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- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
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- Art. 29a FC
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- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
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- Art. 143 CO
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- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
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- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
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- Art. 47 PRA
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- Art. 59a PRA
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- Art. 59c PRA
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- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
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- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. Overview
- II. History of origins
- III. Context
- IV. Commentary in the narrow sense
- Recommended further reading
- Bibliography
I. Overview
1 The principle of subsidiarity is sometimes referred to as a "dazzling" - difficult to understand - principle. The reason for this is that there is no such thing as "the" principle of subsidiarity. There is a multitude of conceptions of the principle of subsidiarity. The idea of subsidiarity is used in many different ways and can look back on a long, extremely rich and varied history. Due to the rather modest legal-practical significance of Art. 5a FC (Section IV.), there is sufficient space here to duly appreciate the ideological-historical significance of the principle of subsidiarity not only, but of course also in the context of the Swiss Federal Constitution (especially Section III.). This weighting is in keeping with the character of the subsidiarity principle, which is more a guiding political idea than a legal principle applicable to individual cases.
II. History of origins
A. Conceptual and ideological roots of the subsidiarity principle
2 On the one hand, the concept of subsidiarity goes back to the Latin "subsidium", which stands for help and more specifically for military reserve forces. On the other hand, Catholic theologians translated the Greek term "hypo taxis" into the Latin "sub sedeo". Inspired by subordinate clauses in Greek grammar, they thus described society as pluralistic, as an organisation built on many supporting subordinate and superior communities. This is how the term "subsidiarium", subsidiarity, came into being. This word origin is significant because it emphasises the basic structure of social reality behind the idea of subsidiarity: by its very nature, every social activity across many levels is always subordinate to that of the individuals involved or affected by it or their associations in groups such as families, associations, communities, etc. This is why the multi-level concept of subsidiarity was developed. This is why the multi-level (federal) structure of the state was also called a pre-constitutional principle of order.
3 Thomas Aquinas developed the idea that increasingly complex human societies emerge through many levels of organisation, each with its own purposes (families, villages, etc.). According to Aquinas, the role of the state is merely to ensure the conditions (order, common good) necessary for human associations to prosper below the level of the state. This idea is reflected in the constitutional principle of subsidiarity. In my opinion, the idea can also be applied to multi-level state systems in a slightly modified form: Articles 47 and 50 FC, for example, could be understood in this sense: The former guarantees the autonomy of the cantons in the federal state (para. 1) and ensures them sufficient tasks, sources of funding and organisational autonomy (para. 2); the latter protects the communes at least to a certain extent (see below, n.26).
4 While Aquinas had anticipated today's understanding of subsidiarity as a principle of political order, Johannes Althusius, known as the father of federalism, represented an understanding of the relationship between centre and members that deviated from the order of the federal constitution. Althusius wanted to grant the members a veto right against centralisation steps, as is known from the confederation of states and traditional international treaty law. In contrast, the individual cantons in the federal state do not have a veto right against centralisation steps. Only, but nonetheless, changes in status and territory require the consent of the affected cantons and their population (Art. 53 para. 2-3 FC). Instead of immunity from unwanted centralisation, considerations of effectiveness and efficiency characterise federalism at the federal level (cf. Art. 43a para. 1-2 and 5 FC).
5 In the recent past, it was primarily the Catholic social teaching of Pope Pius XI (1931) that formed the concept of subsidiarity. According to Catholic social teaching, every action of a community presupposes that it serves the next smallest group of people down to the individual: although society organises itself into groups, the individual should remain as much as possible as an individual. By protecting and promoting a diverse (pluralistic) society, the individual's development is also protected. The constitutional principle of subsidiarity is ultimately also based on the insight that "tasks [should] be assigned to the smaller communities as far as is reasonably possible", provided that the "preservation of the smaller community is desired". It is precisely this desire that constitutes the principle of subsidiarity: It expresses a preference for leaving responsibilities to the smaller unit so that it remains as a (partially) autonomous entity.
6 In fact, the popularity that subsidiarity as a principle of political order in multi-level systems has experienced in recent decades is mainly driven by more or less pronounced fears of the creeping expansion of the influence of the higher or central level ("mission creep"). This became clearly visible when the media and legal scholars reported that the Maastricht Treaty on European Union could only have been "saved" by inserting the principle of subsidiarity into it. The subsidiarity principle was also included in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (recital 6 of the preamble) to satisfy member states for whom the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had become too influential. As an element of international treaty interpretation, the addition to the ECHR preamble is in principle legally significant. Nevertheless, the political decision to anchor the principle of subsidiarity in the ECHR already sent out an effective signal: It was enough, as empirical legal research shows, to induce the ECtHR to judge more cautiously in anticipation - before the Convention amendment entered into force. The subsidiarity principle under federal constitutional law is basically motivated in a similar way to the subsidiarity principles under European law. Switzerland's possible accession to the EU was one of the reasons for anchoring the subsidiarity principle in the constitution.
7 This perspective brings the liberal idea of self-determination to the fore. Individual and common interests can presumably be better pursued in comparatively small, homogeneous communities than by a superordinate central authority. Just as it may seem justified to protect member states from centralisation, however, it may also be justified to establish central mechanisms that protect the individual from violations of fundamental rights by member states; for example, if discriminatory practices persist in individual member states that have already been overcome at the national level. For example, the federal constitutional catalogue of fundamental rights and the federal court have long protected individuals against violations of fundamental rights by cantonal authorities. Admittedly, this is only one legitimate reason for centralisation among others.
8 These remarks show that the principle of subsidiarity is a complex principle that can manifest itself in different ways. The literal reference to "the principle of subsidiarity" in Art. 5a FC cannot therefore adequately determine the distribution of competences in the Swiss federal state.
B. Incorporation of the principle of subsidiarity into the Federal Constitution
9 Contrary to what the long roots of the subsidiarity principle in the history of ideas might suggest, Art. 5a FC appears to be relatively insignificant when the provision is viewed in terms of constitutional history and practice. The principle of subsidiarity was absent from the federal constitutions of 1848 and 1874, and the 1999 constitutional revision did not include the term "subsidiarity" in the constitutional text either. It was not until the 2004 revision of the financial equalisation system and the tasks between the Confederation and the cantons (NFA) that Art. 5a was introduced into the Federal Constitution and with it the explicit reference to the idea of subsidiarity.
10 Before going into detail on this rather recent development, it should be pointed out that the Swiss federal state has always implicitly followed the logic of subsidiarity (see Art. 3 FC 1848/FC 1874: "The cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution, and as such exercise rights which are not vested in the federal power"): The "general competence" never lay with the Confederation, which in the past, as today, was only allowed to act on the basis of an explicit constitutional foundation (cf. Art. 3 and Art. 43a para. 1 FC). Today, as in the past, the Confederation can only act if the constitutional legislator, i.e. a majority not only of the Swiss people but also of the cantons (Art. 142 para. 2 in conjunction with 140 para. 1 let. a FC), considers this to be expedient, useful, desirable or the like (cf. the 2nd chapter of the 3rd title of the current FC and the enumeration of federal competences in the Federal Constitution of 1874). From a historical point of view, the federal state does not serve to unite the cantons as closely as possible, but to preserve their autonomy and independence, so that constitutional federalism is ascribed a "static-defensive" character.
11 These constitutional historical roots of the subsidiarity principle in the idea of enumeration, i.e. the explicit and conclusive naming, of all federal competences (principle of limited or concrete individual authorisation, see Art. 3, 42 FC) raises the question of the relationship between the enumeration and subsidiarity principles. From a perspective that takes into account the fundamental nature of the principle of subsidiarity, this often insufficiently clarified relationship (see, for instance, n.12 below) appears as a means-ends relationship: the enumeration of federal competences places the Confederation within "enumerated limits" vis-à-vis the cantons, which serves to ensure the subsidiarity of the Confederation. This clearly assigns the task of concretising the subsidiarity of the Confederation vis-à-vis the cantons through corresponding allocations of competences (cf. n.30 below) to the federal constitutional legislature and thus to a political actor (cf. n.37 below). Furthermore, ensuring the subsidiarity of the Confederation by means of "enumerated barriers" allows to establish a certain legal certainty about the competences assigned to the subsidiary level. In view of the great vagueness of the subsidiarity principle (cf. below N.13 f., 34 ff.), this is valuable in terms of the rule of law.
12 In view of the long constitutional tradition of the subsidiarity of the Confederation (above n.10), it is not surprising that at the beginning of the total revision of the Federal Constitution in the 1960s there was fundamental agreement on the subsidiarity of the Confederation. What was disputed was the extent to which the principle of subsidiarity was capable of acquiring practical legal significance. The draft constitution of the expert commission under Federal Councillor Furgler (1977) included the idea of subsidiarity in Art. 53 para. 1, but without explicitly mentioning the concept of subsidiarity. The model study "What a new Federal Constitution could look like" by the Federal Department of Justice and Police (1985) contained a similar provision in Art. 55 (see also Art. 54 para. 2-3). Finally, the preliminary draft (1995) wanted to anchor the idea of federal subsidiarity at least indirectly in Art. 32 para. 1 ("The cantons are responsible for all tasks that are not assigned to the Confederation by the Federal Constitution."). However, the Conference of Cantonal Governments (KdK) demanded that the principle of subsidiarity be explicitly written down: The KdK demanded that the Confederation only "intervene in the right of the cantons to enforce ... if this is unavoidable". As a result, the draft constitution of 1996 for the first time mentioned the idea of subsidiarity by name (Art. 34 para. 3: "The Confederation shall observe the principle of subsidiarity."). This provision was intended to take the concerns of the cantonal governments into account "to the greatest extent possible".
13 Interestingly, however, the explicit mention of the principle of subsidiarity was then deleted in the Council of States, i.e. by the cantonal deputies. The rejection by the Council of States of the draft Art. 34 para. 3, which explicitly mentions subsidiarity, is usually attributed to the votes of Rhinow, who was then a member of the Council of States. Rhinow, a member of the Council of States (and professor of constitutional and administrative law), warned against including new unclear and ambiguous terms in the constitutional text and took the view that the idea and philosophy of subsidiarity were too unclear and vague to devote a constitutional provision to the principle of subsidiarity. The National Council only relented in the Unification Commission. The result was the provision according to which the Confederation "shall assume only those tasks which require uniform regulation" (Art. 42 para. 2 FC 1999).
14 According to Rhinow, the Council of States "expanded" the principle of subsidiarity in the formulation just quoted. In view of the complex and varied history of ideas on subsidiarity on the one hand and the short Art. 42 Para. 2 FC 1999 on the other, this admittedly appears to be an exaggeration; the provision was also criticised for being misleading. Only a few years later, on the occasion of the reorganisation of financial equalisation and the division of tasks between the Confederation and the cantons, it was already supplemented again, namely to the effect that the Confederation not only takes over tasks that require uniform regulation, but also (other) tasks that exceed the power of the cantons. The current Art. 43a para. 1 FC reads: "The Confederation shall assume only those tasks which exceed the power of the cantons or which require uniform regulation by the Confederation."
15 In addition to various provisions on the relationship between the Confederation and the cantons, the NFA constitutional revision thus addressed also included the current "subsidiarity article" (Art. 5a FC, according to the dispatch still Art. 3a) and thus the decision to include the subsidiarity principle as a "state policy maxim" in the Federal Constitution. In contrast to 1999, the Council of States was largely in agreement in 2004 on explicitly anchoring the principle of subsidiarity in the constitutional text. The only point of contention was where the current Art. 5a should be placed in the constitutional system. The majority of the advisory commission voted to include the principle of subsidiarity in the General Provisions at the beginning of the constitutional text, so that it would apply in principle to all three levels of government. The minority, however, complained that the principle of subsidiarity should correctly be included in Art. 42 para. 2, because it only regulates the relationship between the Confederation and the cantons, but not the relationship between a canton and its communes, which is shaped by communal autonomy under cantonal law (see n. 26 below).
16 In the National Council, too, it was undisputed during the deliberations on the NFA that a subsidiarity article should be included in the constitutional text. As in the Council of States, the debate revolved around where the provision should be placed. The committee that prepared the report wanted to place the principle of subsidiarity in Art. 43a, but the majority of the National Council followed that of the Council of States (and the Council's own committee minority), which meant that Art. 5a FC, which has remained unchanged since then, was a done deal - subject to the obligatory constitutional referendum. In accordance with the systematic affiliation of Art. 5a to the General Provisions of the FC, the principle of subsidiarity is now to be regarded (in contrast to the former Art. 42 para. 2 FC) as a general rule of state organisation that affects all three levels of state (see on this below n. 26 ff.).
III. Context
17 The subsidiarity article of the Federal Constitution belongs to the constitutional order of federalism. This can be seen simply from the fact that Art. 5a FC found its way into the Constitution on the occasion of the federalism reform (see II.B. above). In particular, however, Art. 43a para. 1 FC "Principles for the allocation and fulfilment of state tasks" illuminates the meaning of Art. 5a FC (at least a little): According to Art. 43a para. 1 FC, the Confederation "shall assume only those tasks which exceed the power of the Cantons or which require uniform regulation by the Confederation". It is this provision - a kind of hinge between the subsidiarity and enumeration principles (cf. n. 11 above) - that primarily clarifies what Art. 5a FC actually means by "the principle of subsidiarity shall be observed" when tasks are assigned and fulfilled in the federal state. However, conversely, Art. 5a FC also illuminates Art. 43a FC, namely insofar as certain limits for Art. 43a FC follow from the preference of the principle of subsidiarity in favour of the decentralised level of regulation: Neither may the Confederation take action solely because it is of the opinion that there is a need for uniform regulation, nor may it be automatically concluded from the need for uniform regulation that federal regulation must be imposed on the cantons. These two considerations make it possible to further contextualise Art. 5a FC.
18 The first idea, according to which the Confederation may not take action merely because it considers that federal competence is required, leads to Art. 3 FC, according to which the cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution. The second part of this provision states that federal action must always be based on a constitutional norm of competence (cf. II.B. above with reference to the literature). The principle of individual authorisation applies to the Confederation: Each of its competences must have been transferred to it individually in the constitution. This also means that every federal competence is based not only on a popular vote but also on a majority of the cantons and not only on the will of the federal bodies. Conversely, the cantons are responsible in principle - i.e. even without a corresponding constitutional provision - unless a competence has been exclusively transferred to the Confederation. This is sometimes referred to as the "subsidiary" general competence of the cantons. However, this expression is misleading insofar as the Confederation is subsidiary. It is the Confederation that "stands in" for the cantons (cf. the historical roots of the term above n. 2 ff.) if this appears necessary or at least sensible in an area of state action, not vice versa. It would therefore be correct to speak of a residual general competence of the cantons, as in the French-language literature on Swiss constitutional law.
19 It should also be noted that even if regulatory sovereignty lies with the Confederation, the principle of enforcement or implementation federalism applies: normally, the cantons implement federal law, so that they retain a certain influence that allows them to take cantonal peculiarities into account (Art. 46 para. 1 FC). The concept of subsidiarity also encourages the Confederation to respect cantonal particularities and the greatest possible cantonal room for manoeuvre (Art. 46 para. 3 FC). Nevertheless, the Confederation must ensure that the cantons (uniformly) respect federal law, which has priority (Art. 49 para. 1 FC) (Art. 49 para. 2 FC). The tension between diversity and unity that the principle of subsidiarity seeks to navigate is clearly evident here.
20 With regard to the second consideration mentioned in n. 17, according to which the Confederation may not take action merely because a matter requires uniform regulation, the following should be noted: In principle, the cantons can coordinate among themselves independently, even if not always smoothly, if there is a need for uniform regulation. In principle, the Confederation is not needed for this: Art. 48 f. FC explicitly provide for intercantonal agreements. For example, the concordat on measures against violence at sporting events ("Hooligan Concordat") is well known to the general public. Related to intercantonal coordination through such agreements is the instrument of (suspensively) conditional and in this sense subsidiary federal competences, i.e. legislative competences to which the federal government is only entitled under a temporal and factual condition: temporally only when the cantons have not (successfully) acted; factually only insofar as the cantons have not acted (or failed). Illustrative is Art. 62 para. 4 FC concerning the harmonisation of the school system (see also Art. 63 para. 5 FC concerning coordination in higher education). The Confederation assumes this harmonisation task only on the condition precedent that the cantons achieve no or only partial harmonisation.
21 Finally, with regard to Art. 43a para. 1 FC, it must be clarified in view of its wording that a task does not exceed the "power of the cantons" merely because the Confederation could perform it more efficiently in an economic sense. The first argument against a comparative efficiency criterion is that this would contradict the spirit of the subsidiarity principle: efficiency criteria threaten to promote centralisation rather than to curb it. As the ineffective subsidiarity principle of EU law shows, this should not be surprising, especially when the central regulatory level is empowered to compare the efficiency of a centralised and a decentralised regulation. Comparative efficiency thinking runs counter to the values of pluralism and self-determination. They are served by the principle of subsidiarity (cf. II.A. above). If these values are underestimated, this can also destroy the supposed efficiency gains of centralisation steps: "Imposed" centralisation steps are likely to fail regularly due to their lack of social acceptance.
22 The subsidiarity principle cannot be applied mechanically. Just as federalism includes "cooperative" forms of cooperation between the levels of government based on goodwill and partnership, "lived" subsidiarity also plays a non-negligible role in the federal state. Examples of this are federal competences that the federal government does not exercise, only exercises partially or only after a certain delay. Furthermore, a (moderate) "recantonalisation", i.e. a strengthening of the cantons' competences, always remains possible in principle, which also happened when Art. 5a FC was included in the Constitution. Conversely, the past has shown that the cantons sometimes like to leave decisions to the federal government that they would otherwise have to make. The resulting oscillation between centralisation and decentralisation helps to find widely accepted solutions; in this respect, subsidiarity is also a mediating mechanism. The downside of this is, for example, unclear responsibilities, regulatory patchwork and a lack of ability to act when time is of the essence.
23 A final consideration of the context of Art. 5a FC must finally ask whether the idea of subsidiarity as such - Art. 5a FC should at most have an analogous effect - could and should not also guide Switzerland's foreign relations. Switzerland gave itself its constitution "in an effort to ... strengthen freedom and democracy, independence and peace in solidarity and openness towards the world". Here, too, the tension between sovereignty or autonomy and integration into central or superordinate structures shines through, so that it must be discussed (politically) under which conditions Switzerland should become involved and integrated internationally and to what extent. The basic ideas of the principle of subsidiarity can probably also be applied to this problem. In fact, Switzerland was a driving force when it came to anchoring the principle of subsidiarity in the ECHR (see n. 6 above). If one realises that the principle of subsidiarity under the Convention mainly regulates the relationship between the international court and the states as politically self-governing commonwealths, this can hardly come as a surprise. The Swiss constitutional tradition traditionally assigns a comparatively strong role to political democracy vis-à-vis constitutional court control. The discussion about the subsidiarity of the European level of the convention system thus suggests the following: In particular, states that traditionally attach great importance to the democratic process will, for the time being, insist on granting only a decidedly subsidiary role - subordinate to the member states - to international organisations to which they accede. For the democratic legitimacy of international legal systems and the political control over them will continue to derive primarily from the states due to the lack of developed supranational democracy.
24 The question is what this means for Switzerland's relationship with the European Union. In any case, the discussion about the appropriate distribution of competences with regard to the relationship with a legal system that sees itself less as inter- than as supra-national and whose law claims primacy of application over national law is intensifying. The UK's Brexit and Switzerland's EU-scepticism indicate that states with a strong tradition of parliamentary supremacy or (indirect) popular democracy attach particular importance to a pronounced and effective EU subsidiarity. On the other hand, the following must be taken into account: The EU's current stage of development makes it a sui generis organisation to which a subsidiarity logic, which seems appropriate for other intergovernmental organisations, can presumably not be meaningfully applied. Mechanisms known from the constitutional law of federal states for the preservation of federal subsidiarity are also unlikely to be suitable for the EU due to its lack of federal character. This shows once again that the principle of subsidiarity can take on different forms in different contexts and is highly susceptible to change. For this reason, it is hardly conceivable that the inclusion of the subsidiarity principle in future treaty provisions on bilateral Swiss-European relations will be able to break through the Gordian knot of domestic and European "red lines": due to its great indeterminacy, both sides are likely to be wary of setting aside controversial points by referring to the subsidiarity principle. However, Switzerland could use the idea of subsidiarity internally to structure the domestic discussion on the relationship with the EU. The principle of subsidiarity could help in interpreting the central arguments for and against further integration into the supranational structures of the European project.
IV. Commentary in the narrow sense
A. Scope of application
25 According to its wording, the scope of application of Art. 5a FC is limited to state tasks. It covers the performance of state tasks in all phases of law-making and law implementation. Foreign affairs" (Art. 54 ff. FC) are also covered, since the Confederation and the cantons must also cooperate here (see Art. 55 FC) and respect their respective competences and interests (see in particular Art. 56 para. 1-2 FC).
26 As part of the General Provisions of the Federal Constitution, Art. 5a FC is addressed to all three levels of government. At least in principle, it also concerns the communes or the relationship of the cantons to them. The argument that the relations between a canton and its communes cannot fall under the federal constitutional principle of subsidiarity because they are shaped by communal autonomy under cantonal law (see above n. 15 in fine) is not entirely conclusive. The Federal Constitution (Art. 50 para. 1) guarantees communal autonomy as a justiciable constitutional right, the meaning and purpose of which presupposes a tripartite state structure and thus the existence of communes, even if it does not completely clarify the question of whether a canton may completely dispense with the communal level. Admittedly, the communes "only" enjoy autonomy according to cantonal law, but they are nevertheless recognised as a level of state with their own competences (but not individually in their existence) under federal law or, in my opinion, even protected according to the more convincing view. This protection serves a concern, community democracy, the practice of democracy closest to the citizen in the tripartite federal state, which is in line with the general logic of the subsidiarity idea. Accordingly, the view that Art. 50 para. 1 FC (also) implements the principle of subsidiarity is to be followed. This does not negate the fact that it is up to cantonal law to determine the scope of communal autonomy. The overview of cantonal law in Bellanger confirms this: The subsidiarity principles of the cantonal constitutions largely coincide with the understanding of Art. 5a FC in this context, so that a political obligation to justify cantonal extensions of competence follows from this (cf. below n.35).
27 The individual and society are not addressed by Art. 5a FC. The subsidiarity principle of Art. 5a FC is only applicable to state action (see above N. 25 f.). In distinction to the principle of subsidiarity concerning the state (and supranational) levels of regulation, there is sometimes talk of a "socio-political" principle of subsidiarity, which refers to the relationship of the individual and civil society to the state and provides for the state to intervene only if civil society efforts are insufficient. Insofar as reference is made in this regard to Art. 6 and 41 para. 1 FC, which emphasise the responsibility of each person for themselves and their contribution to the state and society, the legal anchoring of this socio-political principle of subsidiarity is easily recognisable. However, naming other provisions such as equal opportunities (Art. 2 para. 3 FC) as aspects of a constitutional principle of subsidiarity threatens to overstretch it. If one assumes (and this should be indisputable) that the state should ultimately always serve the individual, every state action must be rooted in a broadly understood "need to help" individuals. Thus, practically every constitutional provision can be placed in the context of the idea of subsidiarity, including fundamental rights as principles of the liberal constitutional state that limit the state in favour of individual initiative. This reminds us that the idea of subsidiarity is based on a conception of the basic structure of social reality (see above n. 3). However, the normative benefit of an excessive use of the concept of subsidiarity for all kinds of constitutional arrangements is likely to be small, if not negative.
28 On the other hand, the principle of subsidiarity is relevant to the question of whether and, if so, within what framework the state should become active in an area in the future: It designates, at least in principle, the level of government that is responsible for assessing and deciding whether public action is necessary at all. However, this must not be understood as a preference of the subsidiarity principle enshrined in Art. 5a FC for the promotion of private self-regulation, the delegation of state tasks to private parties or similar strategies of withdrawal by the state: Art. 5a FC does not express itself in this regard (but cf. Art. 6 FC, on this above n. 27, and, as far as the economy is concerned, Art. 94 FC with its fundamental decision in favour of a free, private, competition-oriented market order).
B. Purpose and functioning
29 The principle of subsidiarity in general and in Art. 5a FC serves self-determination and pluralism (cf. n. 3 ff. above). In the Swiss constitutional state, it thus aims to protect decentralised democracy and thus political freedom and proximity to citizens, cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity, as well as the (concomitant) competition of different economic locations, tax systems, etc.
30 To this end, Art. 5a FC first establishes a rule for the distribution of competences, which serves to allocate tasks to the levels of government. Admittedly, Art. 5a, like Art. 43a FC, was drafted too openly to be able to "fine-tune" the distribution of tasks in the federal state (see below n. 34 ff.).
31 Contrary to the conceptual roots of subsidiarity (see above n. 2), Art. 5a FC does not stipulate an (auxiliary) duty of the Confederation to take over tasks from the cantons (see below n. 36). In addition to the question of "whether" a federal competence is appropriate, Art. 5a FC also concerns the question of "how" a federal competence should be structured and exercised. The provision is thus also a rule for the exercise of competences that guides discretion and must be observed in the fulfilment of tasks. In particular, the principle of subsidiarity requires the Confederation or its organs to exercise its competences as sparingly as possible: Exclusive federal competences are to be avoided if the Confederation can also perform a task competitively with or in parallel to cantonal competences or if a basic federal competence is sufficient. However, Art. 5a, even in conjunction with Art. 43a FC, is not specific enough to function as a "hard" (prohibition-like) barrier to the exercise of competences (cf. below n. 34 ff.).
32 Finally, it is important to note what Art. 5a FC is not. The principle of subsidiarity is not an independent rule of interpretation that overrides the traditional elements of constitutional interpretation and would generally require a restrictive interpretation of federal competences. Nevertheless, the concept of subsidiarity, as a consequence of the federal structure of the Swiss state, must be taken into account when determining the scope of federal competences. If a norm of competences can be interpreted in different ways, it may be advisable to give preference to the interpretation that best satisfies Art. 5a FC. Generally speaking, Art. 5a FC must be taken into account as part of the overall context of the Federal Constitution when establishing practical concordance within the constitutional provisions.
33 It should be noted that the principle of subsidiarity addresses both the subsidiary and the primary level: In Switzerland, it is (as much) the responsibility of the cantons (and the municipalities) as of the Confederation (and the cantons) to prevent centralisation. The subsidiarity idea can only succeed if it functions according to both a negative (inhibiting) and a positive (empowering) logic.
C. Normative content
34 The subsidiarity principle of Art. 5a FC is not merely a programmatic principle. Art. 5a FC establishes a legal principle, albeit an open one in terms of content, which is highly open to interpretation and which the political authorities must flesh out (see below n. 35 ff.). This has hardly been done to date; in particular, Art. 43a FC, which concretises Art. 5a FC, is itself too open to be able to provide this service adequately. The questions of when a matter requires uniform regulation by the Confederation or when the power of the cantons is not sufficient to fulfil a state task satisfactorily are questions of value that can ultimately only be answered politically. A general legal concretisation of the subsidiarity principle of Art. 5a FC is therefore hardly to be expected in the future.
35 For this very reason, there is probably agreement that the principle of subsidiarity is a procedural or institutional principle: It does not impose any substantive requirements, but places the bodies addressed by it - primarily the federal legislature and the cantonal constitutional and legislative bodies (cf. n. 26 above) - under an increased "obligation to justify and substantiate". Its main significance therefore lies in the fact that proposals to the authorities within the scope of application of Art. 5a FC (cf. above N. 25 f.) require a special political justification. In addition, decisions to centralise a task or its fulfilment must be periodically examined for their continuing justification.
36 The federal constitutional legislature, the people and the cantons, are not bound by Article 5a FC in a sense that would make this provision a barrier to permissible constitutional amendments. Nevertheless, the constitution-maker does well to take the principle of subsidiarity into account as a "state-policy maxim" when striving for a coherent overall constitutional order that equally respects the various structural principles of the constitutional order. The majority of the cantons required for constitutional amendments (Art. 140 para. 1 let. a and Art. 142 para. 2 FC) also prevents additional federal competences from being created against the will of a majority of the cantons and thus steps towards centralisation from being taken.
37 In individual cases, the application of Art. 5a FC is a political question (cf. below n. 38). The main addressee is the federal legislature, which must transfer constitutional federal competences into federal law in a way that does not encroach on cantonal competences. However, it is only free to do so to the extent that the constitution requires it to exercise and shape federal competences (for example, in the case of basic federal legislative competences or concurrent federal competences). For the federal legislature subordinate to the federal legislature, the same applies in principle. For the federal constitutional legislature, Art. 5a FC cannot represent more than a kind of political declaration: Like any constitutional provision, Art. 5a FC merely acts as a self-binding obligation from the perspective of the constitutional legislator (see above n. 26). At the cantonal level, many authorities are already required by cantonal law to observe the principle of subsidiarity. Many cantonal constitutions have a subsidiarity article (see above n. 26), or they implicitly recognise the core idea of subsidiarity. In the absence of a corresponding provision, this silence is to be understood as a reference to Art. 5a FC. Consequently, every canton must base its relations with its communes on the principle of subsidiarity.
D. Lack of justiciability
38 The subsidiarity principle of Art. 5a FC is generally regarded as non-justiciable. Its content is too vague to lend itself to judicial assessment. The courts cannot control its observance by the federal authorities; Art. 5a FC does not confer any enforceable rights. This corresponds to Switzerland's general constitutional policy decision in favour of parliamentary supremacy. Even if the isolated doctrinal opinions in favour of the justiciability of Art. 5a FC were followed, Art. 190 FC would preclude constitutional court review of the federal legislature; even the Federal Supreme Court is prohibited from not applying federal laws if, in its judgement, they are unconstitutional ("application requirement"). At least Art. 190 FC allows the Federal Supreme Court to review federal laws for their constitutionality without legal consequences (no "ban on review"). The question of whether the Federal Supreme Court could find a violation of the principle of subsidiarity in response to an autonomy complaint by a municipality must also be answered in the negative. Art. 5a FC can be understood as the programmatic foundation of communal autonomy of Art. 50 para. 1 FC, but the justiciability of the principle of subsidiarity does not follow from the combination of these two provisions; the concretisation of communal autonomy under the guidance of subsidiarity qua state policy maxim remains the political responsibility of the cantons. Consequently, the Federal Supreme Court could at best make a moral appeal to the political leaders to take sufficient account of the subsidiarity principle of Art. 5a FC. In view of the above, it is not surprising that Art. 5a FC has hardly been taken into account in the practice of the Federal Supreme Court.
39 For the time being, the application of the subsidiarity principle remains a matter for politics. At least the sciences can assist them.
About the author
Reto Walther, Ph.D., legal officer, Federal Office of Justice, has published and lectured in the fields of constitutional, administrative and public international law. Currently, he prepares a PhD-based book manuscript «Subsidiarity, Legitimacy, and the European Court of Human Rights» for Oxford University Press
Recommended further reading
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Nörr Knut Wolfgang/Oppermann Thomas (Hrsg.), Subsidiarität: Idee und Wirklichkeit, Tübingen 1997, S. 49 ff.
Saladin Peter, Bund und Kantone: Autonomie und Zusammenwirken im schweizerischen Bundesstaat, ZSR 103 (1984-II), S. 433 ff.
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