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- Art. 96 para. 1 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
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- Art. 734f CO
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- Art. 788 CO
- Art. 808c CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 4 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. d FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 para. 3-5 FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
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- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
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- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
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- Art. 44a FADP
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- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
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- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 16 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 18 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 27 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 28 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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- Art. 2 para. 1 AMLA
- Art. 2a para. 1-2 and 4-5 AMLA
- Art. 3 AMLA
- Art. 7 AMLA
- Art. 7a AMLA
- Art. 8 AMLA
- Art. 8a AMLA
- Art. 11 AMLA
- Art. 14 AMLA
- Art. 15 AMLA
- Art. 20 AMLA
- Art. 23 AMLA
- Art. 24 AMLA
- Art. 24a AMLA
- Art. 25 AMLA
- Art. 26 AMLA
- Art. 26a AMLA
- Art. 27 AMLA
- Art. 28 AMLA
- Art. 29 AMLA
- Art. 29a AMLA
- Art. 29b AMLA
- Art. 30 AMLA
- Art. 31 AMLA
- Art. 31a AMLA
- Art. 32 AMLA
- Art. 38 AMLA
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
- I. History
- II. Concept of criminal authorities
- III. Obligations of the criminal authorities towards the reporting office
- IV. Cooperation between criminal authorities and supervisory authorities
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. History
1 Back in the 1990s, the FATF recommended in its Recommendation No. 32 that member states continuously review the effectiveness of their anti-money laundering measures. To this end, statistical data should be collected not only on suspicious activity reports received and forwarded, but also on criminal proceedings and convictions relating to money laundering, seized and confiscated assets, and international mutual legal assistance in the area of money laundering. Against this background, the original version of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, which came into force in Switzerland in 1998, already required cantonal criminal authorities in Art. 29 para. 2 aGwG to report all pending proceedings in connection with a criminal organization (Art. 260ter SCC), money laundering (Art. 305bis SCC) and lack of due diligence in financial transactions (Art. 305ter SCC). Beyond the requirements of FATF Recommendation No. 32, the Swiss legislature also intended that this information would help the reporting office to continuously improve its own analysis and forwarding practices and to train financial intermediaries.
2 In practice, it became apparent after only a few years that the reporting office was not receiving sufficient information to fulfill its tasks. This was due, on the one hand, to gaps in the existing provisions of Art. 29 para. 2 aGwG and, on the other hand, to the inadequate implementation of the reporting obligations contained therein by the cantonal law enforcement authorities. The shortcomings in the collection of statistical data were also criticized by the FATF in its 2005 country review report. As part of the 2007 revision of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Federal Council proposed, among other things, amendments to the regulations on the exchange of information between the criminal authorities and the other Swiss authorities involved in the implementation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. Parliament made only cosmetic changes, and the new regulations came into force on February 1, 2009. These contained the following key changes:
Replacement of the previous Art. 29 para. 2 AMLA with the new Art. 29a AMLA,
Extension of reporting obligations to all criminal authorities, now also including federal authorities and all courts,
Obligation to deliver decisions, including their reasoning,
Explicit regulation of reporting obligations in proceedings initiated by reports to the Money Laundering Reporting Office,
Creation of a legal basis for the disclosure of information by the criminal authorities to the supervisory authorities responsible for implementing the AMLA,
Obligation of the supervisory authorities to coordinate their proceedings with the criminal prosecution authorities.
3 With the Money Gaming Act, which came into force on January 1, 2019, organizers of large-scale games were defined as financial intermediaries within the meaning of the AMLA (Art. 2 para. 2 lit. f AMLA), in addition to casinos. Since the supervision of large-scale games falls within the competence of the cantons (Art. 106 para. 3 of the FC), the cantons were required by federal law in the Money Gaming Act to entrust an intercantonal authority with the supervision of large-scale games. This authority complements the Federal Gaming Board and, like the latter, has the task of monitoring compliance with anti-money laundering obligations (Art. 107 para. 1 lit. a no. 2 BGS) In order to enable this intercantonal authority, the Intercantonal Money Gaming Supervisory Authority (Gespa), to fulfill its tasks in the area of money laundering, Art. 29a AMLA was amended to allow the criminal authorities to disclose information and documents not only to the ESBK but also to the intercantonal authority.
4 The Federal Decree on the Approval and Implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Terrorism of September 25, 2020, contained the following two cosmetic amendments to Art. 29a para. 1 AMLA, which came into force on July 1, 2021:
Replacement of the word “promptly” with the word “immediately”;
Deletion of “paragraph 1” after “Article 260ter.”
5 The reason for replacing “promptly” with ‘immediately’ is not mentioned in the materials. Naegeli suspects that this was done to correct the stylistically unattractive double use of “promptly” in the same paragraph.
6 The reason for deleting “no. 1” is more difficult to understand: in the version applicable until 2021, the offense of participation in a criminal organization was included in no. 1 of Art. 260ter SCC. In the version that came into force on July 1, 2021, the offense is included in paragraph 1. It would therefore have been obvious to replace “paragraph 1” with “paragraph 1” in Art. 29a AMLA, especially since the references to Art. 260quinquies and 305ter in Art. 29a AMLA also contain the clarification “paragraph 1.” The deletion of “paragraph 1” only becomes understandable when the history of the revised Art. 260ter SCC is taken into account: this article contained the criminal offense in two paragraphs in both the consultation draft and the draft federal decree on the approval and implementation of the Council of Europe's Convention on Terrorism (paragraph 1 concerning criminal organizations and paragraph 2 concerning terrorism). The proposal to delete “paragraph 1” in Art. 29a AMLA was therefore correct. It would have been possible to replace “paragraph 1” with “paragraphs 1 and 2.” However, during parliamentary deliberations, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Art. 260ter SCC proposed by the Federal Council were combined into a newly worded paragraph 1. Consequently, the reference to Art. 260ter “paragraph 1” in Art. 29a AMLA should have been replaced by “paragraph 1.” This may simply have been overlooked.
7 As a result, Art. 29a AMLA in its current version is inconsistently worded in that there are references to paragraph 1 with regard to Art. 260quinquies and Art. 305ter SCC, but not with regard to Art. 260ter SCC, even though this article also only contains the criminal offenses in paragraph 1. However, it is not clear what purpose the clarifications regarding “paragraph 1” in Art. 29a AMLA serve. If these were omitted, nothing would change in terms of content: the criminal authorities would have to report exactly the same criminal proceedings. It would therefore be appropriate to delete all references to “paragraph 1” in Art. 29a in a future revision of the AMLA. This would streamline the article and make its wording more consistent.
8 In 2016, the FATF evaluated Switzerland's legal and institutional framework for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The Federal Council took up the recommendations of the FATF country report 2016 and initiated a revision process of the AMLA in 2017, which led to the following two amendments to Art. 29a AMLA:
Introduction of para. 2bis in Art. 29a AMLA with the following text: ”They [the criminal authorities] shall use the information forwarded by the reporting office in accordance with the conditions laid down by the latter in each individual case in accordance with Article 29 paragraph 2ter.“
Paragraph 3: Replacement of ”intercantonal supervisory and enforcement authority under Article 105 BGS“ with ”intercantonal authority“ and insertion of ”and the Central Office" .
9 Para. 2bis created the legal basis for the reporting office to comply with FATF Recommendation No. 40, which requires that information received from foreign authorities may only be passed on to other domestic authorities in compliance with the conditions associated with its disclosure. This amendment to Art. 29a AMLA, which came into force on January 1, 2023, implemented a long-standing request by the reporting office. However, this regulation raised numerous questions in criminal proceedings that remained unresolved.
10 In addition, this revision newly designated trade auditors and group companies pursuant to Art. 42bis of the Precious Metals Control Act (EMKG) as financial intermediaries (Art. 2 para. 2 lit. g AMLA) and thus subject to the AMLA. At the suggestion of the Swiss Association of Precious Metal Manufacturers and Dealers (ASFCMP), the Central Office for Precious Metals Control, which is already responsible for enforcing the Precious Metals Control Act, was also tasked with supervising and monitoring the obligations arising from the AMLA (Art. 36, 42bis and 42ter EMKG). Consequently, the Central Office was placed on an equal footing with the other supervisory authorities involved in the enforcement of the AMLA, including in Art. 29a para. 3 AMLA.
11 The replacement of “intercantonal supervisory and enforcement authority under Article 105 FCA” with “intercantonal authority” was not explained in the message in the explanatory notes to Art. 29a AMLA. The aim was probably to streamline the text of the law: In Art. 12 AMLA, a new lit. bbis was introduced in paragraph 1. This refers to the intercantonal supervisory and enforcement authority and notes in brackets that this authority is referred to in the rest of the text of the law as “intercantonal authority.”
12 On August 30, 2023, the Federal Council opened the consultation process on the Federal Act on the Transparency of Legal Entities and the Identification of Beneficial Owners. This involves amendments to the AMLA. In particular, “advisors” are to be subject to the AMLA. “Advisors” are essentially persons who perform certain activities in connection with the establishment and structuring of legal entities, i.e., who are particularly active in legal advice and fiduciary services. As a consequence, supervisory authorities could intervene with advisors in the future, which is why Art. 29a AMLA is to be amended to stipulate that supervisory authorities must also coordinate any interventions with “an advisor” with the law enforcement authorities. In its message published on May 22, 2024, the Federal Council largely stuck to its proposals, including the amendment to Art. 29a AMLA. The Federal Assembly debated the actual Transparency Act and the amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering Act contained in the bill separately. Although the Federal Council's proposals regarding the subordination of “advisors” were controversially discussed, this had no influence on the amendment to Art. 29a para. 4 AMLA proposed by the Federal Council. It was adopted without amendments by the Council of States on June 17, 2025, and by the National Council on September 11, 2025.
II. Concept of criminal authorities
13 Art. 29a AMLA imposes various rights and obligations on “criminal authorities.” The AMLA does not contain a definition of this term. The framework for the term “criminal authorities” in Art. 29a AMLA is derived from the scope of application of the AMLA: In principle, Art. 29a AMLA only covers criminal authorities that are active in the fight against money laundering, organized crime, and terrorist financing. Administrative criminal authorities such as the Criminal Affairs and Investigations Division of the Federal Tax Administration do not fall under the term “criminal authorities” within the meaning of Art. 29a AMLA. The legislative history and materials also show that Art. 29a AMLA refers not only to cantonal criminal authorities, but also to those of the federal government. Furthermore, the term “criminal authorities” includes the courts of all instances. This is evident from the materials and the systematics of the AMLA, which only uses the term “criminal authorities” in Art. 29a, but otherwise consistently refers to “law enforcement authorities.” In this respect, the use of the term in the AMLA is consistent with the definitions contained in Articles 12–14 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code.
14 It is not entirely clear whether the police also belong to the “criminal authorities” within the meaning of Art. 29a AMLA. Applying the definition of terms in the Criminal Procedure Code, this would be the case: according to Art. 12 CrimPC, the police, together with the public prosecutor's office and the misdemeanor authorities, form the “law enforcement authorities,” which, together with the courts, form the “criminal authorities.” It should be noted, however, that the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code (CrimPC) did not come into force until 2011. The AMLA, which came into force in 1998, could therefore not be based on the definition in the CrimPC at the time of its enactment. In practice, the authorities involved (the reporting office, federal and cantonal public prosecutors, police) traditionally understood the term “law enforcement authorities” to mean the public prosecutor's office and not the police. In particular, the reporting office has so far filed reports with the federal and cantonal public prosecutors' offices within the meaning of Art. 23 AMLA, and the police have not reported any pending criminal proceedings to the reporting office on the basis of Art. 29a para. 1 AMLA. On the other hand, the 2012 message on the amendment to the Anti-Money Laundering Act indicates that the term “law enforcement authorities” used in Art. 23 para. 4 AMLA includes not only the public prosecutor's office but also the police. Apart from a reference to Art. 12 of the CrimPC, this interpretation of the term “law enforcement authorities” is not further justified in the dispatch. The requirement for coherent legislation is that a term should have the same meaning at least within the same law. The term “law enforcement authorities” is used in numerous places in the AMLA: for example, the reporting of suspicious transactions by the reporting office to the “law enforcement authorities” in accordance with Art. 23 para. 4 AMLA triggers a freezing of assets by financial intermediaries. According to the AMLA, this must be maintained until a decision is received from the “law enforcement authorities” (Art. 10 para. 1 and 2 AMLA). However, according to the CrimPC, only the public prosecutor's office is responsible for the seizure of assets and the issuance of account freezes (Art. 198 para. 1 in conjunction with Art. 263 CrimPC), not the police. It is inconsistent that the term “law enforcement authority” in Art. 10 AMLA cannot include the police, but in Art. 23 para. 4 AMLA the same term is supposed to include the police.
15 It should therefore be noted that the terms “criminal authority” and “law enforcement authority” are not used consistently and uniformly in the AMLA. The terms must therefore be interpreted teleologically (purpose-oriented). With regard to Art. 29a AMLA, this means that the terms “law enforcement authorities” and “criminal authorities” also include the police, because it would be incompatible with the purpose of Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA, for example, if only the public prosecutor's office and the criminal courts had to comply with the restrictions on use imposed by the reporting office, but not the police. In addition, the information provided by the police is just as important to the AMLA supervisory authorities as the information provided by the public prosecutors, which is why Art. 29a para. 3 AMLA must also include the police when viewed from a teleological perspective. Consequently, the police also fall under the category of “criminal authorities” within the meaning of Art. 29a para. 1 AMLA and are therefore generally obliged to report to the reporting office any proceedings pending before them in the areas of money laundering, organized crime, and terrorist financing. However, as long as the reporting office refrains from requesting such reports from the police, this obligation remains a dead letter.
16 The consistent use of the terms “criminal authorities” and “law enforcement authorities” in the AMLA therefore remains a matter for future revision of the law. In the interests of consistency in the legal system, the definition of terms in the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code should be adopted and applied uniformly and clearly to the AMLA.
III. Obligations of the criminal authorities towards the reporting office
A. Information obligations (paragraphs 1 and 2)
17 The reporting office is tasked, among other things, with conducting operational and strategic analyses and producing an annual report on money laundering, its predicate offenses, organized crime, and terrorist financing (Art. 1 MGwV). To this end, the reporting office requires information on criminal proceedings conducted in Switzerland in these areas of crime. The reporting office is aware of some of these proceedings, namely those initiated on the basis of reports made by the reporting office to the criminal prosecution authorities pursuant to Art. 23 para. 4 AMLA. However, the criminal authorities also conduct criminal proceedings relating to money laundering, lack of due diligence in financial transactions, organized crime, and terrorist financing that are not based on reports from the reporting office. In order to fulfill its tasks, the reporting office must be informed about these proceedings. However, this is only a first step: a mere overview of the criminal proceedings conducted in Switzerland in the aforementioned areas of crime is not sufficient for their analysis. For this purpose, the reporting office requires in-depth information from the criminal case files. In principle, it would be useful to have access to the entire files of the relevant criminal proceedings. However, it would not be feasible for the reporting office to process the complete case files. For reasons of efficiency, it makes sense to limit the reporting to decisions that conclude criminal proceedings (judgments, summary penalty orders, orders to discontinue proceedings). In addition to the criminal consequences, these decisions usually contain a description of the facts of the case, including the respective predicate offenses of money laundering, and a statement of reasons.
18 In order to enable the reporting office to fulfill its mandate, it therefore makes sense to legally oblige the criminal authorities to do the following:
Report all pending proceedings relating to money laundering, organized crime, terrorist financing, and lack of due diligence in financial transactions of which the reporting office is not yet aware.
To deliver the complete final decisions (judgments in the reasoned version, summary penalties, orders to discontinue proceedings) in all proceedings concerning money laundering, organized crime, terrorist financing, and lack of due diligence in financial transactions.
19 The reporting of all relevant criminal proceedings by the criminal authorities is stipulated in Art. 29a para. 1 AMLA. The presiding judge (cf. Art. 61 CrimPC) is obliged to report criminal proceedings relating to the aforementioned areas of crime to the reporting office as soon as such proceedings become pending. Criminal proceedings are pending even before they are formally opened within the meaning of Art. 309 of the CrimPC.
20 Art. 29a AMLA contains the following provisions regarding the service of criminal proceedings files:
Paragraph 1: Service of judgments and orders to discontinue proceedings, including reasons, concerning proceedings that are not based on reports from the reporting office.
Paragraph 2: Reporting of all orders issued on the basis of a report by the reporting office.
This provision is flawed in several respects:
1) In view of the purpose of the provision (preparation of analyses by the reporting office), it makes no sense to have different provisions for criminal proceedings that have been initiated with or without a report by the reporting office. There is no justification for the different provisions in the materials and none is apparent.
2) para. 1 limits delivery to “judgments and orders to discontinue proceedings.” This wording is very narrow and does not even cover all final decisions (penalty orders and orders not to prosecute are missing). In practice, many more criminal proceedings are concluded with penalty orders than with judgments. No justification for this restriction can be found in the materials, nor is it apparent.
3) In contrast to para. 1, para. 2 defines the scope of the documents to be served in an extremely broad manner: the wording covers the service not only of final decisions, but of all decisions and thus also of all interim decisions relating to the conduct of the proceedings. These include investigation orders to the police, search warrants, arrest warrants and detention orders issued by the coercive measures court, disclosure orders of all kinds (including bank disclosures), orders for covert coercive measures such as telephone surveillance, and many more. The literal implementation of the text of the law would lead to a high workload for the criminal authorities and an extraordinarily high workload for the reporting office in analyzing the incoming orders.
4) Para. 2 refers to orders that were issued “on the basis of” a report by the reporting office. If a particular suspicion is already known to a law enforcement agency before the reporting office files a report, in practice this is added to the criminal proceedings already pending. If para. 2 is interpreted literally, orders issued later in these criminal proceedings are not made “on the basis” of the report by the reporting office, but on the basis of the criminal proceedings already pending. Some criminal authorities conclude from this that in such cases no reports need to be made to the reporting office.
21 The shortcomings of a literal interpretation can be partially offset by a teleological interpretation. As already explained, the purpose of the provisions contained in Art. 29a para. 1 and 2 AMLA is to enable the reporting office to compile analyses and statistics on money laundering, its predicate offenses, organized crime, and terrorist financing, and to publish the results in an annual report. In addition, this should enable better training and awareness-raising among financial intermediaries and self-regulatory organizations.
22 Taking into account a teleological interpretation yields the following results for paragraph 1:
“Judgments”: Penalty orders become judgments without a valid objection (Art. 354 para. 3 CrimPC). Penalty orders are therefore understood as “proposed judgments” and the public prosecutor's office exercises a judicial function when issuing a penalty order. The term “judgment” therefore also includes summary orders within the meaning of Art. 353 CrimPC when interpreted correctly.
“Discontinuation orders”: The requirements for issuing a non-prosecution order and a dismissal order are the same, except for the question of whether the criminal investigation to be concluded was opened within the meaning of Art. 308 CrimPC. With regard to the regulation of non-prosecution orders, the law essentially refers to the provisions on the discontinuation of proceedings (Art. 310 para. 2 CrimPC). The term “discontinuation orders” therefore also includes, when interpreted correctly, non-prosecution orders within the meaning of Art. 310 of the CrimPC.
23 With regard to paragraph 2, the reporting office already interprets the word “decisions” restrictively and requires the criminal authorities to provide not only the opening decisions but also, in addition to judgments, summary orders, discontinuation and non-prosecution decisions, also suspension and resumption decisions. This restriction makes sense from a teleological point of view, as the delivery of criminal proceedings files should empower the reporting office to fulfill its tasks and not block them. From a systematic and teleological point of view, paragraphs 1 and 2 should also be brought into line with each other as far as possible. The word “decision” in paragraph 2 should therefore be interpreted restrictively to mean that the criminal authorities are only required to deliver final decisions (including suspension orders) to the reporting office.
24 According to Art. 381a of the CrimPC, federal authorities are entitled to take legal action if federal law stipulates that they must be notified of a decision. Decisions on the disposition of criminal proceedings concerning money laundering, organized crime, terrorist financing, and lack of due diligence in financial transactions must therefore be communicated to the reporting office before they become legally binding.
25 It was pointed out above that a literal interpretation of the term “on the basis of” allows the conclusion that no “decisions” need to be served on the reporting office if a report from the reporting office has been attached to criminal proceedings that are already pending. However, FATF Recommendation 2023, No. 33, calls on member states to maintain comprehensive statistics on all areas that are essential to the effectiveness and efficiency of the anti-money laundering regime, including explicitly statistics on suspicious activity reports received and forwarded. The reporting office must therefore know whether its reports had any consequences and, if so, what those consequences were. A teleological interpretation of the term “on the basis of” therefore means that the decision to close the case, which finally decided on a suspicion reported by the reporting office to the public prosecutor's office, must be communicated to the reporting office, regardless of whether this suspicion was already known to the law enforcement authorities before the report was made. The following consideration leads to the same conclusion: the parties to criminal proceedings have the right to appeal regardless of how the criminal authorities initially became aware of the suspicions (Art. 107/382 CrimPC). The same must apply to the reporting office's right to appeal as enshrined in Art. 381a CrimPC: the reporting office must be notified of the disposition of its report so that it can exercise its right of appeal, regardless of whether the reported suspicion was already known to the prosecution authorities beforehand. However, if the law enforcement authorities are investigating various suspicions in the same criminal proceedings (e.g., for traffic offenses and money laundering), the reporting office does not have to be notified of decisions concerning suspects who do not fall within its jurisdiction. If the same decision on the case covers several grounds for suspicion, including one that falls within the reporting office's jurisdiction, the complete (uncensored) decision on the case must be sent to the reporting office, as the reporting office is bound by official secrecy and may only publish anonymized analyses and statistics on incidents within its jurisdiction.
26 Even if the legal basis for the delivery of decisions to the reporting office in Art. 29a para. 1 and 2 AMLA is not optimally formulated, the real challenge for the reporting office in fulfilling its mandate to prepare operational and strategic analyses and an annual report on money laundering, its predicate offenses, organized crime, and terrorist financing lies not in the flawed wording of the legal basis, but in its implementation: Unfortunately, the provisions contained in Art. 29a AMLA have only been partially implemented by the criminal authorities to date. The reporting office therefore contacts the criminal authorities at regular intervals and requests them to submit any outstanding notifications of decisions on the completion of proceedings. This does lead to an improvement in the data situation. However, the implementation of an IT-based solution and the automation of the delivery of final decisions remain indispensable for the comprehensive enforcement of reporting obligations.
B. Compliance with restrictions on use (paragraph 2bis)
27 The background to this regulation, which came into force on January 1, 2023, is as follows: According to the FATF recommendations, each country must have a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) that acts as a nationwide central office for receiving, analyzing, and forwarding suspicious activity reports. These FIUs should be able to exchange information quickly and easily with each other. In addition, the FIUs should become members of the Egmont Group and comply with its rules on the exchange of information with foreign FIUs. In particular, exchanged information should only be used for the purpose for which it was requested, unless the FIU that provided the information consents to its use for other purposes. According to the principles of the Egmont Group, the FIU that receives information must treat it as confidential and may only use it within the scope of the consent given by the FIU that provided the information. Appropriate legal provisions must be in place.
28 Such legal bases did not exist in Switzerland when the revised FATF recommendations came into force in 2012. Accordingly, the relevant legal basis was added to the existing Art. 29 AMLA: since then, para. 2bis has contained the legal basis for the transmission of information by the reporting office to other authorities, in particular to public prosecutors and the police, both on request and spontaneously (i.e., on the reporting office's own initiative and without a request from the receiving authority). Para. 2ter restricted this possibility of administrative assistance by the reporting office to domestic authorities to the extent that the reporting office may only pass on information received from foreign FIUs with their express consent. In doing so, the legislator implemented a core principle of the Egmont Group.
29 In practice, however, it became apparent that these legal bases were not sufficient to ensure Switzerland's compliance with the Egmont principles: Although the reporting office routinely imposed the condition that information from foreign FIUs be treated confidentially by the recipient authority (usually the public prosecutor's office), not be included in the case files, and, in particular, not be disclosed to the parties to criminal proceedings, these conditions conflicted with the provisions of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code concerning the keeping of files and access to files by the parties:
File management: According to the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code, all information and evidence relating to criminal proceedings must be included in the files (Art. 100 CrimPC). In principle, the prosecution authorities may not withhold any material they have collected or received that is relevant to the case.
Right to inspect files: According to the Criminal Procedure Code, the parties must be granted access to the complete files (Art. 101 and 107 para. 1 lit. a CrimPC). Although the right to inspect files may be restricted in certain respects, this does not apply to legal counsel (Art. 108 CrimPC).
30 Various cantonal public prosecutors therefore took the view that the reports in which the reporting office forwarded information from a foreign FIU to a public prosecutor's office for use in criminal proceedings should be included in the criminal files. Compliance with the confidentiality requirement was not possible, or only within the narrow limits of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code. This meant that although the reporting office complied with the disclosure requirements of foreign FIUs and forwarded the information received to the law enforcement authorities only under appropriate conditions, it could not guarantee that the law enforcement authorities would actually comply with these confidentiality requirements. By taking this approach, Switzerland risked violating its international obligations and causing foreign FIUs to stop transmitting information to Switzerland or to the reporting office.
31 The purpose of paragraph 2bis is now to resolve this conflict between the Egmont Principles and the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code by legally obliging the criminal authorities to comply with the reporting office's requirements regarding the further use of transmitted information. According to the materials, the legislature wanted this provision to enable the public prosecutor's office to obtain information in accordance with the conditions set by the reporting office without having to include it in the case files. However, the wording chosen is difficult to understand, even for specialists. In addition, important questions arise in the implementation process for both the reporting office and the public prosecutor's office, which remain unresolved. The legal solution must be considered a failure.
32 According to the wording of Art. 29 para. 2bis AMLA, when using the information forwarded by the reporting office, the criminal authorities must comply with the conditions specified by the reporting office in each individual case “in accordance with Article 29 para. 2ter.” A grammatical interpretation of this passage suggests that Art. 29 para. 2ter AMLA lists the various possible conditions that the reporting office may impose. However, this is not the case. Instead, Art. 29 para. 2ter AMLA refers to Art. 29 para. 2bis AMLA with regard to the “purposes of disclosure.” However, Art. 29 para. 2bis AMLA also does not contain any substantive provisions, but refers to Art. 30 paras. 2–5 AMLA. Art. 30 paras. 2, 3, and 5 are not relevant. Only Art. 30 para. 4 AMLA contains provisions concerning the conditions that the reporting office may impose when disclosing information. Although Art. 30 para. 4 AMLA concerns foreign FIUs, this paragraph could be applied “mutatis mutandis” to the Swiss criminal authorities. Based on the wording of the law, the reporting office can therefore only impose the conditions contained in Art. 30 para. 4 AMLA on the criminal authorities when forwarding information from foreign FIUs. With this interpretation of Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA, the phrase “in accordance with Article 29 para. 2ter” would ultimately have only declaratory value, because the forwarding of information from foreign FIUs to all authorities in Switzerland, including the criminal authorities, is in any case regulated by Art. 29 para. 2ter AMLA. If anything, instead of the cumbersome triple reference in Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA, a direct reference to Art. 30 para. 4 AMLA could have been made.
33 However, the materials reveal a completely different meaning of the phrase “in accordance with Article 29 paragraph 2ter.” According to the message, the purpose of Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA is to enable public prosecutors to obtain information in accordance with the conditions laid down by the reporting office without having to include it in the case file. The phrase “in accordance with Article 29 paragraph 2ter” is intended solely to clarify that the reporting office may only make the disclosure of information from foreign FIUs to the criminal authorities subject to this condition (namely, non-inclusion in the case files). There is no indication in the materials that the reporting office should be restricted in the formulation of conditions for the disclosure of information from foreign FIUs to Swiss criminal authorities. However, the intention of the legislature as set out in the dispatch could have been clearly formulated in the law in a simple manner by omitting the phrase “in accordance with Article 29 paragraph 2bis” in Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA and instead inserting the phrase “foreign reporting offices” after “information.”
34 In the absence of court rulings, it remains unclear whether the reporting office is bound by the restrictions of Art. 30 para. 4 AMLA when formulating the conditions of use for the transmission of information from foreign FIUs to the criminal authorities, or whether it is free to choose the conditions of use. This distinction is particularly relevant with regard to the inclusion of reports containing information from foreign FIUs in the files of criminal proceedings, because Art. 30 para. 4 AMLA does not contain any legal basis for such a restriction.
35 The reporting office has been implementing Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA in practice since January 1, 2023, by adopting the conditions imposed by the foreign reporting office when passing on foreign information to a Swiss criminal authority. Even though the restrictions on use applied by the reporting office are therefore generally tailored to each individual case, the reporting office usually uses the following standard notice:
"Use of the (international) information received in accordance with Art. 29 para. 2ter AMLA:
The above information is sensitive and subject to official secrecy. It is disclosed subject to compliance with the following conditions of use:
(1) The information may only be used for intelligence purposes.
(2) The receiving authority shall use the information exclusively for analysis purposes in the context of combating money laundering and its predicate offenses, organized crime, and terrorist financing.
(3) The information may not be used as evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings.
(4) The information may not be disclosed to third-party authorities under any circumstances without the prior, express, and written consent of MROS.
MROS reserves the right to request information about the use made of the information.
This standard notice does not include the requirement for the criminal authorities not to include the report or the information in the criminal proceedings file. Given that, according to the message, this was the purpose of introducing Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA into the law, this is very surprising.
36 The question arises as to how the public prosecutor's office deals with these requirements. First of all, it should be noted that the report transmitted by the reporting office to the public prosecutor's office with the information from the foreign FIUs must be included in the criminal proceedings files by the criminal authorities, because the warning notice from the reporting office does not contain any instructions to the contrary. It is also clear and unproblematic that the information may only be used in relation to money laundering and its predicate offenses, organized crime, and terrorist financing. Such reservations of specialty are also common in judicial assistance and can be implemented by the public prosecutor's office without further ado. In addition, the above-mentioned conditions of use raise the following questions for the criminal authorities in their implementation:
Use for information and analysis purposes only: It is unclear what is meant by the public prosecutor's office only being allowed to use the information for information (“intelligence”) and analysis purposes. The task of the public prosecutor's office is to investigate criminal offenses (Art. 6, 299, 308 CrimPC). To this end, it collects evidence (Art. 139 CrimPC), which can only be used in court if it has been collected in a legally correct manner and is therefore admissible (Art. 141 CrimPC). The public prosecutor's office does not collect information for intelligence and analysis purposes outside of criminal proceedings. The public prosecutor's office may therefore only include a report from the reporting office containing information from foreign FIUs in the files of a (pending or newly initiated) proceeding and analyze it like all other evidence to determine whether it contains information relevant to the assessment of a criminal offense. It remains unclear in what respect the public prosecutor's office should use the reports from the reporting office differently from other evidence.
No use as evidence: This restriction on use has a clear legal basis in Art. 30 para. 4 lit. c AMLA. In terms of content, it undoubtedly means that foreign information may not be used to justify the final court decision. This restriction on use can be implemented by the criminal authorities without further ado. If a criminal authority wishes to use information received from the reporting office of a foreign FIU as evidence for a final criminal decision, it must follow the path of judicial assistance. However, it is unclear whether this restriction on use means that the criminal authorities can use the foreign information to justify investigative measures, e.g., an international request for legal assistance, the disclosure of bank records, or the ordering of pre-trial detention. At the latest in the appeal proceedings (or the proceedings before the coercive measures court in the case of ordering pre-trial detention), the public prosecutor's office will have to submit the report received from the reporting office with the information from a foreign FIU to the court as evidence. The wording of the above restriction on use prohibits this. However, this would mean that the reports received from the reporting office could no longer be used by the public prosecutor's office at all and would therefore be worthless. The wording chosen by the reporting office should therefore be interpreted restrictively to mean that only the use of the reports as admissible evidence in the final decision is prohibited. Ultimately, the report from the reporting office containing information from foreign authorities has the same value as other police information, e.g., information transmitted by foreign police authorities to Swiss police authorities via Interpol. This view is supported by Art. 30 para. 4 lit. a no. 2 AMLA: Here, the use of foreign information (by analogy) for the initiation of criminal proceedings or to substantiate a request for legal assistance is explicitly provided for. If information can be used to initiate criminal proceedings, it must also be possible to use it for further investigative measures. The opposite would not make sense, as it would mean that the public prosecutor's office could initiate criminal proceedings on the basis of foreign information, but would not be allowed to continue with subsequent investigative measures. In summary, it can be concluded that, despite the restrictions on use, the public prosecutor's office may use information received from foreign FIUs via the reporting office to justify further investigative measures. However, its use as evidence in reaching and justifying the final decision is excluded.
No disclosure to third-party authorities: Until the end of 2024, the reporting office used a standard text that prohibited disclosure not only to third-party authorities, but also to “third parties” in general. This raised the question of whether this also meant the parties and participants in the criminal proceedings. Such a restriction on use would have been contrary to fundamental party rights, in particular those of the accused, and would have been difficult to uphold. Since the beginning of 2025, the reporting office's standard text has only prohibited disclosure to third-party authorities. The wording of this restriction on use prohibits the public prosecutor's office from disclosing foreign information to the criminal court or the police from disclosing it to the public prosecutor's office. This would restrict the use of foreign information to such an extent that it could hardly be used at all. The wording of the restriction on use must therefore be interpreted restrictively: disclosure between criminal authorities is permitted. However, disclosure to other authorities, such as the tax authority or a debt collection office, is prohibited.
37 It has already been pointed out that, in its previous practice, the reporting office does not instruct the criminal authorities not to include reports containing foreign information in criminal files. Since, according to the dispatch, this was the central purpose of the introduction of Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA, the following comments are nevertheless appropriate: Although the new Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA, as lex specialis and lex posterior, should in principle take precedence over the rules of the Criminal Procedure Code, even after the revision, the AMLA does not contain any explicit legal basis for restricting the criminal authorities' obligation to keep files and, associated with this, for restricting the right to inspect files. It is questionable whether the implicit provision contained in Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA is sufficient for a derogation from the CrimPC, especially since the right to inspect files is a fundamental right of the accused guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. If, despite these doubts, it is assumed that there is a sufficient legal basis for the reporting office to instruct the criminal authorities not to include reports containing information from foreign FIUs in the criminal case files, the question arises for the criminal authorities as to how they should specifically implement this instruction in practice. There are basically two options: On the one hand, the report received from the reporting office could be included in the criminal case files, but without granting the parties to the criminal proceedings access to it, which could be based on Art. 108 para. 1 lit. b CrimPC. However, this solution has several weaknesses: First, a corresponding instruction from the reporting office not to include the report in the case files would not be implemented literally, but only in spirit. Second, it is unclear how such “secret files” would have to be marked so that all authorities, including any courts dealing with the case files, would not inadvertently disclose the report to the parties. Finally, the right to a fair hearing and access to files can only be temporarily restricted on the basis of Art. 108 of the CrimPC (see Art. 108 para. 3 and 4 of the CrimPC). However, at the time the information is used for further investigative measures (with restriction of the right to a fair hearing), it is uncertain whether the foreign FIU will ever agree to the use of the information as evidence. It is unclear how to proceed if the foreign FIU does not give its consent. The better option would be for the criminal authorities not to include the report from the reporting office containing information from foreign FIUs in the files of the pending criminal proceedings, but to file it under a separate file number. In this way, the relevant requirement of the reporting office would be implemented verbatim and it would be clear that the parties to the previously pending criminal proceedings would not have access to the separately filed information. If the criminal authority comes to the conclusion that the report from the reporting office contains information that is relevant to the pending criminal proceedings (either incriminating or exonerating, cf. Art. 6 para. 2 CrimPC), the criminal authority would have to request the reporting office to grant permission to include the report in the files of the pending criminal proceedings.
38 The provision introduced into the law by Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA has the advantage that the reporting office is authorized to comply with any requirements imposed by foreign FIUs by imposing binding restrictions on use on the criminal authorities. This improves the reporting office's opportunities for international cooperation and enables it to remain in the Egmont Group. For the criminal authorities, the problem arises that evidence that has not been collected in a legally correct manner may not be admissible in court (Art. 141 CrimPC). In the present context, this means that evidence used by the criminal authorities contrary to the restrictions on use imposed by the reporting office may not be admissible, as may any subsequent evidence (Art. 141 para. 4 CrimPC). The interpretation of Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA as a validity provision within the meaning of Art. 141 CrimPC is contradicted by the fact that Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA does not aim to protect the accused from punishment. Nevertheless, the restrictions on use, some of which are currently unclear, pose procedural risks for the criminal authorities. The reporting office faces the challenge of translating the requirements formulated by the Egmont Group for the handling of exchanged information into meaningful instructions for the criminal authorities acting in accordance with Swiss procedural law. A particular challenge is that the strictly confidential exchange of information required by the FATF and the Egmont Group conflicts with the principle of party disclosure in criminal proceedings in Switzerland. Art. 29a para. 2bis AMLA has not resolved this problem.
IV. Cooperation between criminal authorities and supervisory authorities
A. Criminal authorities: disclosure of information and documents to supervisory authorities (para. 3)
39 While paragraphs 1 to 2bis codify the obligations of the criminal authorities towards the reporting office and the legally established feedback mechanism primarily serves the strategic functions of the reporting office, since February 1, 2009, para. 3 has regulated the right to information of all special supervisory authorities, namely FINMA, the ESBK, the intercantonal supervisory and enforcement authority under Article 105 BGS, and the Central Office for Precious Metals Control vis-à-vis the criminal authorities, and is intended to support the former in their supervisory activities.
40 The right to information closed a legal loophole at the federal level in 2009 and provided an adequate legal basis for effective cooperation between criminal and supervisory authorities. Based on the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code, which came into force on January 1, 2011, Article 101 para. 2 now also grants supervisory authorities the right to inspect files, but expressly only for pending proceedings.
41 However, in order to assess the guarantees required by law and compliance with the obligations under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the supervisory authorities need to know not only whether a criminal investigation is currently underway against a company subject to supervision or its managers, but also whether and how previous criminal investigations have been concluded. Only by inspecting the files of ongoing and completed criminal proceedings do the supervisory authorities have all the information they need to grant, refuse, or withdraw licenses or to order supervisory measures. Their right to information should enable them to proactively perform their tasks of protecting the reputation and integrity of the financial center, as well as protecting creditors and the functioning of the market.
42 The supervisory authorities' right to information is therefore comprehensive in terms of content: the criminal authorities may provide them with all information and documents they request in the course of performing their duties. The scope of exchange between the criminal and supervisory authorities is thus broader than that between the reporting office and the supervisory authorities based on Art. 29 para. 1 AMLA, which is limited to the application and enforcement of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.
43 While the right to information in favor of the supervisory authorities is comprehensive in terms of content, the present provision preserves the criminal authorities' scope for action with regard to the timing of the disclosure of the requested information and documents: The criminal authorities are authorized and required to provide the requested information, provided that this does not prejudice the criminal proceedings and that the interest of criminal prosecution does not (or no longer) preclude the disclosure of the information.
44 In addition to Art. 29a para. 4 AMLA, the revised Art. 38 FINMASA, which came into force on January 1, 2016, has been applicable to exchanges between law enforcement authorities and FINMA as a further legal and administrative assistance provision, although the relationship between these standards is not regulated by law and is therefore unclear. While Art. 38 FINMASA regulates the mutual exchange between FINMA and the criminal prosecution authorities within the framework of administrative and legal assistance, Art. 29a para. 3 AMLA only covers the unilateral exchange between these authorities, insofar as the criminal prosecution authority discloses and transmits information and documents from its proceedings. The relationship between criminal and supervisory proceedings in the exchange of information, which is the subject of heated debate due to the administrative cooperation obligations of supervised entities, is therefore irrelevant in the scope of application of Art. 29a AMLA and will not be discussed further here.
45 However, the legal provisions also differ in that Art. 29a AMLA stipulates that the criminal authorities shall transmit the information and documents requested by the supervisory authorities. Art. 38 FINMASA also contains a general authorization for criminal authorities to communicate with FINMA: information, which includes not only details but also documents, should be able to be transmitted by the criminal authorities to FINMA quickly and informally, not only at FINMA's request, but also on their own initiative.
46 Art. 38 FINMASA is also relevant to the exchange of information between the criminal prosecution authorities and the Central Office for Precious Metals Control due to the reference in Art. 42ter para. 3 EMKG.
47 For the ESBK, there is an explicit legal provision on mutual administrative and legal assistance with the criminal prosecution authorities in Art. 102 para. 2 BGS of September 29, 2017, and for the intercantonal authority in Art. 111 para. 2 of the same decree. As the intercantonal authority has no law enforcement powers, Art. 111 para. 2 BGS does not contain any provisions on mutual coordination of proceedings.
B. Supervisory authorities: coordination of proceedings with law enforcement authorities (para. 4)
48 The interests of law enforcement enjoy special protection during ongoing criminal proceedings. In contrast to the preceding para. 4, which therefore only refers to the coordination of proceedings between the supervisory authorities and the law enforcement authorities and does not include the adjudicating courts. In criminal and supervisory proceedings running in parallel, the exchange of information is intended to avoid duplication and enable effective cooperation between law enforcement and supervisory authorities. At the same time, it must be ensured that information and documents from the preliminary criminal proceedings are not made available to parties to the proceedings or third parties at an inopportune moment as a result of intervention by the supervisory authorities. Action by the supervisory authorities could warn those affected prematurely and jeopardize or prevent the subsequent access of the law enforcement authorities to evidence required for the criminal proceedings. If the interests of creditors, investors, or insured persons are at acute risk and action by the supervisory authority to avert danger cannot be postponed, information and coordination appear to be particularly important. This is all the more important given that supervised entities regularly contest law enforcement agencies' access to information and documents held by FINMA, citing their administrative obligations to cooperate.
49 Supervisory authorities are therefore generally required to coordinate their interventions with the financial intermediary concerned with the law enforcement agencies. Before forwarding the information and documents received from the law enforcement authorities, the supervisory authorities are additionally and expressly obliged to consult with the law enforcement authorities, although it remains unclear in what form this consultation should take place and whether the consent of the law enforcement authorities is required. According to the explanations in the dispatch, however, it is the intention of the legislator that the supervisory authority should consult with the law enforcement authorities on the use of the information and documents as soon as they are received, so that any interference with the ongoing criminal proceedings can be ruled out.
50 Following the entry into force of the revised Art. 38 FINMASA, FINMA signed memoranda of understanding on cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland and various cantonal public prosecutors' offices, which contain agreements on the form and content of mutual administrative and legal assistance requests.
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Naegeli Vera, Kommentierung zu Art. 29a GwG, in: Hsu Peter/Flühmann Daniel (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Geldwäschereigesetz, Basel 2021.
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Materials
Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei im Finanzsektor (Geldwäschereigesetz, GwG) vom 17.6.1996, BBl 1996 1101 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1996/3_1101_1057_993/de, besucht am 10.8.2024 (zit. Botschaft GwG 1996).
Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht (Finanzmarktaufsichtsgesetz, FINMAG) vom 1.2.2006, BBl 2006 2829 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2006/303/de, besucht am 29.3.2025 (zit. Botschaft FINMAG 2006).
Botschaft zur Umsetzung der revidierten Empfehlungen der Group d’action financière (GAFI) vom 15.6.2007, BBl 2007 6269 ff, abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2007/938/de, besucht am 10.8.2024 (zit. Botschaft GAFI 2007).
Botschaft zur Änderung des Geldwäschereigesetzes vom 27.06.2012, BBl 2012 6941 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2012/1031/de, besucht am 24.3.2025 (zit. Botschaft GwG 2012).
Botschaft zur Umsetzung der 2012 revidierten Empfehlungen der Group d’action financière (GAFI) vom 13.12.2013, BBl 2014 605 ff, abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2014/100/de, besucht am 29.3.2025 (zit. Botschaft GAFI 2014).
Botschaft zum Finanzmarktinfrastrukturgesetz (FinfraG) vom 3.12.2014, BBl 2014 7483 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2014/1633/de, besucht am 29.3.2025 (zit. Botschaft FinfraG 2014).
Botschaft zum Geldspielgesetz vom 21.10.2015, BBl 2015 8387 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2015/2141/de, besucht am 10.8.2024 (zit. Botschaft BGS 2015).
Botschaft zur Genehmigung und Umsetzung des Übereinkommens des Europarates zur Verhütung des Terrorismus mit dem zugehörigen Zusatzprotokoll und Verstärkung des strafrechtlichen Instrumentariums gegen Terrorismus und organisierte Kriminalität vom 14.9.2018, BBl 2018 6427 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2018/2301/de, besucht am 11.8.2024.
Erläuternder Bericht zur Vernehmlassungsvorlage bezüglich der Änderung des Bundesgesetzes über die Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei und der Terrorismusfinanzierung vom 1.6.2018, abrufbar unter https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/52554.pdf, besucht am 11.8.2024.
Botschaft zur Änderung des Geldwäschereigesetzes vom 26.6.2019, BBl 2019 5451 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2019/1932/de, besucht am 11.8.2024 (zit. Botschaft GwG 2019).
Erläuternder Bericht zur Vernehmlassungsvorlage bezüglich des Bundesgesetzes über die Transparenz juristischer Personen und die Identifikation der wirtschaftlich berechtigten Personen vom 30.8.2023, abrufbar unter https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/82297.pdf, besucht am 12.8.2024.
Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die Transparenz juristischer Personen und die Identifikation der wirtschaftlich berechtigten Personen vom 22.5.2024, BBl 2024 1607 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2024/1607/de, besucht am 24.3.2025 (zit. Botschaft TJPG 2024).
Bundesamt für Polizei, Die Praxis der Meldestelle; eine Zusammenfassung der Praxis seit 2004, Bern, März 2016.
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units: Principles for Information exchange between financial intelligence units vom 28.10.2013, abrufbar unter https://egmontgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Egmont-Group-of-Financial-Intelligence-Units-Principles-for-Information-Exchange-Between-Financial-Intelligence-Units.pdf, besucht am 12.8.2024.
Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht FINMA, Leitlinien zur Rechtshilfe gegenüber inländischen Strafbehörden vom 20.11.2015, abrufbar unter https://www.finma.ch/de/~/media/finma/dokumente//dokumentencenter/myfinma/3durchsetzung/leitlinien-zur-rechtshilfe-gegenüber-inländischen-strafbehörden.pdf?sc_lang=de&hash=3474150F15494595032699496113756Ff, besucht am 30.3.2025.
Eidgenössische Finanzkontrolle (EFK); Bericht über die Prüfung der Aufgabenerfüllung der Meldestelle für Geldwäscherei vom 20.12.2021, abrufbar unter https://www.efk.admin.ch/wp-content/uploads/publikationen/berichte/sicherheit_und_umwelt/justiz_und_polizei/20146/20146be-endgueltige-fassung-v04.pdf, besucht am 30.3.2025.
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), International Standards on Combating Money laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (FATF-Recommendations) 2012, updated February 2025, abrufbar unter https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/recommendations/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf, besucht am 30.3.2025.
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)/Groupe d’actioin financière (GAFI), 3ème Rapport d’Évaluation mutuelle de la Lutte Anti-Blanchiment de capitaux et contre le Financement du terrorisme, Suisse, Novembre 2005, Zusammenfassung abrufbar unter https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/mer/mer%20switzerland%20resume.pdf.coredownload.pdf, besucht am 30.3.2025.
FATF (2016), Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures – Switzerland, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report, FATF Paris, abrufbar unter https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/images/mer/mer-switzerland-2016.pdf, besucht am 12.8.2024.
Meldestelle für Geldwäscherei, Jahresberichte 1999 bis 2024, abrufbar unter https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/fedpol/de/home/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/publikationen.html, besucht am 8.10.2025.
Vorentwurf und erläuternder Bericht bezüglich der Genehmigung und Umsetzung des Übereinkommens des Europarates zur Verhütung des Terrorismus mit dem zugehörigen Zusatzprotokoll und Verstärkung des strafrechtlichen Instrumentariums gegen Terrorismus und organisierte Kriminalität vom Juni 2017, abrufbar unter https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/de/home/sicherheit/gesetzgebung/archiv/terror-europarat.html, besucht am 11.8.2024.