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- Art. 5a FC
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- Art. 43a FC
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- Art. 75b FC
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- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 701 CO
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- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
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- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
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- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. Background
- II. Systematic and context
- III. Art. 166: Foreign relations and international treaties
- Recommended further reading
- About the author
- Bibliography
I. Background
1 The Federal Constitution of 1848 already enshrined in Article 74, para. 5 the competence of the Federal Assembly to approve alliances and treaties with foreign states. Despite the absence of a general provision on the involvement of the Federal Assembly in foreign affairs in the Constitution of 1874 and the dominant role of the Federal Council in practice between the end of the 19th century and the end of the 20th century, the executive did not have exclusive competence in this area.
2 The current Art. 166 FC was the subject of heated debate during the last total revision of the Federal Constitution. Following criticism during the consultation procedure, the Federal Council proposed a new Article 156 FC in its 1996 draft. The first paragraph of the new article expressly stated that the Federal Assembly had the power to exert considerable influence on foreign policy, providing that "the Federal Assembly shall participate in the formulation of foreign policy and shall supervise foreign relations". Paragraph 2 reaffirmed the Federal Assembly's competence to approve treaties, except in cases where the Federal Council was empowered to conclude them alone on the basis of the Constitution, a law or an international treaty. In 1997, the two constitutional review commissions proposed a more direct formulation of the general competence ("the Federal Assembly shall determine the fundamental orientations of foreign policy"), which the Federal Council opposed. In addition, both commissions considered that international treaties that fall solely within the competence of the Federal Council and therefore do not require approval by the Federal Assembly should be defined in law.
3 After intensive discussions, the Federal Council's proposal was adopted with regard to the current paragraph 1 of Article 166 FC. Thus, a general and explicit provision on the involvement of the Federal Assembly in foreign policy matters was adopted, without however granting the Federal Assembly the power to set guidelines in this area in a binding manner. With regard to para. 2, the proposal that the Constitution could give the Federal Council the power to conclude certain international treaties on its own was quickly rejected and the committees' proposal was accepted.
II. Systematic and context
4 Article 166 FC is part of the general theme of the competences of the Federal Assembly (Title 5, Section 3, Chapter 3 FC) and deals specifically with the separation of powers in the area of foreign policy. Article 166 FC is closely linked to Article 184 FC, which states that "the Federal Council shall be responsible for foreign affairs subject to the rights of participation of the Federal Assembly" as defined in Article 166 FC. This intrinsic link between the two provisions demonstrates the intertwining of the competences of the legislative and executive branches in this area. Furthermore, the inclusion of shared competences and intensive cooperation between the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly in the field of foreign policy in the 1999 Constitution marks an important step in the general trend towards the erosion of the executive's monopoly in foreign relations.
5 At the root of this intertwining of competences are two major challenges facing the federal authorities in charge of foreign affairs. On the one hand, the internationalisation of politics and law, which has gained in intensity especially since the second half of the 20th century, and the effects that international norms have directly on the public and on national law, have highlighted an increased need for democratic legitimacy in the international sphere. On the other hand, the Federal Council needs to be able to maintain a margin of manoeuvre and a degree of flexibility and efficiency in the conduct of foreign policy, needs that can be undermined by the often time-consuming processes of parliamentary involvement. This tension is particularly delicate for a globalised state like Switzerland, whose "constitutional DNA" includes democratic participation in law-making.
III. Art. 166: Foreign relations and international treaties
6 Art. 166 FC concerns the horizontal division of competences in the field of foreign affairs between the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly.
A. Participation in the definition of foreign policy and supervision of foreign relations (paragraph 1)
7 While the Federal Council is "responsible for foreign affairs" (Art. 184 para. 1 FC), the Federal Assembly has certain rights of participation under Art. 166 and 184 para. 1 FC. The doctrine considers that the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly have concurrent powers in foreign affairs. The Federal Council's message on a new Federal Constitution of 20 November 1996 notes a parallelism and overlap in the respective competences of the executive and the legislature which "encourage [...] the two powers to combine their efforts" and that they act like "the fingers of a single hand" in the field of foreign policy. The federal legislature thus has a strong position in foreign policy that is unique in international comparison. According to Article 166 paragraph 1 FC, the Federal Assembly "participates in the definition of foreign policy" (inter alia by approving international treaties, paragraph 2) and "supervises foreign relations".
1. Participation in the definition of foreign policy
a. Terminology
"Participation" in the definition
8 "Participation" means taking part in something, in an action, in this case in the definition of foreign policy. Article 166 paragraph 1 FC thus establishes a right and an obligation for the Federal Assembly to participate. Ehrenzeller refers to this as a "co-responsible decision-maker" ("mitverantwortlicher Entscheidungsträger").
9 The current wording goes further than the 1995 draft ("it can contribute to the orientation of foreign policy"), but less than the proposal of the two commissions in 1997 that "the Federal Assembly determines the fundamental orientations of foreign policy". We conclude from this that the Federal Assembly cannot set binding goals in the field of international policy. However, in June 2021, the EPC of the National Council requested in a parliamentary initiative that 'the Federal Council should clarify the institutional rules for the continuation and facilitation of relations with the European Union within the framework of the structured political dialogue with the European Union, in such a way as to safeguard Switzerland's interests' and that 'the main lines of the dialogue as well as the role of parliament and the cantons and their involvement in the process should be defined in a federal law'. In Baumbacher's view, such a law would not be compatible with the division of competences established by the Constitution. In our opinion, it would be justified for the Federal Assembly to legally define the strategic orientations and guidelines of European policy. However, an obligation to enter into negotiations and the impossibility for the Federal Council to break off negotiations, as proposed in the initiative, would go beyond the participation of Art. 166 para. 1 FC and would thus infringe the prerogative of the executive. The Federal Court has expressly held that the Federal Assembly cannot oblige the Federal Council to undertake certain foreign policy measures under Art. 166 para. 1 FC and that it is the sole competence of the Federal Council to refrain from further negotiations.
10 By "participating" in the sense of Art. 166 para. 1 FC, the Federal Assembly must not merely legitimise the action of the Federal Council in the area of foreign policy, but must act proactively on its own initiative and in accordance with the procedures in force.
"Definition" of "foreign policy"
11 The concept of "foreign policy" should be understood broadly, in the sense that it includes all activities carried out in the context of Switzerland's external affairs. In general, it is considered that the notion of "foreign policy" is narrower than the notion of "foreign affairs". However, these terminological distinctions have little practical significance.
12 The Federal Assembly "participates in the definition", "sich an der Gestaltung beteiligen", "participa all'elaborazione" of foreign policy. The French version simply speaks of "definition", while the German version uses the term "Gestaltung" and the Italian version "elaborazione". It can be deduced from this that the Federal Assembly must participate in the shaping, the elaboration of foreign policy, i.e. in its formation and its mature preparation. The Federal Assembly must therefore be associated with the formation of political will on fundamental issues and be involved in the taking of important decisions and thus have the possibility of exercising an effective influence on the orientation of Swiss foreign policy. The operational aspects of the conduct of this policy, in particular its implementation, are the responsibility of the Federal Council alone.
13 Article 24 of the Federal Act defines the concept of "foreign policy definition". According to paragraph 1, "the Federal Assembly [...] shall participate in the decision-making process on important foreign policy issues". The doctrine considers that the notion of "important issues" is of a material and non-formal nature, in the sense that formal criteria such as the form or nature of a foreign policy act are not decisive and that it must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into account all the circumstances.
14 In conclusion, the Federal Council is obliged to involve the Federal Assembly before taking decisions on "important issues" in the field of foreign policy. However, this involvement also entails a responsibility for the Federal Assembly to "follow international developments" in accordance with Art. 24 para. 1 of the Federal Act and to take positions and initiatives in this regard.
b. Actors of participation
15 Art. 166 FC includes the participation of the plenum and the parliamentary committees. The most relevant committees are the two foreign policy committees (FPC), but other thematic committees also participate depending on the area concerned. The FPCs act as a link between the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly thanks to the specific rights granted to them under Article 152 of the Federal Law on Parliament.
c. Forms of participation
16 The Federal Assembly performs the tasks defined in Art. 166 FC and Art. 24 para. 1 FL (i.e. monitoring international developments and participating in the decision-making process on important foreign policy issues) mainly in four forms: exchange of views, right to information, right to consultation and parliamentary foreign relations.
Exchange of views and right to information
17 According to Art. 152 para. 1 of the Federal Act, "the committees responsible for foreign policy and the Federal Council shall maintain mutual contacts and regularly exchange views".
18 Para. 2 of the same article requires the Federal Council to inform the Presidential Colleges of Councils and the FPC regularly, promptly and comprehensively of important developments in this area, whether these concern Switzerland's foreign policy alone or have implications for its domestic policy. Ehrenzeller considers that in order to ensure effective participation of the Federal Assembly, it is the responsibility of the FPC and not the Federal Council to sort out important and less important developments. Furthermore, the general information rights of the Federal Assembly under Art. 150 para. 1 letters a to c of the Federal Act and their limitations under para. 2 letters a and b also apply to foreign policy.
Right of consultation
19 Article 152 paragraph 3 of the Federal Act establishes an obligation to consult the FPC on the main foreign policy guidelines, on planned changes to the Swiss diplomatic and consular network abroad, and on directives or guidelines concerning the adoption or amendment of a mandate for important international negotiations to be issued by the Federal Council. The Federal Council is also obliged to inform the FPC about the progress of work in view of the guidelines and negotiations. The broad formulation of important international negotiations includes not only negotiations within international organisations, but also all bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The notion of major policy is even broader and also includes soft law. This concept was clarified by Art. 5b OLOGA, which entered into force on 1 August 2016. Main orientations" and "important international negotiations" are indeterminate legal concepts and should therefore not be defined in the abstract, but assessed on a case-by-case basis by the committees and the Federal Council. In the event of a conflict between the Federal Council and the FPC on such an assessment, the FPC may at any time request consultation with the Federal Council on the basis of Art. 152 para. 5 of the Federal Act.
20 On the one hand, a lack of sufficient information and consultation of the FPCs, and of course of the Federal Assembly as a whole, has been alleged on several occasions by the members concerned. For example, numerous parliamentary interventions have criticised the Federal Council for not having sufficiently involved Parliament in the elaboration of international soft law instruments and led to the introduction of the above-mentioned Art. 5b OLOGA. Nevertheless, other parliamentary interventions on the same issue were tabled in the course of 2018, focusing particularly on the UN Pact on Migration. In our opinion, these various challenges were not only motivated by the legal nature of the instrument, but also and above all by the political significance of its content.
21 On the other hand, the EPC of the Council of States refrained from expressing an opinion when the Federal Council consulted it during the final stage of negotiations on the institutional framework agreement between Switzerland and the European Union in April 2021. Both EPCs were consulted on the Federal Council's assessment that the conditions for continuing the negotiations or signing the agreement were not met for Switzerland. The EPC of the Council of States took the view that it was solely up to the Federal Council to decide whether to interrupt, suspend or continue the negotiations on the basis of the constitutional division of powers. The EPC of the National Council, on the other hand, took a position and demanded that the negotiations be continued with the rapid adoption of a message to parliament.
Parliamentary external relations
22 Article 24 paragraph 4 of the Federal Act states that the Federal Assembly "shall participate in the work of international parliamentary assemblies and shall maintain regular relations with foreign parliaments". Foreign parliamentary relations are dealt with in Art. 60 PA and in the Ordinance of the Federal Assembly on the International Relations of Parliament (ORInt). The aim of this form of participation is not only to have an effect on the outside world of the Federal Assembly, but also to enable it to be more effectively involved in the internal decision-making process. The Federal Assembly can thus present itself to the Federal Council as more informed and competent thanks to the individual international experiences of its members. Today, the members of the Federal Assembly participate in the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and in the parliamentary assemblies of international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, EFTA, NATO and the International Organisation of the Francophonie (Art. 1 and 2 ORInt). Art. 60 of the Federal Law on Parliament provides for the creation of parliamentary delegations to maintain bilateral relations with foreign parliaments. At present, such permanent delegations exist for relations with the parliaments of all neighbouring states (Art. 4 ORInt). These various contacts contribute, on the one hand, to the democratisation of international organisations and, on the other hand, to the legitimacy of foreign policy by enabling a more effective exercise of the participation mandate of the Federal Assembly under Article 166 FC.
d. Instruments of participation
23 The range of instruments through which the Federal Assembly participates in the definition of foreign policy is broad. The first instrument available is the federal law (Art. 164 FC). However, it is not used much because of the often unpredictable nature of foreign policy, which creates a need for rapid action. Federal decrees, simple federal decrees, decisions of principle and plans (Art. 28 LParl) are more suitable instruments for "one-off acts relating to the conduct of the state, for activities limited in time, for important procedural acts or for provisional decisions". In addition, the Federal Assembly can make use of various parliamentary interventions (Art. 118 LParl) and budgetary decisions. Finally, the rights of participation, in particular the right to information, are given concrete form in various reports: the Federal Council's reports on the foreign policy strategy for each legislature (Art. 148 para. 3bis LParl), the Federal Council's ordinary annual reports on Switzerland's foreign policy activities (Art. 148 para. 3 LParl), the quarterly lists informing the EPC of foreign and European policy activities and the Economic and Fiscal Affairs Committees of foreign financial policy activities, as well as other specific or thematic reports.
e. Effects of participation
24 Article 166 paragraph 1 FC gives the Federal Council the right and duty to take note of the various opinions of the Federal Assembly and to examine them in depth. Schmid speaks of an obligation on the part of the Federal Council to 'reflect sincerely on the content of the positions taken by the Federal Assembly and its committees'. Without such consideration, the participation rights of the Federal Assembly would not be respected. However, the Federal Council is not obliged to follow the views of the Federal Assembly; it may deviate from them if it has duly and concretely weighed up the interests at stake and if the circumstances so require, but must then justify the direction of its foreign policy actions.
2. Monitoring of foreign relations
25 According to Article 166 paragraph 1 FC, the Federal Assembly shall supervise foreign relations. In view of the systemic nature of this paragraph, a close link between supervision and participation can be deduced. The explicit mention of supervision in this paragraph shows that the role of the Federal Assembly is not limited to a political control a posteriori, but is an aspect of the general competence of participation, namely a proactive participation of the Federal Assembly.
26 Beaufsichtigung does not only refer to the way the Federal Council handles foreign affairs, which is already subject to the supreme supervision of the Federal Assembly (Art. 169 FC), but also to Switzerland's relations with foreign countries in general, including the activities of the various public actors in this area, including those of the cantons (Art. 56 FC) and its own foreign policy (Art. 24 para. 4 FL). We agree with Aubert that the word "ensure" would have been more appropriate, in that the Federal Assembly must "ensure" that foreign relations are "as good as possible" overall. Its role is not limited to passive observation, in the sense that it must "look after" these relations when it acts itself. In addition, the Federal Assembly ensures that it is effectively involved in the definition of foreign policy.
B. Approval of international treaties (paragraph 2)
27 Art. 166 para. 2 FC provides for a particularly extensive right of participation of the Federal Assembly in foreign affairs. In principle, the Federal Assembly is responsible for approving international treaties prior to their ratification by the Federal Council. This role of the legislature in approving "hard" international law is similar to the main function of the legislative body, namely lawmaking. An exception to the above principle concerns treaties the conclusion of which is the sole responsibility of the Federal Council by virtue of a law or an international treaty.
1. General
28 The material scope of application of Art. 166 para. 2 FC is limited to international treaties. A treaty is an international agreement between two or more subjects of public international law (states and international organisations) by which they express their concurring wills and thereby create, for their benefit or at their expense, rights or obligations governed by international law. According to the majority doctrine, Art. 166 para. 2 FC applies only to international treaties in the narrow sense and not to decisions of international organisations or to flexible law. However, it should be mentioned that some international instruments that do not correspond to this definition of an international treaty have already been submitted to the Federal Assembly for approval, for example the UN Global Compact on Migration, which is an instrument of soft law.
29 In contrast to signature, ratification and denunciation, approval is the expression of explicit consent through an act of national law rendered within the framework of the internal decision-making procedure. From a legal point of view, approval is not a mandate, but a mere authorisation for ratification. This means that the Federal Council may not ratify a treaty despite prior approval by the Federal Assembly. However, there are dogmatic differences in the doctrine. Schmid considers that the approval contains an authorisation for the Federal Council to ratify, but that under Art. 184 para. 1 FC, the Federal Council can waive this authorisation, particularly in the event of a major change in the factual situation. Epiney, on the other hand, considers that approval constitutes an obligation to ratify, but that exceptions are possible in the event of a substantial change in circumstances.
30 The question of parliamentary participation in the conclusion, amendment and termination of international treaties is part of one of the central issues in constitutional law in recent years, namely how to make international law more democratically legitimate and how to better involve the legislature. In 2019, this debate led to the adoption of the new Federal Act on the Competence to Conclude, Amend and Denounce International Treaties, which is discussed in point 4 of this section.
2. Approval by the Federal Assembly (so-called ordinary procedure)
31 Approval takes place between the time of signature and the ratification of the treaty by the Federal Council. It takes the form of a federal decree subject to a mandatory referendum if the treaty concerns Switzerland's membership of a collective security organisation or a supranational community (Art. 140 para. 1 let. b FC), or of a federal decree subject to a mandatory referendum if the treaty concerns Switzerland's membership of a supranational community. ), or a federal decree subject to an optional referendum if the treaty is of indefinite duration and cannot be terminated, provides for membership of an international organisation, contains important provisions establishing rules of law (Art. 22 para. 4 LParl) or if its implementation requires the adoption of federal laws (Art. 141 para. 1 let. d FC). In all other cases, it is a simple federal decree (Art. 24 para. 3 PESA).
32 On 6 December 2021, the National Council rejected a draft revision of the Constitution aimed at extending the mandatory referendum to international treaties containing provisions of constitutional rank or whose implementation requires an amendment to the Constitution. This case of application of the compulsory referendum was already part of unwritten constitutional law according to a widely held interpretation. The draft revision was proposed following the adoption of motion 15.3557 Caroni by Parliament, which in turn referred to the report drawn up in execution of postulate 13.3805 in which the Federal Council supported the idea of a mandatory referendum for international treaties of a constitutional nature. According to National Councillor Caroni, the inclusion of this popular right in the Constitution did not create a new case for the application of the mandatory referendum, but simply introduced already existing unwritten constitutional law in order to guarantee clarity and legal certainty. However, it cannot be excluded that the motion 15.3557 Caroni and the draft were also motivated by the absence of a referendum before the ratification of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 in 1974 and the numerous developments that this has brought about in Swiss law. In 2018, Schmid considered that the change to the mandatory referendum was not an adequate solution to the general unease about the normative intertwining between Swiss national and international law. She also considered that the new wording of Art. 140 FC as proposed by the Federal Council would have posed a number of interpretation problems as well as a risk of introducing a mandatory referendum for all treaties dealing with fundamental rights.
33 Depending on the parliamentary debates in both chambers, the Federal Assembly can either accept or reject the treaty, i.e. either grant or reject approval in the final vote. The latter must cover the entire treaty and be unconditional. Insofar as reservations are permitted by the treaty and by the general rules of international law (Art. 19 VCLT), the Federal Assembly may approve a treaty provided that a reservation is made upon ratification by the Federal Council.
34 Article 141a FC provides that decrees approving an international treaty subject to a mandatory or optional referendum may also contain constitutional or legislative amendments related to the implementation of the treaty. It is controversial whether the Federal Assembly can include other elements ("enrichments") than the approval itself, such as modalities of application or interpretation of the treaty, in a simple decree. In this respect, Epiney takes the view that, due to Swiss monism, treaties also become binding in domestic law as soon as they enter into force at the international level and that such interpretative declarations would not be binding on the courts. Schmid, on the other hand, considers that art. 166 para. 2 FC refers only to the approval of international treaties and not to the modalities of their application or interpretation.
35 The effect of the approval of an international treaty by the Federal Assembly is not an obligation of the Federal Council. According to Art. 184 para. 2 FC, it is up to the Federal Council to subsequently ratify or not to ratify the treaty, while giving reasons for its choice. Furthermore, the Federal Assembly cannot oblige the Federal Council to ratify (or not to ratify) a treaty by means of a motion, postulate or initiative even when the approval decree has been validly adopted, due to the purely enabling nature of the latter and the limits of the effects of these instruments. At the international level, non-compliance with a provision of domestic law concerning the competence to conclude a treaty such as Art. 166 para. 2 FC does not invalidate the ratification, unless "the violation was manifest and concerned a rule of domestic law of fundamental importance" (Art. 46 VCLT).
36 According to Art. 7b LOGA, the Federal Council may decide to apply a treaty whose approval falls within the competence of the Federal Assembly on a provisional basis without the latter if "the safeguarding of essential interests of Switzerland and a particular urgency require it" (para. 1) and if the competent committees of the two councils do not oppose it (para. 1bis). Lammers, Schenker and Schmid speak of a real veto right of the parliamentary committees. The Federal Council must submit a draft approval decree to Parliament within six months, failing which provisional application will cease (paragraph 2).
3. Conclusion by the Federal Council alone (simplified procedure)
37 Article 166 paragraph 2 FC authorises the Federal Council to conclude international treaties without the approval of the Federal Assembly in two cases: if this is provided for by a federal law or an international treaty (delegation clause, art. 7a paragraph 1 LOGA), or if the international treaty is of minor importance (art. 7a paragraph 2 LOGA). Thanks to this competence to conclude treaties, the Federal Council can independently commit Switzerland at the international level. Although the simplified procedure is the exception to the principle, in practice it represents the majority of cases.
38 Art. 166, para. 2 FC reflects the principle that important provisions at federal level are enacted by the Federal Assembly (Art. 164 FC) and aims to ensure the democratic legitimacy of treaties concluded by the Federal Council alone by requiring that the Federal Council's own competence is based on a treaty or a federal law that the Federal Assembly has already approved or adopted respectively.
39 The first (and most common) case of the simplified procedure is specified in Art. 7a para. 1 LOGA. Many international treaties and special laws contain delegation clauses that allow the Federal Council to conclude a treaty on its own. These clauses must not grant a general authorisation to the Federal Council to conclude international treaties on its own and must therefore be sufficiently delimited and precise.
40 The Federal Council may also conclude minor international treaties on its own in accordance with Art. 7a para. 2 LOGA. In Schmid's view, this paragraph constitutes a general clause that is subsidiary to paragraph 1, in that it does not require the Federal Council to conclude international treaties. 1, in that it establishes the autonomous competence of the Federal Council in the absence of a special legal basis. Para. 3 of this article lists, in a non-exhaustive manner, the treaties that may be qualified as minor in scope (positive definition, letters a to c). Para. 4 also contains an exemplary list of cases in which minor scope is excluded (negative definition, letters a to c). However, the Federal Council remains free to submit such treaties to the Federal Assembly.
41 The competence to conclude international treaties may be delegated by the Federal Assembly to the Federal Council (Art. 7a para. 1 LOGA), but also to subordinate administrative units. The Federal Council may also delegate its competence to conclude treaties solely to a department (Art. 48a para. 1 lett. 1 LOGA), to a grouping or to an office in the case of an express legal basis or a treaty of minor importance (Art. 48a para. 1 lett. 2 LOGA).
4. Amendment and denunciation
42 The new Federal Act on the Competence to Conclude, Amend and Denounce International Treaties entered into force on 2 December 2019. In the legal literature, the question has been raised whether the concept of 'approval' within the meaning of Art. 166 para. 2 FC already includes denunciation and whether a constitutional amendment would otherwise have been necessary.
43 The core of this legislative amendment is to be found in Art. 24 para. 2 LParl, according to which the Federal Assembly 'shall approve the conclusion, amendment or denunciation of international treaties insofar as the Federal Council is not authorised to conclude, amend or denounce them on its own under Art. 7a and 7bbis LOGA'. According to the principle of the contrary act, there are parallel competences for the conclusion and modification or denunciation of international treaties. This is an important clarification of the legal situation at the level of the law, as the Federal Council previously considered the denunciation of treaties to be within its exclusive competence under the Constitution. Since a considerable proportion of international treaties are the basis for individual rights and obligations, it was crucial that amendment and denunciation be given sufficient democratic legitimacy. A shift in the distribution of competences in favour of Parliament, which follows the current trend towards greater involvement of Parliament in foreign policy, was clearly formulated. Thus, the amendment or denunciation must, in principle, be approved by the Federal Assembly with a potential submission to a referendum according to the constitutional criteria relevant to the conclusion which apply by analogy. The approval of the denunciation or amendment thus constitutes an authorisation for the Federal Council to execute the act under international law. The question of whether the approval of the Federal Assembly is required must be re-examined for each amendment or denunciation according to its material importance, even if this amendment is provided for in the basic text (parallelism of powers according to the importance of the content or material parallelism). According to Art. 24 para. 2 of the Federal Act, the Federal Council may therefore autonomously amend or terminate a treaty according to the criteria of Art. 7a para. 1 and 7b para. 1bis and 2 of the Federal Act on the Law of Treaties. It should be emphasised that Art. 7a para. 1bis LOGA provides for a case of autonomous denunciation by the Federal Council that is not parallel to the cases of conclusion or modification, in that the Federal Council may also denounce international treaties when "the Constitution prescribes their denunciation", for example in the event of the acceptance of a popular initiative.
44 The new Art. 7bbis LOGA provides for the case of urgent denunciation. The Federal Council may denounce a treaty without the approval of the Federal Assembly, even if such approval is in principle required, if "the safeguarding of essential interests of Switzerland and a particular urgency require it" (para. 1) and if none of the competent parliamentary committees objects (Art. 7bbis LOGA, Art. 152 para. 3bis LParl). The competent committees thus have a right of veto. This procedure allows the Federal Council to act quickly and to denounce an international treaty definitively.
45 Article 166 paragraph 2 FC does not give the Federal Assembly the power to force the Federal Council to terminate a treaty. However, the Federal Assembly may request the Federal Council to denounce a treaty by means of its general powers under Art. 166 para. 1 FC, such as a motion, without the Federal Council being obliged to act on it. In our view, the Federal Assembly should not force the Federal Council to terminate existing treaties or prohibit it from breaking off negotiations by means of a possible new Federal Act on the continuation and facilitation of relations between the Swiss Confederation and the European Union, in view of the principle of the contrary act and the case law of the Federal Court.
5. Annual report
46 Art. 48a para. 2 LOGA requires the Federal Council to report annually to the Federal Assembly on the treaties concluded, amended and terminated by itself, its departments, groups or offices. A special section for international treaties in the Directorate of Public International Law of the FDFA coordinates the submission of the annual report to the Federal Assembly. As a result, the Federal Assembly has a right of review over the agreements concluded by the Federal Council. This control procedure enables it to verify whether each treaty concluded falls within the sole competence of the Federal Council, particularly if it is a treaty of minor importance. In the event of disagreement, the Federal Assembly may request a posteriori approval by means of a motion. In this case, the treaty remains in force during the parliamentary procedure and must be denounced as soon as possible if it is rejected by parliament. In practice, however, the risks to Switzerland's international image and reputation as a result of such a denunciation should not be overlooked. This is due in particular to the fact that a treaty concluded without respecting the national norms on competence to conclude remains validly concluded under international law and that many treaties simply do not allow for denunciation.
Recommended further reading
Diggelmann Oliver, Der liberale Verfassungsstaat und die Internationalisierung der Politik, Veränderungen von Staat und Demokratie in der Schweiz, Berne 2005.
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Epiney Astrid/Kern Markus, Aussenverfassung, in: Diggelmann Oliver/Hertig Randall Maya/Schindler Benjamin (éds.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz – Droit constitutionnel suisse, Zürich 2020, pp. 2151–2182.
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Langer Lorenz, Die demokratische Kontrolle von Kompetenzübertragungen an inter- und supranationale Institutionen, in: Müller Andreas Th./Schroeder Werner (éds.), Demokratische Kontrolle völkerrechtlicher Verträge: Perspektiven aus Österreich und der Schweiz, Vienne 2017, pp. 61–79.
Lanz Matthias, Bundesversammlung und Aussenpolitik, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen parlamentarischer Mitwirkung, thèse, Zürich 2020.
Martenet Vincent, La séparation des pouvoirs, in: Diggelmann Oliver/Hertig Randall Maya/ Schindler Benjamin (éds.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz – Droit constitutionnel suisse, Zürich 2020, pp. 999–1023.
Petrig Anna, Die demokratische Mitwirkung an der Entstehung und Umsetzung rechtsetzender Beschlüsse internationalen Rechts, in: Revue suisse de droit international et européen vol. 25, no. 4, 2015, pp. 507–537.
Petrig Anna/Sinz Mareike, Rechtsgutachten zum Thema «Mitwirkung des Parlaments im Bereich von Soft Law», im Auftrag der PVK, Bâle 2021, https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/01-02-22-Rechtsgutachten%20Prof.%20Petrig%20definitiv.pdf.
Sägesser Thomas, Parlamentarische Informations- und Konsultationsrechte, in: Pratique juridique actuelle, 2002, pp. 382 ss.
About the author
Jelena Protic is a graduate assistant in public international law at the Centre for Comparative, European and International Law of the Faculty of Law, Criminal Sciences and Public Administration of the University of Lausanne. She is currently conducting research for her doctorate in law on the participation of the Federal Assembly in the elaboration of international non-binding legal instruments. Ms Protic holds a MLaw and a BLaw in law from the University of Lausanne. From 2019 to 2021, she worked in the Directorate of Public International Law (DDIP) of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
The author would like to thank Prof. Evelyne Schmid and Dr. Constance Kaempfer as well as Prof. Odile Ammann and Dr. Stefan Schlegel of the Onlinekommentar for their suggestions and careful proofreading.
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