N. 34). On the other hand, cases in which restrictions on federal powers result solely from a simple statutory provision are likely to be particularly relevant. For example, the Energy Act allows support for geothermal energy projects by means of federal guarantees, but limits the scope of the guarantees. Since this legislation is based on the substantive powers in Art. 64, 74–76, 89, and 91 of the Federal Constitution, the question arises as to whether the federal government may, on the basis of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution, grant support that goes beyond this simple legal provision. In terms of the hierarchy of norms, this does not appear to be a problem – provided that the requirements of Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution are met – as this restriction does not arise from the powers specified in the Federal Constitution itself. Nevertheless, some argue that even such a simple legal provision, as a concretization of the respective powers, precludes recourse to Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution. Since a simple federal law (despite the de facto effect of Art. 190 BV) cannot change the division of powers in the Federal Constitution, this view must be rejected.
37 Where cantonal powers exist, Art. 81 BV establishes a parallel federal power that does not supersede the cantonal powers. Here, the extent to which the federal government acts only in a supplementary capacity to the cantons or acts alone depends heavily on the nature of the work in question. Ultimately, however, Art. 81 BV enables the federal government to take over the construction of certain infrastructure. If the federal government does not construct the works, the cantons can continue to build infrastructure of supra-cantonal importance themselves.
E. Competence and procedure
38 The Federal Assembly, i.e. the legislature, is responsible for the measures to be taken under Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution. Given that federal competence is primarily administrative in nature (see N. 11 ff. above), this is not self-evident.
39 According to Art. 163 of the Federal Constitution, the form in which the decree is issued depends first of all on whether it contains legislative provisions. According to Art. 163 para. 1 of the Federal Constitution, such decrees must be issued as federal laws or ordinances. The remaining decrees are issued as federal resolutions in accordance with Art. 163 para. 2 of the Federal Constitution. According to the simple interpretation of Art. 22 para. 4 ParlG, “legislative” provisions are those that impose obligations, confer rights or define responsibilities in a directly binding and generally abstract manner. This may also include “purely founding and organizational enactments” such as the SBBG. Given the complexity of today's infrastructure projects, legal regulation is often necessary in practice. In any case, it is often difficult to distinguish between legislative provisions and other enactments.
40 A federal law may be necessary in particular if a formal legal basis is required in accordance with the principles governing the level of norms (see in particular Art. 164 para. 1 of the Federal Constitution). This may be necessary, for example, in the case of a serious infringement of fundamental rights within the meaning of Art. 36 para. 1 of the Federal Constitution or in the case of a levy. In addition, in the case of restrictions on constitutional rights pursuant to Art. 164 para. 1 lit. b BV and in the other cases of Art. 164 para. 1 BV, the fundamental provisions must in any case be regulated in a federal law.
41 If, on the other hand, these criteria indicate that the provisions are not legislative and, in particular, that no federal law is necessary, a federal decree may be issued. It is questionable whether this should take the form of a simple federal decree (Art. 29 para. 1 ParlG in conjunction with Art. 163 para. 2 BV) or a federal decree subject to referendum (Art. 29 para. 2 ParlG in conjunction with Art. 163 para. 2 BV).
42 According to the wording in Art. 29 para. 2 ParlG, which has been sharply criticized in some quarters, this depends on whether there is a legal basis for the resolution in the BV or in a federal law. If the supplementary legislative power under Art. 81 of the Federal Constitution (see above N. 13 ff.) is exercised and a federal law is enacted first, a simple federal decree can then be used for the further details.
43 However, if there is no specific legal basis, the question arises as to whether Art. 81 BV itself constitutes a sufficient basis in the Constitution or whether the federal decree is subject to (optional) referendum. Assuming that Art. 81 BV is an administrative power deriving directly from the Constitution (see above N. 11), the application of Art. 29 para. 1 ParlG and thus the choice of a simple federal resolution would seem obvious. In contrast, recent doctrine argues that the vagueness of Art. 81 BV argues against considering it a sufficient basis for a concrete decision within the meaning of Art. 29 para. 2 ParlG; therefore, in accordance with the principle of legality, a decision subject to referendum is required.
44 If Art. 29 para. 2 ParlG is interpreted in the light of Art. 5 para. 1 BV, its purpose is only to waive a referendum if the electorate had the option of a referendum when the legal basis was created in the Federal Constitution or a federal law (Art. 140 para. 1 lit. a FC or optionally under Art. 141 para. 1 lit. a FC). In the case of Art. 81 BV, however, this is largely ineffective due to its vagueness and the multitude of conceivable applications. The constitutional principle of legality is only satisfied if the measure is subject to a referendum.
45 The practice of the Federal Assembly is very inconsistent. Measures based on Art. 81 BV (or its predecessor provisions) have already been enacted in the form of federal laws, federal decrees subject to referendum, and simple federal decrees.
About the author
Assoc. Prof. Dr. iur. Markus Schreiber is an assistant professor of public law and blockchain at the Zug Institute for Blockchain Research (ZIBR) at the University of Lucerne.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Sanna Neuhauser for her assistance with literature research and anonymous peer review, and editors Prof. Dr. Odile Ammann and Dr. Stefan Schlegel for their critical review of the manuscript and helpful comments.
Recommended further reading
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Vogel Stefan, Rechtsgutachten zu Inhalt und Tragweite von Art. 81 BV sowie weiterer Bundeskompetenzen aus dem Bereich Planung und Verkehr im Zusammenhang mit dem Projekt Cargo sous terrain, Fällanden 19.8.2016 (zit. Vogel, Rechtsgutachten CST).
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