-
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
-
- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
-
- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
-
- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
-
- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
I. History and Systematics
A. A difficult genesis
1 As indicated by its title, which is identical in all three language versions, Article 10a deals with information prior to - and in preparation for - popular (federal) votes, which is dealt with exclusively in Title II of the Political Rights Act. The provision therefore applies only to votes, not to elections, and should therefore be referred to as "information for citizens", rather than "information for voters".
2 This provision did not exist in the original 1976 version of the law. It was introduced by a partial revision of the law on political rights, dated October 5, 2007, which had this as its sole purpose and came into force on January 15, 2009.
3 The amendment was not initiated by the Federal Council itself, which was even strongly opposed to it, but by the Chambers, via a parliamentary initiative by the National Council's Political Institutions Committee on September 15, 2006, following fairly lengthy and heated discussions within the Federal Assembly. In a way, this revision is the consequence of a debate which, in the early 2000s, opposed two opposing tendencies, one advocating active, or more active, information of the authorities, in particular the Federal Council, on matters subject to federal referendum, the other which, on the contrary, as the Government recalled, intended to ban or prohibit, to a large extent, any intervention by the federal authorities in the campaigns preceding popular votes.
4 More specifically, on the one hand, the popular initiative "People's Sovereignty without Government Propaganda", launched in January 2003 by a "Verein Bürger für Bürger" committee and submitted on August 11, 2004, called for two new paragraphs (3 and 4) to be added to art. 34 Cst. which, among other things, would oblige the "Federal Council, the senior executives of the Federal Administration and the offices of the Confederation" to refrain "from any information and propaganda activities. In particular, they are to refrain from any intervention in the media and any participation in events concerning the vote. The only exception is a brief, one-off announcement to the population by the head of the relevant department". On the other hand, a parliamentary initiative by National Councillor Didier Burkhalter, dated October 7, 2004, proposed incorporating into Art. 10 of the LDP "a provision requiring the Federal Council to conduct an active information campaign on matters submitted to a federal vote, and to defend the position of the federal authorities clearly and objectively".
5 In its message of June 29 2005 on the popular initiative, the Federal Council firmly opposed it, believing that it was and is its duty to inform citizens prior to federal referenda, since the guarantee of free opinion-forming conferred by Art. 34 para. 2 Cst. gives them "the right not only to know their government's opinion on a matter submitted to a vote, but also the reasons why it is for or against that matter". This "information activity of the Federal Council and the Federal Administration prior to votes must, however, comply with clearly defined criteria". Considering that the principles governing the provision of information prior to referenda were widely recognized - and had been sufficiently concretized by the internal directives put in place - the Government nonetheless judged that it was "not necessary to enshrine these principles in law", and therefore decided "not to submit an indirect counter-proposal to the popular initiative to the Federal Assembly".
6 For its part, the Political Institutions Committee of the National Council, which had been followed by that of the Council of States, chose to follow up the Burkhalter parliamentary initiative and finally decided to draw up a preliminary draft to implement it as an indirect counter-proposal to the popular initiative "Sovereignty of the people without government propaganda", which in its view sought "to silence the authorities during federal votes". The preliminary draft was favourably received during the consultation process, and the Commission then turned it into its own draft, which differed from the current text finally adopted by Parliament. The Commission's draft proposed an Art. 10a consisting of just two paragraphs, with the following wording: "The Federal Council informs the electorate in a comprehensive manner about the issues submitted to a federal vote. It shall defend the position of the Federal Assembly", for the first paragraph; para. 2 added: "It shall inform the electorate as and when required, in accordance with the principles of objectivity, transparency and proportionality".
7 Even though the Federal Council reiterated in its opinion of November 8, 2006, that such a legislative amendment was not necessary in its view - a position which, moreover, it fiercely defended practically throughout the debates in Parliament - the Federal Assembly ultimately followed the proposal of the National Council's Political Institutions Committee, albeit with some structural and substantive modifications.
B. Some structural and systematic issues
8 In terms of structure, Art. 10a is made up of four short paragraphs, each taking up one of the ideas already contained in the two paragraphs of the Commission's draft, but adding a new idea. We will come back to each of these paragraphs in the commentary proper (Ch. III), after having highlighted, in a fairly general and synthetic way, the meaning and importance of the provision as a whole (Ch. II). Before doing so, however, it is worth making a few brief comments on the history and systematics of art. 10a.
9 First of all, it should be noted that the National Council's Political Institutions Committee, the instigator of the provision, questioned its place and suggested that other solutions or anchorings would also have been possible, given that the Federal Council's duty and activities to provide information are already governed by various provisions of federal law, such as art. 180 al. 2 Cst. and art. 10 LOGA, as well as, as the Federal Council pointed out throughout the parliamentary proceedings, art. 11 al. 2 LDP.
10 If the "delimitation" between articles 180 al. 2 Cst. and 10 and 11 LOGA, on the one hand, and art. 10a LDP, on the other, does not seem too problematic, the latter concerning "only information provided by the Federal Council during federal votes, to the exclusion of official information activities outside this framework", to quote the Commission, the coordination between art. 10a and art. 11 para. 2 LDP, as amended a few months before the adoption of the former, is much less successful, and questionable, from the point of view of systematics, at least formally. The two provisions both deal with the same subject matter - informing citizens prior to referenda - but they contain rules and principles that overlap or overlap, at least in part, while nevertheless differing in their wording. It is therefore legitimate to ask what the relationship - or delimitation - is between the two, and to what each should apply. The most reasonable approach, it seems, is to consider that one, art. 10a, applies to pre-voting information in a general way, while the other, art. 11 para. 2, applies to the concrete and precise instrument of so-called "explanations of vote", whereby the general rules and principles of art. 10a also apply to "explanations of vote" within the meaning of art. 11 para. 2.
11 It should also be noted that, while it explicitly sets out the Federal Council's duty to provide information and the principles that should guide - and limit - the provision of information by the authorities prior to a vote, art. 10a says nothing about the means or instruments that may - or may not - be used for this information activity, i.e. about the means by which information is provided. The National Council's Political Institutions Committee states that, when drafting the provision, it "envisaged drawing up a list of unauthorized information instruments and techniques", but that "it decided against it", notably because such a list "could not be exhaustive and would therefore only have illustrative value", giving "a false impression of security". We'll come back to this question of information vectors later.
12 Lastly, but not least, the National Council's Political Institutions Committee decided not to explicitly regulate two related issues with the proposed new provision: the financial transparency of information campaigns prior to referenda, and the applicability of the principles laid down in Art. 10a to "companies linked to the Confederation".
II. Meaning and significance of the provision
A. Informing the authorities - and the Federal Council - in the context of freedom to vote
13 The subject of Art. 10a - the provision of information to citizens prior to federal referenda, and by the Federal Council - is just one aspect of a much broader and much-discussed issue, that of the various interventions, from different quarters, but particularly by the authorities, of all kinds, in the run-up to referenda, in the context of what is commonly referred to as "freedom to vote". Guaranteed by art. 34 para. 2 of the Swiss Constitution, as part of the "guarantee of political rights", the freedom to vote "protects", as this provision puts it, "the free formation of the opinion of citizens and the faithful and reliable expression of their will". In other words, it "protects the members of the electorate against information and state intervention which are liable to exert an unlawful influence on the outcome of the ballot. Influence is unlawful when it has the effect that the elector is not or is no longer able to freely form or express his or her choice in a vote or election".
14 This issue is of considerable importance in Switzerland, given the importance of direct democracy and popular votes in the country, as we have seen.
15 As the Federal Council pointed out in 2005 in its message on the "Sovereignty of the people without government propaganda" initiative, the question of whether the freedom to vote implies an obligation on the part of the authorities to refrain from any intervention in campaigns - and thus to limit information to what is strictly necessary - or whether, on the contrary, it implies a duty to inform has been the subject of much debate, both politically and in legal doctrine. And the answer to this question has evolved considerably. While the majority tendency at first was towards an obligation to abstain, the prevailing doctrine today - and more or less since the 1990s-2000s - generally accepts that informing the authorities is "possible and even necessary", and that it therefore constitutes, within certain limits, a genuine duty on the part of the authorities in voting matters.
16 Nevertheless, the issue of official intervention and its limits remains a topical one. The question is widely discussed in the legal literature, and there are almost countless contributions, while case law is abundant and nuanced. The discussions and debates are not confined to the question of information - and intervention - by the Federal Council as such, which is the subject of art. 10a discussed here, but also touch on many other, more or less related issues: firstly, that of interventions in federal referendum campaigns by other federal authorities, such as departments of the federal administration, public enterprises or other autonomous institutions or establishments under (federal) public law, or even legal entities under private law delegated with a public task (health insurance funds); but also that of interventions in these same federal referendum campaigns by the cantons or certain inter-cantonal organizations or institutions. It is beyond the scope of this article to deal with these issues in detail and exhaustively. However, we can summarize the situation as follows.
17 The Federal Supreme Court and legal doctrine have deduced from the freedom to vote a number of requirements and principles concerning the provision of information to citizens, which define and frame the role of the authorities in campaigns preceding a vote or election. In this respect, it is important to distinguish the position of the authorities from that of other players, such as private individuals, whose interventions can only exceptionally be deemed unlawful, or the press and media. As far as the authorities are concerned, the principle is, as certain authors have summed it up very well, the obligation to inform, but the prohibition on influencing or at least, and more precisely, on influencing in an "inadmissible", "illicit", "prohibited" or "undue" manner, i.e. in a way likely to distort democratic debate. As indicated, case law is abundant, and practice evolving and nuanced, based as it is on a whole series of distinctions.
18 With regard to the obligation to inform, it is now accepted that the authorities are required to provide official information to all citizens in advance of elections, in order to enable them to form their own opinions freely through these "explanations of vote". This information, which explains the purpose of the ballot and what is at stake, must be objective and exhaustive, and provided all at once, sufficiently early in the campaign; it is also accepted that the authorities may provide voting recommendations (except in the case of elections), without however falling into the category of propaganda.
19 With regard to other interventions by the authorities - referred to as circumstantial, as opposed to general official information - in and during the campaign preceding an election, a distinction must be made, first of all, from a temporal point of view, between information and interventions by the authorities that take place in ordinary times, outside a voting or election campaign, and those that take place during such a campaign: While the "government is recognized as having the right - and even the duty - to intervene in the political debate outside the pre-voting periods", it is "only in the run-up to a popular decision that the political authority is in principle obliged to refrain from any influence on the electorate, so that the latter can make up its own mind independently". A distinction must also be made between elections and referenda, as the requirement for the authority to reserve or abstain is considerably stricter in the former case.
20 In practice, distinctions are also made according to the aims of the interventions and the "quality" of the intervening authorities. Thus, "pro populo" interventions, which aim to protect the process of free formation of popular opinion by correcting false information, are contrasted with "pro domo" interventions, through which the authorities seek to defend a certain point of view in the campaign: while the former are necessary, the latter are subject to certain limits and conditions.
21 A further distinction is made between interventions by a public authority - or its authorities - in its own votes, and those by a public authority in the votes of another public authority, either "upwards" (by a commune in a cantonal vote, or by a canton in a federal vote) or "downwards" (by a canton in a communal vote, or by the Confederation in a cantonal vote), or "to the side" (of a commune in the vote of another commune, for example), which are in principle admissible only in the presence of a direct and particular interest ("eine besondere Betroffenheit"). In fact, in this area too - under the influence of a certain body of legal doctrine - case law seems to be showing a degree of openness.
22 A few years ago, intervention by a canton in the campaign leading up to a federal referendum was only permitted on condition that the outcome of the referendum was of direct and particular interest to the canton concerned. It now considers that "[w]here the outcome of a federal vote is of significant interest to all or several cantons, the cantonal governments may express themselves publicly before the vote and issue a voting recommendation. In doing so, they must respect the principles of objectivity, proportionality and transparency as they also apply to the Federal Council. The question is somewhat different for inter-cantonal organizations and institutions: the Federal Supreme Court accepts that what applies to the cantons also applies to the Conference of Cantonal Governments, but considers that interventions by the Conferences of Cantonal Directors and other inter-cantonal institutions remain excluded, with the exception, in special cases, of certain companies owned by the cantons.
23 The duty of confidentiality applicable to the Federal Council and to the authorities of territorial public bodies also applies to the services of the Federal Administration. The same applies, at least in principle, to public establishments and other public institutions or companies, as well as to delegates (even those organized on the basis of private law) of a public task, whose jurisprudence nevertheless admits that they may take a stand in a voting campaign that particularly affects them, notably in their economic interest. This is the case, for example, with the Swiss National Bank, SUVA and recognized health insurance companies.
24 Interventions by one or more communes in the voting campaigns of another public authority, such as a cantonal referendum, appear to be subject to a special regime, which is both stricter and more permissive. In a recent ruling, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court stated that "the intervention of a commune in a campaign preceding a cantonal ballot (intervention 'upwards') is admissible only exceptionally, under certain conditions, and must comply with certain rules, failing which the campaign is affected by a defect which may lead to the annulment of the operations [references]. First of all, a municipal authority may only intervene in a campaign relating to a cantonal election if it is prompted to do so by relevant reasons. This is the case when it intends to provide objective information to citizens or to correct manifestly erroneous information in opposing propaganda, or when the commune and its citizens have a direct and specific interest in the outcome of the ballot, which far exceeds that of the other communes in the canton". However, once these conditions have been met, i.e. "when a commune is particularly concerned, it can use all the means of influencing opinion that are usually employed in a campaign by the supporters or opponents of a project. Although it is always obliged to present the interests of the commune in an objective and concrete manner, the commune thus has more freedom in its intervention than an authority called upon to draw up an explanatory report for a ballot of its own community [references]".
25 Practice offers further distinctions and nuances. It accepts, for example, that the authorities' regime does not apply, or not to the same extent, to the personal interventions of members of an authority, who are subject to a nuanced regime and thus enjoy greater freedom of intervention, provided they act as private individuals and also appear as such, for example by not giving an official appearance to their interventions or by not using official stationery for their correspondence. This rather "liberal" regime is sometimes criticized for being somewhat "artificial" (or far removed from reality), and for making it difficult to distinguish between personal interventions and official positions.
26 In the final analysis, although there is a degree of unanimity in recognizing that the authorities responsible for organizing the vote - in this case, the Federal Council, in the case of federal votes - have a duty to provide information, in an objective and transparent manner, while respecting the principle of proportionality, and that, generally speaking, there has been a certain relaxation of practice and case law in this regard, not all controversies have disappeared, with opinions clashing on certain specific points.
27 In any case, as indicated, Art. 10a only regulates a (small) part of this vast problem, namely the information provided by the Federal Council prior to a vote, and its limits. The provision only applies to federal referenda, but the question and problem of information prior to referenda is not specific to these referenda alone, but affects all referenda, including cantonal and communal referenda, where case law is also abundant. For this reason, cantons sometimes have provisions similar to art. 10a of the LDP, which regulate the question of information prior to voting.
B. Cantonal law
28 In fact, in the cantons - as was also the case at federal level, with art. 11 of the LDP, prior to the adoption of art. 10a - there are usually provisions stipulating that items put to the vote must be accompanied by a message or explanatory brochure, which is generally drafted by the executive, i.e. the State Council in cantonal matters, but sometimes also by the Grand Council or one of its bodies. This message or brochure must generally be brief and objective, also setting out the opinions of important minorities and taking into account the arguments of the initiative committee or the persons responsible for the request for a popular vote.
29 More rarely, however, and particularly in more recent legislation, we also find provisions quite similar to art. 10a, which deal specifically with informing the authorities in general prior to (cantonal and/or communal) votes. This is the case, for example, with art. 32 of the Vaud law on the exercise of political rights, dated October 5, 2021, which stipulates that "[t]he Conseil d'État shall inform the electorate on an ongoing basis about the objects submitted to cantonal voting, explaining the position of the cantonal authorities" (para. 1) and that "[e]ach of its interventions must respect the principles of objectivity, transparency and proportionality" (para. 2).
30 Failure to comply with these cantonal provisions, which govern the provision of information to citizens prior to cantonal and communal votes - and set out the principles and limits of such information - may constitute a violation of the freedom to vote guaranteed by art. 34 Cst. and consequently lead to the annulment of the vote, where the conditions for such annulment are met.
31 The principles of objective, complete and transparent official information, as laid down in these cantonal provisions - and in art. 10a for federal votes - derive from the guarantee of freedom to vote in art. 34 Cst. and therefore apply to official information provided by cantonal and/or communal authorities prior to votes, even in the absence of cantonal provisions on the subject.
III. Comments
A. Paragraph 1: a duty to provide information on a regular basis
32 Under the terms of para. 1, the Federal Council is required to "inform [...] on an ongoing basis about matters submitted to a federal vote". In a way, this provision puts an end to the controversies and discussions that previously existed on the subject, by imposing on the Federal Council a duty, an obligation to inform. The use of the present tense ("informs") is clear in this respect: the Federal Council is obliged to inform, and to do so "in an ongoing manner", on (all) matters submitted to a vote. The idea of an obligation to inform is also clear from the preparatory work. According to the National Council's Political Institutions Committee, the aim of this provision, which was intended to ratify the practice hitherto followed by the Federal Council, was to anchor a genuine "obligation on the part of the Federal Council to inform" citizens "about federal votes", a duty to inform which has as its corollary - and at the same time as its justification - their "right [...] to be fully informed by the authorities about the matters put to the vote".
33 The expression "de manière suivie" - in the French text - did not appear in the draft of the National Council's Political Institutions Committee, nor in the new wording proposed by the Council of States' Political Institutions Committee, to which both chambers finally agreed: both spoke of informing "au fur et à mesure". This expression ("de manière suivie") was therefore (presumably) introduced by the Drafting Committee, and in no way alters the content of the provision.
34 With the phrase "as and when required", the National Council's Political Institutions Committee was referring to what it called the "principle of continuity" of information, which in its view implied "that the Federal Council should set out from the outset the main reasons for its support or opposition to a project, so that its arguments can, if necessary, be challenged. The principle of continuity is in the interests of the electorate, who must be able to form an opinion within the framework of a broad opinion-forming procedure and in full knowledge of the facts". This was also the intention of the Political Institutions Committee of the Council of States, and the phrase "on an ongoing basis" must therefore be interpreted in the same way.
35 In fact, and without detracting from this "historical" interpretation, the expression could - and probably should - also be understood as requiring the Federal Council to inform citizens regularly, or systematically and consistently, about all the issues put to the vote, and not just some of them. Such systematic information is in line with Federal Council practice.
36 One might even wonder whether the idea of informing citizens in a single intervention at the start of a campaign is not somewhat outdated in the light of new information technologies and social networks, which allow other forces active in a campaign to intervene at any time, and in a repeated and massive way. In the words of some authors, "the authorities who assume an information function must be able to intervene quickly, and their interventions must not be limited to a given moment in the campaign corresponding to the publication of the explanatory brochure". If the "historical" interpretation of the provision seems to point in another direction, the text of para. 1, which speaks of informing "in an ongoing manner", does not preclude such a more teleological understanding of the Federal Council's duty to inform.
37 Be that as it may, if it is thus a duty of the Government, regular and ongoing information prior to federal votes is also limited and framed by a certain number of rules and principles, which are provided for and specified by the other paragraphs of art. 10a, especially para. 2.
B. Paragraph 2: exhaustive, objective, transparent and proportionate information
1. Introductory and general remarks
38 According to para. 2, the Federal Council "shall respect the principles of completeness, objectivity, transparency and proportionality". The provision thus defines the four principles that govern and limit the Federal Council's information activities prior to referenda, principles whose observance makes it possible to distinguish between information, which is permitted and even necessary, and propaganda, which is prohibited.
39 From a formal point of view, it should be noted that the initial proposal of the National Council's Political Institutions Committee had a slightly different tenor, since in para. 2 it referred explicitly only to the principles of objectivity, transparency and proportionality. 1, however, already specified that the Federal Council was to provide information "in a comprehensive manner", so that the principle of comprehensiveness simply became explicit with the new wording proposed by the Political Institutions Committee of the Council of States, without there being any substantive change.
40 In substance, even if the text of art. 10a para. 2 LDP is formally addressed only to the Federal Council, the principles laid down by this provision, which derive directly from the freedom to vote guaranteed by art. 34 para. 2 Cst. also apply, at least by analogy, to other federal authorities and institutions, in particular the federal administration and its agents, as well as to autonomous enterprises and establishments under federal law, when they assume or exercise an information task or activity in connection with federal votes. These principles also apply, moreover, to a certain extent at least, by virtue of the relevant provisions of cantonal law, and the requirements deriving from the freedom to vote as laid down by the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, to other authorities likely to intervene - and to the extent that they are authorized to do so - in campaigns preceding federal votes.
41 As already mentioned, while it lays down the principles that must guide the provision of information to the authorities prior to a vote, art. 10a says nothing about the means or techniques that may - or may not - be used to provide information, as the Commission has decided not to regulate this issue. This does not mean, however, that the Federal Council or the authorities responsible for information can use any instrument or technique, insofar as the means or vectors used must comply with and be employed in a manner consistent with the principles laid down in para. 2 of art. 10a, and in particular the principle of proportionality. The Federal Supreme Court rightly examined art. 10a, and in particular para. 2, that the Federal Supreme Court examined the admissibility in principle of the now systematic publication by the Federal Chancellery of explanatory videos prior to - and in preparation for - federal referenda, partially reproducing the Federal Council's "explanations of vote".
42 The four principles mentioned in art. 10a para. 2 will therefore be repeated below, in the order in which they are enumerated in the provision, even if, in doctrine, these principles are not always presented in the same way and are often presented in an order different from that of the provision - different from one work to another, moreover -. As we shall see, these principles are not always clearly and easily distinguishable, and sometimes even overlap, at least in part.
2. The principle of completeness (and accuracy)
43 The first principle mentioned in para. 2, that of completeness, presupposes that citizens are informed "in a complete manner". As mentioned, this principle was already present, albeit without this name, in para. 1 of the draft of the National Council's Political Institutions Committee, which referred specifically to "complete" information. To meet this requirement, the information must in principle "include any important element likely to have a significant influence on the formation of citizens' opinions, starting obviously with the opinion of the initiators, referendums or main opponents of a government or parliamentary project".
44 However, the authors point out that the Federal Supreme Court "shows a certain flexibility in this respect, and does not require that the information provided to citizens contain details of lesser importance"; "it does not have to deal with every detail or aspect of the proposal put to the vote, nor with every objection to it, but it is forbidden to pass over in silence elements that are important for the citizen's decision, or to reproduce inaccurately the arguments of the opponents of the referendum or initiative". Moreover, at least as far as the Federal Council's "explanations of vote" within the meaning of art. 11 para. 2 are concerned, the law requires that they be kept brief, so that the principle of completeness cannot be interpreted as implying an obligation on the part of the authority to go into all the details of a project or to discuss all the objections it might raise.
3. The principle of objectivity
45 The principle of objectivity requires "impartial and sober information", or "balanced (content) and sober (form) information", or else "requires the authority to provide reliable, complete and balanced information on the purpose and scope of the matter submitted to a vote", enabling citizens "to form a faithful and objective image" of this matter. For the Federal Court, the requirement of objectivity thus implies a duty not to provide "information or assertions that are outrageous or polemical in form, or erroneous, exaggerated or misleading in substance". Authorities are not, however, "bound by a duty of neutrality and may issue a recommendation; they are, however, bound by a duty of objectivity". In the words of the Commission, "they may present arguments, but they are prohibited from proselytizing".
4. The principle of transparency
46 The principle of transparency "requires that official interventions be unambiguously identifiable as such by the citizen". In other words, it "prohibits the authorities from exerting influence underhand", or from "acting in an opaque manner, for example by underhand financing of supporters of the position" they defend, or by amalgamating their "positions with those of a private committee by presenting indistinctly a partisan position and the official position in the information content of which they [are] the editors".
47 The requirement of transparency also presupposes that the authority "sheds full light on the sources and nature of the information it issues", and it "also requires that if there are significant uncertainties in the assessment of the initial situation, these should be clearly presented as such", insofar as "it is essential that citizens, on the basis of the data at their disposal, should be able to recognize the unreliability of forecasts and figures". So, for example, when a precise estimate is not possible, "the transparency of information [requires] that no mention be made of any concrete number in the explanatory brochure, or that mention be made of the unreliability of the estimates given, so that voters can form a correct and reliable idea of the matter". Similarly, when an authority communicates its own interpretation of a piece of legislation or a popular initiative, an interpretation which is based on mere hypotheses and not on certainties, it is obliged to indicate it as such, on pain of violating the principle of transparency.
5. The principle of proportionality
48 The principle of proportionality of information "means", according to the Commission, "that the nature, intensity and choice of the means used must be appropriate and necessary for the free formation of opinion. Ultimately, it is a question of equality of opportunity in voting campaigns".
49 This requirement, which applies in principle to all State activities under art. 5 para. 2 of the Swiss Constitution, "prohibits the authorities from using excessive means during the campaign".
50 As we have seen, no technique or means of information - no vector - is a priori prohibited. Their admissibility will depend on the manner in which they are used and the content of the information provided, which must respect the various principles set out in para. 2: objectivity and completeness, transparency and, of course, proportionality. Generally speaking, given the evolution of information technologies, it must be recognized that the authorities must be able to use communication techniques that correspond to the habits of the population. In this sense, case law recognizes their right to organize a press conference or issue a press release, as well as to make use of new audiovisual means of communication, such as the dissemination of computer graphics or explanatory videos, always provided that the principles laid down in para. 2 are respected.
51 In addition, and even more generally, i.e. without this being exclusively linked to pre-voting information, the use of new communication technologies, in particular the use of social media as a means of information, has increased considerably within the administration. In June 2023, the Federal Council decided to regulate the use of social networks by the federal administration. To this end, it put out to consultation, until October 2023, a draft amendment to the Ordinance of November 25, 1998 on the Organization of Government and Administration. The draft not only lays down "the conditions under which units of the Federal Administration may manage an interactive social media profile", but also establishes "an exhaustive list of the types of comment that the authorities may delete, hide or otherwise make disappear", as well as "regulating the circumstances in which these same authorities may block" a user and "prevent them from interacting with their profile".
6. Other rules and principles
52 In the view of some authors, the Federal Court seems to have added other rules or principles to the principles laid down in art. 10a para. 2. A principle of accuracy, for some, which "prohibits the authorities from communicating information that is erroneous, incomplete or simply misleading".
53 A principle of immediacy, for others, which would complement the principle of completeness "insofar as it requires that official information relating to an election be given at once, sufficiently early in the campaign, so that citizens can form an opinion about it and, if necessary, contest or supplement it". However, this seems to be the same idea as that of art. 10a, para. 1, with the expression "on an ongoing basis", which the Commission referred to as the "principle of continuity".
54 This shows that, as indicated, the various principles set out in art. 10a para. 2 of the LDP are not easy to delimit and even overlap or overlap, at least in part.
C. Paragraphs 3 and 4: main opinions expressed during the parliamentary procedure and voting recommendation
1. Introductory remarks
55 Paragraphs 3 and 4 of art. 10a will initially be dealt with together here, as they have a special relationship which can only be understood by looking at their history. The draft originally presented by the National Council's Political Institutions Committee contained neither para. 3 nor para. 4. However, in the second sentence of para. 1, it included a rule to the effect that the Federal Council, when called upon to inform citizens, "shall defend the position of the Federal Assembly". In this way, the draft was intended to impose an obligation on the Federal Council to defend the same position as that of Parliament before the vote. In fact, this was one of the reasons why the Government was fiercely opposed to the Commission's draft, and for a long time defended the idea of non-entrée en matière during debates in Parliament.
56 It was during the first debate in the National Council, in December 2006, that the Lower House, basing itself in particular on a legal opinion from the Federal Office of Justice, accepted a Philipp Müller proposal, which somewhat softened the text of the Commission's draft, by amending the second sentence of para. 1 as follows: "It [the Federal Council] shall not advocate a voting recommendation that differs from that formulated by the Federal Assembly". This change from an active - or imperative - to a passive formulation was intended to give the Federal Council greater flexibility, by enabling it to defend the position of Parliament, by giving the same voting recommendation as the latter, but also not to give a voting recommendation, and to limit itself to indicating that of the Federal Assembly; the only thing that was forbidden to the Federal Council was to give a voting recommendation differing from that of Parliament. Although supported by the Federal Council, this amendment did not prevent it from remaining opposed to the project.
57 This led to a second, double amendment during the second round of deliberations in the Council of States, when the latter finally agreed to go ahead with the project, and its Political Institutions Committee proposed a new wording for the entire provision, with the two new paragraphs 3 and 4 that make up the current text. Para. 4 reproduced the Müller proposal accepted by the National Council virtually as it stood, albeit as a separate paragraph: "It [the Federal Council] does not advocate a voting recommendation that differs from that formulated by the Federal Assembly". Para. 3 was new, and was intended to make the provision even more explicitly flexible in favor of the Federal Council.
58 The idea was that para. 3, which explicitly requested, but also allowed, the Federal Council to set out "the main opinions expressed during the parliamentary procedure", thus authorizing the Government to also give its own opinion, possibly different from that of the Federal Assembly, while respecting the prohibition in para. 4, i.e. not to defend a voting recommendation that differs from that of the Assembly. Para. 3 was therefore conceived as a complement to para. 4, a sort of safeguard clause for the Federal Council's freedom of speech. It was at this point, moreover, that the Federal Council was able to endorse the draft - while maintaining that, in its view, the new provision was, on the whole, unnecessary.
2. Paragraph 3: the main views expressed during the parliamentary procedure
59 Para. 3 therefore stipulates that the Federal Council, when informing citizens, "shall set out the main opinions expressed during the parliamentary procedure". The juxtaposition of paragraphs 3 and 4 makes it necessary to distinguish between the "recommendation to vote", which is the subject of paragraph 4, on the one hand, and the information given to citizens on the other. 4, on the other. Para. 3 deals essentially with this general information of citizens, which is provided in particular and principally via the brochure containing the Federal Council's "explanations of vote". Para. 3 therefore seems to apply primarily to these "explanations of vote" - which were, moreover, the main focus when the provision was introduced in Parliament - which raises an initial problem of delimitation with the rule in art. 11 para. 2 of the LDP.
60 The latter contains a rather similar rule, but not completely identical in its wording, insofar as it stipulates that the Federal Council must, in its "explanations of vote", "also set out the opinion of important minorities". However, according to the meaning given to the latter provision as long ago as 1976, the opinions of "important minorities" are essentially those expressed during the parliamentary procedure, so that para. 3 of Art. 10a adds nothing in this respect to what already existed, except that it makes a little more explicit the idea that important minorities are above all those represented in Parliament.
61 The rule - of Art. 10a para. 3, as well as of Art. 11 para. 2 - thus implies that the Federal Council must set out, in its "explanations of vote", the arguments of the principal minorities which have expressed themselves, within the Federal Assembly, on the subject submitted to the vote. For this to happen, these minorities must actually have expressed their views during the debates in the chambers, and not just in committee, or at least the rapporteur of a committee must have presented their opinion to the plenary. On the other hand, it is irrelevant whether the minority in question is quantitatively significant or has the status of a group within Parliament. What is decisive, according to the doctrine, is the importance of the objections raised against a project, in terms of shaping the opinion of citizens.
62 This brings us back to the problem and question, already raised, of the delimitation between articles 10a and 11 para. 2 of the LDP, which in this case are somewhat overlapping, and which raises the question of whether the two provisions apply cumulatively to the elements for which they are both applicable, or whether, on the contrary, their scope of application must be carefully delimited and separated. In this case, it would seem reasonable to accept the cumulative application of both provisions to the Federal Council's "explanations of vote".
63 This question begs another, however, namely whether the scope of para. 3 of Art. 10a is limited solely to the Federal Council's "explanations of vote" within the meaning of Art. 11 para. 2, or whether it also extends to other means and channels of information, such as videos published by the Federal Chancellery in the run-up to votes, for example, or oral interventions by members of the Federal Council, such as their press conferences or official speeches on television. The question is a delicate one. As part of the general information provided to citizens, the Federal Council has the right in principle, but also the duty, according to para. 3, to set out "the main opinions expressed during the parliamentary procedure". While it is undoubtedly possible to answer that the Federal Council may, in the aforementioned cases, i.e. interventions outside the framework of "explanations of vote", set out the main opinions expressed in the parliamentary or extra-parliamentary debate, it seems more difficult to affirm or admit the existence of a duty to do so, or at least to do so systematically.
64 Para. 3 is therefore, as we can see, not very clear, and raises as many questions as it resolves. It is, and probably was, unnecessary, given that its substantive content, i.e. the fact that the Federal Council must or may - or may and must - at least in its "explanations of vote", set out "the main opinions expressed during the parliamentary procedure", is, as we have just seen, already covered by art. 11 para. 2, but is also covered by the principles set out in para. 2 of art. 10a, in particular the principles of completeness and objectivity. As we have seen, these imply that the information provided must reflect the opinions of the authors of an initiative, the referendums and the main opponents of a government project, as well as the divergent opinions of third parties.
65 In any case, para. 3 is also and above all intended, as we have seen - and this is its main raison d'être - to authorize the Federal Council to set out its own opinion, notably in its "explanations of vote", even if this differs from that of (the majority of) the Federal Assembly. This is so long as it does not infringe the rule of para. 4, i.e. does not defend a "voting recommendation" different from that of Parliament.
3. Paragraph 4: the absence of a voting recommendation differing from that of the Federal Assembly
66 Para. 4 requires the Federal Council, as we have just seen, not to defend "a voting recommendation different from that formulated by the Federal Assembly". Unlike para. 3, the "voting recommendation". This concept refers to the constitutional provisions on popular rights, specifically art. 139 para. 5 of the Federal Constitution, which gives the Federal Assembly the power to recommend the acceptance or rejection of a popular initiative. The "recommendation to vote" is thus the act by which an authority formally and officially recommends that citizens "accept" or "reject" an item put to the vote. In principle, the power to decide on this "recommendation" lies with Parliament, which is the body that formally submits items to popular vote.
67 In federal law, this is explicitly stated in art. 139 para. 5 Cst. for popular initiatives presented in the form of a draft. In the case of acts subject to compulsory referendum on the basis of a proposal by Parliament itself, as well as votes on acts subject to optional referendum, such as laws, there is no formal "voting recommendation" in the act itself, since the recommendation is implicit: Parliament obviously recommends acceptance of its own proposals as well as that of its own acts which are opposed by a referendum. In these cases, therefore, it is only in the "explanations of vote" that the voting recommendation appears, and it is in fact the Federal Council that "gives" it.
68 As we have seen, the idea of para. 4 is to enable the Federal Council to make the Federal Assembly's voting recommendation its own, as it were, by authorizing it to associate itself with it, or to join with the Assembly, notably in its "explanations of vote". However, the provision must also authorize the Federal Council, if it so decides, not to issue a voting recommendation, but merely to indicate, notably in its "explanations of vote", that of the Assembly, without associating itself with it.
69 But, in any case, para. 4 prohibits it from issuing a voting recommendation that would differ from or diverge from that of the Assembly, i.e. that would be, since the question put to the vote is generally binary, opposed to it.
70 It is clear from the parliamentary work on Art. 10a that the Federal Council has never issued a recommendation opposed to that of the Federal Assembly, but that it has sometimes - rarely, in fact - taken the liberty of abstaining from formulating a voting recommendation, merely indicating that of the Assembly. In the last five decades, this has apparently only been the case on two occasions: the vote of February 18, 1979, on lowering the voting age to 18, and the vote of December 1, 1996, on amending the Labor Act. Already in its opinion on the initial draft of the National Council's Political Institutions Committee, dated November 8, 2006, the Federal Council, implicitly invoking the separation of powers, intended to reserve the right to retain this option, a position it maintained during the work of the Chambers. And it is true that, on a number of occasions, the Federal Council has, in its "explanations of vote", expressed reservations about the solution chosen by Parliament, while nonetheless associating itself with the Assembly's voting recommendation: this was the case during the votes on the "tax package" of May 2004, on the popular initiative "organizations' right of appeal" of November 2008, on the popular initiative "housing savings" of March 2012 and on the popular initiative "against abusive remuneration" of March 2013.
71 As we have seen, the combination of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 10a was intended to enable the Federal Council to continue this practice, while retaining the prohibition, intended by Parliament, on the Federal Council defending a "voting recommendation different from that formulated by the Federal Assembly". The interpretation of art. 10a para. 4 is not easy, however. Some authors take the text of the provision literally, arguing that it does not authorize the Federal Council to continue its practice of refraining from making a recommendation. In fact, interpreted strictly, the rule in para. 4, i.e. the explicit statutory prohibition on the Federal Council defending its own point of view in a dissenting voting recommendation, is problematic from a constitutional point of view, in terms of the separation of powers. Consequently, even if it is customary for the Federal Council to refrain in principle from supporting a solution that differs from that of Parliament, even when the latter has been decided without its contribution, or even against its will, and the text of art. 10a para. 4 prohibits it from defending a position opposed to that of the majority of Parliament, it seems to us that the Government should be able, at least in exceptional or special cases, to set out its own opinion in the "explanations of vote" and refrain from making a recommendation. Similarly, the Federal Council should not be bound by the absence of a recommendation from the Assembly, either because the Assembly has voluntarily refrained from making a recommendation, or because the National Council and the Council of States have been unable to reach agreement.
Bibliography
Auer Christoph, Ist das Interventionsverbot noch zeitgemäss?, in: ZBl 118 (2017) pp. 181-182.
Auer Christoph, Bundesgericht, I. öffentlich-rechtliche Abteilung, 14. Dezember 2016, 1C_455/2016; das Urteil ist zur amtlichen Publikation bestimmt (commentaire de l’ATF 143 I 178), in: ZBl 118 (2017) pp. 216-230 (226 ss).
Auer Christoph, Interventionen bei Wahlen und Abstimmungen: Auswege und neue Lösungsansätze, in: ZBl 122 (2021) pp. 245-246.
Biaggini Giovanni, BV Kommentar, 2e éd., Zurich 2017.
Bisaz Corsin, Direktdemokratische Instrumente als «Anträge aus dem Volk an das Volk», Eine Systematik des direktdemokratischen Verfahrensrechts in der Schweiz, Zürich/St. Gallen 2020.
Braun Binder Nadja/Glaser Andreas, Die Verschiebung von Volkswahlen und Volksabstimmungen, in: ZBl 122 (2021) pp. 591-613.
Buser Denise, Gibt es Grenzen der Einflussnahme Privater in Abstimmungskampagnen?, Jusletter du 18.5.2015.
Commission des institutions politiques du Conseil national, Initiative parlementaire. Engagement du Conseil fédéral lors des votations fédérales. Rapport de la Commission des institutions politiques du Conseil national, du 15 septembre 2006, FF 2006 8779 (cité : Rapport CIP CN 2006).
Commission des institutions politiques du Conseil national, Initiative parlementaire. Modifications diverses du droit parlementaire. Rapport de la Commission des institutions politiques du Conseil national, du 18 août 2017, FF 2017 6425 (cité : Rapport CIP CN 2017).
Conseil fédéral, Message concernant l’initiative populaire « Souveraineté du peuple sans propagande gouvernementale », du 29 juin 2005, FF 2005 4139 (cité : Message 2005).
Conseil fédéral, Initiative parlementaire. Engagement du Conseil fédéral lors des votations fédérales. Rapport de la Commission des institutions politiques du Conseil national du 15 septembre 2006, Avis du Conseil fédéral, du 8 novembre 2006, FF 2006 8797 (cité : Avis du Conseil fédéral 2006).
Dubey Jacques, Droits fondamentaux, Volume II : Libertés, garanties de l’État de droit, droits sociaux et politiques, Bâle 2018, pp. 1041-1198.
Glaser Andreas, Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichts zu den politischen Rechten auf Bundesebene, in: ZBl 118 (2017) pp. 415-436.
Glaser Andreas/Brunner Arthur, Der Einsatz strafrechtlich verbotener Mittel bei Abstimmungen aus verfassungsrechtlicher Perspektive, Jusletter du 8.6.2015.
Glaser Andreas/Lehner Irina, Moutier, quo vadis? Die Aufhebung der Volksabstimmung über den Kantonswechsel, in: PJA 2019, pp. 452-462.
Grisel Étienne, Initiative et référendum populaires, Traité de la démocratie semi-directe en droit suisse, 3e éd., Berne 2004.
Hangartner Yvo/Kley Andreas, Die demokratischen Rechte in Bund und Kantonen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, Zurich 2000.
Hangartner Yvo/Kley Andreas/Braun Binder Nadja/Glaser Andreas, Die demokratischen Rechte in Bund und Kantonen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, 2e éd., Zurich 2023.
Langer Lorenz, Kantonale Interventionen bei eidgenössischen Abstimmungskämpfen, in: ZBl 118 (2017) pp. 183-215.
Langer Lorenz, Die Zulässigkeit individueller Stellungnahmen von Regierungsmitgliedern: Zwischen Meinungsfreiheit und (un)verfälschter Willensbildung, in: ZBl 122 (2021) pp. 247-262.
Mahon Pascal, Droit constitutionnel, volume I : Institutions, juridiction constitutionnelle et procédure, 3e éd., Bâle/Neuchâtel 2014 (cité : Droit constitutionnel I).
Mahon Pascal, Droits politiques, in : Olivier Diggelmann/Maya Hertig Randall/Benjamin Schindler (édit.), Droit constitutionnel suisse / Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, Volume II : État de droit, Droits fondamentaux et droits humains / Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Grund- und Menschenrechte, Zurich/Bâle/Genève 2020, pp. 1499-1541 (cité : Droits politiques).
Malinverni Giorgio/Hottelier Michel/Hertig Randall Maya/Flückiger Alexandre, Droit constitutionnel suisse, Volume I : L'État, 4e éd., Berne 2021.
Martenet Vincent/von Büren Théophile, L’information émanant des autorités et des particuliers en vue d’un scrutin, à l’aune de la liberté de vote, RDS 2013 I, pp. 57-83 (cité : L’information).
Martenet Vincent/von Büren Théophile, Art. 34, in : Vincent Martenet/Jacques Dubey (édit.), Constitution fédérale, Commentaire romand, Bâle 2021, pp. 983-1020 (cité : CR-Martenet/von Büren).
Pirker Benedikt, Behördliche Interventionen in Abstimmungskämpfe, in: PJA 2017, pp. 1366-1381.
Rhinow René/Schefer Markus/Uebersax Peter, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3e éd., Bâle 2016.
Sägesser Thomas, Amtliche Abstimmungserläuterungen: Grundlagen, Grundsätze und Rechtsfragen, in: PJA 2014, pp. 924-940.
Schaub Lukas, Behördliche Interventionen in Unterschriftensammlungen? Eine Auslegeordnung sowie Kritik am Urteil 1C_642/2019 vom 20. Mai 2020, in: ZBl 122 (2021) pp. 263-284.
Schefer Markus/Schaub Lukas, Die Bindung der Krankenkassen an die Wahl- und Abstimmungsfreiheit, Jusletter 22.12.2014 (cité : Krankenkassen).
Schefer Markus/Schaub Lukas, Rassendiskriminierende Propaganda im Abstimmungskampf, Eine Entgegnung auf Denise Busers Beitrag vom 18. Mai 2015, Jusletter du 10.8.2015 (cité : Propaganda).
Steinmann Gerold, Art. 34, in : Bernhard Ehrenzeller/Benjamin Schindler/Rainer J. Schweizer/Klaus A. Vallender (édit.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St. Galler Kommentar, 3e éd., Zurich/St. Gall 2014, pp. 776-792.
Tschannen Pierre, Art. 34, in : Bernhard Waldmann/Eva Maria Belser/Astrid Epiney (Hrsg.), Bundesverfassung, Basler Kommentar, Bâle 2015, pp. 701-722 (cité : BSK-Tschannen).
Tschannen Pierre, Staatsrecht der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, 5e éd., Berne 2021 (cité : Staatsrecht).