-
- Art. 3 FC
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 73 PRA
- Art. 73a PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
I. Introduction
1 The action to reduce the inheritance is subject to a limitation period of one year from the time when the violation of the reserved portion becomes known (see N. 3-5), but no later than ten years after the opening of the testamentary disposition or the date of death (see N. 6), in accordance with Art. 533 para. 1 CC. These are not limitation periods, but forfeiture periods. Accordingly, it is not possible to interrupt the period in accordance with Art. 135 CO or to restart the period in accordance with Art. 137 f. CO. These deadlines are met by filing a claim in due time, i.e. by submitting a request for arbitration (with the corresponding legal requests), whereby the provisions of Art. 77 f. OR (and not of Art. 142 ff. ZPO) are applicable for calculating the deadline. The court will review compliance with the deadline ex officio (and not merely upon objection). Failure to file a reduction action within the deadline will result in a dismissal.
2 Irrespective of the deadline for filing a reduction action, the right to a reduction under Art. 533 para. 3 CC may – under the given conditions – be asserted at any time by way of objection (see N. 7 et seq.).
II. Time limits for filing
A. Relative limitation period
3 The action for reduction is subject to a limitation period of one year “calculated from the time when the heirs became aware of the violation of their rights” (Art. 533 para. 1 CC). This relative limitation period therefore begins to run when the person whose right to a compulsory portion has been violated “is aware of the factual elements that give rise to confidence in the favorable outcome of a possible action for reduction” or “that give rise to expectations of the possible success of an action for reduction”. The beginning of the period therefore presupposes knowledge of the cause of action, i.e. knowledge of the necessary elements for substantiating an action for reduction. “Absolute certainty” or knowledge of the ‘exact extent of the violation of the compulsory portion’ is not required for the period to begin. Nor does the start of the period depend on whether an action for reduction can already be quantified in accordance with the ultimately achievable amount of the reduction. It is sufficient if the person entitled to a compulsory portion can recognize that their compulsory portion claim has been violated. If the person concerned has been completely excluded from the succession or has been passed over, or if, for example, they have only been given a usufruct, they will learn of the violation of the compulsory portion from the disposition of property upon death, due to the lack of (their own) lifetime gifts. Otherwise, an approximate knowledge of the size of the estate is sufficient. Any lack of knowledge of the law on the part of the person entitled to a compulsory portion is irrelevant.
4 In the case of a plurality of dispositions and allocations by the testator that infringe the compulsory portion or can be reduced, the relative forfeiture period begins separately for each cause of action according to the opinion represented here. If a testator leaves two descendants and appoints the descendants as heirs with inheritance shares of 4/5 and 1/5, the disadvantaged descendant – in the absence of (his or her own) lifetime gifts – is already aware of the violation of the compulsory portion based on the disposition of property upon death. The relative forfeiture period for reducing the disposition of property upon death therefore begins at the point in time at which the disadvantaged descendant becomes aware of the disposition of property upon death (but no earlier than the time of death). If this descendant allows the one-year (relative) forfeiture period to elapse and subsequently becomes aware of a reducible lifetime gift, a separate one-year (relative) forfeiture period begins for this lifetime gift – according to the understanding represented here. In the case of a reduction by way of legal action, the person whose right to a compulsory portion has been violated can, however, only enforce the reduction to the extent of the violation of the right to a compulsory portion that results from the lifetime gift (and not already from the disposition of property upon death), subject to the defense of reduction.
5 The point in time of knowledge is to be determined in each case according to the overall circumstances of the individual case. While the question of what a particular person knew or did not know at a particular time is a factual one, the question of whether the elements known to that person are sufficient to trigger the forfeiture period is a legal one.
B. Absolute forfeiture period
6 The action for reduction “in any case forfeits after ten years” (Art. 533 para. 1 ZGB). This absolute forfeiture period begins for the reduction of a disposition of property upon death from the time of the “opening of the will” (in the sense of Art. 557 ZGB) and for “other” (i.e. lifetime) gifts from the time of the testator's death (Art. 533 para. 1 ZGB). If the disposition of property upon death is declared invalid (see Art. 519 et seq. ZGB), the period begins with the entry into force of the invalidity judgment (Art. 533 para. 2 ZGB).
III. Defense of reduction
A. General
7 A person who is entitled to claim a reduction and who has “(co-)ownership” of the estate (see notes 11-15) may assert the reduction by way of objection at any time. This objection may be raised, for example, in the context of an action to divide the estate or an action to claim a legacy, irrespective of whether the person raising the objection is the plaintiff or the defendant.
8 The defense of reduction – in contrast to the action to reduce the inheritance – is not subject to forfeiture, but it also requires that the right to a reduction has not already been waived. In addition, the defense of reduction is only possible to the extent of those estate assets in which the person raising the defense has “(co-)ownership” (see N. 11-15). If the estate is worth less than the claim for reduction, the defense of reduction is possible, but in the end the compulsory portion cannot be fully established by way of objection.
9 In line with the aforementioned limitation of the scope of the defense of reduction (see N. 8), changes in the value of the estate can have a significant influence on the extent to which the compulsory portion can be safeguarded by means of the defense of reduction. On the one hand, a person entitled to a compulsory portion who, due to sufficient estate assets, refrains from filing a reduction action and “relies” on the defense of reduction risks that the estate assets will decrease – in particular due to economic conditions – and that the compulsory portion can no longer be established (in full) by means of the defense. On the other hand, a person entitled to a compulsory portion can benefit from an increase in the value of the estate to the extent that the compulsory portion can be established retroactively (in full or in part or by means of a settlement with a smaller loss). For example, if a testator dies after January 1, 2023, leaves two descendants (A and B), no disposition of property upon death and net estate assets worth “10”, and has made a lifetime gift to made a gift (not subject to equalization) to descendant A, which has a value of “70” at the time of death, the compulsory portion of descendant B (“20”, corresponding to 1/4 of “80”) is violated. If descendant B does not file a reduction action within the time limit, he would only receive “10” by means of a reduction of the intestacy acquisition by way of objection. However, if the estate assets (e.g. consisting of a stock portfolio) increase to “20” by the time of the distribution of the estate, in which descendant B raises the objection, the compulsory portion is preserved.
10 It is disputed whether the defense of reduction is still possible after the distribution of the estate has already taken place. According to the view represented here, the defense of reduction is not waived or forfeited when the estate is distributed, but the extent to which the reduction can be asserted by way of defense is limited in this case to the estate assets that were allocated to the affected forced heir as part of the distribution of the estate. If the heir of the compulsory portion has received less than the value of his compulsory portion in the division of the estate, he can still raise the objection of reduction against a legacy claim of a third party directed against him, who was not directly involved in the division of the estate (as a contracting party) or indirectly (as a beneficiary under a contract in favor of third parties).
B. Requirement of ownership
11 In connection with the requirement of (co-)ownership of the estate (see N. 7-8), there are various ambiguities, which in practice lead to the fact that persons entitled to a compulsory portion only rarely “rely” on the defense of reduction and deliberately allow the time limit for the action for reduction to expire. One ambiguity concerns the question of what type of ownership is required to assert the defense of reduction. Apart from legal ownership in the case of easements and land charges, a distinction must be made as follows in the case of material ownership: According to Art. 920 para. 2 ZGB, a person who possesses an object as the owner is considered to be an independent possessor, and a person who possesses the object without being the owner is considered to be a dependent possessor. A further distinction is made between direct and indirect possession: If an independent owner transfers custody (i.e. actual control or power) of the property to a third party based on a special legal relationship (e.g. a lease), the owner has independent indirect possession, while the third party (non-owner, e.g. tenant) has dependent indirect possession.
12 Especially since the heirs acquire the “inheritance as a whole by operation of law upon the death of the testator” and, in particular, ownership and possession of the testator pass to the heirs on the day of death (so-called universal succession, Art. 560 ZGB), the heirs become independent owners of the assets in the estate on the day of death (and until the execution of the division of the estate). If the estate includes a property that is rented to a co-heir, that co-heir exercises independent direct ownership, while the other co-heirs exercise independent indirect ownership. If the estate includes a movable object, the (independently) directly holding co-heir exercises ownership for the heirs as a whole (joint ownership), which is why the (independently) indirectly holding heirs can invoke the “heir ownership” in accordance with Art. 560 para. 2 CC.
13 It is undisputed that an heir who is an independent and direct possessor can raise the defense of reduction. However, the defense of reduction is also possible if an executor (or an administrator of the estate or heir representative) has been appointed and the heir merely has independent indirect possession. The executor has dependent (direct or indirect) ownership of the entire estate, while the heirs have independent indirect (and in some cases also direct) ownership.
14 Accordingly, independent (direct or indirect) possession is sufficient for the defense of reduction. In contrast, according to the view represented here, mere dependent (direct or indirect) possession is not sufficient. In conclusion, this means that, according to the view represented here, the assertion of the defense of reduction requires heirship or (joint) ownership of the person raising the defense. Accordingly, a virtual heir who has allowed the forfeiture period for the assertion of his right to a compulsory portion by way of legal action to elapse, has dependent direct (or indirect) possession of an object of the estate and is requested by the heirs to surrender this object, cannot object to such a claim for surrender with the defense of reduction.
15 In this context, the question may be raised as to whether the requirement of possession means that the defense of reduction only applies to “things” in the sense of property law, in which “possession” can be exercised in accordance with Art. 919 et seq. ZGB. According to the view expressed here, such a substantive restriction of the scope of the defense of reduction is not justified. Accordingly, the objection under Art. 533 para. 3 ZGB can extend to all assets, i.e. also to claims (in particular against banks in the context of a bank account relationship) or to “intangible assets” such as cryptocurrencies. The above comments are also applicable, mutatis mutandis, to assets in which no “ownership” can be exercised in the sense of property law.
C. Procedural
16 The possibility of a defense of reduction does not exclude the right to bring an action for reduction. Accordingly, an action for reduction can be brought – if the conditions are met – even if the reduction could also be enforced by way of a defense.
17 The defense of reduction must be asserted in court, especially since the court does not officially review a violation of the compulsory portion. Although the defense of reduction does not have to be asserted in the first judicial document (statement of claim or statement of defense), the facts and evidence necessary for its assertion must be submitted in good time, in accordance with the rules of civil procedure regarding new evidence.
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