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- Art. 3 FC
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 73 PRA
- Art. 73a PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. Overview
- II. History
- III. Context within the Federal Constitution
- IV. Regulatory content
- Recommended further reading
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. Overview
1 Article 3 FC – often referred to as the “basic norm” or “cornerstone” of Swiss federalism – deals with the position of the cantons and their relationship to the federal level. The first sentence states that the cantons are “sovereign” “insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution” (sovereignty clause). The second part of the sentence declares that the cantons are responsible for exercising all “rights that are not transferred to the federal government” (distribution of authority clause).
2 Both parts are closely related to each other in factual and historical terms, with the “sovereignty clause” serving as the internal justification for the federal distribution of powers: a rule for the distribution of powers between the federal and cantonal levels is necessary because the cantons in a federal state with an independent central power cannot have full and unrestricted legal sovereignty. The fulfillment of federal and member state tasks must therefore be coordinated. By formally and legally defining the scope of cantonal “residual sovereignty” through the distribution of competences, the second part of Article 3 FC has an effect on the first (see N. 26).
3 By stating that the cantons are “sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution”, Art. 3 FC defines the scope of the Federal Constitution (Art. 54–135 FC) – depending on the type of competence (N. 46 f.) – as a latent or current limitation of cantonal sovereignty. The same applies to international treaties (Art. 54 in conjunction with 186 FC). At the same time, however, the sovereignty of the cantons is also constituted as a barrier to federal power; the decisive concept of sovereignty remains to be defined (see N. 19 ff.).
4 These restrictions on cantonal sovereignty have an absolute character. Firstly, because federal law that has been enacted in accordance with the constitution takes precedence over conflicting cantonal law (Art. 49 para. 1 FC), and secondly, because federal law cannot be reviewed in the procedure for the abstract review of a statute (Art. 189 para. 4 sentence 1 FC; Art. 82 let. b BGG a contrario). Due to this “binding” to the constitutional and legislative power of the Confederation, Article 3 FC appears at first glance to be more of a structural principle of the federal state than a justiciable limit on federal power. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that Article 3 FC also has practical significance (see N. 48 ff.).
II. History
5 Article 3 FC goes back to the 1803 Act of Mediation, which established Switzerland as a confederation under the supervision of France, the former occupying power (1798–1803). In line with its structure as a confederation, federal power was subject to strict legal ties: “The cantons exercise all power that has not been expressly transferred to the federation” (Art. 12, 20th title of the Act of Mediation). The same standard was also included in the draft constitutions of 1832 and 1833, which intended to re-establish Switzerland as a federal state. Even though these efforts were unsuccessful, the drafts were still of lasting importance as a basis for the deliberations of the 1848 Constitutional Commission. Article 3 FC (1848) corresponded almost word for word to the Act of Mediation: “The cantons are sovereign to the extent that their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution, and as such they exercise all rights that are not transferred to the federal government”.
6 It was necessary to retain this provision because the relationship between the “new” central power and the formerly self-governing cantons had to be regulated in 1848. To this end, the state of the mediation constitution was taken as a starting point. The starting point for the “new” order was the view that the Confederation was a creation of the cantons. All federal powers (whether at that time or today) originally lay in cantonal hands. The cantons were to remain responsible for all tasks that the constitution itself did not transfer to the federal government. Equally important was the fact that the FC of 1848 introduced the basic principle of the federal system, i.e. that, figuratively speaking, the Confederation was established “above” (or, in legal terms, “alongside”) the cantons as a centralized, constitutionally independent body. This was endowed with “its own” political organs and entrusted with the fulfillment of tasks that are in the national interest. The contradictions inherent in this construct – the autonomy of constituent states in a federal context – had to be coordinated.
7 The founding generation based this – implicitly – on the concept of “shared sovereignty” between the federal government and the cantons (see N. 23 ff.). According to this concept, both the federal government and the cantons are sovereign, but their sovereignties are mutually limited. Art. 3 FC (1848) was intended to express this. The systematic position of this article in the 1848 FC was no coincidence. Art. 1 FC (1848) stated that the “peoples united by the present alliance” are not subject territories of the alliance, but “sovereign” cantons. Art. 2 FC (1848) listed the purposes for which the cantons had joined together to form a “federation”. Art. 5 and 6 FC guaranteed the cantons their own territories, their own peoples, their own political systems and their own constitutions. In this context, Art. 3 FC (1848) defined which rights the cantons retained after their “union” to form a federal state and which rights were to be held by the newly established federal bodies (primarily: the federal legislature). The supremacy of the federal state over the cantons was to become relevant where the people and the cantons (by a double majority) had voluntarily transferred an area of responsibility to the federal state by amending the FC. The 1999 FC basically adopted this structure. However, Article 1 FC no longer refers to the “peoples united by the present Confederation”, but to the “Swiss People and the Cantons [...] forming the Confederation”. In particular, the reference to the “Swiss people” indicates that national identity has changed since 1848 in that it is no longer the “cantonal peoples” but the “Swiss people” that constitute the Confederation.
8 From a historical point of view, it can be seen that Art. 3 FC was intended to structure the federal balance between the central power and the member states. Art. 3 FC contains the formula for determining the degree of vertical separation of powers at a given time, without maintaining a certain historical “state of equilibrium”. Which competencies should be in which hands cannot be inferred from Art. 3 FC. This question is to be decided in the democratic process of constitutional lawmaking at the federal level: every shift in emphasis in favor of the federal government is desired under Art. 3 FC if it was preceded by a mandatory referendum with a double majority. The legal scope of federalism as a structural principle for organizing the state is thus tied to constitutional lawmaking at the federal level. The “power of decision” – the power to decide on the distribution of tasks between the federal government and the cantons – lies with the people and the cantons. In contrast, the Federal Assembly decides on the scope of a federal competence within the framework of legislation (see N. 50). These principles still apply today (see N. 9 f., N. 28).
9 The total revision of the FC in 1874 did not amend Article 3. However, with this total revision, two new provisions were introduced that had a lasting impact on the significance of Article 3 FC in practice: The first innovation allowed the Confederation and the cantons to take legal action to the Federal Supreme Court in the event of a conflict of jurisdiction. However, because even then there was only limited constitutional jurisdiction with regard to federal laws and international treaties, the Federal Supreme Court could only repeal cantonal decrees that had been issued in violation of its authority. The second innovation was a provision according to which “provisions of federal legislation, concordats, cantonal constitutions and laws that contradict the new Federal Constitution shall cease to be in force upon the adoption of the same, or the enactment of the federal laws envisaged therein” (Art. 2 of the Transitional Provision FC [1874]). The Federal Court reinterpreted this standard, which is in itself purely transitional, as a larger “constitutional principle” that is violated when “cantonal decisions, either explicitly or de facto (by not applying federal law and the principle that federal law takes precedence over cantonal law [...] is effectively denied). This early decision, which was not based on Article 3 FC, is now positive constitutional law with Article 49, para. 1 FC.
10 The total revision of the Federal Constitution in 1999 did not result in any fundamental changes with regard to Article 3 FC. Thus, from the founding of the Swiss Confederation in 1848 until today, Article 3 FC has exhibited an impressive historical continuity, both formally and substantively. All the changes made to Art. 3 FC in 1999 are of a purely editorial nature. The wording of Art. 3 FC in the preliminary draft of 1995 was literally the same as that in use since 1848. The Federal Council's 1996 draft, on the other hand, sought to divide Art. 3 FC into three paragraphs: The reference to the sovereignty of the cantons in para. 1, the fulfillment of tasks by the federal government and the cantons in para. 2, and the participation of the cantons in the federal government's decision-making process and in the implementation of federal law In the parliamentary process, the councils agreed in the difference settlement to return to the wording from 1874 and 1848 respectively for reasons of tradition.
11 In 2004, a comprehensive reform of federalism was undertaken (reorganization of the system of fiscal equalization and the division of tasks between the Confederation and the cantons; NFE), whereby Art. 5a FC and Art. 43a (see N. 13 f.) were incorporated into the FC. These norms were previously derived (at least in part) from Art. 3 FC. For more information on their content, please refer to the individual commentaries.
III. Context within the Federal Constitution
12 Art. 3 FC deals with the position of the cantons and their relationship to the federal level. Art. 3 FC therefore only addresses a small selection of the questions that arise in a federal system. This constitutional provision is part of a broader regulatory context that shapes federalism as a legal and political principle. The FC defines the broader contours of Swiss federalism through a number of individual provisions.
13 Article 3 FC, for example, is silent on the specific criteria for the distribution of powers between the Confederation and the cantons (see Art. 5a and 43a FC) and on the way in which the Confederation and the cantons should exercise their respective powers if the catalog of powers of the Confederation does not provide any guidance (currently Art. 5a, 43a, 44, 46 and 47 FC).
14 Article 3 FC is also interrelated with the principle according to which the cantons participate in the federal government's decision-making process (Article 45 FC). Before 1999, this principle was derived from several individually guaranteed participatory rights. The cantons' participation in the federal government's decision-making process has been part of the constitutional text since 1999. The most important institutions of this principle are the majority of the cantons (Art. 142 FC), the cantonal initiative (Art. 160 para. 1 FC), the cantonal referendum (Art. 141 para. 1 FC), the right to participate in the consultation procedure (Art. 147 FC) and the cantons' participatory rights in the decision-making process (Art. 45 FC) and in the preparation of the federal government's foreign policy decisions (Art. 55 FC).
15 Art. 42 and Art. 43 FC have hardly any independent significance compared to Art. 3 FC, but basically only repeat that, firstly, federal competences in the federal state are allocated according to the principle of individual authorization and, secondly, the cantons decide for themselves, within the scope of their responsibilities, which tasks they carry out and how (provided that they do not violate federal law by failing to act).
16 In addition, the cantons are involved not only in enacting but also in enforcing federal law (Art. 46 FC). In this context, the cantons are responsible for fleshing out or supplementing federal law through their own legislation (laws and ordinances) and through the application of the law (individual acts of the administration and court rulings), provided that they are competent to do so and do not violate the spirit of federal law or thwart its objectives.
17 The autonomy of the cantons (Art. 47 FC) forms a “commitment to cantonal autonomy in terms of responsibilities, finances and organization”. According to the view presented here, the term “autonomy” is congruent with the concept of sovereignty in accordance with Art. 3 FC (see N. 23 ff.). Both terms express the idea that the cantons are also “states” in the sense of federalism theory (consisting “under their own law”), even if a federal power still exists “over” them. As shown, the cantons have remained sovereign to the extent that they have their own sovereign rights (see N. 6 f., N. 23 ff.). However, under international law, the cantons are considered to be members of the federal state. In international law, only the federal state itself is considered a state.
18 Finally, cantonal financial autonomy is closely linked to cantonal sovereignty (Art. 43a paras. 2 and 3 FC). The cantons enact their own tax and duty laws (Art. 127 et seq. FC) and are free to decide how these revenues are used. The Constitution only imposes a few restrictions on this principle. The most important of these are the intercantonal equalization of revenues and expenses (Art. 135 FC) and the federal tax harmonization authority (Art. 129 FC).
IV. Regulatory content
A. The sovereignty of the cantons (1st part sentence)
1. Overview of the history of the idea
19 The concept of sovereignty has been interpreted in different ways in state theory. In the Middle Ages, when God was considered the primary source of all power, sovereignty was understood as a right of dominion received directly from God. The first recipient of this right was the King of the Franks, Charlemagne, who was “appointed” by the Pope as the supreme protector of Christendom. It was only in the 14th century that the sacred elevation was replaced by an election by the electors. The emperors continued to see themselves as “political and judicial representatives of God”. They assumed that they had received their right to rule directly from God and therefore were only responsible to God.
20 A development from the personal level of the prince to the institutional level of the state began with Jean Bodin (1530–1596), who derived all power from the interest in maintaining the state. The prince was the representative and administrator of this “puissance absolue & perpetuelle” of the state. For Bodin, “sovereignty” meant the supreme power of the state internally and externally, i.e. absolute, lasting and self-responsible rule in all main areas of state life. The concept of sovereignty had a different meaning for Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), whose philosophy of the state is based on the theory of the social contract. Unlike Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Rousseau did not place a person, a “Leviathan”, at the head of the state, but rather the organized will of the people. Because only this will was entitled to determine the laws of a state and its existence as such, state sovereignty for Rousseau ultimately meant popular sovereignty.
21 With the emergence of the federalist theory in the 19th and 20th centuries, several federalism theories were developed both in Switzerland and abroad. The “sovereignty question” was an integral part of these theories. “Sovereignty” was generally interpreted in the sense of Jean Bodin (N. 20), i.e. as the supreme power of the state internally and externally, the sum of all powers necessary to maintain the state. The concept of sovereignty was considered inseparable from the idea of a state; a state could not be imagined without a ‘sovereign’. Opinions as to who was the bearer of sovereignty in the federal state, however, differed widely.
22 In Georg Waitz's theory of shared sovereignty, a federal state only exists where 1) “a certain part of state life is common and another equally certain part is left to the individual members,” and 2) “each part is in itself also a state.” From the legal state characteristic, an independence is derived, which Waitz equates with the concept of sovereignty. In the federal state, this sovereignty “is not due to one or the other, but to both, the overall state (the central power) and the individual state (the individual state power),” and this “each within its own sphere”. Waitz bases this idea on a statement by Alexis de Tocqueville about the federal power of the USA: “L'union [...] n'a [...] qu'un sovereignty restreinte [...]; but it was intended that within this circle it should form only one and the same people. Within this circle, it is sovereign”. Numerous contemporary authors were of the opinion that the FC of 1848 was based at least implicitly on this theory (see N. 7). Fritz Fleiner and Zaccaria Giacometti, on the other hand, rejected Waitz's theory as logically impossible: if member states were sovereign states, they would have to be independent of federal power, but this in turn would exclude their belonging to the federation. Belonging to the federal state excludes member state sovereignty from the outset. Fritz Fleiner and other authors therefore distinguished between the federal state as a sovereign state and the member states as non-sovereign states: only the federal state is sovereign, but the cantons rule within the scope of their competencies by virtue of their own laws. Zaccaria Giacometti went a step further, stating that the federal state was a “decentralized unitary state”. Sovereignty and statehood lie with the federal government; the cantons are “merely self-governing bodies, albeit of a special kind”. Hans Nawiasky put forward a mediating view with the theory of the tripartite federal state, according to which the federal government and member states are subsystems of an overall state that are equal to one another. The “overall constitution”, the sum of the norms governing the relationship between the federal government and the cantons, arches over these subsystems. In this model, all sovereignty is relative: that of the federation because of its subordination to international law and the “overall constitution”, that of the cantons because of their subordination to federal law.
2. The sovereignty concept of Art. 3 FC
23 None of the above theories captures the sovereignty concept of the FC (and thus of Art. 3) in its purest form. The reason for this is that the FC of 1848 did not follow one single specific doctrine, but rather combined various philosophical influences and political ideas to create an innovative overall work; the only unmistakable influence is Rousseau's concept of popular sovereignty. The “Federalist Project” had to be realized quickly. The deliberations of the Tagsatzung were correspondingly hectic, and the Constitutional Revision Commission had to draft the final constitution in a relatively short time. It was not possible to draft a detailed dogma of sovereignty. However, in view of the realized legal structure (see immediately N. 24 ff.), this was not necessary.
24 By uniting to form a federal state, the cantons created the “competence of the Confederation” (Art. 73 FC [1848]). In this way, the federal power acquired legal personality as a state and received its own purposes (Art. 2 FC [1848]), its own tasks (Art. 13 et seq. FC [1848]) and its own organs to fulfill these tasks (Art. 61 et seq. FC [1848]). Furthermore, direct-democratic processes specifically concerning the federal level were introduced (Art. 62 et seq., 111 et seq. FC [1848]) and gradually expanded over time. At the same time, the cantons were to remain legally independent political units (self-governing) under the new FC, governed by their own processes. According to Biaggini, this follows from an overall view of several individual provisions. The founding of the federal state meant that from then on two types of independent, democratically controlled state authority existed in parallel in Switzerland – the federal authority (“central state”) and the individual cantonal authorities (“individual states”), each with its own organization, its own tasks and its own finances.
25 When Article 1 of the FC (1848) implicitly reaffirmed the continued existence of the “sovereign cantons”, it referred to the (limited) autonomy that the cantons had already enjoyed under the 1815 federal treaty. The FC of 1848 guaranteed that this pre-existing, limited right of self-determination of the cantons with regard to their internal affairs would continue to apply after the founding of the federal state. In general terms, the constitutional concept of sovereignty can thus be defined as the ability of a state to practice democratic “self-government”. This decision reflects the widespread view in the 19th century that sovereignty, however it is defined, can only be possessed by a state because the constitutional legislator has conferred upon it a monopoly on the use of force that is limited to a specific territory, people and certain purposes. However, it is not specified which persons should represent this sovereignty. It could be an individual (monarchy) or the people (democracy) – in a direct or indirect form. In Switzerland, this decision was made in favor of democracy (see Art. 5 FC [1848]). The sovereignty thus defined is initially vested in the cantons (pursuant to Art. 1 and 3 FC). However, after the founding of the federal state, the cantons were no longer the only state authority to fulfill the conditions of this concept of sovereignty, since democratic processes now also existed at the federal level. For this reason, the authors of the FC draft of 1848 also distinguished between federal and cantonal sovereignty in their explanatory report.
26 The scope of cantonal sovereignty was regulated by the founding generation in Art. 3 FC (for the precursor norms, see N. 5). Where the Federal Constitution (or implementing legislation enacted on the basis of it) does not impose any requirements on the cantons, the cantons regulate their own affairs and remain “sovereign”. Article 3 FC refers to the federal distribution of powers (see N. 30 et seq.). If the cantons are responsible for an area, they have regulatory freedom within these competencies and within other requirements of the Federal Constitution. If, on the other hand, the FC explicitly assigns a competence to the federal government, the cantons (originally reserved for derogatory competences [N. 47]) are only “free” to the extent that the federal government has not exhausted the competence. Max Imboden aptly describes the division of federal tasks as the “formal-constructive means by which this form of state [i.e. the federal state] fulfills its own basic idea” that in a federal state, several communities inevitably share the fulfillment of state tasks. The federal government's legislative powers are based on specific authorizations, while those of the cantons are of a general nature (see N. 30 et seq.). In the event of a conflict of jurisdiction, the burden of proof lies with the federal government to show whether it actually has the claimed jurisdiction. Thus, the guarantee of cantonal sovereignty also has practical legal implications (see also N. 48 et seq.).
3. Current significance of the “sovereignty clause”
27 Due to the continuity of the historical concept of Article 3 FC (see N. 6 et seq.), the sovereignty concept explained above remains unchanged today. Article 3 sentence 1 FC thus still guarantees the cantons to be more than just mere federal members and – like the federal government – to have their own constitutionally guaranteed scope for decision-making and spheres of competence. Within this scope, both communities are considered sovereign with regard to “their” respective democratic processes. Article 3 FC thus constitutes both the Confederation and the cantons as “limited sovereignty” communities.
28 The concept of sovereignty has led to dogmatic disputes several times in history, which have resulted in widely differing views on the content and function of the concept of sovereignty (see N. 22). However, the original function of guaranteeing cantonal sovereignty under Article 3 FC remained unaffected. Nevertheless, the concept of sovereignty is still disputed today: The dense international interdependence, a central state that has grown considerably since 1848 and theoretical barriers to the concept of sovereignty raise doubts as to whether the term democratic self-government in the federation and cantons as “sovereignty” still hits the nail on the head. In this regard, suffice it to say that, as shown, the concept of sovereignty is to be interpreted legally as the ability for democratic self-government. The term has no absolute content, since the spheres of sovereignty of the Confederation and the cantons are bound to democratic constitutional legislation and to the law that substantiates the constitution (see N. 8). However, because every person entitled to vote is at the same time part of a canton and of the Swiss people, the conditions for “sovereign” decisions within the respective spheres of competence at both levels of government are met within the meaning of Article 3 FC. Insofar as and as long as the cantons have their own powers and scope for democratic self-government, they were, are and remain “sovereign” within the meaning of Article 3 FC. Overarching factors such as international law, federal requirements or the Brussels effect are consistent with this rule and do not lead to a different result.
29 However, even in Switzerland, there is no such thing as “democratic absolutism”. The power of the electorate is subject to legal limits at both the cantonal and federal level (see N. 57 et seq.). Important constitutional barriers to federal legislation, according to the current legal situation, include, for example, fundamental rights (Art. 7-34 FC) and the conditions for their restriction (Art. 36 FC), the principle of the separation of powers, the primacy of federal law (Art. 49 FC), as well as the general principles of the rule of law, , i.e. the principle of legality (Art. 5 para. 1 FC), the principle of public interest (Art. 5 para. 2 FC), the principle of proportionality (Art. 5 para. 3 FC) and the principle according to which the federal government and the cantons must observe international law (Art. 5 para. 4 FC). For the rest, reference is made to the fundamental description by Reich regarding the relationship between the principles of the rule of law and democracy.
B. The division of powers in the federal state (2nd part)
1. General
30 The necessity of a clause on the division of powers follows from the “guarantee” of cantonal sovereignty (see N. 26 f.). A division of sovereignty includes a division of state responsibilities (see N. 24 f.). Accordingly, Art. 3 FC stipulates the principle (alternativity, accumulation, complementarity) according to which the spheres of competence of the Confederation and the cantons are to be coordinated.
31 The decision taken in Art. 3 FC argues in favor of a general original competence in favor of the cantons (so-called subsidiary general competence). However, for tasks that require uniform execution and regulation throughout Switzerland, the federal government should be responsible for regulating the manner in which they are fulfilled (including the modalities of execution). However, this requires explicit authorization by the Federal Constitution itself (and thus by the people and the cantons) (principle of individual authorization; enumeration principle). Taken together, the principle of individual authorization and the subsidiary general authority contain the 'formula' by which, for specific provisions of authority (Art. 54–135 FC), it can be determined through interpretation for which specific issues the Confederation and for which the cantons are responsible (see N. 8, N. 48 et seq.).
32 The primary normative statement of Art. 3 FC consists in this allocation of competences. However, the provision does not rule on the hierarchical relationship between the federal and cantonal provisions. It cannot be inferred from Art. 3 FC whether what the Confederation prescribes by virtue of its competence takes precedence over the provisions of the cantons or vice versa. According to the concept of Article 3 FC (see N. 7 f., N. 22, N. 24 et seq.), the provisions of the Confederation and the cantons have the same normative rank because both types of law are based on the same legitimizing basis, the concordant will of the people (see also N. 57 et seq. in the context of conflicts of jurisdiction). From a historical perspective, the fact that federal law takes precedence over conflicting cantonal law is not a postulate of Art. 3 FC, but a case law that was (originally) based on Art. 2 of the Transition Act (1874) (see N. 9).
33 In theory, the system set out in Article 3 FC provides for a seamless division of powers. Initially, state responsibilities are distributed between the federal government and the cantons on an alternative basis: either the cantons or the federal government are responsible for legally regulating an area of responsibility. If only the federal government is responsible, it has exclusive authority. If this is not the case, the original authority of the cantons automatically leads to complementary and cumulative (parallel) responsibilities of the federal government and the cantons in the same area (for a typology of possible competencies, see N. 43 et seq.). However, because the matters to be regulated can mutually interfere, complement or restrict each other, the dividing line between jurisdictions is often difficult to determine based on this rule-exception principle. Furthermore, from a practical point of view, this system carries the risk of negative conflicts of jurisdiction when urgent action is required. This problem became particularly apparent at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. Other examples include the energy shortage in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, cyber attacks on companies and administrative units, or natural events such as the (recurrent) water shortage in cantons and municipalities during periods of intense heat and prolonged drought.
34 In this context, we believe the statement that Article 3 FC contains a “presumption of competence in favor of the cantons” is misleading. Determining whether the regulation of a specific issue falls within the jurisdiction of the cantons or the federal government is a legal question that must be resolved on a case-by-case basis and through interpretation (see N. 48 et seq.). There is no presumption in favour of the cantons in the case of doubt in Art. 3 FC. On the contrary, in case of doubt, the federal government must be able to prove its alleged regulatory authority (see N. 26). If it fails to do so, regulatory authority remains with the cantons by virtue of subsidiary general competence.
2. Constitutional reservation at the expense of the Confederation
35 The system of individual authorization requires that new tasks be transferred to the federal government by means of a partial revision of the constitution (Art. 192 et seq. FC). Thus, there is a “constitutional reservation” at the expense of the federal government for new federal competences. These individual authorizations are, in line with the historical concept, leges speciales to the general subsidiary competence of the cantons.
36 The initial allocation of powers between the federal government and the cantons took place in 1848. Strictly speaking, all subsequent changes to this allocation of powers were mere shifts in powers. However, this does not mean that the cantons no longer have anything to do with the task after it has been transferred to the federal government. This is because what is “shifted” is only the responsibility for fulfilling the task. The authority to legislate on the matter and to regulate the execution of the task passes from the cantonal parliaments to the National Council and the Council of States – the 'dual basis' of federal sovereignty – whereby the Council of States should ensure the participation of the cantons in federal legislation.
37 The powers conferred on the federal government are largely set out in Articles 54-135 FC (see Articles 38-40 FC as exceptions). According to prevailing doctrine, the social objectives (Article 41 FC) do not establish federal powers. Insofar as a task falls within the jurisdiction of the cantons, the cantonal legislature can in principle enact a law directly based on the subsidiary general authority. A basis in cantonal constitutional law is not necessary, unless the cantonal constitution itself requires it. The subsidiary general authority directly authorizes the cantons to the extent that the canton does not contradict applicable federal law. “New” tasks fall within the jurisdiction of the cantons without further ado. Assignments of authority from the FC to the cantons are of a purely declaratory nature (e.g. Art. 62 para. 1 and 112c para. 1 FC).
38 Some legal scholars distinguish between “competences” and “duties”. According to Biaggini, a competence includes the authorization to take a measure or enact a regulation, whereas a duty is the corresponding obligation. This view is also held, for example, by Rütsche, whose definition of a 'public task' necessarily presupposes a mandate from the legislature 'in the broad functional sense' (i.e. including mandates at the constitutional or ordinance level). These views are shared here: a power becomes a task when it is formulated in a binding manner. For more details, see the differentiated presentation in Biaggini.
39 The establishment of new federal powers must be based primarily on the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 5a, 43a, 46 para. 3 and 47 para. 2 FC). According to the prevailing legal opinion, the principle of subsidiarity does not have a legally “blocking effect”, but it is an appeal to use existing powers sparingly and to create new federal powers only for convincing reasons.
40 Typically, a legislative provision empowers the federal government as a whole, as a constitutional body, and leaves the responsibility of the organs open. If a legislative provision does not empower a specific organ, it is a so-called association competence, i.e. a competence that is to be exercised by the federal government as a whole (i.e. as an “association”). The constitutional legislator is primarily responsible (Art. 148 para. 1 in conjunction with 164 FC). The executive ordinance law, on the other hand, which determines the specific enforcement of the law, is to be issued by the Federal Council or the departments and federal offices (Art. 174, 178 para. 1 and 182 para. 1 FC). Which body is specifically responsible for which regulatory matters is decided in the matter primarily on the basis of the substantive legal concept (Art. 164 para. 1 FC).
41 In “urgent” or “extraordinary” cases, the question then arises as to when the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council may disregard the distribution of powers set out in Art. 3 FC. The right to urgent parliamentary action explicitly allows this, in that Art. 165 para. 3 FC stipulates that urgent federal laws that have no constitutional basis must be accepted by the people and the cantons within one year of their enactment in order to have any further validity. This principle also applies without further ado to enactments that do not only partially correspond to the traditional distribution of tasks between the federal government and the cantons or horizontal and vertical provisions on the separation of powers.
42 The legal situation is different for “emergency ordinances” of the Federal Assembly (Art. 173 para. 1 let. c FC) and the Federal Council (Art. 184 para. 3 and 185 para. 3 FC). Whether – and if so, to what extent – the federal bodies may issue measures that override the constitutional allocation of powers under Art. 3 FC is part of the dispute over whether the FC's system of emergency law allows the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly to issue so-called “constitutionally derogating emergency ordinances”. According to prevailing doctrine (and rightly so in our opinion), this is not the case. Insofar as “emergency decrees” have the substantive status of laws or the constitution, they are to be treated like ordinary federal laws in view of Art. 3 FC and must uphold the principle of individual authorization (see N. 30 et seq.); other restrictions on the subsidiary general competence of the cantons are unconstitutional. In view of the “cross-cutting nature” of emergency decrees (e.g. the regulation of the economy and the mask, vaccination, testing and certification systems during the COVID-19 pandemic), their legality in the light of Article 3 FC is thus highly dependent on the design of the measures and their legal basis. Because this provision covers the legal aspect of the “right to issue emergency decrees”, the preservation of Art. 3 FC requires a thorough preventive control of planned legal acts, in particular for measures issued “constitutionally immediately”, but also for those based on a federal law (e.g. the EpG). The most important means in this respect is the interpretation of federal powers in conformity with the Constitution (see N. 67).
3. Typology of legislative powers
43 Among the types of powers, a distinction must be made between legislative powers (or law-making powers) and executive powers (or administrative powers).
44 The legislative powers of the Confederation can be systematized according to their material scope or their effect on cantonal sovereignty. Whether the cantons have any leeway of their own following measures by the Confederation (in the same area) must be determined by interpretation. The type of federal authority and the degree to which it is exercised are decisive in determining the leeway left to the cantons.
45 In exceptional cases, constitutional interpretation may also result in implied powers for the Confederation. According to prevailing doctrine, a distinction is made between powers that arise “by virtue of a material connection” (implied powers) and powers that are “inherent” to the Confederation or that it has “by virtue of the federal structure of the state” (inherent powers). A competence by virtue of factual connection follows “from the necessity of being able to exercise a task at all”. This also includes powers that are derived from the factual context of several individual powers. One example of this is the Ingress of the Disentangle Act, which lists no fewer than 16 powers as constitutional bases. A power by virtue of the federal structure of the state, on the other hand, is derived from the federal state principle for areas that only the federal government can regulate. This type of competence is more common than one would think: for example, there is still no explicit constitutional basis for the ParlA (Art. 165 para. 1 let. g FC), the GAOA, the BPG (both Art. 173 para. 2 FC) and other enactments.
a. The scope of federal powers
46 Every power establishes a certain scope for legal regulation. This may correspond to the area of life to be regulated or be limited to certain partial aspects of it. From this perspective, a distinction can be made between comprehensive powers, fragmentary powers, and powers to enact framework legislation and to enact legislation on matters of principle:
Comprehensive federal powers authorize the federal government to regulate all legal issues down to the last detail. The matter to be regulated may be a subject area (e.g. Art. 74 para. 1 FC [environmental protection]) or a area of law (e.g. Art. 122 f. FC [formal and substantive civil and criminal law]). This type of power is the norm.
Fragmentary federal powers relate to certain aspects of a particular area of life or subject. The FC thus imposes specific restrictions on the regulatory scope of these areas, but not on the regulatory intensity within them. In other words, only certain legal issues may be regulated, but these may be regulated in detail. Important examples are contained in Article 118, para. 2 FC in a (dealing with certain objects and organisms), b (combating certain diseases) and c (protection against ionizing radiation).
Principle/framework legislative powers authorize the federal government to set up framework rules for a subject area. At the same time, they oblige the federal government to leave detailed questions of regulation to the cantons. These powers restrict the permissible level of detail of federal regulation to legal issues of central and national importance. In practice, this form of legislation occurs primarily in “federal minimum requirements” for cantonal enforcement systems. Examples include Art. 64a para. 1 FC (continuing education), Art. 66 para. 1 sentence 2 FC (education grants), Art. 67a para. 3 FC (music education), Art. 75 para. 2 FC (spatial planning), Art. 76 para. 2 FC (water), Art. 77 para. 2 FC (protection of the forest), Art. 79 (hunting and fishing), Art. 88 para. 1 FC (footpaths, hiking trails and cycle paths), Art. 89 para. 2 FC (energy policy), and Art. 129 para. 1 FC (tax harmonization).
b. Effect on cantonal powers
47 Federal powers can have different effects on the original cantonal jurisdiction in this area. Compared to the type of power, the assessment of the effect on cantonal sovereignty is, so to speak, an additional dimension for heuristically identifying federal powers. From this perspective, a distinction can be made between concurrent, exclusive and parallel powers:
Competing powers mean that cantonal law only loses its effect when the federal law comes into force, and only to the extent that the federal legislature has exhausted its powers (so-called retroactive-derogatory effect). As long as and insofar as the federal legislature has not exhausted its authority, the cantons remain responsible for regulating that area of law under the subsidiary general authority. Comprehensive and concurrent authority is the normal case.
Exclusive powers mean that cantonal law is repealed as soon as the federal power is established (so-called original-derogatory effect). This is a rare case. Common examples are Art. 54 FC (foreign affairs), Art. 99 FC (coinage, currency and monetary matters), Art. 133 FC (customs). According to the prevailing interpretation, there is no cantonal counterpart to this, not even in the special case of cantonal rights of monopoly.
Parallel powers are characterized by the fact that they have no effect on cantonal powers in the same area, meaning that federal and cantonal law can coexist. This type of competence exists primarily in areas where the state operates funding systems, such as in the area of culture (Art. 69 para. 1 FC), but also in the area of direct taxation (Art. 128 in conjunction with Art. 134 FC a contrario).
c. Interpretation of legislative powers
48 The FC's catalog of powers is a somewhat systematic network of individual tasks that are implemented very differently and evolutively interpreted in practice according to contemporary regulatory needs. Behind this is the insight that the regulatory needs of a society can change or develop over time in the face of changing values or new challenges, and that the constitutional legislator has thus granted the federal government regulatory authority in a manner that is “open to the future”. The legislature should not be hindered in its activities by historical value judgments, unless clear legal limits are set in the content of a competence norm.
49 However, federal competences are often formulated very openly and concisely. Apart from the typology (N. 43 et seq.), their substantive limits are rarely apparent and must be determined through careful interpretation. The wording is the starting and finishing point of the interpretation. However, because this is “not always meaningful [...] and not always reliable”, the meaning of the chosen words is also based in particular on previous practice. However, there are also limitations here because state practice is not always based on a flawless interpretation of the competence norm. The decisive factor is therefore the interplay of all elements of interpretation.
50 Federal laws, once they have come into force, can no longer be amended or repealed by any other authority than the Federal Assembly itself. The reason for this is that federal laws cannot be reviewed for their constitutionality in the procedure of abstract judicial review (Art. 189 para. 4 sentence 1 FC; Art. 82 let. b BGG a contrario). Federal law that was enacted in violation of the principle of conferral is binding on the cantons (Art. 49 para. 1 FC). The same applies to the Federal Supreme Court with regard to federal laws (Art. 190 para. 1 in conjunction with 148 para. 1 FC). In other words, the federal legislature ultimately determines the scope of its own powers. When planning a new law or an amendment to an existing law, the most important means of “protecting” cantonal sovereignty thus appears to be a careful interpretation and correct determination of the scope of a federal competence provision (see N. 42; N. 67).
51 This setting of the course with regard to the horizontal and vertical separation of powers does not alter the fact that an evolutive interpretation of federal competences is in itself compatible with the dogmatic functioning of Art. 3 FC. However, the principle of individual authorization requires that “new” regulatory needs must be traceable to applicable competence norms. Otherwise, their regulation requires a new (separate) competence norm – or the regulatory authority remains with the cantons by virtue of subsidiary general competence. Any argument against a (too) flexibly evolutive interpretation of applicable competence norms must thus be derived from the wording, history and purpose of the relevant competences themselves with regard to Art. 3 FC.
52 Article 3 FC thus only has a legal preclusive effect if subsuming new regulatory phenomena or needs under applicable competence norms violates the principle of individual authorization. Only in this respect does Article 3 FC prohibit restrictions of cantonal regulatory powers (or their “sovereignty”). This limiting function is, however, only a by-product of the prohibition, arising from the principle of individual authorization, of the use of federal powers in a way that violates cantonal sovereignty. In any case, it is not an original objective of Art. 3 FC to prevent a centralization (however defined) of legislative powers at the federal level. From the perspective of Art. 3 FC, any centralization at the federal level or any “limitation of sovereignty” of the cantons is permissible in itself, provided it can be based on a sufficient constitutional foundation (see N. 8; on the problem of legal protection, see N. 57 et seq.).
53 In connection with this, it may be asked whether the principle of individual authorization can also be invoked – e.g. in the context of a specific judicial review – against an evolutive concretization of federal laws. Whether the blocking effect of Article 3 FC also extends to the enactment of concretizing ordinances or general rulings (in particular plans, registers, inventories and lists), contractual agreements (e.g. program agreements [Article 46 para. 2 FC]) or on the enactment of soft law, is likely to play a role in practice, especially with regard to Art. 49 para. 1 FC; however, case law on this norm is scarce. In theory, such a spillover effect can be affirmed if new regulatory phenomena are, for the sake of simplicity, “subsumed” under the law, but the underlying statutory provision does not cover these phenomena in a legally sufficient manner (see N. 51). In the event of a dispute, the federal government bears the burden of proof that it is acting in accordance with the constitution from a “competence law” perspective (see N. 26). In view of the (future) openness of competence norms (see N. 48 f.), however, such “sub-statutory concretizations” are likely to be unconstitutional as a rule due to the lack of an adequate statutory basis (Art. 164 para. 2 FC).
4. Execution powers
54 Legislative power includes the power to regulate execution (concretization, application, execution and supervision). The question of which body is responsible to what degree must be considered not only from the perspective of the horizontal, but also of the vertical separation of powers. Another rule-exception principle applies here: federal legal regulations are to be enforced by the cantons (Art. 46 FC), unless the constitution or federal law stipulates otherwise. This “enforcement federalism” also has its roots in the 19th century.
55 The guarantee of sovereignty (Art. 3 sentence 1 FC) gives rise to a cantonal organizational autonomy, which also applies to the enforcement of federal law (see also 46 para. 3 and Art. 47 para. 2 FC). Accordingly, the cantons may choose the mode of execution of federal law (taking into account local constraints and preferences), insofar as federal law allows them the leeway to do so. A primary barrier to cantonal organizational autonomy (both with regard to the execution of federal law and with regard to the cantonal exercise of legislative powers) is Art. 49 para. 1 FC, according to which cantonal law may not violate the spirit and purpose of federal law, as well as Art. 49 para. 2 FC, according to which the Confederation supervises the execution of federal law by the cantons (so-called federal supervision).
56 Illustrative practical examples regarding cantonal organizational autonomy (or related legislative and enforcement powers) are, in particular, the judgments of the Federal Supreme Court on the relationship between the Covid-19 federal ordinances and the cantonal measures based on the directly applicable Art. 40 EpG and/or cantonal constitutional or statutory law (e.g. cantonal health laws).
C. Conflicts of jurisdiction between the Confederation and the cantons
1. Fundamentals
57 The relationship between federal and cantonal law can lead to conflicts of jurisdiction in a variety of ways. A conflict of jurisdiction in the broader sense exists when there is disagreement as to which public entity is responsible for legislating or applying the law (see N. 43 et seq., N. 54 et seq.) and to what extent. If the cause lies not in a mere intention to regulate or act, but in a conflict of norms, there is a conflict of competences in the narrower, procedurally relevant sense (N. 65 f.).
58 Art. 3 FC does not provide any guidance for the resolution of conflicts of competences. From this provision, one can deduce the rules according to which the competences of the Confederation are to be delimited from those of the cantons. However, FC art. 3 does not address the question of whether federal provisions should take precedence over cantonal provisions, nor does it address the question of which legal norms the Federal Supreme Court may or may not repeal. On the basis of FC art. 3 alone, the federal government and the cantons thus have a fundamentally symmetrical “guarantee of competence”.
59 However, this isolated view cannot be maintained throughout the entire constitutional structure. Where the federal government is responsible for regulating a particular area, the structure of the federal state requires that the cantons comply with its directives. This central policy choice means that the cantons' position is subject to a material imbalance in favor of the federal government. This is primarily due to the following constitutional provisions:
Federal law that is in conformity with the constitution takes precedence over conflicting cantonal law (Art. 49 FC).
Federal law that is in conformity with the constitution takes precedence over cantonal law if a federal decree replaces a cantonal regulation. In this case, the cantonal law loses its independent significance.
The Federal Supreme Court must enforce federal laws that have been enacted in violation of the division of powers or that are otherwise unconstitutional vis-à-vis cantonal law, as long as the Federal Assembly does not repeal the corresponding federal law (or parts of it) (see in particular Art. 190 FC).
60 These principles are conflict-of-law rules that govern the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction between the Confederation and the cantons. The Federal Supreme Court may only examine and determine the unconstitutionality of federal laws (Art. 190 FC), but it may not repeal them (Art. 189 para. 4 sentence 1 FC). The same applies to federal ordinances, unless the law provides for exceptions (Art. 189 para. 4 sentence 2 FC). The above shows that the legal protection of the cantons against the federal government in Swiss law is rather weakly developed (in comparison to the competences of the constitutional courts of Germany or the USA, for example).
61 Conflicts of jurisdiction between the federal government and the cantons can be resolved in Swiss law in two ways: either through mediation or “agreement” (N. 62 ff.), or through legal action in which the Federal Supreme Court finds that the federal government has violated Art. 3 FC and leaves it to the Federal Assembly to resolve the issue (N. 64 ff.).
2. Cooperative resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction
62 According to Art. 44 para. 3 FC, “disputes between cantons or between cantons and the Confederation [...] shall as far as possible be settled through negotiation and mediation”. The term “dispute” encompasses both legal conflicts and political differences of opinion.
63 This amicable dispute resolution mechanism is an expression of the “cooperative” federalism in Switzerland (Art. 44 para. 1 FC). The Confederation and the cantons should also find a solution together in conflict situations – insofar as these arise in the first place as a result of the cantons' participation in the Confederation's decision-making process (Art. 45 FC) – taking into account their mutual interests.
64 Recourse to the Federal Supreme Court (see N. 65 f.) should only be possible if an amicable settlement of the dispute has failed.
3. Legal protection of the cantons with regard to Art. 3 FC
65 The cantons have procedural rights to safeguard their constitutional rights vis-à-vis the Confederation. Art. 89 para. 2 lit. c BGG gives “public bodies” an independent right of appeal within the framework of Art. 82 BGG to “complain about violations of guarantees granted to them by the cantonal or federal constitution” (cf. Art. 189 para. 1 lit. e FC). A reduction of cantonal sovereignty by federal law enacted in violation of competences is covered by this without further ado. In addition, cantonal bodies, e.g. the government, may be authorized to take legal action in order to safeguard important public interests in the event of disputes within the canton under Art. 89 para. 1 BGG.
66 Furthermore, conflicts of jurisdiction between the federal government and the cantons or between two or more cantons can be brought directly before the Federal Supreme Court by means of a legal action (Art. 189 para. 2 FC; Art. 120 para. 1 lit. a BGG). Unlike the framework of the appeal in public law matters (Art. 82 ff. BGG), an “abstract” challenge of federal law – separate from a specific individual act – is possible here. However, the restrictions on the powers of the Federal Supreme Court explained above also apply in the context of the constitutional action (see N. 50, N. 60).
67 The most effective means by which the cantons can “protect” their sovereignty is constitutional interpretation. This applies both when the Federal Supreme Court examines the constitutionality of cantonal law (abstract judicial review) and when it considers the constitutionality of federal law as a preliminary matter in the procedure for concrete judicial review.
68 In the case of an abstract review of a norm of cantonal law, interpretation in conformity with the Constitution has a protective function, because it is the Federal Court's established practice to set aside cantonal enactments only if they cannot be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution. In the case of the specific review of the constitutionality of federal law, however, the constitutional interpretation has an appellate function with regard to the federal enactment on which the contested individual act is based. By establishing that the federal legislature (or the Federal Council) has exceeded its powers in an unconstitutional manner and by refusing to apply the relevant provision in the individual case, the Federal Supreme Court points out the error to the federal bodies and urges them to amend the law. For more information on the interaction of Articles 49, 189, para. 4 and Article 190 FC, please refer to the respective individual comments.
About the authors
MLaw Noah Rohner is a research assistant and doctoral candidate at the Chair of Law, Medicine and Technology at the University of Zurich.
Prof. Dr. iur. et Dr. med. Kerstin Noëlle Vokinger, LL.M., is a professor and holds the Chair of Law, Medicine and Technology at the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich.
Recommended further reading
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Blumer Johann Jakob/Morel Joseph, Handbuch des schweizerischen Bundesstaatsrechts, Erster Band, 2. Aufl., Schaffhausen 1877.
Dubs Jakob, Das öffentliche Recht der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft: Dargestellt für das Volk, Erster Theil. Allgemeine Einleitung und Kantonalstaatsrecht, 2. Aufl., Zürich 1878.
Dubs Jakob, Das öffentliche Recht der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft: Dargestellt für das Volk, Zweiter Theil. Das Bundesstaatsrecht, Zürich 1878.
Hangartner Yvo, Die Kompetenzverteilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen, Bern/Frankfurt am Main 1974.
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Materials
Bericht über den Entwurf einer Bundesverfassung vom 8.4.1848, erstattet von der am 16.8.1847 von der Tagsatzung ernannten Revisionskommission, Bern 1848 (zit. Bericht BV 1848).