-
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
-
- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
-
- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
-
- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
-
- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. History of origin
- II. Context
- III. Commentary in the narrow sense
- Recommended further reading
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. History of origin
1 Since the total revision in 1999, the Federal Constitution has regulated the tasks of the Confederation (Art. 42 FC) and the tasks of the cantons (Art. 43 FC) under Title 3 "Confederation, cantons and communes" in Section 1 of Chapter 1 on the "Relationship between the Confederation and the cantons". Since 2008, this section has also included principles on the allocation and performance of tasks (Art. 43a FC). Corresponding predecessor provisions cannot be found in earlier versions of the Federal Constitution.
2 The 1995 draft Constitution still focused on the cantons and stipulated in Art. 32 para. 1: "The cantons are responsible for all tasks that are not assigned to the Confederation by the Federal Constitution." According to the explanatory notes, this allocation of responsibilities - in conjunction with Art. 3 of the 1995 Draft Constitution - sets out the "basic decision for federalism as a concrete political principle in its modern form". Unlike the current Art. 42 FC, the draft did not explicitly state the tasks of the Confederation; these would result from the interpretation of the Federal Constitution. This is to be agreed with, which is why the independent meaning of Art. 42 FC remains open to this day (cf. N. 19 f.).
3 In the consultation, it was criticized that the relationship between Art. 32 para. 1 VE 1995 and Art. 3 VE 1995 was "unclear". This is because the latter provision also established the subsidiary general competence of the cantons. The Federal Council wanted to take this criticism into account and reformulated the provisions relevant to federalism in the 1996 draft constitution. The wording of the provision on the position of the cantons (Art. 32 para. 1 VE 1995) was amended to the effect that the cantons have all the sovereign rights they need to perform their tasks within the framework of the Federal Constitution (Art. 35 VE 1996). This provision thus no longer regulated the federal distribution of powers, but the performance of tasks by the cantons. The tasks of the Confederation were newly described in Art. 3 para. 2 VE 1996: "The Confederation shall perform the tasks assigned to it by the Federal Constitution". This wording was retained and can be found today in Art. 42 FC. The change in the system - from Art. 3 para. 2 VE 1996 to Art. 42 FC - goes back to the Council of States, which took the view in the parliamentary deliberations that this was merely a concretization of the principle of federalism.
4 The 1996 draft constitution also introduced the principle of subsidiarity into the discussion. According to Art. 34 para. 3 VE 1996, the Confederation should now be obliged to observe the principle of subsidiarity. However, the Council of States considered the Federal Council's proposal to define the concept of subsidiarity in Art. 34 para. 3 VE 1996 to be unclear and ambiguous. It preferred to define subsidiarity as follows: "It [the Confederation] only assumes those tasks that require uniform regulation.". A minority of the Commission would have advocated the deletion of the word "only" in order to express the principle of subsidiarity in a positive way. In the National Council, the explicit anchoring of the principle of subsidiarity in the sense of the Federal Council's draft initially prevailed. The Council of States and the National Council only finally agreed on the "Germanized" wording at the conciliation conference, whereby the word "only" was deleted from the Council of States' original version. This new wording on the principle of subsidiarity was placed in Art. 42 para. 2 FC.
5 However, the paraphrasing of the principle of subsidiarity was not able to eliminate the ambiguities of this provision. By deleting the word "only", the impression was avoided that the Confederation could only be assigned those tasks that require uniform regulation. With this second paragraph, however, Art. 42 FC could now be understood to mean that the Confederation performs both the tasks assigned to it by the Federal Constitution (para. 1) and those tasks that require standardization (para. 2). However, according to the prevailing opinion, para. 2 was not intended to create an additional independent basis of competence for federal tasks. With the reform of federalism that came into force on January 1, 2008 to restructure financial equalization and the division of tasks between the Confederation and the cantons, this paragraph was finally repealed. Since then, the principle of subsidiarity has been expressly enshrined in Art. 5a FC and specified in Art. 43a para. 1 FC.
II. Context
A. Federalism-theoretical contextualization
6 There are various types of federal division of powers. The most common distribution technique (see N. 7-11) follows the dichotomy of titled (named) or enumerated competences and residual competences: For one level, competencies are explicitly designated, while the other level is assigned all residual competencies. There are sometimes historical reasons for this type of division of powers. Federal states that have emerged from former sovereign states generally prefer to clearly state the competences of the Confederation and retain the other competences. Nevertheless, the residual powers do not necessarily have to be attributed to the subordinate level (cf. N. 9). The establishment of a residual competence for one level or another has the advantage of avoiding gaps in competence. The rule-exception scheme is seen as another type of competence allocation technique (cf. N. 10). Although a subtraction also takes place here, it is positively stipulated as a rule that one level is responsible for all tasks, unless a specific task is assigned to the other level by way of an exception. It is not apparent that such a regulatory technique is intended to have a different material meaning than the system of titled and residual competences. In particular, it cannot be assumed that the competences of one level as "exceptions" must be interpreted differently - more narrowly - than those of the other level.
B. Comparative legal contextualization
7 The allocation of competences in the Swiss Federal Constitution is primarily based on Art. 3 FC as the "basic norm of the federal state". Like other federal constitutions, this provision is committed to the dichotomy of titled (named or enumerated) competences and residual competences (cf. N. 6). In this sense, the cantons remain responsible for all those areas that are not constitutionally assigned to the Confederation. The cantonal residual competence already arises from Art. 3 FC and is merely underlined by Art. 42 FC from the perspective of the Confederation. Due to the subsidiary general clause of Art. 3 FC, the Federal Constitution provides a "seamless system of division of powers". The Federal Supreme Court decides on conflicts of jurisdiction between the Confederation and the cantons in accordance with Art. 189 para. 2 FC in conjunction with Art. 120 para. 1 lit. Art. 120 para. 1 lit. a BGG. Other central provisions of the federal division of powers are Art. 5a FC (principle of subsidiarity), Art. 43 FC (tasks of the cantons), Art. 43a FC (principles for the allocation and fulfillment of tasks), Art. 44 FC (principles of cooperation between the Confederation and the cantons) and Art. 47 FC (autonomy of the cantons).
8 The Austrian Federal Constitution Act (B-VG), like the Federal Constitution, recognizes the dichotomy in the distribution of competences of titled competences and residual competences, in that the competences of the federal government are named in the constitution and all other subject areas fall within the competence of the federal states. In this sense, according to the general clause of Art. 15 para. 1 B-VG, the Austrian federal states are responsible unless the federal constitution expressly assigns a matter to the federal government. The areas of responsibility of the federal government are listed enumeratively in particular in Art. 10-12 B-VG.
9 Art. 35 of the Belgian Constitution would also require an explicit allocation of competence for the competence of the higher federal level ("federal authority") and grant the Communities and Regions a residual competence. However, due to a transitional provision, this regulation does not (yet) apply. At present, therefore, the residual competence in Belgium - as in Canada - lies with the federal level.
10 The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) declares in its basic standard on the division of powers between the federal government and the federal states in Art. 30 that the exercise of state powers and the fulfillment of state tasks is a matter for the federal states, unless the Basic Law makes or permits other provisions. In the same way, Article 70 of the Basic Law stipulates that the federal states have the right to legislate unless the Basic Law delegates this power to the federal government. The regulatory technique of the German Basic Law is qualified as a rule-exception scheme (cf. N. 6). However, the different regulatory techniques do not change the fact that in many federal states the higher level, i.e. the federal government, has the majority of responsibility due to the constitutional allocation of numerous and significant powers. This applies to Germany as well as to Austria, and no less so to Switzerland, where the area of responsibility of the federal government is constantly growing - also as a result of the increase in state treaty norms.
11 Similarly, the European Union, as a federally structured system, requires a distribution of competences between the Union and the Member States. Unlike in federal states, the allocation of competences here is one-dimensional, in that the EU treaties only establish the competences of the Union, but not those of the Member States. It is true that Art. 5 para. 2 TEU stipulates that, in accordance with the principle of conferral, the Union only has those competences that were transferred to it by the EU Treaties, and that all other areas remain with the EU Member States. However, the latter aspect only has a descriptive effect, as sovereignty in the Member States is constituted by their constitutions and is not transferred by Union law. Another difference to federal states is that the Union cannot assign itself any new powers. It is up to the Member States to authorize it to regulate new areas by amending the treaty - this requires unanimity and ratification (cf. Art. 48 TEU).
III. Commentary in the narrow sense
A. Basic concepts of competence law
12 Art. 42 FC refers to "tasks" assigned to the Confederation by the Federal Constitution. In contrast, other constitutional provisions relating to competences use the term "competence" (e.g. Art. 43, 57, 61a, 67a and 76 FC). In the old Federal Constitution of 1874, the term "competence", which is generally used synonymously with "jurisdiction", was still used in several places (e.g. Art. 16, Art. 24bis and Art. 84 FC 1874). While the Federal Constitution of 1999 initially only spoke of "tasks" and "responsibilities", the term "competence" was reintroduced into the Constitution with the insertion of Art. 117b FC following the adoption of the Care Initiative in 2021. The basic legal concepts of "task" on the one hand and "responsibility" or "competence" on the other must be distinguished in the federal context. Art. 43 FC also differentiates in this sense, according to which the cantons determine which "tasks" they fulfill within the scope of their "competence" (cf. Art. 43 N. 8-11).
13 The "tasks" form the interface between the state and society. The Constitution defines which tasks the state must perform and thus reflects the "expectations towards the state". In this way, it also defines the state: the state is made responsible for fulfilling these tasks; the boundary to society is thus drawn. The FC also specifically refers to state tasks when it comes to this demarcation between the state and society. Furthermore, in the literature, the task is generally qualified as a duty of the state to make a regulation or take a measure. Accordingly, a task covers an area of activity in which the state is fundamentally obliged to take action. However, the state's duty to perform a task does not say anything about which level of government is responsible for it. It is not necessarily possible to infer from a task which local authority is responsible; conversely, an attribution of competence regularly leads to the conclusion that a (state) task exists.
14 Only the competence determines who is authorized to perform a (state) task. It links the state task with an organizational unit. For example, the FC speaks of "federal tasks" and "cantonal tasks" in the competence standards of Art. 42 FC and Art. 43 FC. Through this allocation, the state tasks become federal tasks on the one hand and cantonal tasks on the other. In the federal context, the competence norms focus on precisely this vertical distribution of tasks between the two levels of state organization, namely the Confederation and the constituent states (the allocation of responsibilities to the municipalities is regularly the responsibility of the latter). This refers to the so-called "association competence". By empowering one local authority to perform tasks, a constitutional provision of competence is at the same time withheld from the other. Only the addressee of the competence is authorized to adopt a specific regulation or measure. Authority or authorization means that the person responsible is not necessarily obliged to take a measure. A competence can include both permission and an obligation to perform a task.
15 The order of duties and the order of competences therefore take on different perspectives: While the order of tasks in a constitution obliges the state to perform a specific activity and thus removes it from the purely social sphere, the order of competences focuses on the delimitation of the scope of action between the Confederation on the one hand and the constituent states on the other.
B. Federal tasks and federal competences
16 It follows from Art. 42 FC that the Confederation must fulfill all the tasks assigned to it by the Federal Constitution. According to the wording of the norm, the focus is on the tasks of the Confederation and less on its competences, which are regulated in the individual competence norms of the Federal Constitution (cf. N. 20). While the delimitation of tasks and competences is important for Art. 43 FC (cf. Art. 43 FC n. 8-11), it plays a subordinate role for the Confederation. The decisive factor for the Confederation's power to act is the existence of a corresponding competence norm. Against this background, the Federal Constitution does not clearly and unambiguously distinguish between these two categories.
17 The relationship between competence and task in the Federal Constitution is correspondingly complex. According to Art. 42 FC, the Confederation fulfills the tasks assigned to it by the Federal Constitution. However, this does not mean that the Confederation's powers are exhausted. It is not only responsible for assigned tasks in the sense of a duty to act (e.g. Art. 38 para. 1, Art. 62 para. 5 FC: "The Confederation shall regulate...", but also Art. 40 para. 1, Art. 64 para. 1 FC: "The Confederation shall promote..." and Art. 77 para. 1, Art. 92 para. 1 FC: "The Confederation shall ensure..."). Federal competence also exists if the Federal Constitution declares the Confederation to be responsible without simultaneously imposing a task on it, i.e. a duty to act. There is no (direct) duty to act, but the Confederation is responsible for the enabling provisions, the "may" provisions (e.g. Art. 71 FC: "The Confederation may promote Swiss film production and film culture.").
18 In addition, in some places the Federal Constitution entrusts the Confederation with a task, but limits the associated duty to act to the "scope of its competence" (e.g. Art. 76 para. 1 FC on water supply and Art. 118 para. 1 FC on health protection). In these cases, the federal legislator requires additional constitutional authorization. Such a limitation of the fulfillment of tasks by competence is found above all in those provisions that simultaneously empower the Confederation and the cantons (e.g. Art. 57 para. 1 FC on national security and civil protection, Art. 61a para. 1 FC on the Swiss education area, Art. 67a para. 2 FC on music education and Art. 89 para. 1 FC on energy policy).
19 It is true that the assignment of a task to the Confederation regularly also entails its responsibility. However, due to the complex interplay of tasks and competences, the competences of the Confederation can only be derived from Art. 42 FC to a limited extent. Consequently, its (practical and legal) significance is limited.
20 Another - even more important - reason for the limited independent content of Art. 42 FC lies in the fact that the question of the Confederation's concrete competence must be directed to the specific competence norm, in particular in Chapter 2 of Title 3 of the Federal Constitution. The individual substantive norms simultaneously determine the scope of federal competence and the legal effects on cantonal competences. For although the use of the verb "fulfils" ("accomplit", "adempie") in Art. 42 FC could lead to the conclusion that the Confederation is obliged to fulfil its duties in every case, the need for action only arises from the relevant individual provision (possibly in conjunction with other constitutional requirements) - whereby even purely enabling norms (cf. N. 17) require that the Confederation regularly examines whether action is necessary. For this reason, the Federal Supreme Court does not review the competence of the Confederation directly on the basis of Art. 42 FC, but on the basis of a specific substantive norm (e.g. Art. 78 para. 2 FC), for example by ruling on the scope of a "federal task".
C. Assignment of tasks by the Federal Constitution
21 Despite its minor importance (n. 19 f.), Art. 42 FC makes it clear that the Confederation is responsible for the fulfillment of tasks, namely those assigned to it by the Constitution. The Federal Constitution thus takes account of the fundamental fact that it constitutes the state and assigns it tasks, i.e. responsibility. Art. 42 FC clarifies the system of individual authorization implicit in Art. 3 FC (also known as the principle of enumeration): The allocation of "tasks" to the Confederation must - in principle expressly and conclusively - be made by the Federal Constitution. However, the combination of these two provisions shows that it is primarily not the tasks but the responsibilities of the Confederation that are to be laid down in the Constitution. If the Confederation is responsible in an area and may - but does not have to - make a regulation, it can only take on a task in the sense of a duty to act at the legislative level.
22 In any case, the requirements of Art. 42 FC are met if the task or competence of the Confederation is expressly enshrined in the Constitution. It is also recognized that, in exceptional cases, the Confederation is tacitly empowered to perform a specific task. Tacit powers for the federal government can arise by virtue of the factual connection (pouvoirs implicites, implied powers) or by virtue of the federal state structure (pouvoirs inhérents, inherent powers). A competence by virtue of the factual connection follows from the necessity of being able to exercise an explicit competence at all. There are hardly any such powers in the current Federal Constitution. The Confederation is competent by virtue of the federal state structure if its competence must reasonably arise from the principle of the federal state. Such competence applies, for example, to the protection of the state and the determination of coats of arms or flags. Since the total revision of the Federal Constitution in 1999 and the associated intention to enshrine unwritten constitutional law in the constitutional charter, there is little room for tacit powers; they require special justification.
23 Due to the "constitutional reservation" of Art. 42 FC in conjunction with Art. 3 FC. Art. 3 FC, new federal powers are only possible with a corresponding constitutional amendment. New tasks or responsibilities can be transferred to the Confederation or existing ones can be withdrawn by means of a total revision in accordance with Art. 193 FC or by means of a partial revision in accordance with Art. 194 FC. The federal legislator is therefore responsible for changing the federal system of tasks and responsibilities; it has the authority to do so. A (voluntary) assignment of powers by the cantons, for example by treaty, is excluded. Equally inadmissible is the creation of new competences by filling gaps or by customary law.
D. Overview of federal responsibilities
24 The majority of federal responsibilities can be found in Chapter 2 (Responsibilities) of Title 3 (Art. 54-125 FC). In the light of these provisions, the Confederation - in part jointly with the cantons - is essentially responsible for the following areas:
foreign affairs;
national security and civil protection;
education and research;
sport and culture;
environmental protection and spatial planning;
public transportation;
energy and communication;
economic policy;
Housing, social security and health protection;
migration;
civil and criminal law.
25 According to the wording of Art. 42 FC, the Confederation is obliged to fulfill the tasks assigned to it. However, the general view is that it is also permitted to entrust third parties such as the cantons or private individuals or organizations outside the federal administration with the fulfilment of its tasks, subject to the requirements of the specific substantive provision. However, this does not release it from its general duty of fulfillment.
About the author
Dr. iur. Christina Neier, Bsc., is a postdoctoral researcher at the Faculty of Law of the University of Zurich. She studied law, economics and social sciences in Vienna and obtained her doctorate at the University of Zurich. Her dissertation dealt with European citizenship. She is currently working on her habilitation thesis on solidarity in the European Union and in European federal states, including Switzerland. She is financially supported by the UZH Alumni FAN (Ernst Göhner Foundation Fellowship) and the UZH Postdoc Grant (incl. Suslowa Postdoc Fellowship). She is also a lecturer for European law and public law at various Swiss universities. Since 2020, she has been Managing Editor of the journal Swiss Review of International and European Law (SRIEL). She can be reached at christina.neier@ius.uzh.ch.
Recommended further reading
Bellanger François, Kommentierung zu Art. 42 BV, in: Martenet Vincent/Dubey Jacques (Hrsg.), Commentaire Romand, Constitution fédérale, Basel 2021.
Benoit Anne, Le partage vertical des compétences en tant que garant de l’autonomie des Etats fédérés en droit suisse et en droit américain, Genf/Zürich/Basel 2009.
Biaggini Giovanni, Kommentierung zu Art. 42 BV, in: Waldmann Bernhard/Belser Eva Maria/Epiney Astrid (Hrsg.), Schweizerische Bundesverfassung, Basler Kommentar, Basel 2015.
Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Ehrenzeller Kaspar, «L’amour de la complexité» im Bundesstaat Schweiz – Kompetenzzuteilung und Kompetenzwahrnehmung in Bund und Kantonen, in: Gamper Anna/Bussjäger Peter/Karlhofer Ferdinand/Pallaver Günther/Obwexer Walter (Hrsg.), Föderale Kompetenzverteilung in Europa, Baden-Baden 2016, S. 33–66.
Gamper Anna/Bussjäger Peter/Karlhofer Ferdinand/Pallaver Günther/Obwexer Walter (Hrsg.), Föderale Kompetenzverteilung in Europa, Baden-Baden 2016.
Hangartner Yvo, Die Kompetenzverteilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen, Bern/Frankfurt a.M. 1974.
Isensee Josef, § 133 Die bundesstaatliche Kompetenz, in: Iensee Josef/Kirchhof Paul (Hrsg.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band IV Bundesstaat, 3. Aufl., Heidelberg 2008.
Jestaedt Matthias, Theorie der Kompetenzverteilung, Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte Österreichs (2021), S. 163–181.
Knapp Blaise, La répartition des compétences et la coopération de la Confédération et des cantons, in: Thürer Daniel/Aubert Jean-François/Müller Jörg Paul (Hrsg.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, Zürich 2001, S. 457–472.
Müller Lucien, Vorbemerkungen zur bundesstaatlichen Aufgabenteilung, in: Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Egli Patricia/Hettich Peter/Hongler Peter/Schindler Benjamin/Schmid Stefan G./Schweizer Rainer J. (Hrsg.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St. Galler Kommentar, 4. Aufl., Zürich 2023.
Müller Lucien/Schweizer Rainer J., Kommentierung zu Art. 42 BV, in: Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Egli Patricia/Hettich Peter/Hongler Peter/Schindler Benjamin/Schmid Stefan G./Schweizer Rainer J. (Hrsg.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St. Galler Kommentar, 4. Aufl., Zürich 2023.
Reich Johannes, § 12 Kompetenzverteilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen, in: Biaggini Giovanni/Gächter Thomas/Kiener Regina (Hrsg.), Staatsrecht, 3. Aufl, Zürich/St. Gallen 2021, S. 153–167.
Schindler Benjamin, Die föderale Kompetenzverteilung in der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft aus historischer Sicht, Beiträge zur Rechgtsgeschichte Österreich (2021), 238–255.
Schweizer Rainer J., Verteilung der Staatsaufgaben zwischen Bund und Kantonen, in: Diggelmann Oliver/Randall Maya Hertig/Schindler Benjamin (Hrsg.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, Bd. I, Zürich 2020, S. 691–713.
Waldmann Bernhard/Spiess Angelika, Aufgaben- und Kompetenzverteilung im schweizerischen Bundesstaat. Typologie der Aufgaben und Kompetenzen von Bund und Kantonen, 2015, https://www.unifr.ch/federalism/en/assets/public/files/NZ/Gutachten_final.pdf, besucht am 12.2.2024.
Bibliography
Aubert Jean-François, Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 42 BV, in: Aubert Jean-François/Mahon Pascal (Hrsg.), Petit commentaire de la Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse du 18 avril 1999, Zürich/Basel/Genf 2003.
Bellanger François, Kommentierung zu Art. 42 BV, in: Martenet Vincent/Dubey Jacques (Hrsg.), Commentaire Romand. Constitution fédérale, Basel 2021.
Benoit Anne, Le partage vertical des compétences en tant que garant de l’autonomie des Etats fédérés en droit suisse et en droit américain, Genf/Zürich/Basel 2009.
Berka Walter, Verfassungsrecht, Grundzüge des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts für das juristiche Studium, 8. Aufl., Wien 2021.
Biaggini Giovanni, Kommentierng zu Art. 42 BV, in: Waldmann Bernhard/Belser Eva Maria/Epiney Astrid (Hrsg.), Schweizerische Bundesverfassung, Basler Kommentar, Basel 2015.
Biaggini Giovanni, Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, 2. Aufl., Zürich 2017.
Brühl-Moser Denise, § 97 Der Föderalismus Kanadas: interstaatlich, exekutiv und asymmetrisch, in: Härtel Ines (Hrsg.), Handbuch Föderalismus, Band IV: Föderalismus in Europa und der Welt, Berlin/Heidelberg 2012, S. 627–669.
Edenharter Andrea, Grundrechtsschutz in föderalen Mehrebenensystemen, Tübingen 2018.
Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Ehrenzeller Kaspar, «L’amour de la complexité» im Bundesstaat Schweiz – Kompetenzzuteilung und Kompetenzwahrnehmung in Bund und Kantonen, in: Gamper Anna/Bussjäger Peter/Karlhofer Ferdinand/Pallaver Günther/Obwexer Walter (Hrsg.), Föderale Kompetenzverteilung in Europa, Baden-Baden 2016, S. 33–66.
Eichenberger Kurt, Strukturen von heute für Aufgaben von morgen (1980), in: Müller Georg/Rhinow René/Schmid Gerhard (Hrsg.), Ausgewählte Schriften von Kurt Eichenberger. Vom schweizerischen Weg zum modernen Staat, Basel/Genf/München 2002, S. 11–20.
Fehling Michael, Mechanismen der Kompetenzabgrenzung in föderativen Systemen im Vergleich, in: Aulehner Josef et al. (Hrsg.), Föderalismus – Auflösung oder Zukunft der Staatlichkeit?, Stuttgart et al. 1997, S. 31–55.
Fleiner Fritz/Giacometti Zaccaria, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, Zürich 1978.
Glaser Andreas, Staatsaufgaben, in: Biaggini Giovanni/Gächter Thomas/Kiener Regina (Hrsg.), Staatsrecht, 3. Aufl, Zürich/St. Gallen 2021, S. 23–32.
Häfelin Ulrich/Haller Walter/Keller Helen/Thurnherr Daniela, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 10. Aufl., Zürich 2020.
Hangartner Yvo, Die Kompetenzverteilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen, Bern/Frankfurt a.M. 1974.
Hanschel Dirk, Konfliktlösung im Bundesstaat: die Lösung föderaler Kompetenz-, Finanz- und Territorialkonflikte in Deutschland, den USA und der Schweiz, Tübingen 2012.
Heintzen Markus, Kommentierung zu Art. 70 GG, in: Kahl Wolfgang/Waldhoff Christan/Walther Christian (Hrsg.), Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Loseblatt (Stand November 2022).
Isensee Josef, § 73 Staatsaufgaben, in: Isensee Josef/Kirchhof Paul (Hrsg.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bunesrepublik Deutschland, Band IV Aufgaben des Staates, 3. Aufl., Heidelberg 2006 (zit. Isensee, Staatsaufgaben).
Isensee Josef, § 133 Die bundesstaatliche Kompetenz, in: Iensee Josef/Kirchhof Paul (Hrsg.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band IV Bundesstaat, 3. Aufl., Heidelberg 2008 (zit. Isensee, Kompetenz).
Jaag Tobias, Die Rechtsstellung der Kantone in der Bundesverfassung, in: Thürer Daniel/Aubert Jean-François/Müller Jörg Paul (Hrsg.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, Zürich 2001, S. 473–490 (zit. Jaag, Rechtsstellung).
Jaag Tobias, Rechtsschutz bei Kompetenzstreitigkeiten zwischen Bund und Kantonen, in: Mahon Pascal/Ngyuen Minh Son (Hrsg.), L'activité et l'espace: droit du sport et aménagement du territoire: Mélanges en l'honneur de Piermarco Zen-Ruffinen, Basel 2011, S. 521–533 (zit. Jaag, Rechtsschutz).
Jestaedt Matthias, Theorie der Kompetenzverteilung, Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte Österreichs (2021), S. 163–181.
Kment Martin, Kommentierung zu Art. 70 GG, in: Jarass Hans D./Pieroth Bodo (Hrsg.), Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Kommentar, 17. Aufl., München 2022.
Knapp Blaise, La répartition des compétences et la coopération de la Confédération et des cantons, in: Thürer Daniel/Aubert Jean-François/Müller Jörg Paul (Hrsg.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, Zürich 2001, S. 457–472.
Mahon Pascal, Droit constitutionnel, Volume I: Institutions, juridiction constitutionnelle et procédure, 3. Aufl., Basel/Neuenburg 2014.
Müller Lucien, Vorbemerkungen zur bundesstaatlichen Aufgabenteilung, in: Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Egli Patricia/Hettich Peter/Hongler Peter/Schindler Benjamin/Schmid Stefan G./Schweizer Rainer J.(Hrsg.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St. Galler Kommentar, 4. Aufl., Zürich 2023.
Müller Lucien/Schweizer Rainer J., Kommentierung zu Art. 42 BV, in: Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Egli Patricia/Hettich Peter/Hongler Peter/Schindler Benjamin/Schmid Stefan G./Schweizer Rainer J.(Hrsg.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St. Galler Kommentar, 4. Aufl., Zürich 2023.
Nettesheim Martin, Kompetenzen, in: von Bogdandy Armin/Bast Jürgen (Hrsg.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Theoretische und dogmatische Grundzüge, Heidelberg 2009, S. 389–439.
Palermo Francesco/Kössler Karl, Comparative Federalism, Constitutional Arrangements and Case Law, Portland, 2017.
Reich Johannes, § 12 Kompetenzverteilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen, in: Biaggini Giovanni/Gächter Thomas/Kiener Regina (Hrsg.), Staatsrecht, 3. Aufl, Zürich/St. Gallen 2021, S. 153–167.
Rhinow René, Die Bundesverfassung 2000, Eine Einführung, Basel/Genf/München 2000.
Rhinow René/Schefer Markus/Uebersax Peter, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3. Aufl., Basel 2016.
Saladin Peter, Bund und Kantone – Autonomie und Zusammenwirken im schweizerischen Bundesstaat, ZSR 103 (1984) II, S. 431–590.
Schindler Benjamin, Die föderale Kompetenzverteilung in der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft aus historischer Sicht, Beiträge zur Rechgtsgeschichte Österreich (2021), 238–255.
Schweizer Rainer J., Verteilung der Staatsaufgaben zwischen Bund und Kantonen, in: Diggelmann Oliver/Randall Maya Hertig/Schindler Benjamin (Hrsg.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, Bd. I, Zürich 2020, S. 691–713.
Thalmann Urs, Die verfassungsrechtliche Stellung der Kantone, in: Hänni Peter (Hrsg.), Schweizerischer Föderalismus und europäische Integration, Die Rolle der Kantone in einem sich wandelnden internationalen Kontext, Zürich 2000, S. 56–117 (zit. Thalmann, Kantone).
Thalmann Urs, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Kompetenzverteilung, in: Fleiner Thomas/Forster Peter/Misic Alexander/Thalmann Urs (Hrsg.), Die neue schweizerische Bundesverfassung, Basel/Genf/München 2000, S. 149–170 (zit. Thalmann, Kompetenzverteilung)
Tiefenthal Jürg Marcel, «Vielfalt in der Einheit» am Ende? Aktuelle Herausforderungen des schweizerischen Föderalismus, Zürich 2021.
Tschannen Pierre, Bundesstaatliche Aufgabenteilung und politisches System – Grenzen der Verfassungsästhetik, ZSR 114 (1995) I, S. 143–169 (zit. Tschannen, Aufgabenteilung).
Tschannen Pierre, Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen, in: Uhlmann Felix (Hrsg.), Die Rolle von Bund und Kantonen beim Erlass und bei der Umsetzung von Bundesrecht, Zürich 2013, S. 7–33 (zit. Tschannen, Grundlagen).
Tschannen Pierre, Staatsrecht der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, 5. Aufl., Bern 2021 (zit. Tschannen, Staatsrecht).
Uhlmann Felix, Gutachten zuhanden der Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen (KDK) betreffend gerichtliche Überprüfung der föderalistischen Grundsätze in der Schweiz, 18.7.2016, https://kdk.ch/fileadmin/files/Newsletter/Gutachten_GerichtlicheUEberpruefungFoederalerStreitigkeiten.pdf, besucht am 15.4.2024.
Vogel Stefan, Verfassungsgebung: Eine Standortbestimmung aus schweizerischer Sicht. Zugleich eine Würdigung des Wirkens von Kurt Eichenberg, in: Uhlmann Felix (Hrsg.), Rechtsetzung und Verfassungsgebung. Kolloquium zu Ehren von Professor Kurt Eichenberger, Zürich/St. Gallen 2013, S. 11–43.
von Bogdandy Armin, § 81 Prinzipien des föderalen Verhältnisses in der Europäischen Union: ein Anwendungsdiskurs zum supranationalen Föderalismus, in: Härtel Ines (Hrsg.), Handbuch Föderalismus, Band IV: Föderalismus in Europa und der Welt, Berlin/Heidelberg 2012, S. 37–61.
Waldmann Bernhard/Spiess Angelika, Aufgaben- und Kompetenzverteilung im schweizerischen Bundesstaat, Typologie der Aufgaben und Kompetenzen von Bund und Kantonen, 2015, https://www.unifr.ch/federalism/en/assets/public/files/NZ/Gutachten_final.pdf, besucht am 12.2.2024.
Woydt Malte, § 100 Dissoziativer Föderalismus (1): Belgo-Föderalismus, in: Härtel Ines (Hrsg.), Handbuch Föderalismus, Band IV: Föderalismus in Europa und der Welt, Berlin/Heidelberg 2012, S. 745–795.
Materials
Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesverfassung 1998 zur Reform der Bundesverfassung – Nationalrat (zit. AB 1998 NR).
Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesverfassung 1998 zur Reform der Bundesverfassung – Ständerat (zit. AB 1998 SR).
Botschaft über eine neue Bundesverfassung vom 20.11.1996, BBl 1997 I 1 ff. (zit. Botschaft BV).
Ergebnisse des Vernehmlassungsverfahrens 1996 (zit. Vernehmlassungsverfahren).
Erläuterungen zum Verfassungsentwurf 1995 (zit. Erläuterungen VE 1995).
Verfassungsentwurf vom 19.6.1995 (zit. VE 1995).
Verfassungsentwurf vom 20.11.1996 (zit. VE 1996).
alle abrufbar unter: https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/de/home/staat/gesetzgebung/archiv/bundesverfassung.html, besucht am 15.2.2024.