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- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
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FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
FEDERAL ACT ON DIRECT FEDERAL TAX
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
FEDERAL ACT ON MEDICINAL PRODUCTS AND MEDICAL DEVICES
TAX HARMONISATION ACT
- I. Origins and Historical Evolution of the Office of the President of the Confederation
- II. Structural Framework
- III. Classification in the Context of Constitutional Law
- IV. “(...) presides over the Federal Council.”
- V. Vice President
- VI. Election Provisions (para. 2 and 3)
- VII. Reform Proposals
- Recommended further reading
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. Origins and Historical Evolution of the Office of the President of the Confederation
1 The wording and substance of Art. 176 of the FC date back to the founding of the federal state. Compared to its two predecessor provisions, Art. 176 of the FC has undergone no substantive changes, only linguistic ones. The phrase “presides over” even dates back to the draft of a federal charter of the Swiss Confederation revised by the Diet in May 1833. The wording of Art. 176 of the FC thus stands—like the other provisions concerning the Federal Council—as an example of the institutional stability that has prevailed in Switzerland since 1848.
2 The Federal Assembly adopted the purely linguistic amendment to Art. 176 of the FC proposed by the Federal Council as part of the latest constitutional revision without any fundamental changes and practically without discussion. In the course of the reform of the federal government, attempts to extend the term of office of the Federal President to two years failed on several occasions (see N. 27 and N. 32).
3 The virtually unchanged wording of Art. 176 of the FC stands in contrast to the changed significance of the office of the President of the Confederation. Thus, the significance of the office of the President of the Confederation and, closely related to this, the election practice of the Federal Assembly for the office have changed significantly. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the office of the President of the Confederation was fundamentally linked to the chairmanship of the Political Department. The Political Department encompassed both foreign policy and internal security. It was thus of great political significance. This great significance of the Political Department meant that the office of Federal President was reserved for those members of the Federal Council who were considered to possess statesmanlike qualities. Consequently, the Federal Assembly did not elect all Federal Councilors as Federal President. However, the annual rotation principle already applied at that time (see N. 29). Due to the circumstances mentioned, the Federal President is said to have enjoyed a “significantly stronger and elevated position” relative to the other Federal Council members at the inception of the federal state.
4 Since the separation of the office of Federal President from the chairmanship of the Political Department and the associated establishment of the current Department of Foreign Affairs in 1920, the office of Federal President has lost its significance. Since then, the Federal President has held the position of first among equals (see N. 11). Due to this change, the Federal Assembly today customarily elects members of the Federal Council as President of the Confederation without requiring proof of special “statesmanlike” qualifications. It is customary practice that a member of the Federal Council only becomes President of the Confederation after having served under the presidency of all senior colleagues.
5 Completely independent of the changed significance of the office, the Federal Assembly’s election practice underwent another important change at the end of the last century: Since the election of former Federal Councilor Ruth Dreifuss at the end of 1998 as the first Federal President, the Federal Assembly has regularly elected women to the office.
II. Structural Framework
6 Art. 176 of the FC consists of three para.s. Only para. 1 contains a substantive provision—albeit a rather vague one—stipulating that the Federal President presides over the Federal Council. However, the constitutional text leaves open which powers are associated with the presidency. Para. 2 and 3 primarily contain provisions regarding electoral law. Viewed purely in terms of scope, the entire Art. 176 of the FC thus contains primarily electoral provisions and only a few substantive provisions. This is consistent with the fact that, even according to its heading, Art. 176 of the FC does not deal with the powers or competences of the Federal President, but merely with the “presidency” of the Federal Council. The wording of the FC and the heading of Art. 176 of the FC thus symbolize the rather modest position of the President of the Confederation within the Swiss state organization.
7 Para.2 stipulates that, in addition to the President of the Confederation, there is also the office of the Vice President—which is not mentioned in para. 1. Furthermore, it is stipulated that the United Federal Assembly elects the President of the Confederation as well as the Vice President. Only incumbent members of the Federal Council are eligible for election. It is also stipulated that the term of office of the President of the Confederation lasts one year. Para. 3 then excludes re-election for the following year. For the President of the Confederation, this prohibition also applies to the office of Vice President.
III. Classification in the Context of Constitutional Law
8 Art. 176 of the FC is part of the first section of the third chapter of the fifth title “Federal Authorities” of the FC. This section contains the provisions on the organization and procedures of the Federal Council, the Federal Administration, and the Federal Chancellery. Art. 176 of the FC follows the two provisions dealing with the Federal Council as such, as well as its composition and election (Art. 174 et seq. of the FC). This is followed by Art. 177 of the FC, the final provision addressing the organization of the Federal Council, which establishes the collegial and departmental principles as the basis for the Federal Council’s mode of operation.
9 Art. 176 of the FC bears certain similarities to Art. 152 of the FC, which regulates the presidency of the National Council and the Council of States. It is notable that the wording of Art. 152 of the FC also primarily reflects the electoral law provisions of that article (see N. 6). For the Federal Supreme Court, the third branch of the federal government, there is no comparable provision, as the presidency of the Federal Supreme Court is not prescribed by the FC (see Art. 188 of the FC, Art. 14 of the BGG). However, the cantonal constitutions contain numerous provisions similar to Art. 176 of the FC that regulate the presidency of the respective cantonal government. Para. 2 of Art. 176 of the FC also shows similarities to Art. 175, para. 2–4 of the FC, which concern the authority to elect members of the Federal Council and the corresponding eligibility requirements.
10 The function of Art. 176 of the FC is primarily to regulate the presidency of the Federal Council (see N. 12). Art. 176 of the FC assigns this task to the President of the Confederation and regulates the President’s powers as well as their position within the Federal Council. Furthermore, Art. 176 of the FC regulates the election of the President of the Confederation and the Vice President and, in doing so—supplementing the (apparently incomplete) list of the Federal Assembly’s electoral powers in Art. 168 of the FC—provides in particular that the Federal Assembly shall conduct this election.
11 The non-prominent role of the President of the Confederation is closely linked to the principles of collegial government and concordance that prevail in Swiss democracy. It follows from the collegial principle enshrined in para. 1 of Art. 177 of the FC that all members of the Federal Council are equal, which also has implications for the structure of the office of the Federal President. This is linked—as rightly pointed out in the literature—to a strong distrust of the accumulation of power in a single person, which is also reflected in the structure of the Federal Presidency. Fritz Fleiner had already observed that Switzerland has a preference for collegial bodies, which provide space for a majority of people and prevent and limit the overwhelming influence of any single individual. Finally, “concordance” refers to “the endeavor to ensure that values and interests are taken into account to the greatest extent possible in the political process.” Against this backdrop, the office of the Federal President can be characterized today as follows: she or he is merely the first among equals and holds no actual position of primacy over the other members of the Federal Council (see N. 12). In accordance with the collegial principle, the office of the President of the Confederation is also associated with only limited powers. However, the collegial principle would not preclude a slight strengthening of the President’s role, as the scope of the collegial principle must not be overstretched.
IV. “(...) presides over the Federal Council.”
12 The wording of Art. 176 para. 1 of the FC is extremely concise. Furthermore, the President of the Confederation often performs his or her duties not in public but within the collegium. This makes it difficult to determine whether and how the President of the Confederation performs his or her duties in each instance. These circumstances also complicate the interpretation of Art. 176 of the FC. One point of reference for this is the Federal Assembly’s interpretive practice regarding Art. 176 of the FC, as it emerged, for example, during the enactment of Art. 25 et seq. of the GAOA. This must be taken into account in the following analysis of the content of Art. 176 of the FC. However, it is not acceptable to derive the meaning of Art. 176 of the FC from its legislative implementation; this would amount to a reversal of the hierarchy of norms.
13 The wording of the FC does not explicitly specify either the exact function or the duties of the President of the Confederation. The Constitution merely states that the President of the Confederation presides over the Federal Council (Art. 176 para. 1 of the FC). But what exactly does this mean? Generally speaking, the role of presiding can be described as follows: The President of the Confederation “only” presides over the Federal Council, not over the Confederation. Nor does he or she lead the Federal Council, but merely presides over it. He or she is responsible for ensuring the “operational capacity and system-appropriate performance of the [Federal Council] and bears primary responsibility for this.” Thus, the office of the Federal President confers “neither power nor a position of legal and political hegemony.” As the legislature has succinctly and convincingly formulated in Art. 19 para. 3 GAOA, she or he is the presiding member of the Federal Council. However, to deny the President of the Confederation any real authority goes too far. Rather, due to her or his presidential duties, she or he holds a certain additional position of power compared to the other members of the government.
14 In principle, a distinction must be made between the management and coordination function of the President of the Confederation on the one hand, and his or her other formal “functions within the Federal Council” as regulated by law (see, for example, N. 20 and N. 22) on the other. The exercise of the leadership and coordination function constitutes the main task of the Federal President. In this leadership and coordination function, “chairmanship” refers to “executive management.” Leadership here includes “initiating, coordinating, steering procedures, mediating, bringing together, driving forward, and monitoring,” and thus refers to the leadership of the College (see N. 18). All these tasks must be performed in accordance with the Constitution, whereby the President must bear in mind that the office of the President does not confer upon him or her the powers of a head of government. In the wake of the Libya affair, it ultimately became clear that the President—by signing an international treaty on her or his own authority—can do more under international law than she or he is permitted to do under domestic law.
15 Due to the limited scope of responsibilities, constitutional scholars have rightly concluded for over 140 years that the Federal President is more of a President of the Federal Council. The title “Federal President” “Federal President” thus obscures the actual lack of substance of the office in question or promises more than it can deliver. Furthermore, the office does not relieve the Federal President of the obligation to simultaneously head one of the seven departments (see Art. 175 para. 1, Art. 177 para. 2, and Art. 178 para. 2 of the FC) . Nevertheless, political science literature notes that, even in recent times, Federal Presidents have been able to set certain political priorities despite their non-prominent role.
16 The Federal President generally possesses a specific democratic legitimacy based on a separate election by the United Federal Assembly. However, given the existing electoral practice, under which the election tends to degenerate into a routine appointment, this additional legitimacy is minimal. Consequently, this additional legitimacy does not necessarily imply a broad interpretation of the federal president’s duties. In particular, no such indications can be found in the text of the Constitution. Nevertheless, in the Protocol Regulations of the Swiss Confederation approved by the Federal Council, the Federal President is listed as rank 1a, following the Federal Council as a whole, which is classified as rank 1. In terms of protocol, the Federal President thus ranks above both the other Federal Councilors and the President of the National Council (rank 2) as well as the President of the Council of States (rank 3). The FDFA justifies this departure from the domestic hierarchy of powers with the “hierarchical ranking of officeholders with regard to the external representation of our country.”
17 The role of the Federal President is frequently described in negative terms in academic literature and by the Federal Council itself. Thus, one repeatedly reads that the Federal President is neither head of state nor head of government. As brief and catchy as this description may be, it adds little. While these catchphrases do rule out two (theoretically) possible functions for the Federal President, they offer no further insight regarding the concrete division of powers. However, a negative description of the role of the President of the Confederation, based on the concrete structure of the office, is helpful. The President of the Confederation has no influence over the composition of the Federal Council. This is determined for her or him by the United FC Assembly (see Art. 175 para. 2 of the Federal Constitution). Furthermore, under the Constitution, the Federal President does not hold a hierarchical position vis-à-vis the other members of the Federal Council. He or she is not their superior. In the absence of this superior position, the Federal President has no substantive authority to issue instructions to the other members of the Council. This would be alien to the system in a multi-party government bound by the principle of concordance, such as the Swiss Federal Council (see N. 11). Finally, the constitutional framers did not confer any substantive decision-making powers on the President of the Confederation through the chairmanship.
18 The most important task of the chairmanship of the Federal Council is the management of the College as such (see Art. 25 para. 1 GAOA). The President “holds the College together as a body and drives it forward, keeps it running, and safeguards it through [her or] his leadership.” This includes presiding over Federal Council meetings (see Art. 18 para. 1 GAOA), which also encompasses their preparation and the casting of a deciding vote in the event of a tie (a situation that, in practice, likely occurs rarely due to the odd number of Federal Council members) (Art. 25 para. 2 let. b and Art. 19 para. 3 GAOA). The powers of the President of the Confederation are thus closely linked to the formal handling of business. Since 2014, the President of the Confederation has been able to formally instruct a member of the Federal Council to submit a specific matter to the Federal Council by a set deadline (Art. 25 para. 2 let. bbis GAOA). Politically, however, it is difficult to imagine that a Federal President would instruct another Federal Councilor to place a matter (which may not yet be ready for a decision) on the agenda of a Federal Council meeting. Whether the powers arising from these tasks are exercised with restraint in practice—as posited by legal doctrine—is difficult to assess from the outside. The assessment is likely accurate, however, as no examples from Federal Council practice indicating the contrary have yet been reported in the media. Leading the College, however, involves more than just the formal task of chairing meetings. Leading the College means that the President of the Confederation initiates important discussions in the Federal Council, works toward a consensus-based proposal, but also strives for a decision when no compromise can be reached in the Federal Council. Social skills are also required here. Through thoughtful and goal-oriented leadership of the Council, the President is likely to be able to exert the greatest influence on the body today—in the absence of a prominent position and substantive decision-making authority.
19 Legal scholarship further posits that the primary task of the President should be to bring about a unified and coherent government policy both domestically and internationally (see Art. 180 of the FC). In this sense, one could argue that the President of the Confederation must ensure the fundamental function of the Federal Council—the political leadership of Switzerland. In this way, the President of the Confederation could review and ensure that the goals set forth in the legislative program (see Art. 146 of the ParlA) or other planning instruments are achieved. While such demands appear fundamentally reasonable from a theoretical perspective, they are likely to be difficult to fulfill in practice with the tools currently available to the President of the Confederation.
20 The President of the Confederation represents the Federal Council both domestically and abroad (Art. 28 GAOA). These representative duties include, for example, participating in international conferences and undertaking state visits abroad upon invitation, as well as delivering the annual New Year’s and August 1st addresses. State receptions in Switzerland, on the other hand, are conducted by the Federal Council as a whole, since the representation of the Confederation both domestically and abroad is the responsibility of the Federal Council as a collegiate body (see Art. 174 para. 1, Art. 184 para. 1, and Art. 186 para. 1 of the FC). Despite these responsibilities, the President of the Swiss Confederation is often not viewed by the Swiss public—in line with their legal powers—as a leader. However, this also depends on current events and the character of the incumbent President. For example, former Federal Councilor Simonetta Sommaruga was very much in the public eye as Federal President at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020, which even earned her the title of “Mother of the Nation” in certain media outlets.
21 The office of Federal President is associated with prestige, particularly due to the aforementioned representative duties. This prestige and the media presence associated with it today—even if it has diminished compared to that of the other Federal Council members—should still not be underestimated. Accordingly, Federal Councilors often view a presidential year as the (crowning) conclusion of their time in the Federal Council and step down from office shortly thereafter. The prestige and increased media presence are likely also two of the reasons why a revision of the provisions regarding the President of the Confederation has not yet been successful. However, it is likely not only the individual members of the Federal Council who covet the prestige associated with the office of President of the Confederation, but also their political parties, which presumably also wish to bask in the office’s glory.
22 Finally, the President of the Confederation has other minor duties, including, among other things, presidential decisions in urgent cases under Art. 26 GAOA, maintaining relations with the cantons under Art. 29 GAOA, and decisions in interdepartmental conflicts of jurisdiction under Art. 47 para. 3 GAOA. Pursuant to Art. 9 of the Ordinance on the Organization of the Federal Council of November 29, 2013 (SR 172.111, OV-BR), the President of the Confederation represents the Federal Council in parliamentary deliberations on the legislative program, on the Federal Council’s annual objectives, and during the annual reporting on matters concerning the Federal Council as a collegiate body.
23 The President of the Swiss Confederation is primarily supported in the performance of his or her duties by the Federal Chancellor (see Art. 30 para. 2 let. a GAOA). In addition, pursuant to Art. 29a para. 1 of the GAOA, the President of the Confederation has a Presidential Service at their disposal to carry out their special duties, in particular regarding international relations, communication, protocol, and organizational matters. The Presidential Service is located within the Federal Chancellery (Art. 29a para. 2 GAOA). The Presidential Service has existed in this form since 2015. The idea behind this was that continuity and efficiency in the performance of the Federal President’s diplomatic duties could be enhanced if these duties were concentrated within a dedicated service. Support is provided solely for the performance of the aforementioned specific tasks. Consequently, the Presidential Service is not intended to support the Office of the President in the management of the Federal Council per se. However, strengthening and expanding the Presidential Service in this direction would be worth considering (see N. 34).
V. Vice President
24 The role of the Vice President of the Federal Council is not defined in the Constitution. Nor did the Federal Council comment on the position of the Vice President in its message on a new Federal Constitution. Nevertheless, Art. 27 GAOA provides that the Vice President shall act as deputy and assume all presidential duties if the President of the Federal Council is unable to perform his or her duties. This provision is intended to ensure the Federal Council’s ability to act. The Vice President may also, for example, chair a Federal Council meeting if the President recuses themselves from a matter (Art. 20 GAOA, Art. 4 para. 1 OV-BR).
VI. Election Provisions (para. 2 and 3)
25 Under Art. 176, para. 2 of the FC, the Federal Assembly elects the President and the Vice President from among the members of the Federal Council. This provision does not entitle any member of the Federal Council to be elected as President. The principle of rotation, which is strictly observed in current electoral practice (see N. 29), is not mandated by the Constitution. This also applies to the custom that the President must previously have served as Vice President. The latter requirement cannot be met in any case, particularly if the Vice President resigns or is voted out of office as a Federal Councilor. This was most recently the case when Federal Councilor Joseph Deiss became President in 2004 after Federal Councilor Ruth Metzler, who was serving as Vice President, was voted out of office in December 2003. Current electoral practice also cannot establish a customary right to election to one of the aforementioned offices, particularly since Art. 176, paras. 2 and 3 of the FC (and presumably also Art. 148, para. 1 of the FC) leave no room for this due to their exhaustive nature.
26 The Federal Assembly elects the President of the Confederation and the Vice President for a term of one year (see Art. 176 para. 2 of the FC). This short term of office makes it difficult to meet the demands of the office, as there is little time to grow into this coordinating leadership role. The term of office thus stands in a certain contradiction to para. 1. At the same time, the one-year term prevents the “legal development of a dominant role within the Council and a prominent standing among the people,” which corresponds to the collegial principle that governs the structure of the office of the President of the Confederation (see N. 11).
27 Para. is regularly the subject of proposals to reform the organization and strengthen the Federal Council. In the supplementary message of October 13, 2010, on government reform, the Federal Council itself proposed—ultimately unsuccessfully (see N. 3)—to extend the term of office of the President of the Confederation to two years. It justified this, among other things, by arguing that a two-year term would strengthen the leadership and coordination functions of the President of the Confederation. In addition, the President’s duties of presence and representation, particularly vis-à-vis foreign countries, could thus be better managed.
28 According to Art. 176 para. 3 of the FC, re-election to the office of Federal President or Vice President is excluded for the following year. Furthermore, the Federal President may not be elected as Vice President for the following year. The prohibition on immediate re-election is intended to prevent the dominance of individual members of the Federal Council and to protect the balance within the college. The wording of para. 3 would, however, allow three members of the Federal Council to take turns holding the presidency in succession. The question of whether such an electoral practice by the United Federal Assembly would be compatible with the collegial principle under Art. 177 para. 1 of the FC is of a theoretical nature. However, it is likely to be answered in the affirmative, as the scope of the collegial principle must not be overstretched.
29 Today—as already explained (see N. 3)—the election practice is that a member of the Federal Council only becomes President of the Confederation after having served under the presidency of all senior colleagues. However, the United Federal Assembly is not constitutionally obligated to follow this rigid rotation principle. The rotation of the office of President among all members of the Federal Council is, on the one hand, a consequence of the diminished political significance of the office. On the other hand, the rotation principle is likely also linked to the prestige of the presidency, which is intended to be distributed evenly among the parties. These arguments make the rigid rotation principle currently in practice appear reasonable. However, they do not justify it, as the constant rotation weakens the leadership function of the office of the Federal President (see N. 32 ff. for reform proposals). At the same time, the rotation principle also has the advantage of serving justice, collegiality, and concordance, thereby contributing to the stability and thus the legitimacy of the system.
30 The annual election of the Federal President is often “abused” by members of the United Federal Assembly to express their displeasure with the policies of the Federal Council member due for election by casting a blank or invalid ballot. Since the members of the United Federal Assembly are free to decide whom they elect as Federal President, such political games appear rather petty.
VII. Reform Proposals
31 As already explained, the prestige associated with the office of Federal President is likely one of the reasons why no reform of the relevant provisions has succeeded to date. Under the current system, every Federal Councilor—regardless of their suitability for the office—has the opportunity to assume it. This also brings a bit of prestige to the respective Federal Council party. In this system, the members of the United Federal Assembly also spare themselves the discussions about which sitting Federal Councilors actually possess the necessary competencies to assume the presidency of the Federal Council and the associated duties. Moreover, the parties represented in the Federal Assembly would have to hold such a discussion as early as when compiling their “tickets” for the Federal Council elections, which they would likely prefer to avoid.
32 A look at the cantons shows that other (electoral) systems would also be conceivable. For example, in the canton of Basel-Stadt, the president of the government is directly elected to office for a four-year term and assumes the associated leadership role. In such a system, candidates must consciously face the question of whether they possess the leadership and interpersonal skills required for the office of President. The disadvantage of such an electoral system is the increased competition for the presidency, which could jeopardize successful cooperation and collegiality within the body. It is also conceivable that the political discussions arising around the election of the Federal President in such a system could be detrimental to the political climate. These disadvantages do not outweigh the associated advantage—the strengthening of the leadership function of the Federal Presidency.
33 Such an “election based on suitability” therefore represents a desirable system for the Office of the President. This would entail abandoning the automatic election process or the rotation principle and placing greater emphasis on members of the Federal Council with enhanced leadership skills. The Federal Assembly could implement such a system change by modifying its election practices without altering the legal framework. To further strengthen the leadership role of the Office of the President, an extension of the term of office also appears sensible. However, a four-year term for the President seems too long, given the principle of collegiality. Instead, a two-year term would be appropriate. On the other hand, the creation of a Presidential Department does not appear to be effective. The fact that the Federal President is simultaneously the head of a specialized department and is thus on an equal footing with the other Federal Council members from a professional standpoint appears appropriate in light of the collegial principle (see N. 11).
34 What should be sought, however, is the creation of an administrative unit (or the strengthening of the existing Presidential Office) that reports directly to the Office of the President or the Federal Council as a whole and is thus not part of the rest of the administration. This would ensure that, at least within this administrative unit, the collegial perspective prevails over the departmental one. The administrative unit could support the Federal President in his or her leadership tasks and in ensuring a long-term, coherent government policy. The creation of such an administrative unit would, moreover, make sense even without further strengthening of the presidential powers, since strengthening the collegial perspective is desirable even in the current system.
About the Author
Attorney Dr. Christoph Raess is a legal expert at the Federal Office of Justice. This article reflects solely the personal opinion of the author. The author would like to thank Reto Walther, Jonas Alig, and Rahel Jent for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks are also due to the peer review panel, as well as to Odile Ammann and Stefan Schlegel.
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Materials
Bericht der GPK-S vom 3.12.2010, Verhalten der Bundesbehörden in der diplomatischen Krise zwischen der Schweiz und Libyen, Bericht vom 3.12.2010, BBl 2011 4215 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2011/664/de, besucht am 8.9.2025 (zit. Bericht Libyen).
Botschaft vom 4.6.1894 betreffend Organisation und Geschäftsgang des Bundesrates, BBl 1894 II 766 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1894/2_766__/de, besucht am 7.4.2025 (zit. Botschaft Organisation und Geschäftsgang).
Botschaft betreffend die Organisation der Bundesverwaltung vom 13.3.1913, BBl 1913 II 1, abrufbar unter: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1913/2_1_1_/de, besucht am 7.4.2025 (zit. Botschaft Organisation Bundesverwaltung)
Botschaft über eine neue Bundesverfassung vom 20.11.1996, BBl 1996 I 1, abrufbar unter: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1997/1_1_1_1/de, besucht am 7.4.2025 (zit. Botschaft BV).
Zusatzbotschaft vom 13.10.2010 zur Regierungsreform, BBl 2010 7811 ff., abrufbar unter: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2010/1440/de, besucht am 18.6.2025 (zit. Zusatzbotschaft).