-
- Art. 3 FC
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 13 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 26 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 31 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 1 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123a FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 130 FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 164 FC
- Art. 166 FC
- Art. 170 FC
- Art. 178 FC
- Art. 189 FC
- Art. 191 FC
-
- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 97 CO
- Art. 98 CO
- Art. 99 CO
- Art. 100 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 633 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Art. 808c CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
-
- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 60 PRA
- Art. 60a PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 64 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 73 PRA
- Art. 73a PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
-
- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 4 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. d FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 para. 3-5 FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 18 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 52 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 55 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
-
- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 16 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 18 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 27 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 28 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
-
- Art. 2 para. 1 AMLA
- Art. 2a para. 1-2 and 4-5 AMLA
- Art. 3 AMLA
- Art. 7 AMLA
- Art. 7a AMLA
- Art. 8 AMLA
- Art. 8a AMLA
- Art. 11 AMLA
- Art. 14 AMLA
- Art. 15 AMLA
- Art. 20 AMLA
- Art. 23 AMLA
- Art. 24 AMLA
- Art. 24a AMLA
- Art. 25 AMLA
- Art. 26 AMLA
- Art. 26a AMLA
- Art. 27 AMLA
- Art. 28 AMLA
- Art. 29 AMLA
- Art. 29a AMLA
- Art. 29b AMLA
- Art. 30 AMLA
- Art. 31 AMLA
- Art. 31a AMLA
- Art. 32 AMLA
- Art. 38 AMLA
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
- I. Origin of the standard
- II. Context: deprivation of liberty in Switzerland in practice
- III. Scope of application of Art. 21 Cst.
- IV. Art. 31 para. 1 Cst.: legality and legitimacy of deprivation of liberty
- V. Procedural guarantees under Article 31 of the Constitution
- VI. Outlook
- Recommended further reading
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. Origin of the standard
1 “Deprivation of liberty must always be a measure of last resort, strictly necessary and proportionate. Any other approach constitutes a violation of human rights.” " These are the words of the former Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, reminding us that safeguards relating to deprivation of liberty enjoy special protection.
2 With regard to international conventions, Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR, ratified by Switzerland in 1974), which protects the right to liberty and security, and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter: UN Covenant II, ratified by Switzerland in 1992) are legally binding on Swiss authorities. For any question relating to deprivation of liberty, it is therefore essential to refer to international obligations, in particular Art. 5 ECHR.
3 At the constitutional level, Art. 31 of the Constitution essentially reflects these treaty guarantees. It should be noted that the Federal Constitution did not originally provide for any guarantees in relation to deprivation of liberty, as this was an area falling within the authority of the cantons. In fact, the right to personal liberty, from which Art. 31 of the Constitution, was considered an “inalienable and imprescriptible” right, but unwritten until the total revision of the Federal Constitution, which came into force on January 1, 2000.
4 Guarantees relating to deprivation of liberty must be placed in a broader context, namely that of freedom of movement. The right to freedom of movement—of which deprivation of liberty is the most extreme restriction—is an essential fundamental right on which the exercise of most fundamental rights depends, such as freedom of movement or communication, protection of privacy, freedom of religion, and economic freedom. The right to freedom of movement has been enshrined and codified in various instruments, including the Magna Carta of 1215 (prohibiting deprivation of liberty without trial by peers), the United Nations Charter of 1945 (human dignity and fundamental freedoms) and the ECHR of 1950 (in particular Art. 5 ECHR, see below). The Swiss Federal Constitution refers to this in Art. 10 (Art. 10 para. 2, protecting the right to freedom of movement, see N. 25) and, of course, in Art. 31 Cst., which is discussed in this commentary.
5 Art. 31 Cst. comprises four paragraphs. The first paragraph is based solely on Article 5 § 1 ECHR, while paragraphs 2 to 4 are also based on provisions contained in various preliminary drafts preceding the total revision of the Federal Constitution that came into force in 2000. The third paragraph is the only one that specifically concerns pre-trial detention, while the other three paragraphs apply to all forms of deprivation of liberty. The wording of this provision has not been amended since it came into force. It should be noted that the first paragraph concerns the requirements relating to deprivation of liberty, while paragraphs 2 to 4 guarantee certain rights to persons already deprived of their liberty.
II. Context: deprivation of liberty in Switzerland in practice
A. Statistics on deprivation of liberty in Switzerland
6 As of January 31, 2025, 6,994 people were deprived of their liberty in Switzerland. Of these, 4,362 were detained in connection with the enforcement (including early enforcement) of sentences and measures (Art. 75 ff. SCC), 2,211 were in pre-trial detention or detention for security reasons (Art. 220 ff. Criminal Procedure Code, hereinafter: CPC), and 220 were in administrative detention under immigration law (Art. 75-78 LEI). In terms of the "number of inmates “ at a given reference date, Switzerland is among the countries with a particularly low detention rate. However, the total number of people deprived of their liberty over the course of a year (the ‘flow’) is ”very high" in comparison with other European countries: in 2022, 37,127 people entered prison in Switzerland, representing an incarceration rate three times higher than the European median incarceration rate. This partly explains the prison overcrowding that several institutions, particularly in French-speaking Switzerland, have been suffering from for years.
7 Another factor explaining the high incarceration rate is the frequency of short prison sentences, i.e., less than six months, handed down without suspension. In 2024, out of a total of 4,997 custodial sentences without suspension, 56.8% (2,837) were for less than six months. This figure was 4,267 in 2023, meaning that short custodial sentences have fallen dramatically by 48%. This drop could be linked to the revision of the CCP, in particular the introduction of Art. 352a CCP, which now provides for the hearing of the person prosecuted by the criminal prosecution authority if it is likely that the summary penalty order will result in a PPL to be enforced.
8 However, a significant proportion of short prison sentences served are alternative custodial sentences (PPLS), imposed in lieu of a monetary penalty (Article 36 of the Swiss Criminal Code) or a fine (Article 106 of the Swiss Criminal Code). Switzerland stands out internationally for its particularly high frequency of imposing SLS, which account for around half (4,964) of the 9,297 incarcerations for the enforcement of a sentence or measure in 2023.
9 The short duration of detention raises fundamental questions with regard to the objective of rehabilitation set out in Art. 75 of the Swiss Criminal Code, as a few days or weeks of deprivation of liberty generally do not allow for the implementation of sustainable support measures or have a significant impact on the life course of the convicted person. Alternative custodial sentences are also criticized from a human rights perspective, and there are increasing calls for their abolition. With regard to Switzerland, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has analyzed PPLS from the perspective of Art. 8 ECHR on the protection of privacy. It ruled that a five-day PPLS for a fine of CHF 500 imposed on a person begging constituted a violation of this article.
B. Groups particularly affected
10 In Switzerland, foreign nationals are particularly affected by deprivation of liberty. This is due in particular to the existence of specific immigration law offenses, such as illegal residence (Art. 115(1)(b) of the Foreign Nationals and Integration Act, hereinafter: FNA), violation of an entry ban (Art. 119 para. 1 LEI), or non-cooperation in removal proceedings (Art. 115 para. 1(a) LEI). In addition, there are forms of deprivation of liberty that fall under administrative law, such as detention pending removal or expulsion (Art. 76 ff. FNA) or preparatory detention (Art. 75 FNA), which may be added to criminal detention or extend its effects cumulatively. A report published in 2025 by the Swiss Observatory on Asylum and Foreigners (ODAE-Suisse) highlights structural deficiencies in administrative detention in Switzerland.
11 In addition, foreign nationals are, in some cases, automatically excluded from alternative forms of enforcement such as community service, semi-detention, or electronic monitoring. Furthermore, conditional release is also denied to foreign nationals in advance or applied with greater restraint, often due to considerations related to residence status rather than the conduct or reintegration of the person concerned. This treatment, based on migration criteria rather than individual prognosis, is considered by some authors to be contrary to the principle of equality (Art. 8 Cst.) and the prohibition of arbitrariness (Art. 9 Cst.). In summary, the practices described above contribute to the overrepresentation of foreign nationals in the prison population and are interpreted in the literature as a form of criminalization of migration.
12 Also heavily affected by deprivation of liberty, this time in the name of security imperatives, are people suffering from mental disorders. This dynamic is partly reflected in the significant increase in the average number of people placed in detention or in an institutional measure under Art. 59 CP (see also N. 42) due to a high risk of recidivism: this figure has increased by around 70% since the new sanctions law came into force in 2007. At the same time, the average length of stay in prison has increased significantly since 2007: from 595 days in 2007 to 1,605 days in 2023, an increase of around 170%. These data reflect a shift in criminal law away from a model focused on punishing a past act (the logic of time-limited sentences) towards a model focused on prevention, whose primary objective is to neutralize the supposed danger posed by the individual (see also N. 55). This shift, which Oberholzer describes as a transition “from repression to prevention,” raises fundamental questions about the principles of proportionality, predictability, and legality of criminal measures in a state governed by the rule of law. Furthermore, the usefulness of such measures remains debatable.
C. Adverse effects of deprivation of liberty
13 Any deprivation of liberty is an extremely traumatic psychological and social experience for those concerned. The breakdown of social contacts, the loss of physical and financial autonomy, the inability to organize one's life freely, the emotional and social damage to family and friends, and psychological or physical abuse in detention are all factors that contribute to stress. The European Court of Human Rights even recognizes that incarceration, by its very nature, involves a certain degree of humiliation for prisoners.
14 Pre-trial detention (see N. 39 and N. 63 ff.) constitutes a particularly brutal infringement of personal freedom, particularly due to the absence of a period allowing the person concerned to prepare for the deprivation of liberty—a period that may sometimes exist after a final conviction or an administrative decision that has entered into force. Imprisonment occurs suddenly, without transition, leaving no time to prepare psychologically or to anticipate the practical repercussions such as loss of employment, separation from loved ones, or complete disruption of daily life. This abrupt upheaval – often referred to as “prison shock” – is associated with an increased risk of suicide, particularly during the first few days of detention. This risk is all the greater as the regime of pre-trial detention is normally stricter than that of the execution of sentences, with complete isolation being widely practiced, at least at the beginning of incarceration.
15 According to a report by the Swiss Center of Expertise in Human Rights (hereinafter: SCHR), practitioners involved in the enforcement of criminal sanctions in Switzerland “unanimously consider pretrial detention to be the harshest form of deprivation of liberty.” Thus, although pretrial detention is de jure only preventive in nature, it must be noted that de facto it inevitably also has a punitive character. This is one of the reasons why the third paragraph of Art. 31 Cst. (see N. 63 ff.) is specifically dedicated to pretrial detention, the implementation of which in Switzerland has been the subject of much criticism from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and the National Commission for the Prevention of Torture (CNPT). Several initiatives aimed at improving the conditions of detention under this regime are currently underway. At the end of 2023, the Conference of Cantonal Justice and Police Directors (CCDJP) adopted a “guideline on pretrial detention and detention for security reasons,” aimed at ensuring greater compliance with the principle of proportionality in the conditions of pretrial detention.
16 The practice of solitary confinement, i.e., the individual detention of a person for at least 22 hours a day without any real possibility of contact with other people, is particularly harmful. According to a report by the World Health Organization (WHO), the medical repercussions of solitary confinement include panic attacks, depression, anger, rage, perceptual disturbances, even total confusion, sensory disturbances, hallucinations, paranoia, psychosis, self-harm, and suicide. In Switzerland, the serious damage to health caused by isolation has long been known. A literature review by Zurich psychiatrist Reto Volkart dating from 1983 provides a damning overview of this issue. The practice of “prolonged isolation,” i.e., for more than 15 consecutive days, is considered cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and is strictly prohibited by the Nelson Mandela Rules. Nevertheless, prolonged isolation continues to be practiced in Switzerland, particularly in the context of the enforcement of sentences in the form of a security measure within the meaning of Article 78(b) of the Swiss Criminal Code, which provides for the possibility of such a security measure for the protection of the detainee or third parties. Some cantonal legislation also allows for cell confinement as a disciplinary measure (in connection with Article 78(c) of the Criminal Code) for a period exceeding 14 days.
17 Solitary confinement is particularly problematic when applied to persons with disabilities (including mental disorders): the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) emphasizes that solitary confinement applied to persons with disabilities may be considered a form of torture.
D. Suicide and assisted suicide
18 In Switzerland, an average of eight people per year committed suicide in detention between 2003 and 2023. Switzerland ranks poorly internationally in terms of the suicide rate in detention. According to annual surveys by the Council of Europe, it regularly ranks among the countries with a “very high” rate, i.e., more than 25% above the European median. This excess mortality due to suicide is a worrying indicator of the conditions of detention and the vulnerability of prisoners in Switzerland.
19 The issue of assisted suicide is closely linked to that of suicide. Assisted suicide is subject to a relatively liberal legal regime in Switzerland, with Article 115 of the Criminal Code only punishing incitement and assistance to suicide for selfish motives. Article 10(2) of the Swiss Constitution and Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights protect the right to self-determination, which includes the right to decide when and how to end one's life. This right is also protected by the constitutional guarantee of human dignity (Article 7 of the Swiss Constitution). However, this does not imply a right to assistance in suicide from third parties or state authorities. The Swiss Center of Competence for the Enforcement of Sanctions (CSCSP) has developed a guide for prisons, which sets out several conditions for processing a request for assistance in suicide.
III. Scope of application of Art. 21 Cst.
A. Personal scope
20 Due to the significant consequences of deprivation of liberty on a person's life and health, Art. 31 Cst. covers a broad personal scope, stating that “no one may be deprived of their liberty.” The constitutional guarantee covers both ordinary citizens (including minors) and foreign nationals residing in Switzerland, whether legally or not. As deprivation of liberty is broadly defined, a person does not need to be involved in criminal proceedings to benefit from the protection provided by Art. 31 of the Constitution. Furthermore, any form of deprivation of liberty by the state, whether it be a criminal sentence or measure, an administrative measure (in the areas of asylum, migration, and internal security), a civil measure, or a sanction under military law, falls under constitutional and conventional protection. This consideration is particularly important in view of the growing importance of extra-criminal measures that infringe on personal freedom.
21 Subjectively, according to the established case law of the European Court of Human Rights, deprivation of liberty presupposes the absence of free and informed consent on the part of the person concerned. On the question of consent in the context of civil measures involving deprivation of liberty, the European Court of Human Rights has clarified—notably in the Stanev v. Bulgaria judgment—that the presence of a guardian or the absence of express opposition is not sufficient to consider that a placement is voluntary. It requires the free, informed, and legally valid consent of the person concerned. When a person agrees to remain in an institution to which they were initially transferred without their consent, the ECtHR considers that there is no longer any deprivation of liberty. However, consent alone is not sufficient to undermine the protection provided by international conventions.
B. Material scope
22 In order to determine whether an individual is deprived of their liberty and can therefore benefit from the relevant treaty and constitutional guarantees, it is necessary to consider their specific situation and take into account a set of criteria, such as the type, duration, and context of detention, its effects, and the manner in which it is carried out. The effects of the measures must be examined in a “cumulative and combined” manner .“
23 A central aspect of this substantive assessment concerns the distinction between deprivation of liberty and ”mere" restriction of movement, to which the guarantees relating to personal liberty provided for in Art. 10 para. 2 of the Constitution and Art. 12 para. 1 of the UN Covenant II apply. The difference between deprivation and restriction of liberty is one of intensity and degree, not of nature or substance. The measures must be extraordinarily incisive, preventing a person from going and living where they wish. However, deprivation of liberty involves broader guarantees than restriction of freedom of movement. While such restriction must comply with the principles of legality and proportionality, there is no requirement for a court to review the legality of the measure, as is the case for deprivation of liberty. Unlike Article 5 of the ECHR, which exhaustively lists the situations in which deprivation of liberty is permissible under human rights law (see N. 36 ff.), there is no comparable list governing restrictions on liberty. Furthermore, as Switzerland has not ratified the 4th Additional Protocol to the ECHR, a measure that is merely restrictive (and not depriving) of personal liberty does not enjoy the specific protection of the ECHR.
24 As for the time criterion, eight minutes may already be sufficient for there to be deprivation of liberty. In principle, the greater the spatial restriction, the less the duration of the deprivation matters. Confinement in a cell for only a few minutes constitutes deprivation of liberty. House arrest (see below, N. 26) must last longer to reach the threshold necessary to be considered deprivation of liberty.
25 With regard to the specific conditions of implementation, coercive measures are not a necessary condition for the qualification of deprivation of liberty. The person concerned does not necessarily have to be physically restrained during their detention. According to some authors, placement in closed units of homes or medical-social establishments for elderly people or people with dementia must also be classified as deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Art. 31 of the Constitution and Art. 5 of the ECHR.
26 Judges also have a wide margin of discretion with regard to the criterion of space. According to the Federal Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights, a ban on leaving the airport for several days constitutes deprivation of liberty. House arrest also constitutes deprivation of liberty, even if certain exceptions, such as medical visits or religious services, are granted. A general lockdown that applies to the entire population, particularly during a pandemic, does not constitute a deprivation of liberty. Forced exile on an island may constitute a deprivation of liberty if police surveillance is such that the person cannot leave their residence without prior authorization, if the space that can actually be used is limited (in this case, 90% of the island's surface area was occupied by a prison), and if the possibilities for social contact are virtually non-existent. However, the factual impossibility of leaving an enclave of 1.6 km2, caused by a ban on entry into the neighboring country, does not constitute deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Art. 5 ECHR, as long as the person theoretically has the possibility of moving to another part of the country to escape de facto from the geographical restriction.
27 It should also be noted that Art. 31 Cst. and 5 ECHR do not in principle apply to the conditions of detention per se. These are dealt with under other provisions, in particular Art. 3 ECHR (degrading treatment) or Art. 7 of the Constitution (human dignity), Article 8 of the ECHR (right to privacy) and Article 13 of the Constitution (protection of privacy), or Article 14 of the ECHR (discrimination) and Article 8 of the Constitution (equality). The terms and conditions of detention must in all cases respect human dignity (Art. 7 of the Constitution) and avoid subjecting detainees to "distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention .“ This principle is also enshrined in Article 75 of the Criminal Code, which states that custodial sentences ”must correspond as closely as possible to ordinary living conditions, provide prisoners with the necessary assistance, combat the harmful effects of deprivation of liberty, and take adequate account of the need to protect the community, staff, and fellow prisoners. "
28 These conditions include, in particular, hygiene, air and light, food, social relations, procedural rights, and the exercise of political rights. Prison isolation, particularly when prolonged or applied to vulnerable individuals, may constitute a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. The placement of a drug-dependent patient in a secure room as part of a compulsory treatment order (PAFA) was ruled by the Federal Supreme Court to constitute “an additional restriction of personal freedom” within the meaning of Art. 10 para. 2 of the Constitution and therefore requiring a legal basis. At the soft law level, conditions of detention are covered by the European Prison Rules (EPR) and the Nelson Mandela Rules, as well as other guidelines on deprivation of liberty.
IV. Art. 31 para. 1 Cst.: legality and legitimacy of deprivation of liberty
29 The first paragraph of Art. 31 Cst. enshrines the principle of legality, echoing Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. It provides that “no one may be deprived of liberty except in the cases provided for by law and in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law.” This wording refers, on the one hand, to the requirement for an explicit legal basis in domestic law for any measure depriving a person of their liberty (cases provided for by law) and, on the other hand, to compliance with the formal procedures laid down by that same legislation (procedures prescribed by law) . In other words, deprivation of liberty must not only be based on a legal basis, but must also be applied in accordance with the procedural guarantees established by that standard, as these requirements constitute essential safeguards against arbitrariness.
30 In cases where a matter is subject to review of conformity with the Convention, the ECtHR generally refrains from questioning domestic law. However, since this is a serious restriction of a fundamental right, the Court requires that the law be “of high quality,” i.e., accessible, predictable, and precise, in other words, characterized by a high degree of normative density. It must also comply with the purpose of Article 5 of the ECHR, which is to protect all individuals against arbitrariness. Since deprivation of liberty is understood in its broadest sense by Article 31 of the Constitution, all applicable legal bases—including those derived from administrative law (asylum, migration, PAFA, etc.) or civil law (placement for assistance, adult protection, etc.), and not only those derived from criminal law and criminal procedure, must be taken into consideration and are subject to the guarantees provided for by the standard.
31 For a deprivation of liberty to be lawful, it must not conflict with the grounds listed exhaustively in Art. 5 § 1 ECHR. These grounds make it possible to give concrete expression, as indicated in the case law of the Federal Court, to the safeguards provided for in Art. 31 of the Constitution with regard to permissible grounds for detention. Three main principles derive from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights with regard to Article 5 § 1 of the ECHR: the narrow interpretation of the exceptions, which are listed exhaustively; the regularity of the deprivation of liberty, which is emphasized from both a procedural and a substantive point of view; and the importance of the speed of the required judicial reviews. At the same time, the principles of proportionality and the inviolability of the essence of fundamental rights referred to in Art. 36 para. 2 to 4 of the Constitution must also be respected.
32 The principle of proportionality and the protection afforded by Art. 5 of the ECHR imply that freedom is the norm and that any measure that infringes upon it must remain the ultima ratio. At least in official discourse, there is international consensus that deprivation of liberty should only be used as a last resort. The standards of the CPT and numerous recent recommendations by the Council of Europe explicitly state that incarceration should only be considered as a last resort and support a criminal policy geared towards reducing the use of detention. This principle is not explicitly reflected in the case law of the ECtHR relating to Article 5 of the ECHR, but the Court's arguments in cases concerning violations of Articles 8 to 11 of the ECHR provide relevant analogies. In the case of Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom, the Court ruled that States are required to minimize interference with the exercise of human rights as much as possible by seeking less intrusive alternatives and striving “to achieve their aims in a manner that is most respectful of those rights.” It further held, referring to the judgment in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, that “where a government policy, as reflected in criminal legislation, impinges on the most intimate aspects of an individual's private life, the scope of the State's margin of appreciation is reduced.” In particular, the State must demonstrate scientifically that the interference with fundamental rights is necessary.
33 Applied to personal freedom, the above statements by the ECtHR imply an obligation for national authorities to prove the effectiveness of the measures imposed to achieve their objective and to find alternative solutions. In concrete terms, the authorities (in particular the legislature and the courts) must systematically examine, even on a case-by-case basis, whether alternative measures or, failing that, shorter periods of deprivation of allow the objectives pursued to be achieved, such as social reintegration (Art. 75 CC) or the restoration of social peace. The results of research on the impacts of different measures – particularly on children and relatives of detainees – must therefore be taken into consideration.
A. Grounds justifying deprivation of liberty under Art. 5 § 1 ECHR
34 Deprivation of liberty is only permissible if one or more of the grounds listed in Art. 5 § 1 ECHR apply. As stated in the text of the provision, “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except in the following cases and in accordance with the law” (emphasis added). The ECHR is of paramount importance for any infringement of fundamental rights resulting from deprivation of liberty: in its practice, the Federal Court takes into consideration the case law of the ECtHR and both judgments involving Switzerland and those concerning complaints made against other States.
1. Post-sentence detention
35 Art. 5 § 1(a) ECHR refers to lawful detention after conviction (“lawfully detained after conviction by a competent court”), typically a custodial sentence ordered by a court as provided for in Art. 40 SCC, Art. 36 SCC (substitute custodial sentence) or Art. 41 SCC (custodial sentence in lieu of a financial penalty). It should be noted that judges must expressly justify their choice of a custodial sentence (Art. 41 para. 2 CC), which must appear to be the only means of preventing the offender from committing further offenses. In addition, the guarantees provided for in Art. 6 ECHR apply with regard to a fair trial. In the Swiss context, internment (Art. 64 CP), which is a purely security-related measure, also falls within the scope of Art. 5 § 1 (a) ECHR. Finally, the concept of “after” implies not only a temporal succession, but also a causal link between the grounds given in the conviction and the pronouncement of detention. However, this link fades as time passes.
2. Non-criminal preventive detention
36 Article 5 § 1(b) of the ECHR provides for the possibility of detention for failure to comply with a court order or to ensure the fulfillment of a legal obligation, for example in the event of non-payment of a fine or violation of the conditions of parole. The measures in question must not be punitive in nature. The person concerned must have received a binding order, must have had the opportunity to comply with it, and must have failed to do so. The deprivation of liberty must also serve exclusively to ensure the fulfillment of the obligation, which could not be achieved by less severe measures. This obligation must be specific and concrete.
37 With regard to the nature of the legal obligation, it may be a negative obligation, in particular the obligation to refrain from committing offenses, which opens the door to pre-trial detention outside the criminal justice system, which has been dealt with by the ECtHR both from the perspective of Art. 5 § 1 (b) ECHR and under Article 5 § 1 (c) ECHR. However, the “potential” perpetrator must know what specific act he or she should have refrained from committing and there must have been concrete indications suggesting that he or she did not intend to refrain from committing it. For the obligation to be sufficiently concrete and specific, the place and date of the offense and the potential victims must be specified. Preventive detention that does not meet this requirement for precision cannot therefore be considered. This is one of the reasons why the proposal for preventive detention for “potential terrorists” had to be abandoned when the Federal Act on Police Measures to Combat Terrorism (LMPT) was adopted in Switzerland in 2020. House arrest, on the other hand, has been retained and is now part of the preventive arsenal of the Federal Act on Measures to Safeguard Internal Security (LMSI). This is despite the fact that application in accordance with Article 5 of the ECHR seems impossible, in particular because the grounds set out in Article 23o LMSI and in the Message relating to the MPT are not sufficiently precise to justify preventive detention within the meaning of either Art. 5 § 1 let. b) ECHR or Art. 5 § 1 let. c) ECHR (see below, N. 39 ff.) .
38 The ECtHR considers that Article 5 § 1 ECHR is not violated as long as the detention complies with the principle of proportionality and the deprivation of liberty is lifted as soon as the concrete risk disappears. This requires continuous assessment of the situation and cannot, in principle, justify detention exceeding a few hours. In accordance with this case law, the Federal Supreme Court considers that keeping demonstrators in a police cordon (“kettling”) for 2.5 hours, followed by detention for security checks for 3.5 hours, constitutes permissible deprivation of liberty, both from the perspective of subparagraph (b) – to prevent the persons concerned from committing an offense, in this case violent acts during a prohibited demonstration – and from letter c) (see below) – to curb suspicions relating to the commission of new offenses.
3. Pre-trial detention
39 Article 5 § 1(c) of the ECHR refers to forms of deprivation of liberty that apply to persons suspected of having committed a criminal offense. This letter covers provisional arrests by the police to bring a person to the police station (Art. 217 CCP) and police custody. Simple apprehension by the police (Art. 215 CCP) may also be taken into account, as the existence of an element of coercion in the exercise of police powers of arrest and search indicates a deprivation of liberty, notwithstanding the brevity of these measures. The duration of the apprehension preceding a police arrest is deducted from the 24-hour period during which the person must be released or brought before the public prosecutor (see Art. 219 para. 4 CCP).
40 The most typical manifestation of Art. 5 § 1 let. c) ECHR is detention prior to trial as provided for in Art. 220 CCP, including pre-trial detention until the indictment is filed with the court and detention for security reasons between that time and the entry into force of the judgment. In order to order pre-trial detention, there must be “strong” suspicion and, cumulatively, at least one of the four specific grounds for detention must be present, namely the risk of collusion, the risk of flight, the risk of acting on the crime, and the risk of reoffending (Art. 221 CCP). In doing so, the CCP goes further than the ECHR, which only mentions “sufficient” suspicion. The existence of one of the four grounds must be based on concrete evidence; mere presumption is not sufficient. Pre-trial detention must in principle be a measure of last resort, in order to comply with the principle of proportionality (Art. 36 para. 3 Cst.). It must be noted that this is often not the case in practice, as the wide range of possible alternative measures (Art. 237 CCP) remains underutilized. From the point of view of the rule of law, this is problematic, given the binding nature of the principle of proportionality.
4. Detention of minors
41 Art. 5 § 1 let. d) ECHR refers to the detention of a minor, as provided for in the Juvenile Criminal Law (JCL, 311.1) via placement (Art. 15 JCL) and, depending on the terms of enforcement, geographical prohibition (Art. 16a DPmin). The criminal procedure applicable to minors, as provided for in Art. 27 of the Federal Act on Criminal Procedure Applicable to Minors (PPmin, 312.1) (pre-trial detention and detention for security reasons). It follows from the principles of juvenile criminal law referred to in Art. 2 DPmin and Art. 4 JCP that coercive measures involving deprivation of liberty remain a last resort and are subject to stricter time limits for extension (see Art. 26 ff. JCP). Art. 5 § 1 (d) ECHR also includes measures of placement for assistance in the case of minors (Art. 314b CC). Switzerland is regularly criticized by both national and international bodies for the deprivation of liberty of minors, particularly in the area of migration.
5. Detention of particularly vulnerable persons
42 Art. 5 § 1 let. e) ECHR concerns the deprivation of liberty of persons suffering from mental disorders or drug addiction, or persons described as “vagrants.” The deprivation of liberty ordered for the purpose of containing a contagious disease also falls under Art. 5 § 1 let. e) ECHR. In the Swiss Criminal Code, this corresponds to forms of deprivation of liberty that are strictly speaking non-punitive, namely institutional therapeutic measures (Art. 59 SCC for the treatment of mental disorders, Art. 60 SCC for the treatment of addictions, and Art. 61 SCC for offenses committed by young adults) . In the case of minors, the DPmin provides for placement for the treatment of mental disorders (Art. 15, para. 2, let. a DPmin). Switzerland has been reprimanded both nationally and internationally for subjecting persons with mental disorders to institutional measures within the meaning of Art. 59 CP.
43 According to the SKMR, the facilities where measures are enforced and the forensic psychiatric divisions of existing prisons “can only be partially classified as institutions that are exempt from the enforcement of sentences and attached to the health sector, even when interpreted generously.” The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also criticized the inadequate treatment resulting from inappropriate placement. It states that the detention of persons with mental disorders should only be used as a last resort and that alternatives to deprivation of liberty in institutions must be found and implemented. Furthermore, it considers that Article 59 of the Swiss Criminal Code is not compatible with the UN Covenant II. The Committee recommends that Switzerland amend its legal provisions in order to comply with its international obligations. The situation of persons with severe mental disorders has also been the subject of a long-standing dialogue between the CPT and the Swiss authorities. In its report on its 2021 visit, the CPT recommends that the Swiss authorities repeal disciplinary sanctions for persons subject to institutional treatment and suffering from mental disorders. In light of this criticism, the steady increase in the number of persons with mental disorders deprived of their liberty under the law on measures is a cause for concern.
44 The Civil Code (CC, 210) provides for placement for assistance purposes (Art. 426 and 427 CC). The Child and Adult Protection Authority (APEA) must rule without delay on a request for release (Art. 385 CC, Art. 426 para. 4 CC) and review the legality of the placement after six months at the latest (Art. 431 para. 1 CC). As with Art. 5 § 1 let. a) ECHR, the criminal detention of a person classified as “insane” must be causally linked to the grounds for the conviction. If the person does not reside in an appropriate institution, the measure must be lifted (Art. 62c CC). On April 30, 2019, the ECtHR condemned Switzerland for placing a person with a mental illness in care. In its judgment, the Court specified that deprivation of liberty for the sole reason of endangering others was not provided for in Art. The applicant's deprivation of liberty therefore had no legal basis under national law and violated Article 5 § 1 (e) of the ECHR (right to liberty and security). In other words, the use of civil law measures for purely preventive security purposes, a trend that can also be observed in Switzerland, is inadmissible from the point of view of constitutional and convention requirements. The practice of internment for assistance purposes continues to raise serious concerns with regard to the obligations arising from Article 5 of the ECHR and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). In this regard, the particular problem of persons placed in closed institutions without any real judicial control, often solely on the basis of contracts concluded with relatives, should also be highlighted.
6. Administrative detention in the field of migration
45 As a final exception, Art. 5 § 1 let. f) ECHR provides for legitimate forms of deprivation of liberty in the context of entry bans, the management of the presence and removal of foreign nationals from the territory of a Member State. The existence of this exception may seem surprising at first glance, but given the state-centric nature of international law, there is no fundamental right guaranteeing access to or residence in the territory of a Member State of the ECHR without being a citizen or legal resident. In principle, a Member State does not violate the Convention when it prevents the unauthorized entry of a person into its territory by means of temporary detention. In Switzerland, these forms of detention exist in particular at Zurich-Kloten and Geneva-Cointrin airports. These are “transit zones” in which persons without entry authorization may be detained. These zones have been classified as deprivation of liberty by the Federal Supreme Court, the Federal Council, and the CPT.
46 In the case of asylum seekers who submit an asylum application immediately upon arrival in the country, their detention in transit zones must not exceed 60 days, according to Art. 22 para. 5 of the Asylum Act (AsylA). If the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) does not rule on the admissibility of the asylum application within 20 days, the person must be transferred to a canton or a federal center (Art. 23 AsylA). In principle, once the person crosses the border, they are on Swiss territory and cannot be prevented from accessing it. Detention under Art. 5 § 1 let. f.) therefore becomes inadmissible. Finally, Art. 73 LEI provides for the detention of persons without a short-term, residence or settlement permit in order to notify them of a decision concerning their residence status (Art. 73 para. 1 let. a LEI) or to establish their identity and nationality (Art. 73 para. 1 let. b LEI). This detention may not exceed three days (Art. 73 para. 2 LEI).
47 Once a foreign national without a residence permit is on the territory and threatens public order or is likely to evade a removal or expulsion decision, he or she may be placed under house arrest or prohibited from entering a specific region (Art. 74 LEI). However, if the enforcement measures are such that deprivation of liberty appears to be taking place, it is not Art. 5 § 1(f) ECHR that applies, but Art. 5 § 1(b) ECHR. In this case, the deprivation of liberty cannot be punitive in nature and must be lifted as soon as the obligation in question (in particular that of not threatening public order) is fulfilled.
48 The law on foreign nationals provides for various coercive measures involving deprivation of liberty (Art. 75-78 LEI). Art. 81 LEI imposes certain guarantees, namely the right to contact a lawyer, family members, and consular authorities (Art. 81 para. 1 LEI), the obligation to detain the persons concerned in facilities specifically designed for this purpose or, failing that, to separate them from persons in preventive detention or serving a criminal sentence (Art. 81 para. 2 LEI), and respect for the specific needs of vulnerable persons, unaccompanied minors, and families with children (Art. 81 para. 3 LEI) . At present, only a few cantons have facilities specifically designed for administrative detention. Apart from the Frambois facility (GE), most administrative detention regimes have been set up in former prisons. However, these buildings are often unsuitable for the non-criminal nature of administrative detention. At the same time, there are many smaller facilities in Switzerland that house persons in administrative detention alongside prisoners in pretrial detention, detention for security reasons, or serving sentences or measures. As a result, the foreign nationals concerned are very often placed in prisons or prison-like facilities that are ill-suited to the specific needs of this population. This situation persists despite the Federal Court's requirement that deprivation of liberty can only be justified to the extent strictly necessary for the enforcement of the removal order, and that the conditions of enforcement must reflect the administrative – and strictly non-punitive – nature of the detention.
49 Finally, a foreign national may be detained in the event of expulsion, removal, enforceable expulsion at first instance (Art. 76 LEI) or while awaiting a decision on removal or expulsion, for a maximum period of six months (Art. 75 LEI). For detention to be compatible with constitutional and treaty requirements, the enforcement of the expulsion or removal must be foreseeable and the authorities must respect the principle of expediency, particularly in the procurement of identity documents. The ECtHR has also specified that deprivation of liberty ceases to be in accordance with Art. 5 ECHR when the removal procedure is not conducted with the required diligence. A recent report highlights that in Switzerland, these requirements are not always met, particularly with regard to the principle of proportionality, procedural guarantees, and conditions of detention. In 2016, the Federal Supreme Court ordered the release from detention pending deportation of an Iraqi national convicted of terrorism-related offenses because the first-instance deportation decision, ordered by fedpol, had not examined the principle of non-refoulement applicable to refugees (Art. 25 para. 2 of the Constitution, Art. 5 of the Asylum Act) or non-refoulement in cases of risk of torture (Art. 25 para. 3 of the Constitution, Art. 3 of the ECHR). Expulsion was therefore not possible in this case. This scenario is one of the reasons why the LMPT (see N. 39) introduced the grounds of “threat to internal or external security” for both detention during the preparatory phase and detention to ensure the enforcement of removal or expulsion (Art. 75 para. 1 let. i LEI), as well as for the possibility of isolating a detained foreign national (Art. 81 para. 6 LEI), thereby strengthening the security approach in the field of asylum.
B. Positive obligations
50 The case law of the ECtHR relating to Art. 5 ECHR is not limited to negative obligations, i.e. the requirement to refrain from treatment contrary to the principles of the Convention. Positive obligations have also been highlighted in case law: Member States must take appropriate measures to protect all persons falling within their jurisdiction. This applies to cases of criminal extradition, where there is reason to fear that the State to which extradition is planned will not respect the guarantees provided for in Article 5 of the ECHR.
51 For example, incommunicado detention (i.e., without any possibility of contact with the outside world) constitutes a fundamental violation of the basic guarantees relating to deprivation of liberty. A Member State must record data on the date, time, and place of detention, the name of the detained person, the reasons for detention, and the authority responsible for the detention. If a person is at risk of being held incommunicado (a common US practice in the context of the fight against terrorism) in the hands of another state, the Member State violates the Convention on the merits if it transfers that person to foreign authorities for detention, and on procedural grounds if it fails to examine the legality of the detention abroad. In this case, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was responsible not only for detaining the applicant in a hotel for 23 days, but also for transferring him to Afghanistan and detaining him for four months in an extrajudicial detention center operated by the CIA. In such a case, when a Member State has placed a person under its authority, even for a short period, it may be required to provide evidence of its ignorance of human rights violations by another State (according to the principle of affirmanti incumbit probatio).
52 Finally, the state-centric approach that continues to prevail with regard to the applicability and enforcement of human rights tends to obscure the fact that states are not the only actors that violate these rights and freedoms. Positive obligations must also be respected when state agents are aware of deprivations of liberty carried out by private actors, tolerate them, or even cooperate with them. In this context, the role of private security companies, which perform sovereign tasks and use force, as is the case with security agents in federal asylum centers (CFA), remains to be examined.
C. Absence of arbitrariness
53 Upstream of the more concrete procedural guarantees described in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Art. 31 of the Constitution, the second part of paragraph 1 (“in accordance with the law”) refers to a general procedural guarantee. This serves to mitigate the risks of abuse arising from the misuse of domestic laws, in order to protect everyone from arbitrariness. Deprivation of liberty may thus be considered arbitrary if there is an element of bad faith, cunning, or deception on the part of the authorities. It may also become arbitrary when there is no consistency between the reason given, the place, and the specific conditions of detention, for example when persons are detained in a strict prison regime without justification related to their situation. Similarly, detention may be considered arbitrary if there is a lack of proportionality between the aim pursued and the means of coercion chosen, or if the time between the annulment of a detention measure and the adoption of a new legally valid decision is excessive.
54 According to some authors, this mechanism of protection against arbitrariness is increasingly being put to the test in practice. Under the pretext of preventing various forms of violence, the use of the concept of dangerousness is tending to become an instrument of arbitrariness. The “preventionist” approach focuses on measures that do not target actual offenses, but rather predicted “dangerousness.” This applies to the field of internal security, particularly in the area of counterterrorism, for example through the preventive investigative powers of the intelligence services, as well as the prison system, where more and more people are being held in provisional detention as part of institutional and internment measures.
V. Procedural guarantees under Article 31 of the Constitution
A. Importance of procedural guarantees
55 Deprivation of liberty represents a particularly incisive interference with a person's fundamental rights. It is therefore of paramount importance that the person concerned be able to benefit from a fair procedure when their right to freedom of movement is affected (see above, N. 4). The right to benefit from procedural subject status (Prozesssubjektstellung) is closely linked to human dignity: for deprivation of liberty to be respectful of human rights, the persons concerned must be treated as legal subjects capable of participating in and influencing the proceedings (and not reduced to objects of law). To this end, Art. 31 of the Constitution provides for specific procedural guarantees that go beyond the general procedural guarantees (Art. 29 of the Constitution) and the guarantee of access to the courts (Art. 29a of the Constitution), by specifying them for the deprivation of liberty. Art. 31 of the Constitution guarantees the right to information and the right to effectively assert one's rights (Art. 31 para. 2 of the Constitution), the review of the legality of pre-trial detention (Art. 31 para. 3 Cst.) and the possibility for detained persons to appeal to a court at any time to review the legality of their detention (Art. 31 para. 4 Cst.).
B. Art. 31 para. 2 Cst.: Right to information and to assert one's rights
56 Art. 31 para. 2 Cst. refers to the right to information, which is also covered by Art. 5 § 2 ECHR. Information is essential to enable persons deprived of their liberty to assert all their rights guaranteed by the constitutional norm (see in particular Art. 31 paras. 3 and 4 Cst.). This guarantee reflects the constitutional right to be heard (Art. 29 para. 2 Cst.). The right to information only applies from the moment that the deprivation of liberty becomes effective, i.e., when the person is arrested or placed in detention. The mere existence of an arrest warrant is not sufficient to give rise to this obligation to provide information: this right takes effect as soon as the person is actually deprived of their liberty. This is a procedural guarantee applicable to all types of detention.
1. Reasons for the deprivation of liberty
57Art. 31(2) of the Constitution contains several guarantees regarding the manner and content of the notification. The two purposes concern the reasons for the deprivation of liberty on the one hand and the rights of the person concerned on the other. With regard to the reasons, the text of Art. 5 § 2 ECHR goes slightly further than Art. 31 para. 2 Cst. by adding that the person must also be informed of “any charges against them.” In criminal proceedings, Art. 158 para. 1(a) CCP and Art. 219 CCP require that the accused be informed of the offenses with which they are charged. For further details on the criteria relating to the communication of the reasons for detention, reference should be made to the CCP and the case law of the ECtHR and the Federal Supreme Court.
58The quality of the information must be assessed in light of the specific circumstances. The grounds for detention must be sufficiently explicit, both legally and factually, to enable the person to request a review of the legality of their detention in accordance with Art. 31 para. 4 of the Constitution. It is not sufficient to merely mention the legal provision(s) that are alleged to have been violated. However, the authorities are not required to present the charges and evidence in full, nor to grant access to the investigation file until the first hearing has taken place (see Art. 101 CCP).
2. Rights to be asserted
59Among the rights of the detained person is the right not to incriminate oneself (nemo tenetur, cf. Art. 158 para. 1 let. b CCP for criminal proceedings) . This principle can be inferred from Art. 6 § 1 ECHR and is explicitly guaranteed by Art. 14(3)(g) of the UN Covenant II. It should be noted that this constitutional right is undermined by the obligations of persons suspected of having committed offenses under the Federal Road Traffic Act (RTA), in particular the obligation to participate in the determination of unfitness to drive (Art. 91a RTA in conjunction with Art. 51 RTA) . Finally, it is important to note that the obligation to inform the person of their right to refuse to testify is an achievement of the new Federal Constitution of 1999. Indeed, both Art. 31 para. 2 Cst. and Art. 32 para. 2 Cst. (for criminal proceedings) establish this right to refuse to testify as a directly applicable fundamental right. The person concerned must also be informed of their right to free legal defense (see Art. 29 para. 3 Cst.) and their right to request a review of their liberty at any time (Art. 226 para. 3 CPP). Legal assistance in detention is also recognized by the European Prison Rules (paragraph 23.1) and the Nelson Mandela Rules (Rule 61).
60Beyond the obligation to inform the person of their rights, without which the evidence becomes inadmissible (Art. 158 para. 2 CCP in conjunction with Art. 141 para. 1 CCP for hearings), it is essential that the person be enabled to assert those rights. When a person requests legal defense, the authorities are therefore required to respond quickly and effectively. According to some legal scholars, the mandatory defense provided for in the case of pretrial detention (Art. 130(a) CCP) should apply analogously to the enforcement of sentences and measures. This is because the enforcement of a sentence is characterized by a series of decisions, each of which deserves adequate defense, particularly because detention involves increased vulnerability and a greater need for support. Beyond its purely defensive function, the right to assert one's rights also has a positive dimension, namely the ability and effective possibility to submit requests or applications to the authorities. Thus, a person serving a sentence or measure must be able to invoke the principle of rehabilitation enshrined in Art. 75 of the Criminal Code.
61With regard to the modalities of notification, Article 31(2) of the Constitution provides for two criteria. The first is temporal in nature (“immediately”). The wording of Article 5(2) of the ECHR (“as soon as possible”) is equivalent to the provisions of the constitutional text. In concreto, this temporal criterion does not imply any fixed time limit, but means that the information must reach the person sufficiently early for them to be able to effectively assert their rights. In all cases, the information must reach the person before an initial hearing and before they make any potentially self-incriminating statements. A delay of several days is inadmissible in all cases.
62The second criterion concerns the language of communication. The detained person must be able to understand the language used, without it necessarily being their mother tongue. This may require translation. With regard to criminal proceedings, Article 219(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for information to be given “in a language that [the arrested person] understands.” The information must be provided to the person in accessible, non-technical language. Particular attention must be paid to persons whose ability to understand is limited, whether due to mental disorders, intellectual disability, temporary confusion (e.g., in the case of heavy alcohol consumption), or any other reason. In such cases, it is necessary to ensure that the information is provided in an appropriate manner, in particular with the assistance of trained or specialized personnel. In any case, it is the responsibility of the authorities to ensure that the person fully understands the reasons for their detention and their rights. It is possible to inform a legal representative if it can be reasonably assumed that the information will then reach the person concerned directly. Finally, the information does not necessarily have to be provided in writing; it can be provided orally. However, it is reasonable to keep a written record, for example in the form of minutes drawn up at a later date.
63Finally, Art. 31 para. 2 of the Constitution also guarantees the right to inform one's relatives. The wording implies the involvement of an intermediary: neither the Constitution nor the ECHR guarantees the right to inform one's relatives or legal representatives oneself. The concept of a relative is not limited to the family circle, but extends to “any person connected by a private, professional, associative or other interest to the person deprived of liberty.” In the context of criminal proceedings, Art. 214 para. 1 CCP reflects this constitutional right, requiring the competent criminal authority to “immediately” inform the relatives of the arrested person and, at the latter's request, their employer or, where applicable, their country's embassy. However, the exception provided for in Art. 214 para. 2 CCP introduces a procedural restriction to this fundamental right, allowing the authority to delay the notification in order to preserve the effectiveness of the investigation. This power of postponement raises questions as to the compatibility of the requirements of the investigation with constitutional guarantees.
C. Art. 31 para. 3 Cst.: Pre-trial detention
64The third paragraph of Art. 31 Cst. differs from the others in that it refers exclusively to a particular form of deprivation of liberty: pre-trial detention (also known as preventive detention or detention before trial). In Swiss law, this category includes pretrial detention in the strict sense (Art. 220 para. 1 CCP) as well as detention for security reasons (Art. 220 para. 2 CCP). Art. 31 para. 3 Cst. concerns two aspects: the initial review of preventive detention and its duration. This provision must be read in the light of the presumption of innocence set out in Art. 32 para. 1 Cst.
1. Review of legality
65The review of the legality of pretrial detention is a specific and automatic guarantee, unlike the general guarantee of judicial review referred to in Art. 31 para. 4 Cst. (see N. 71 below), which must be expressly requested by the person deprived of liberty. Article 31(3) of the Constitution guarantees an initial review upon detention but does not provide any guarantees for subsequent reviews, which must meet the criteria specified in Article 31(4) of the Constitution. With regard to the time limit within which this initial review must take place, we find here the adverb “immediately,” already mentioned in Art. 31 para. 2 of the Constitution. According to the European Court of Human Rights, a maximum time limit of 48 hours should not, in principle, be exceeded. The Court considers that a period exceeding four days to rule on legality is prima facie too long, even in the context of the fight against terrorism. In certain circumstances, a shorter period may also be contrary to the principle of speed, particularly in the case of minors and/or non-violent offenses.
66In Switzerland, the public prosecutor must submit a request for detention for a maximum of three months to a coercive measures court (hereinafter: CMC; Art. 13(a) CCP; Art. 18(1) CCP). This request must be made “without delay” and within a maximum of 48 hours after apprehension by the police (Art. 224 para. 2 CCP). The TMC rules immediately, but also has a maximum of 48 hours (Art. 226 para. 1 CCP) to order either detention or a coercive measure, or immediate release (Art. 226 paras. 3-5 CCP). The TMC hears the accused in person, with some exceptions (Art. 225 CCP).
2. Courts of coercive measures: a real counterbalance?
67The TMCs were created with the 2007 revision of the CCP to provide “an indispensable counterbalance to the powers of the police and the public prosecutor's office.” The development of the TMC was intended to address a lack of impartiality on the part of investigating judges, as explained in the Federal Council's Message on the unification of the Criminal Procedure Code. The case law of the ECHR seemed to require that, de facto, only magistrates not involved in a case could not only rule on the legality of detention (Art. 31 para. 4 of the Constitution) but also order detention (Art. 31 para. 3 of the Constitution). Indeed, the wording of Art. 5 § 3 ECHR leaves some room for interpretation by stating that the person must be brought before a judge “or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power” (“officer” in English). Case law has clarified that a magistrate does not necessarily have to be a judge, but must nevertheless possess the attributes specific to this function, in particular independence. On the contrary, according to the text of the Constitution, the power to order pre-trial detention must imperatively be vested in a judge.
68While the presence of TMCs is now a welcome achievement, it must be noted that there is still no real counterweight to the criminal prosecution authorities. TMCs almost never refuse requests for pretrial detention made by public prosecutors. This is all the more problematic in cases (which have been predominant since the new CCP came into force) where the case results in a penal order that may impose a custodial sentence of up to six months (Art. 352 para. 1 let. d CCP). In order for a court to rule on the validity of an order (Art. 356 para. 2 CCP), an objection must be filed. Without an objection, the order is treated as a final judgment (Art. 354 para. 3 CCP). Unlike cases in which a court rules on the final penalty, detention in these cases ultimately escapes the judicial review required by both the Constitution and the Convention. With the introduction of Art. 352a CPP, which came into force on January 1, 2024 (see N. 7 above), which now provides for a hearing by the public prosecutor “if it is likely that the penal order will result in a custodial sentence to be enforced,” is to be welcomed, it still does not remedy the lack of judicial review.
3. Maximum duration of pre-trial detention
69Art. 31 para. 3 of the Constitution codifies the principle of speed, with the person concerned having the right to “be tried within a reasonable time.” This principle is also included in Art. 5 § 3 of the ECHR and recalls the principle of speed in judicial and administrative proceedings (Art. 29 para. 1 of the Constitution). However, this is not “a guarantee in the strict sense of the term.” In practice, two criteria are decisive in assessing the “reasonableness” of the time limit: the complexity of the case on the one hand and the severity of the expected penalty on the other. This second criterion is also found in Art. 212 para. 3 CCP. According to the Federal Supreme Court, reasonableness must take into account the behavior of the defendant and the issues at stake in the proceedings. There is no maximum time limit, as in other countries. For example, the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure provides for six months for misdemeanors and one year for crimes, with a maximum of two years in exceptionally serious cases. It also sets different time limits depending on the reason for pretrial detention: the mere risk of collusion does not justify holding a person in detention for more than two months.
70Such time limits would be desirable in Switzerland, where pre-trial detention can be very long. The Federal Supreme Court has ruled that pre-trial detention must not exceed three-quarters of the final sentence imposed – which is already longer than the two-thirds of the sentence after which conditional release is granted in the absence of an unfavorable prognosis (Art. 86 of the Criminal Code). When pre-trial detention exceeds two-thirds of the expected sentence, a decision (or at least an assessment) regarding the granting of conditional release is required.
71The absence of a fixed time limit may result in less pressure on the prosecuting authorities to act swiftly. Given that the period of pre-trial detention can be deducted from the sentence imposed under Art. 51 CP, judges may be tempted to take this into account when determining the sentence. In addition, release only comes into play when there is a “serious” violation of the principle of celerity and the authorities appear neither able nor willing to move the case forward and bring it to a conclusion. In less serious cases, it is up to the court to determine how to take into account a violation of the principle of celerity, for example by reducing the sentence. Like a snake biting its own tail, a potential violation of the principle of celerity is therefore often likely to be absorbed by the sentence ultimately imposed, which is not in line with the constitutional and conventional protection provided. One solution would be to consider that one day of pretrial detention is equivalent to two days of detention in execution of a sentence.
D. Art. 31 para. 4 Cst.: Habeas corpus
72Art. 31 para. 4 Cst. is modeled on Art. 5 § 4 ECHR and embodies the principle of habeas corpus, namely the right to lodge an appeal “at any time” to have the legality of the deprivation of liberty examined in terms of its substantive and procedural requirements. This principle applies to all forms of detention. Unlike the detention order (“Haftanordnung”) (para. 3), the legality of ongoing detention must be reviewed by a court. The phrase “without a court order” does not preclude subsequent review, particularly when the circumstances that justified the initial detention are likely to change, for example the risk of collusion (for pre-trial detention), the administration and effect of treatment (for PAFA or therapeutic measures) or dangerousness (for internment).
1. Frequency of review
73This review of the legality of detention must be available at reasonable intervals. The frequency of these reviews depends on the nature and duration of the deprivation of liberty, as well as the stage of the proceedings. In the early stages of criminal proceedings—particularly in cases of pretrial detention—or in situations where the evidence is uncertain, more frequent reviews are required. Thus, the Federal Court ruled that the one-month time limit for inadmissibility provided for in Art. 228 para. 5 CCP for filing a new application for release is not contrary to Art. 5 § 4 ECHR, whereas a two-month time limit was considered excessive. The principle of periodic review also applies to situations in which deprivation of liberty lasts for a long time, particularly in the context of institutional therapeutic measures (Article 59 of the Criminal Code) or internment (Article 64 of the Criminal Code). In such cases, the Criminal Code provides for annual judicial review (Art. 62d and 64b CC, respectively). A review may also be requested outside the annual intervals, at the request of the person concerned. The principle of periodic review guaranteed in Art. 5 § 4 ECHR is in clear tension with the regime of life imprisonment provided for in Art. 64 para. 1bis CP, combined with Art. 123a Cst., which does not provide for any judicial review mechanism when the person is considered “irreversibly unamendable.” This lack of review raises serious questions about the compatibility of this regime with the fundamental guarantees of the ECHR. The Federal Court has emphasized, in a specific case, that permanent non-reformability cannot be demonstrated in a scientifically reliable manner.
74The review of legality includes a review of conventionality, in particular to verify that the guarantees of judicial review in Art. 30 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the ECHR – independence, impartiality, and fair treatment – as well as the general purpose of the Convention (Article 1 of the ECHR: obligation to respect human rights) are respected. The procedure must be adversarial and respect the “equality of arms” between the parties, which seems to require compliance with the general procedural guarantees of Art. 29 Cst.
2. Requirement of speed
75With regard to the requirement of speed, it should be noted that the ECtHR has criticized Switzerland on three occasions for violating Art. 5 § 4 ECHR on three occasions for violating Art. 5 § 4 ECHR due to the lengthy duration of proceedings resulting from complex administrative responsibilities in the context of the enforcement of sentences and measures. In the case of I.L. v. Switzerland, more than a year had elapsed between the applicant's request for release and the successive decisions handed down by the higher cantonal court and the Federal Court. The Court considered that such a delay did not constitute an examination “within a reasonable time” within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the ECHR. As in the case of Derungs v. Switzerland, it emphasized that the slowness of the proceedings could not be explained by the particular complexity of the case. The main cause of the delay was rather the fact that the appeal had first to be addressed to an administrative authority, which does not constitute a court within the meaning of the Convention, before reaching a judicial instance. In order to avoid future convictions by the Strasbourg Court, Switzerland should consider introducing a direct judicial remedy in all cantons, at least for decisions falling within the material scope of Article 5 § 4 ECHR.
76To date, the Federal Court has not followed the clear signals from Strasbourg: it considers that the principle of expeditiousness in Article 5 § 4 ECHR is respected if “the circumstances did not make a more rapid decision reasonably possible.”
3. Right to compensation
77Article 5 § 5 ECHR provides for a right to compensation in the event of deprivation of liberty contrary to the Convention. This is the only guarantee that has not been included in the text of Article 31 of the Constitution. According to the case law of the ECtHR, States must deal with claims for compensation in the spirit of Article 5 § 5 ECHR. During criminal proceedings, compensation and reparation for non-pecuniary damage may be awarded (Art. 431 para. 1 CCP), including in cases of full or partial acquittal or dismissal of the case (Art. 429 CCP). This may be taken into account when determining the sentence. Finally, the Federal Supreme Court is of the opinion that it is up to the judge to decide on the best way to compensate for the harm suffered by a person.
VI. Outlook
78Ultimately, Art. 31 of the Constitution stands as a cornerstone of the protection of fundamental rights in matters of deprivation of liberty, guaranteeing a strict legal framework and essential procedural safeguards. While the provision, which is closely linked to Art. 5 ECHR, accurately reflects international standards, its practical application in Switzerland still reveals tensions, particularly with regard to pre-trial detention, due to the isolation practiced there and the absence of a maximum duration, as well as the still very weak counterbalance provided by the courts of coercive measures. The increasingly extensive use of criminal measures and the increasingly long periods of detention under this regime are also causes for concern in terms of respect for fundamental and human rights.
79Recent developments in criminal policy and the criminal justice system—in particular the trend towards prioritizing security and prevention—call for increased vigilance to ensure that deprivation of liberty is truly a measure of last resort, proportionate and respectful of human dignity. A stronger commitment to alternative measures, greater consideration of the needs of vulnerable people, and harmonization of cantonal practices are, among other things, essential levers for improving the effectiveness of this constitutional guarantee.
About the authors
Dr. Ahmed Ajil is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Lucerne and an associate researcher at the Faculty of Law, Criminology, and Public Administration (FDCA) at the University of Lausanne. His work focuses on political and ideological mobilization, counterterrorism, criminal policy, migration, policing, and prisons. Until 2022, he was a research associate at the Swiss Center of Competence in the Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions, where he authored the Manual on Dynamic Security in the Field of Deprivation of Liberty. He can be reached at: ahmed.ajil@unil.ch.
David Mühlemann, MLaw, is currently a doctoral student at the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology at the University of Bern. His research focuses on the enforcement of sentences and measures in Switzerland. Between 2014 and 2022, he helped establish and headed Switzerland's first legal advice center for persons deprived of liberty within the NGO humanrights.ch. David Mühlemann can be contacted at the following address: david.muehlemann@unibe.ch.
Recommended further reading
Albertini Michele, Der verfassungsmässige Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör im verwaltungsrechtlichen Verfahren des modernen Staates, Berne 2000.
Besse Marie, La prise en charge des personnes soumises à un traitement institutionnel des troubles mentaux. Quelle conformité́ de la pratique suisse avec la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme?, Lausanne 2018.
Bigler Olivier, Commentaire de l'art. 5 CEDH, in : Gonin Luc/Bigler Olivier (éds.), Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, Commentaire des articles 1 à 18 CEDH, Berne 2018.
Biro Noemi, Notwendige Verteidigung im Straf- und Massnahmenvollzug, Zurich 2019.
Centre suisse de compétence pour les droits humains (CSDH), diverses publications concernant la privation de liberté : https://skmr.ch/fr/th%C3%A8mes/polizei-und-justiz, dernière consultation le 2.6.2025.
Cliquennois Gaëtan, The Evolving Protection of Prisoners’ Rights in Europe, London 2023.
Hohl-Chirazi Catherine, La privation de liberté en procédure pénale suisse: buts et limites, Genève, Zurich 2016.
humanrights.ch, diverses publications concernant la privation de liberté : https://www.humanrights.ch/fr/pfi/droits-humains/detention/, dernière consultation le 2.6.2025.
Karpenstein Ulrich/Mayer Franz C. (éds.), EMRK Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten Kommentar, 3ème éd., Munich 2022.
Kunz, Karl-Ludwig/Singelnstein Tobias, Kriminologie, Zurich 2021.
Van Zyl Smit Dirk/Snacken Sonja, Principles of European prison law and policy, Penology and human rights, Oxford 2011.
Villiger Mark E., Handbuch der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (EMRK) mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte in Schweizer Fällen, 3ème éd., Zurich 2020.
Bibliography
Ajil Ahmed/Fischmeister Julien/Venezia Marine/Jendly Manon/Scalia Damien, Résister, naviguer, perpétuer ? Analyse des logiques préventionnistes « molles » à l’œuvre en Suisse et en Belgique face aux violences politico-idéologiquement motivées, Champ Pénal/Penal field, 34 (2025), https://journals.openedition.org/champpenal/16818.
Ajil Ahmed/Jendly Manon, Fabriquer un „dangereux ennemi terroriste“: une étude de cas suisse sur les implications d’une prophétie, Déviance et Société, 44, 4 (2020), p. 633-663.
Ajil Ahmed/Lubishtani Kastriot, Le terrorisme djihadiste devant le Tribunal Pénal Fédéral, Jusletter, 31 mai 2021, p. 1–41.
Andriantsimbazovina Joël, Le droit à la liberté et à la sûreté dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Titre VII, numéro 7, La liberté individuelle, octobre 2021, https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/publications/titre-vii/le-droit-a-la-liberte-et-a-la-surete-dans-la-jurisprudence-de-la-cour-europeenne-des-droits-de-l, consulté le 15.8.2025.
Arn Raphaël, Les effets de l’entrée en vigueur de la nouvelle partie générale du Code pénal sur la pratique des tribunaux et des avocats, Revue jurassienne de jurisprudence, Porrentruy 2006, p. 187–218.
Ashworth Andrew/Zedner Lucia, The rise and restraint of the preventive state, Annual Review of Criminology 2 (2019), p. 429–50.
Bernard Stephan, Freiheitsentziehendes Massnahmenrecht oder freiheitsentziehende Massnahmen jenseits des Rechts?, in : André Kuhn/Christian Schwarzenegger/Joëlle Vuille (édit.), Groupe suisse de criminologie, Justice pénale - Individus - Opinion publique, Diversité des perceptions, Berne 2017, p. 139–165.
Besse Marie, La prise en charge des personnes soumises à un traitement institutionnel des troubles mentaux. Quelle conformité de la pratique suisse avec la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme?, Lausanne 2018, p. 1–66.
Biaggini Giovanni, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, 2ème éd., Zurich 2017 (cit. Komm. BV).
Bielmann Florent/Caneppele Stefano, La réponse étatique au terrorisme en Suisse à partir des années 1980, in : Fink Daniel/Kuhn André/Vuille Joëlle (édit.), Criminologie en Suisse – Histoire, état, avenir, Helbing Lichtenhahn, Berne 2024, p. 191–204.
Biro Noemi, Kritische Überlegungen zu den administrativen Zuständigkeiten im Straf- und Massnahmenvollzug, recht 4 (2020), p. 221–234.
Biro Noemi, Notwendige Verteidigung im Straf- und Massnahmenvollzug, Zurich 2019.
Bögelein Nicole, Disziplinierung von Menschen in Armut - Ein kritischer Blick auf die Reformpläne zur Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe, Kritische Justiz 2 (2023), p. 258–270.
Bombay Anne/Heynen Pieterjan, The ECtHR’s Ilias and Ahmed and the CJEU’s FMS-case: a difficult reconciliation?, sui generis 2021, p. 255–260.
Brägger Benjamin F., Die revidierten Bestimmungen des Allgemeinen Teils des Strafgesetzbuches zum Straf- und Massnahmenvollzug: Das Neue scheint nicht gut, und das Gute ist nicht wirklich neu!, Revue pénale suisse, 4 (2018), p. 391–410.
Coninx Anna, Neue Terrorismusbekämpfung in der Schweiz – Grundlagen und Kritik, ZStrR 2 (2021) II, p. 183–208.
Constantin Tamara, Des règles aux pratiques: L’encadrement juridique du renseignement intérieur en Suisse, Criminologie, 58(1), p. 53–74.
Crewe Ben, Depth, weight, tightness: Revisiting the pains of imprisonment, Punishment & Society 13 (2011) V, p. 509–529.
De Brabandere Eric, Non-state Actors, State-Centrism and Human Rights Obligations, Leiden Journal of International Law 22 (2009) I, p. 191–209.
De Castro Rodrigues Andreia, Sacau Ana, Quintas de Oliveira Jorge & Abrunhosa Gonçalves Rui, Prison sentences: last resort or the default sanction?, Psychology, Crime & Law, 25 (2018) II, p. 171-194.
De Viggiani Nick (2007), Unhealthy prisons: exploring structural determinants of prison health, Sociology of health & illness 29 1 (2007), p. 115–135.
Dellazizzo Laura/Mimosa Luigi/Giguère Charles-Édouard/Goulet Marie-Hélène/Dumais Alexandre, Shedding Light on “the Hole”: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis on Adverse Psychological Effects and Mortality Following Solitary Confinement in Correctional Settings, Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2020.
Donatsch Andreas, Dispositions légales et pratiques relatives aux personnes dangereuses, Solutions législatives possibles aux niveaux fédéral et cantonal, Avis de droit sur mandat de la Conférence des directrices et directeurs des départements cantonaux de justice et de police (CCJPD), Zurich 2019, https://www.kkjpd.ch/newsreader-fr/dispositions-légales-et-pratiques-relatives-aux-personnes-dangereuses.html, consulté le 21.11.2024).
Droz-Sauthier Gaëlle/Zermatten Aimée, Personnes malades et/ou dangereuses : interactions licites entre placements pénaux et civils ?, Revue de droit suisse, Band 143 (2024) I, Heft 4, p. 441– 453.
Dumitru Speranta, Qu'est-ce que le nationalisme méthodologique?, Raisons politiques 54 (2014) II, p. 9–22.
Dünkel Frieder, Abschaffung oder Reform der Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe?, Neue Kriminalpolitik 3 (2022), p. 253–269.
Fink Daniel, La prison en Suisse : un état des lieux, Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes, Lausanne 2017.
Flachsmann Stefan/Wehrenberg Stefan, Aussageverweigerung und Informationspflicht, Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung, 97 (2001), p. 313–321
Freeman Sinead/Seymour Mairead, Just waiting: The nature and effect of uncertainty on young people in remand custody in Ireland, Youth Justice 10 (2010) II, p. 126–142.
Frei Mirjam/Zuberbühler Elsässer Simone, Kommentar zu Art. 221 StPO, in : Donatsch Andreas/Lieber Viktor/Summers Sarah/Wohlers Wolfgang (éds.), Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Strafprozessordnung (StPO), Zurich 2020 (cit. Comm. StPO).
Gialuz Mitja/Spagnolo Paola, Reasonable length of pre-trial detention: rigid or flexible time limits? A study on Italy from a European perspective, European Criminal Law Review 3 (2013) II, p. 220– 231.
Gnaedinger Luca, Le paradoxe suisse : entre mansuétude pénale et criminalisation de l’immigration, Champ pénal, 32 (2024), https://journals.openedition.org/champpenal/15692.
Grabenwarter Christoph/Pabel Katharina, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, Vienne 2021.
Haefelin Walter, Die amtliche Verteidigung im schweizerischen Strafprozess, Zurich 2010.
Haney Craig, Restricting the use of solitary confinement, Annual review of Criminology 1 (2018), p. 285–310.
Härri Matthias, Kommentar zu Art. 237 StPO, in : Niggli Marcel Alexander/Heer Marianne/Wiprächtiger Hans (édit.), Schweizerische Strafprozessordnung/Jugendstrafprozessordung, Bâle 2010 (cit. BSK-Härri).
Hauptmann Louise, La relation parent-enfant à l’épreuve de la privation de liberté, Mise en œuvre du droit au respect de la vie familiale dans l’ordre juridique international, fédéral et vaudois, Bâle 2024.
Heri Corina, Commentaire de l’art. 10 Cst., in : Schlegel Stefan/Ammann Odile (édit.), Commentaire en ligne de la Constitution fédérale – Version : 16.03.2023, https://onlinekommentar.ch/de/kommentare/bv10, consulté le 10.10.2023.
Hottelier Michel, Commentaire de l’ Art. 31 Cst., in : Vincent Martenet, Jacques Dubey (édit.), Constitution fédérale, 2021 (cit. Comm. Cst.),
Huey Meredith P./McNulty Thomas L., Institutional conditions and prison suicide: Conditional effects of deprivation and overcrowding, The Prison Journal 85 (2005) IV, p. 490–514.
humanrights.ch, Gewaltprävention – ein Übungsfeld für den Überwachungsstaat, 13.09.2018, https://www.humanrights.ch/de/ipf/menschenrechte/innere-sicherheit/gewaltpraevention-ueberwachungsstaat, consulté le 10.10.2023.
humanrights.ch, Le droit à la vie pour les personnes en détention, 30.05.2022, https://www.humanrights.ch/fr/pfi/droits-humains/detention/detention-droit-vie, consulté le 10.10.2023.
humanrights.ch, U-Haft: Das Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzip muss Rechtswirklichkeit werden, 6.5.2020, https://www.humanrights.ch/de/ipf/menschenrechte/freiheitsentzug/u-haft-verhaeltnismaessigkeit-rechtswirklichkeit, consulté le 10.10.2023.
Johns Diana, Confronting the Disabling Effects of Imprisonment: Toward Prehabilitation. Social Justice/Global Options 45 (2021) I, p. 27– 56.
Kälin Walter/Epiney Astrid/Caroni Martina/Pirker Benedikt, Völkerrecht – Eine Einführung, 5ème éd., Berne et al. 2021.
Kälin Walter/Künzli Jörg, The law of International Human Rights Protection, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.
Kölz Alfred/Jörg Paul Müller, Entwurf für eine neue Bundesverfassung vom 16. Mai 1984, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2ème éd., Bâle, 1990.
Kuhn André, 1974-2024 : Cinquante ans d’évolution de la politique criminelle en Suisse, in : Daniel Fink/André Kuhn/Joëlle Vuille (édit.), Criminologie en Suisse – Histoire, état, avenir, Bâle 2024.
Kunz Karl-Ludwig/Singelnstein Tobias, Kriminologie, Zurich, 2021.
Künzli Jörg/Bishop Kelly, Ausländerrechtliche Administrativhaft in der Schweiz, Centre suisse de compétence pour les droits humains (CSDH), Bern 2020. Résumé français: Künzli Jörg/Bishop Kelly, La détention administrative en application du droit des étrangers (résumé), Centre suisse de compétence pour les droits humains, Berne 2020.
Künzli Jörg/Büchler Alexandra/Weber Florian, Nelson-Mandela-Regeln, Centre suisse de compétence pour les droits humains (CSDH), Berne 2020.
Künzli Jörg/Frei Nula/Krummen David, Freiheitsentzug und Freiheitsbeschränkung bei ausländischen Staatsangehörigen – Dargestellt am Beispiel der Unterbringung von Asylsuchenden in der Schweiz, Centre suisse de compétence pour les droits humains (CSDH), Berne 2017.
Künzli Jörg/Frei Nula/Schultheiss Maria, Menschenrechtliche Standards der Haftbedingungen in der Untersuchungshaft und ihre Umsetzung in der Schweiz, Jusletter du 5 octobre 2015.
Künzli Jörg/Frei Nula/Spring Alexander, Einzelhaft in Hochsicherheitsabteilungen, Menschenrechtliche Standards und ihre Umsetzung in der Schweiz, Gutachten zuhanden des Lenkungsausschusses EDA/EJPD, Berne 2014.
Künzli Jörg/Kälin Walter, Das Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzip als Bestandteil des zwingenden Völkerrechts?, Jusletter du 23 juin 2014.
Künzli Jörg/Ostendarp Samuel/Stucki Noel, Untersuchungshaft : Menschenrechtliche Standards und ihre Umsetzung in der Schweiz, Aktualisierung 2022, Centre suisse de compétence pour les droits humains (CSDH), Berne 2022.
Künzli Jörg/Bertoni Daniel/Stucki Noël, Die Unterbringung urteilsunfähiger Personen in geschlossenen Abteilungen von Alters- und Pflegeheimen – eine freiheitsentziehende Maßnahme?, Jusletter, 18 août 2025, p. 1–43.
Löbbert Markus, Unterbleiben der Ersatzfreiheitsstrafenvollstreckung bei wohnungs- und obdachlosen Personen?, Neue Kriminalpolitik 3 (2023), p. 353–373.
Manfrin Fabio, Ersatzmassnahmen für Untersuchungshaft – Bedeutungsloses Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzip in der Haftpraxis?, in : Mona Martino/Riklin Franz (édit.), Documents du Groupe d‘experts Réformes en matière pénale, Rechtswidrige Zustände? – Untersuchungshaft in der Kritik, Vol. 10, Berne 2018.
Markwalder Nora/Binswanger Janine, Die Anordnung von Untersuchungs- und Sicherheitshaft: Eine empirische Analyse, Forumpoenale 5 (2020), p. 384–391.
May David/Applegate Brandon/Ruddell Rick/Wood Peter, Going to jail sucks (and it really doesn’t matter who you ask), American Journal of Criminal Justice 39 (2014), p. 250–266.
Mazzucchelli Goran, Öffentliches Sicherheitsbedürfnis, Kriminalität und die Funktion der strafrechtlichen Sanktion aus kriminologischer Sicht, PJA 2000, p. 1337–1344.
Meyer-Ladewig Jens, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Handkommentar, 3ème éd., Baden-Baden 2011 (cit. Handkomm. EMRK).
Mohler Markus, Grundzüge des Polizeirechts in der Schweiz, Bâle, 2012.
Mühlemann David, Resozialisierung – Plädoyer für einen Neustart, in : Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft für Straffälligenhilfe, Informationsdienst Straffälligenhilfe 28 (2020) III, p. 11–17.
Müller Joel, Terroristische Gefährder in der Schweiz, Berne 2022.
Müller Jörg Paul/Schefer Markus, Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4ème éd., Berne 2008 (cit. Grundrechte).
Noll Thomas, Optimierung der Untersuchungshaft im Kanton Zürich, Revue suisse de criminologie, 20 Jahre Amt für Justizvollzug – eine Festschrift 2019, p. 29–77.
Oberholzer Niklaus, Von der Repression zur Prävention – Oder von den strafrechtlichen Massnahmen zum fürsorgerischen Freiheitsentzug., in : Mona Martino/Riklin Franz (édit.), Documents du Groupe d‘experts Réformes en matière pénale, Fürsorge oder Präventivhaft? – Zum Zusammenwirken von strafrechtlichen Massnahmen und Erwachsenenschutz, Vol.11, Berne 2018.
Pollähne Helmut, Wider den (Kriminal-)Schuldturm für Arme nebst neun Thesen gegen die Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe, in : Brunhöber Beatrice et al. (édit.), Strafrecht als Risiko, Festschrift für Cornelius Prittwitz zum 70. Geburtstag, Baden-Baden 2023.
Robert Christian-Nils, La défense continue, ZStr (4) 2007, p. 339–350.
Ronc Pacal, Die Menschenwürde als Prinzip der EMRK, Berlin 2020.
Schlegel Stephan, Anwalt der ersten Stunde: Entscheidend ist die Umsetzung, plädoyer 2011 I, p. 36 ss.
Schlegel Stephan, Nr. 19 EGMR, First Section, Pishchalnikov v. Russia, Urteil vom 24. September 2009 – Application no. 7025/04, forumpoenale (2) 2010, p. 86–92.
Schmid Evelyne/Lubishtani Kastriot/Boillet Véronique/Ajil Ahmed/Capus Nadja, Les activités terroristes : une définition terrorisante ?, dans : Camille Perrier Depeursinge/Nathalie Dongois/ Andrew Garbarski, Cimes et Châtiments, Mélanges en l'honneur du Professeur Laurent Moreillon, Lausanne 2022, p. 591–602.
Seiler Hansjörg, Das (Miss-)Verhältnis zwischen strafprozessualem Schweigerecht und verwaltungsrechtlicher Mitwirkungs- und Auskunftspflicht, recht 2005, p. 11–13.
Snacken Sonja/Devynck Caroline/Distelmans Willem/Gutwirth Serge/Lemmens Christophe, Demandes d’euthanasie dans les prisons belges. Entre souffrance psychique, dignité humaine et peine de mort. Criminologie 48/1 (2015), p. 101–122.
Schürmann Thomas, Art. 31 BV, in: Niggli Marcel Alexander/Wiprächtiger Hans (édit.), Basler Kommentar, Strafrecht, 5ème éd., Basel 2025, p. 760-792 (cit. BK-Schürmann).
Tag Brigitte, Strafrecht am Ende des Lebens – Sterbehilfe und Hilfe zum Suizid in der Schweiz. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 128/1 (2016), p. 73–88.
Thommen Marc, Weshalb die Haftanrechnung (Art. 51 StGB) abgeschafft werden sollte. ContraLegem 2 (2019), p. 47–60, https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/182224/1/Contralegem_2%2C_2019_-_Thommen.pdf.
Urwyler Christoph, Die Praxis der bedingten Entlassung aus dem Strafvollzug, Berne 2020.
Urwyler Thierry, (Ir)relevanz von Aufenthaltsrecht und Landesverweis für die Zulassung zur gemeinnützigen Arbeit (Art. 79a StGB), recht 2 (2024), p. 102–111.
Van Zyl Smit Dirk/Snacken Sonja, Principles of European prison law and policy, Penology and human rights, Oxford 2011.
Vest Hans, Kommentierung zu Art. 31, in : Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Schindler Benjamin/Schweizer Rainer J./Vallender Klaus A. (édit.), Bundesverfassung St. Galler Kommentar, 4ème éd., Saint-Gall 2023 (cit. SGK-Vest).
Volkart Reto, Einzelhaft: Eine Literaturübersicht, Revue Suisse de Psychologie Pure et Appliquée 42/1 (1983), p. 1–24, https://www.humanrights.ch/cms/upload/pdf/2020/200421_Einzelhaft_Dr_Volkart_Eine_Literaturu776bersicht.pdf, consulté le 15.8.2025.
Wenger Susanne, « Quand la justice ne s'encombre plus d'un procès », Horizons 124 (2020), p. 34–35, https://www.revue-horizons.ch/2020/03/05/quand-la-justice-ne-sencombre-plus-dun-proces/, consulté le 27.2.2023.
Wohlers Stephan/Schlegel Stephan, Nr. 13 EGMR, Grand Chamber, Case of Salduz v. Turkey, Urteil vom 27. November 2008 - Application no. 36391/02, forumpoenale 2 (2009), p. 71– 76.
Wyss Martin Philipp, Miranda Warnings im schweizerischen Verfassungsrecht? Inhalt und Tragweite von Art. 31 Abs. 2 BV, recht 2001, p. 132–147.
Zedner Lucia, Ends and Means: Why Effective Counter-Terrorism Requires Respect for Proportionality and Rights, in : Emmanouil Billis, Nandor Knust, Jon Petter Rui (édit.), Proportionality in Crime Control and Criminal Justice, Oxford 2021, p. 125–142.
Zermatten Aimée H./Freytag Thomas, Libération conditionnelle : au conditionnel selon le canton ?, in : Queloz Nicolas/Noll Thomas/von Mandach Laura/Delgrande Natalia, Surveiller et punir : nouvelles évolutions dans l’exécution des sanctions pénales, Berne 2018, p. 157–168.
Zimmerlin Sven, Miranda-Warning und andere Unterrichtungen nach Art. 31 Abs. 2, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 121 (2003), p. 311–335.
Materials
Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies, Ensemble de règles minima des Nations Unies pour le traitement des détenus (Règles Nelson Mandela), A/RES/70/175, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/443/42/PDF/N1544342.pdf?OpenElement.
Comité contre la torture (CAT) des Nations Unies, Observations finales concernant le septième rapport périodique de la Suisse, CAT/C/CHE/CO/8, 111.12.2023, par. 27, https://www.ohchr.org/fr/documents/concluding-observations/catccheco8-concluding-observations-eighth-periodic-report.
Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT), Rapport au Conseil fédéral suisse relatif à la visite effectuée en par le Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT) du 20. au 24.10.2003, CPT/Inf (2004) 38, https://rm.coe.int/1680697fa9.
Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT), Rapport au Conseil fédéral suisse relatif à la visite effectuée en Suisse par le Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT) du 24.9. au 5.10.2007, CPT/Inf (2008) 33, https://rm.coe.int/1680697fb3.
Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT), Rapport au Conseil fédéral suisse relatif à la visite effectuée en Suisse par le Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT) du 10.10. au 20.10.2011, CPT/Inf (2012), 7, https://www.bj.admin.ch/dam/bj/de/data/staat/menschenrechte/folterpraevention/ber-cpt-besuch11.pdf.
Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT), Rapport au Conseil fédéral suisse relatif à la visite effectuée en Suisse par le Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT) du 13.4. au 24.4.2015, CPT/Inf (2016) 18, 2016, https://rm.coe.int/1680697fb9.
Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT), Rapport au Conseil fédéral suisse relatif à la visite effectuée en Suisse par le Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT) du 22.3. au 1.4.2021, CPT/Inf (2022) 9, 2022, https://rm.coe.int/1680a6d051.
Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT), Rapport au Conseil fédéral suisse relatif à la visite effectuée en Suisse par le Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants (CPT) du 19.3. au 28.3.2024, CPT/Inf (2025) 01, 2025, https://rm.coe.int/1680b35522.
Comité national de prévention de la torture (CNPT), Rapport d’activité de la CNPT 2014, https://backend.nkvf.admin.ch/fileservice/sdweb-docs-prod-nkvfadminch-files/files/2024/09/06/67b5925b-717e-4833-b113-f76b4a6f18d1.pdf.
Conseil des droits de l'homme de l’ONU, Les Principes directeurs sur l’extrême pauvreté et les droits de l’homme, adopté par consensus (rés. 21/11, sept. 2012), https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/OHCHR_ExtremePovertyandHumanRights_FR.pdf.
Conseil de l'Europe, Annual Penal Statistics – SPACE I 2023, Lausanne, https://wp.unil.ch/space/files/2025/04/space_i_2023_report.pdf.
Conseil de l'Europe, Principes européens relatifs à l'exécution des sanctions pénales, Recommandation Rec(2006)2, 2006, https://rm.coe.int/16806ab9b6.
Message concernant la Loi fédérale sur les mesures policières de lutte contre le terrorisme, FF 2019 4541, FF 2019 4541 - Message concernant la loi fédérale sur les mesures policières de lutte contre le terrorisme (admin.ch) (cit. Message MPT).
Message relatif à l’unification du droit de la procédure pénale, CPP, FF 2006 1057 ; https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2006/124/fr, (cit. Message CPP).
Message relatif à une nouvelle Constitution fédérale du 20.11.1996 (96.091), FF 1997 I 1, p. 1 ss., https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1997/1_1_1_1/fr (cit. Message Cst.).
Office fédéral de la statistique, Réformes du Code pénal suisse : l’impact sur les courtes peines privatives de liberté, Neuchâtel 2023, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfsstatic/dam/assets/28225348/master, consulté le 28.5.2025.
Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), Comité des droits de l'homme, Observations finales concernant le quatrième rapport périodique de la Suisse, CCPR/C/CHE/CO/4, 30.8.2017, https://docs.un.org/fr/CCPR/C/CHE/CO/4.
Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), Comité des droits des personnes handicapées, Observations finales concernant le rapport initial de l’Allemagne, 13.5.2015, CRPD/C/DEU/CO/1, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD%2FC%2FDEU%2FCO%2F1&Lang=fr.
Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), Comité des droits des personnes handicapées, Convention relative aux droits des personnes handicapées, 12.12.2006, https://www.ohchr.org/fr/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities.