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- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
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- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
I. Introduction
1 Part of Chapter III of the Convention on Cybercrime, entitled "International Cooperation", art. 34 CCC deals with international cooperation in relation to content data, as opposed to traffic data, which is covered by art. 33 CCC.
2 The CCC recognizes the importance of being able to intercept content data for the purposes of national criminal proceedings (art. 21 CCC): the collection of telecommunications content data has always been a useful investigative tool for determining whether a communication is illegal, and for providing evidence of past or future offences. Computer communications can constitute or prove the same type of offence, while offering greater possibilities thanks to the transmission of large quantities of data (text, images and sound). It is not possible to determine in real time the harmful and illegal nature of these communications without intercepting the content of the message. If they were unable to establish and prevent the commission of offences at the time they took place, law enforcement authorities would be reduced to investigating past offences, where the harm has already been done. It follows that real-time interception of data relating to the content of computer communications is at least, if not more, important than real-time interception of telecommunications.
3 However, art. 34 CCC places no obligation on States Parties to be able to cooperate in the cross-border collection of such data; at most, the Council of Europe's Explanatory Report refers to the good practices contained in the 1985 Recommendation on the application of the ECCJ to telecommunications surveillance. The Second Additional Protocol to the CCC, of May 12, 2022, does not deal with this measure, nor does the preparatory work for the 3rd Additional Protocol to the ECCJ.
II. Notions
4 Art. 34 CCC provides that the Parties shall afford each other mutual assistance "to the extent permitted by their applicable domestic treaties and laws". Unlike art. 33 CCC, which applies to data relating to computer traffic, art. 34 CCC does not impose any strict obligation on States parties to provide mutual assistance in the interception of data relating to the content of computer communications. The decision to rely on domestic regimes and legislation is justified by the highly intrusive nature of interception, and by the fact that mutual assistance in this area was still in its infancy.
5 The notion of "content data" is not defined in the Convention. It refers to the information content of the communication, i.e. the meaning of the communication or the message or information transmitted by the communication (other than traffic data). In concrete terms, "content data" refers to the communication itself, its very object, i.e. in particular the text of an e-mail (including the Swiss design of the "subject" section), an instant message, any attachments or the audio and/or video file or stream transmitted. This concept is opposed to that of "traffic data", which essentially covers the elements of the communication chain (origin, destination, route, time, date, size and duration of the communication or type of underlying service; art. 1 let. d CCC). This distinction is fundamental to surveillance measures, and has direct consequences for the granting of international mutual assistance. For example, under certain conditions, Switzerland allows the rapid and anticipated transmission of data relating to computer traffic on the basis of art. 18b IMAC, which is excluded in the case of data relating to content (see III.B.1. below).
6 Art. 34 CCC covers "interception in real time", a concept which is opposed to the search of data recorded or stored on a computer medium (server, cloud or other). This direct temporality implies that the person under surveillance has no control over the data. In other words, the data cannot be deleted before it is intercepted. In principle, the "interception" of this data is carried out by a third-party provider (internet and/or telephony providers, providers of derived communication services [hereinafter: FSCD], such as companies managing communication applications). In our view, art. 34 CCC does not cover, in particular, the interception of content data directly from the investigation suspect by means of Trojan Horse software (Govware); however, nothing precludes art. 34 CCC being used as a basis for the interception of communications via an IMSI Catcher.
7 The provision stipulates that mutual assistance is granted for the real-time "collection or recording" of data. In our view, although the distinction between these two terms seems uncertain, collection covers the initial act of gathering the data, while recording concerns its storage with a view to transmission to the requesting authority, or its use in the criminal investigation. These two concepts thus constitute two successive stages necessary for the execution of surveillance, but their distinction has little practical significance. Furthermore, while at first glance the notions of "collection" and "recording" include that of "transmission" - since this collection takes place at the request and for the needs of a foreign authority - we shall see that the Swiss legislator has distinguished these notions. Indeed, data collected in execution of a request for foreign judicial assistance is not exempt from the usual mutual assistance procedure prior to any transmission of the evidence abroad (cf. in particular infra III.A. ad art. 18a IMAC).
8 Intercepted data must be linked to "specific communications". This term means that the Convention neither requires nor authorizes the general or systematic surveillance and collection of large quantities of content-related data (mass surveillance). Nor does it authorize "fishing expeditions" in the hope of uncovering criminal activity - a very different situation from investigations into specific cases of unlawful conduct. Obviously, this term does not mean that it is necessary to determine which specific future communication between several computer systems will need to be monitored, since it is only rarely possible to anticipate future communications. What is important to remember, however, is that the object of the surveillance (e-mail address, user ID for an e-mail application, etc.) must be precisely determined.
9 Finally, the Convention does not apply as such to traditional telecommunications (analog telephony), since data must be transmitted via a computer system. The advent of the digital telephone, and more generally the convergence of telecommunications technologies, is nevertheless blurring the distinctions between telecommunications and telecomputing, and the specific features of their infrastructures. As a result, the Convention - in particular art. 21 and 34 CCC - applies to specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system, the communication being able to be transmitted via a telecommunications network before being received by another computer system.
III. Implementation in Swiss law
A. Interception of content data under Swiss law
10 While art. 33 CCC was responsible for the introduction of art. 18b IMAC, which allows data relating to computer traffic to be transmitted to the requesting authority in advance (i.e. prior to the entry into force of a closure decision), art. 34 CCC did not - directly at least - lead to any changes in Swiss legislation concerning the interception of content data. The usual rules of Swiss criminal procedure (art. 269 et seq. CPP) apply, subject to certain reservations, by reference to art. 18a IMAC.
11 Art. 18a IMAC is the key provision governing the surveillance of postal and telecommunications correspondence in the context of mutual legal assistance. In essence, it states that, at the express request of a requesting authority, the Public Prosecutor's Office - and in certain cases even the Federal Office of Justice - may order such surveillance (para. 2), and that the order must be submitted to the competent Court of Compulsory Measures for approval (para. 3). For the rest, art. 18a IMAC refers to arts. 269 to 279 of the Swiss Penal Code and to the Federal Act of October 6, 2000 on the Surveillance of Correspondence by Post and Telecommunication (LSCPT). This reference to art. 269 et seq. of the Swiss Penal Code - in particular to the catalog of offences set out in art. 269 of the Swiss Penal Code - corresponds to the "range of serious offences" that the Parties must define in their domestic law in order to allow the interception of content data (art. 21 and 34 CCC). The general reference to the provisions of the LSCPT also means that art. 18a IMAC applies to both ordinary communications (traditional analog telephony) and communications linked to a computer system (cf. in particular art. 2 let. c LSCPT).
12 In practice, after entering into the matter (art. 80a IMAC), the executing authority will order the surveillance measure through the Service Surveillance de la correspondance par poste et télécommunication (hereinafter: Service SCPT; art. 269 CPP in conjunction with art. 55 ff OSCPT). It will thus be possible to order real-time monitoring of the content and secondary data of network access services (art. 55 OSCPT), real-time monitoring of the content and secondary data of telephony and multimedia services (art. 57 OSCPT) or real-time monitoring of the content and secondary data of e-mail services (art. 59 OSCPT).
13 The executing authority must then have the measure authorized by the Compulsory Measures Court within 24 hours of the order (art. 274 para. 1 CPP). It should be noted that, with regard to the condition of the existence of a "serious suspicion" set out in art. 269 al. 1 let. a CPP, the Federal Court rightly pointed out that, according to the rules on mutual legal assistance and established case law, art. 14 CEEJ, 28 IMAC and 10 OIMAC require the requesting authority to explain what its suspicions consist of, but not to prove them or even make them likely. Subject to the prohibition on exploratory requests, the requesting authority's suspicions need not therefore be particularly serious or precise. Indeed, while domestic law must be applied when it is more favourable to cooperation than treaty law, it cannot lay down material conditions for mutual assistance that are not provided for in treaty law.
14 The Compulsory Measures Court rules within five days (art. 274 para. 2 CPP). If surveillance is refused, the documents and recordings collected must be destroyed immediately (art. 277 al. 1 CPP). If authorization is granted, it should be noted that art. 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), which provides for communication to the accused or the third party subject to surveillance, and establishes a right of appeal for the latter, as well as for the monitored telecommunications service (art. 279 para. 3 CCP), does not apply, despite the reference in art. 18a para. 4 IMAC to arts. 269 to 279 CCP. In fact, the conventions and laws applicable to international mutual assistance in criminal matters derogate from the usual system of the Swiss Criminal Code, which only applies if it is more favorable to cooperation than the applicable conventions and laws (principle of favorability). In particular, this means that party status, the right to notification and legal remedies are governed by the specific provisions on mutual assistance. However, according to art. 80m para. 1 IMAC, the obligation to notify decisions on mutual assistance is limited to persons residing or having elected domicile in Switzerland. Any indications to the contrary by the TMC, whether by reference to the law or by imposing conditions within the meaning of art. 274 para. 2 CPP, would therefore be invalid, as the TMC has no jurisdiction over this aspect of the proceedings. As part of the mutual assistance procedure, it will be up to the executing authority to ensure compliance with these conventions and applicable laws, and to make the notifications provided for in art. 80m IMAC.
15 Upon receipt of the surveillance data, the executing authority must guarantee the right to be heard of the person affected by the surveillance measure (art. 80b IMAC). As we shall see, in the case of content-related data, any advance transmission, i.e. prior to the entry into force of a termination decision, is in principle excluded (see III.B.1. below). Since the coercive measure in question is essentially secret, its disclosure to the person concerned may have serious consequences for the proceedings abroad. A distinction must be made between two situations:
1. If the person concerned is not domiciled in Switzerland or has not elected domicile there, he or she need not be notified of the authority's decision (art. 80m para. 1 IMAC). The decision to close the case will therefore only be notified to the FOJ (art. 80h let. a IMAC), which means that the result of the surveillance can be passed on to the requesting authority without the person concerned actually having been informed. Of course, if the person concerned applies to the enforcement authority, having taken up residence in Switzerland before the closure decision comes into force, his or her right to take part in the proceedings and to have access to the file must be guaranteed (art. 80b para. 1 in conjunction with art. 80m para. 2 IMAC).
2. If the person concerned by the measure is domiciled in Switzerland or has elected domicile there, the executing authority must guarantee him the right to take part in the proceedings and to consult the file (art. 80b para. 1 IMAC; subject to the specific case of the use of a false identity, cf. infra III.B.3) before any transmission of the means of proof abroad. However, the requesting authority is under no obligation to grant this right to the person concerned as soon as the surveillance measure has been completed. The measure may remain secret for as long as is necessary for the foreign proceedings. The executing authority will have to ascertain from the requesting authority when the existence of the surveillance measure can be disclosed to enable the mutual assistance procedure to continue.
16 At the end of the procedure, the executing authority will issue a closing decision, which may be appealed to the Federal Criminal Court (art. 80e IMAC). A subsequent appeal to the Federal Supreme Court remains possible under the restrictive conditions of art. 84 FSCA (particularly important case).
B. Distinctions and special cases
1. Advance transmission of content data?
17 Under certain conditions, art. 18b IMAC allows the early transmission - i.e. before a decision to close the case has been taken - of data relating to computer traffic collected under an authorized real-time surveillance order. Art. 18b IMAC implements the obligations arising from art. 33 CCC. In the case of content-related data, however, the Federal Court has confirmed that art. 18b IMAC does not apply, and that any early transmission, i.e. prior to the entry into force of a closure decision, is therefore excluded on the basis of this provision. This deprives Switzerland of an important tool in the fight against international crime, particularly organized crime and terrorism. It is also questionable whether, with this interpretation by the Federal Court, Art. 18a IMAC still has any real practical scope and utility.
18 In 2021, however, the legislator has introduced new provisions which partly compensate for this shortcoming, and which represent an important step towards more flexible rules and faster, reactive mutual assistance based on international trust. Art. 80dbis IMAC (dynamic mutual assistance) allows, by way of exception, the advance transmission of information or evidence (a) when foreign investigations into organized crime or terrorism would be excessively difficult without this mutual assistance measure, in particular because of the risk of collusion, or because the confidentiality of the proceedings must be preserved, or (b) in order to prevent a serious and imminent danger, in particular the commission of a terrorist act. The aim of this provision is to enable effective prevention in urgent and well-founded cases (e.g. hostage-taking or terrorist attack), by avoiding too late a reaction to planned criminal acts, confidentiality being of great importance in this context. From a material point of view, unlike art. 18b IMAC, which restricts advance transmission to data relating to computer traffic, or even to secondary data relating to conventional telecommunications, art. 80dbis IMAC provides that any type of evidence or information may be transmitted in advance by this means. From a formal point of view, art. 80dbis para. 4 IMAC requires the executing authority to obtain certain additional undertakings from the requesting authority prior to any advance transmission, in particular to use the information or means of evidence only for investigative purposes and under no circumstances to request, motivate or pronounce a final decision (let. a) and to remove from the file of foreign proceedings, if mutual assistance is refused, the information or means of evidence submitted in advance (let. c). If all these conditions are met, there is nothing to prevent the advance transmission of content data under the conditions of art. 80dbis IMAC.
19 On the other hand, early transmission of content-related data can take place within the framework of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT; art. 80dter to 80dduodecies IMAC). In this case, it can intervene even if the conditions laid down in art. 80dbis para. 1 let. a and b or para. 2 IMAC are not met.
2. Distinction between a deposit order (art. 265 CPP) and a surveillance measure (art. 269 et seq. CPP), particularly with regard to e-mail boxes
20 The secrecy of telecommunications is a constitutional guarantee enshrined in art. 13 para. 1 Cst. This right is an essential aspect of the right to privacy. The monitoring of correspondence and of postal and telecommunications relationships constitutes a serious infringement of this fundamental right. It is therefore essential to distinguish between what is covered by this guarantee and what is not. Two criteria have traditionally been applied to distinguish between cases where information can be obtained directly by a production order and those where an LSCPT request is required:
the first criterion is the relationship with the telecommunication correspondence;
the second criterion is whether the data requested falls within the scope of the fundamental right to secrecy of telecommunications protected by art. 13 para. 1 Cst.
21 If both criteria are met, the LSCPT must be applied.
22 In practice, the majority of cases will concern access to the contents of electronic mailboxes (e-mail). In order to distinguish between data covered by the secrecy of telecommunications and data that can be obtained directly by the criminal authorities (filing order under art. 265 of the Criminal Procedure Code), the Federal Court has established the criterion of the time of the e-mail recipient's last access (connection, log) to his or her electronic mailbox. The Federal Court ruled that the communication procedure must be considered as having ended at the moment when the recipient becomes the sole master of the data, i.e. when he accesses his e-mail inbox, irrespective of whether he has actually opened and read the e-mails received. In practice, this means that the public prosecutor will be able to obtain the content of e-mails prior to the last log-in directly from the service provider (art. 265 CPP), whereas he will have to go through the SCPT Service and the Court of Constraint Measures to obtain the content of e-mails subsequent to the last log-in (art. 269 ff CPP). In other words, art. 31 CCC (mutual assistance regarding access to stored data) and not art. 34 CCC applies to the collection and transmission of e-mails prior to the last log.
3. Use of a false identity
23 In our opinion, anyone who, in order to commit an offence, uses an account on a platform (messaging application, e-mail inbox, etc.) that guarantees a high degree of confidentiality (end-to-end encryption, sometimes coupled with zero-access encryption, little or no data required for registration, etc.) should not be recognized as a party to the mutual assistance procedure, thereby making it more difficult for the criminal authorities to identify him. Indeed, in the absence of any initial identification, there are few means of verifying that the person claiming this status is actually the user of this resource.
The authors have written this contribution in a personal capacity. The assessments and opinions presented are their own and do not commit the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland.
Bibliography
Aepli Michael, commentaire de l’art. 18a EIMP, in : Niggli Marcel Alexander/Heimgartner Stefan (édit.), Basler Kommentar Internationales Strafrecht, 1ère édition, Bâle 2015.
Dangubic Miro/Clerc Yves, Art. 80dbis IRSG – ein Überblick, forumpoenale 4 (2022) p. 287-292.
Ludwiczak Glassey Maria/Bonzanigo Francesca, L’artificielle distinction entre « informations » et « moyens de preuve » en entraide pénale internationale, Revue Pénale Suisse 140 (2022) p. 402-427.
Ludwiczak Maria, L’entraide pénale internationale ‘dynamique’ en bref. Le projet, les débats, le compromis, Pratique juridique actuelle, 1 (2021) p. 71–75.
Zimmermann Robert, La coopération judiciaire internationale en matière pénale, 5e édition, Berne 2019.
Donatsch Andreas/Heimgartner Stefan/Meyer Frank/Simonek Madeleine, Internationale Rechtshilfe, 2e édition., Zurich et al. 2015.
Materials
Message concernant la loi fédérale sur la surveillance de la correspondance par poste et télécommunication (LSCPT) du 27 février 2013, FF 2013 2379, consultable sous https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/filestore/fedlex.data.admin.ch/eli/fga/2013/512/fr/pdf-a/fedlex-data-admin-ch-eli-fga-2013-512-fr-pdf-a.pdf, consulté en janvier 2024 (cité : Message LSCPT).
Message relatif à l’approbation et à la mise en œuvre de la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la cybercriminalité du 18 juin 2010, FF 2010 4275, consultable sous https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/filestore/fedlex.data.admin.ch/eli/fga/2010/813/fr/pdf-a/fedlex-data-admin-ch-eli-fga-2010-813-fr-pdf-a.pdf, consulté en janvier 2024 (cité : Message CCC).
Message relatif à l’arrêté fédéral portant approbation et mise en œuvre de la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe pour la prévention du terrorisme et de son Protocole additionnel et concernant le renforcement des normes pénales contre le terrorisme et le crime organisé, FF 2018 6469 ss, consultable sous https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2018/2301/fr, consulté en janvier 2024 (cité : Message terrorisme).
Rapport explicatif de la Convention sur la cybercriminalité du 23 novembre 2001, Conseil de l’Europe, Série des traités européens – no 185, consultable sous https://rm.coe.int/16800ccea4, consulté en janvier 2024 (cité : Rapport explicatif du Conseil de l’Europe).
Rapport explicatif relatif à la révision totale de l’ordonnance sur la surveillance de la correspondance par poste et télécommunication (OSCPT; RS 780.11) du Service Surveillance de la correspondance par poste et télécommunication, consultable sous https://www.li.admin.ch/sites/default/files/2018-02/Rapport_explicatif_OSCPT.pdf, consulté en janvier 2024 (cité : Rapport explicatif OSCPT).
Recommandation n° R (85) 10 du Comité des Ministres aux États membres concernant l'application pratique de la convention européenne d'entraide judiciaire en matière pénale relative aux commissions rogatoires pour la surveillance des télécommunications du 28 juin 1985, consultable sous : https://rm.coe.int/09000016804e3071, consulté en janvier 2024 (cité : Recommandation no R (85) 10).