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- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. History of origins
- II. Residual Allocation in General
- III. residual distribution rules in the PRA in detail
- Materials
- Bibliography
I. History of origins
1 As a rule, not all mandates can be distributed among the lists during the initial distribution. The legislator recognized this problem as early as 1919, when proportional representation was introduced, and therefore sought a method of distributing the mandates that remained undistributed during the initial distribution among the lists. In the cantons with proportional representation, there were various options for this, which were also discussed at the federal level. The Federal Council proposed to distribute the remainder in principle according to the largest quotient, and provided for a cascade of other, subsidiary rules for the distribution of the remainder. Parliament approved this proposal without discussion. The residual distribution thus introduced pursued the goal of continuing proportionality in residual distribution.
2 Today's statutory rules largely correspond to the residual distribution already introduced in 1919. When the PRA was introduced in 1976, a request was made for a fundamental change: Residual distribution should be carried out according to largest residual numbers. However, due to a lack of political support, the proposal was withdrawn and the previous system was retained without any changes of a material nature.
3 The revision of the PRA in 1994 closed a gap in the law. Previously, there was no provision for the case in which several lists had the same quotient and the same residual vote totals after the initial allocation, but had different party vote totals. It has now been explicitly stipulated that in this case the list with the higher number of party votes is awarded the mandate. In addition, Art. 40 and 41 of the PRA have been re-divided so that the initial and residual allocations are now systematically clearly separated from each other.
II. Residual Allocation in General
A. Necessity of residual apportionment
4 In rare cases, all mandates can already be allocated to the lists during the initial distribution according to Art. 40 PRA. However, the votes cast are distributed among many different lists, therefore it often happens that the distribution number according to Art. 40 para. 1 PRA is too high in a specific case to be able to allocate all mandates to lists. At the same time, it would also not be permissible to choose a lower distribution figure, as this could lead to more mandates being distributed than the number of seats to which the respective constituency is entitled. As a rule, therefore, a residual distribution of the remaining undistributed mandates is necessary.
5 The PRA provides for a whole cascade of residual distribution rules. The distribution according to the largest quotient occurs very regularly. In the 2019 National Council elections, the remainder distribution procedure according to the largest quotient was applied in 13 of the 20 cantons with proportional representation. The subsidiary remainder allocation rules of Art. 41 para. 1 lit. c to f PRA, on the other hand, are potentially only actually applied in individual cases. Since the introduction of proportional representation at the federal level in 1919, there has, as far as can be seen, never been a distribution of residual mandates with distribution rules other than the calculation of the quotient.
B. Constitutional Requirements for the Allocation of Residual Mandates
6 Article 149 para. 2 of the Federal Constitution merely states that the National Council must be elected "on the basis of proportional representation". Within these limits, it is up to the legislature to determine the electoral law, in particular the distribution of mandates. What also applies to the initial distribution applies a fortiori to the residual distribution rules: different mandate distribution methods can be constitutional, provided that the principle of proportional representation is not called into question as a whole. In concrete terms, this means that at least the initial allocation and the first residual allocation rule must comply with proportional principles.
7 Certain residual distribution rules are clearly not proportional. Therefore, it seems important that they are only applied on a subsidiary basis. As long as the initial and primary remainder distribution realize proportionality as well as possible, i.e. the votes cast are converted into mandates as proportionally as possible, it can be said overall that the "principle of proportionality" is respected by the mandate distribution system.
C. Legal comparison
8 Cantons with majoritarian electoral systems do not, by their very nature, require a residual distribution. Also in the case of mandate distributions according to Pukelsheim, the residual distribution is omitted, since the entire mandates are distributed in a single step.
9 The cantons with a mandate distribution method according to Hagenbach-Bischoff all primarily provide for the allocation of undistributed mandates to the lists with the largest quotients. Six cantons also have exactly the same cascade of subsidiary residual distribution rules as the PRA. The canton of Thurgau does not provide for the lottery procedure; otherwise, it also has the same cascade. In two cantons, the legal situation is the same as in the Confederation before the closure of the legal loophole in 1993, i.e. there is no explicit provision for the case where several lists have unequal party vote numbers but equal quotients and equal remainders. The three cantons of western Switzerland with Hagenbach-Bischoff have fewer subsidiary remainder distribution rules. The canton of Geneva distributes the remainder on the basis of the largest quotient, subsidiarily on the basis of the largest remainder, and provides for a lottery procedure at the end. The cantons of Jura and Neuchâtel proceed directly to the lottery procedure after calculating the largest quotient.
10 In the other cantons with different forms of proportional representation, there are different methods of distributing the remainder. In the canton of Basel-Stadt (Sainte-Laguë), the primary distribution of the remainder is also based on the system of the largest quotient. This is calculated by dividing the number of votes received by the list by the number of mandates awarded to it so far times two plus one. Subsidiarily, the respective mandate is allocated to the list with the largest remainder, again subsidiarily to the list with the highest number of votes for the possibly elected person. If this is also equal, a drawing of lots takes place. In the canton of Glarus, which also has a mandate allocation procedure according to Sainte-Laguë, the lottery procedure is used directly for the remaining allocation. In the canton of Vaud with the quota procedure according to Hare/Niemeyer, the largest remainder is primarily calculated for the remaining distribution. Subsidiarily, the mandate is awarded to the list that received the fewest mandates in the initial distribution. This method of residual distribution is not found anywhere else and clearly favors the small parties. If there are several lists with the same, lowest number of mandates, lots are drawn. In the canton of Ticino (also Hare/Niemeyer), the remaining seats are also distributed primarily by the system of the largest remainder. Subsidiarily, the seat goes to the list with the highest number of party votes; subsidiarily, again, lots are drawn.
11 Today, the cantons present an inconsistent picture, even within the cantons with a mandate allocation procedure according to Hagenbach-Bischoff. In this respect, this also fits in with the historical development, in which the cantons had very different, freely combined initial and residual allocation systems for a long time. Nevertheless, a clear consensus emerges among the "Hagenbach-Bischoff cantons" of German-speaking Switzerland, all of which provide for the same residual distribution system as the Confederation.
III. residual distribution rules in the PRA in detail
A. Para. 1: Residual distribution rules
1. Distribution "individually and successively
12 According to the wording of the law, the mandates still undistributed after the initial distribution shall be distributed "individually and successively". Thus, for the first mandate, the quotient of each list is first calculated and the first mandate is allocated accordingly (or according to the further, subsidiary rules) to the list with the largest quotient. Subsequently, for a possible second mandate, the quotient of each list is calculated again, which is now different for the list that received the first mandate of the residual distribution. The rule of residual distribution according to the largest quotient virtually requires this individual and successive procedure.
2. Cascade of the residual distribution rules
13 Art. 41 para. 1 PRA provides for a whole cascade of rules for the residual distribution. If one rule does not lead to a clear result, the following (subsidiary) one is applied. The last rule necessarily always leads to a clear decision on the allocation of the mandate in question, since the PRA provides for the drawing of lots as ultima ratio (Art. 41 para. 1 lit. f PRA). The allocation of mandates is thus regulated in detail - even in the event that two lists have received exactly the same number of party votes and the candidates eligible for the vacant seat have also received the same number of votes. There is no provision for a recount, not even in the event that the decision on the allocation of mandates to the lists is made on the basis of conceivably narrow or even completely absent differences in votes.
14 The PRA provides for distribution according to the largest quotient as the primary remainder distribution rule. This rule is an inherent part of the Hagenbach-Bischoff mandate distribution procedure. The other, subsidiary residual distribution rules, on the other hand, deviate from the idea of the highest possible mandate price and thus from the constituency-internal proportionality as it is part of the mandate distribution according to Hagenbach-Bischoff. The subsidiary redistribution rules are arranged in such a way that, in descending order, they move further and further away from the proportional representation concept of the Hagenbach-Bischoff mandate distribution. The first subsidiary rule for the distribution of the remainder according to the largest remainder (Art. 41 para. 1 lit. c PRA) follows a different understanding of proportionality, while the distribution of the remainder of a mandate to the strongest list (Art. 41 para. 1 lit. d PRA) or to the list with the strongest candidate (Art. 41 para. 1 lit. e PRA) is majoritarian. Finally, the drawing of lots as ultima ratio for the remaining distribution (Art. 41 para. 1 lit. f PRA) follows neither proportional representation nor majoritarian principles.
15 The rules for the remaining distribution in this cascade are thus arranged in a logical sequence that ensures the constitutionality of the legal regulation. The further away from the principle of proportional representation it is, the less frequently the corresponding rule will be applied. Whenever possible, mandates shall be allocated according to the principle of proportional representation.
3. residual distribution according to the largest quotient
a. Para. 1 lit. a: Calculation of the quotient
16 The primary remaining distribution according to PRA shall be made according to the largest quotient, i.e. according to how many votes are behind each distributed mandate. For each list, it is calculated how high the (hypothetical) mandate price would be that it would pay in total for each mandate allocated to it if it received the additional mandate. Specifically, this means: The number of party votes for each list is divided by the number of mandates already allocated to it plus one, and the result is called the quotient. The result of the calculation in lit. a, however, is only designated as such in lit. b.
b. Para. 1 lit. b: Allocation of mandates
17 The list which achieves the highest quotient - calculated according to the rule in lit. a - shall receive the additional mandate. This continues the idea of the mandate price which is decisive for the mandate distribution according to Hagenbach-Bischoff: Each distributed mandate per list shall represent as many votes as possible. Compared to the distribution of the remainder according to the largest remainder, this rule favors the larger parties.
18 The federal legislator gave preference to the remainder distribution according to the largest quotient on the grounds that this best perpetuates proportionality. The remaining mandate distribution according to the largest quotient originates from the proportionality idea of a mandate distribution system according to Hagenbach-Bischoff. This type of residual distribution was already an integral part of the mandate distribution system as designed by Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff in 1892. This also fits the earlier division of today's Art. 40 and 41 PRA, in which the residual distribution according to the largest quotient still formed part of the first article on the distribution of mandates and did not belong to the "special cases" (then subject heading) of today's Art. 41 PRA. If one considers the distribution of mandates according to Hagenbach-Bischoff as a whole to be in conformity with the constitution, there can be no doubt that this primary residual distribution is also constitutional, even though it favors the larger parties.
c. Example
19 The residual distribution is illustrated by the example of the National Council election results in the electoral district (canton) of Schwyz in 2019. The canton (= constituency) had four seats in the National Council to allocate to the lists, a total of 21 lists competed, which were combined in a total of four list groups, with "mother parties" and their smaller offshoots additionally linked by means of sub-list connections. The votes were distributed as follows and the initial distribution resulted in the following:
List group | Number of party votes | Mandates Initial distribution |
SVP+ | 75’234 | 1 |
CVP+/GLP+/EVP | 48’095 | 1 |
FDP+ | 47’103 | 1 |
SP+/Grüne+ | 33’494 | 0 |
Total |
| 3 |
Thus, one of the four seats remained undistributed after the initial allocation. Instead, the remainder was allocated according to the largest quotient. The quotient is calculated separately for each list group by dividing the number of party votes of the list group by the number of mandates already awarded to it plus one. The group with the highest quotient receives the mandate.
E.g. for the SVP+: 75,234 / (1+1) = 37,617 (quotient)
List group | Quotient |
SVP+ | 37’617 |
CVP+/GLP+/EVP | 24'047.5 |
FDP+ | 23'551.5 |
SP+/Grüne+ | 33’494 |
The SVP+ has the highest quotient and therefore receives the last mandate. In total, the SVP+ receives two mandates, the CVP+/GLP+/EVP one mandate and the FDP+ one mandate. The list group SP+/Greens+ is left empty-handed.
4. Para. 1 lit. c: Residual distribution according to the largest remainder
a. Comment
20 If the distribution rule according to the highest quotient does not produce an unambiguous result, i.e. several lists have the same (highest) quotient, this first subsidiary remainder distribution rule is applied. A mandate which remained undistributed during the first distribution is distributed to the list which had the largest remainder of "unvalued" votes during the first distribution. During the initial distribution, a "mandate price" is determined in the form of the divisor. The "utilized" votes of each list are calculated by multiplying the number of mandates allocated to the list by this mandate price. The difference between this number of utilized votes and all party votes cast for this list is the number of unutilized votes decisive for the residual distribution according to the largest remainder.
21 The idea behind the residual distribution according to the largest remainder is that as many of the votes cast as possible should have an influence on the distribution of mandates. Such a remainder distribution favors smaller parties, especially in smaller constituencies where they have not yet received a mandate in the initial distribution.
22 The distribution of residual mandates according to the largest remainder of "unvalued" votes in the initial distribution deviates from the proportionality idea of the initial distribution according to Hagenbach-Bischoff. The basic idea of the distribution according to the largest remainder is to utilize as many votes as possible instead of (as in the distribution according to the largest quotient) allocating the mandate to the party which can show the largest number of votes per mandate allocated to it. However, this also corresponds to the basic idea of proportional representation, so that this type of residual distribution is also constitutional.
b. Example
23 In a fictitious electoral district with five seats, three parties compete, a total of 120,000 votes are cast. The divisor is calculated: 120'000 / (5+1) = 20'000. The following is the result of the initial distribution:
List | Number of party votes | Quotient | Mandates Initial distribution |
A | 70’000 | 3.5 | 3 |
B | 35’000 | 1.75 | 1 |
C | 15’000 | 0.75 | 0 |
Total | 120’000 |
| 4 |
24 After the first distribution, one mandate is thus still to be allocated. The quotient of each list for the first rule of the remaining allocation (Art. 41 para. 1 lit. a and b PRA) is calculated.
List | Number of party votes | Quotient | Mandates Initial distribution |
A | 70’000 | 3 | 17’500 |
B | 35’000 | 1 | 17’500 |
C | 15’000 | 0 | 15’000 |
25 The lists A and B both have the same, highest quotient. Therefore, it is now necessary to calculate the remainder of unvalued votes of the two lists according to Art. 41 Para. 1 lit. c PRA: Party votes minus (number of seats already allocated multiplied by the divisor of the initial allocation)
List A: 70,000 - (3 x 20,000) = 10,000 unvalued votes
List B: 35,000 - (1 x 20,000) = 15,000 unallocated votes
List B thus has more unvalued votes according to the previous distribution than List A. Therefore, list B receives the last mandate. In total, List A has won three mandates, List B two mandates.
5. Para. 1 lit. d: Residual distribution according to the largest number of party votes
26 If two lists have both the same, highest quotient and the same remainder of unvalued votes in the initial allocation, the party vote totals of the two lists are compared. It is the mathematically simplest rule of the remainder distribution to allocate undistributed mandates to the strongest lists. It is obvious that this gives the larger parties a considerable advantage.
27 The allocation of a remaining mandate to the list with the largest number of party votes means that the absolute number of votes is decisive for the distribution of the remainder (at least for the mandate in question). This method of residual allocation deviates from the principle of proportional representation and instead applies a majority rule. In itself, this does not correspond to the proportional representation provided for in the Federal Constitution (Art. 149 para. 2 FC). Interestingly, this variant was discussed as a primary remainder distribution rule in the first design of proportional representation for the National Council, but was described as arbitrary and therefore rejected. Nevertheless, it is applied as a second subsidiary residual distribution rule, but in practice it is of little significance. Only - but still - if all proportional mandate distribution rules do not lead to a result, this majority rule is resorted to. Certain individual majoritarian elements are not detrimental to the character of the National Council elections and their distribution of mandates as a fundamentally proportional system, as long as they are "used with restraint" and accordingly have an effect only in "special concrete constellations". This is to be affirmed in the case of such a second subsidiary rule for the distribution of residual seats; therefore, it must be considered constitutional.
6. Para. 1 lit. e: Residual allocation according to the largest number of candidate votes
28 If the quotient as well as the remainder and the number of party votes are equal, the number of votes of the eligible candidate of each list shall be compared. Any remaining mandate is awarded to the list on which the person in question was able to garner the most votes. Thus, each list is ranked in descending order according to the number of votes cast by persons, and in descending order the mandates previously awarded to the list are distributed to the candidates of the list. The number of votes of the person of each list who would receive the hypothetical additional mandate is compared, i.e. the top person of each list not elected with the mandates already distributed. The list receives the additional mandate on which, of those compared, the person who has received the largest number of personal votes is to be found.
29 The distribution of the remainder according to the largest number of personal votes is not a proportional representation election, but follows the classic pattern of an election of persons in the majority system. This does not comply with the constitutional principle of proportional representation in itself. Just as in the case of the residual allocation rule according to the largest number of party votes, it is decisive for the constitutionality of this rule that it is only applied in absolutely exceptional cases if all proportional mandate allocation rules do not lead to a clear allocation of the mandate in question.
7. Para. 1 lit. f: Residual allocation by drawing lots
30 As a final "catch-all rule", the PRA provides for the drawing of lots between several lists if they have both the same highest quotient and remainder and their party votes and the candidate votes of the person in question are equal. The drawing of lots must be ordered by the competent authority and carried out manually.
31 It is obvious that drawing lots does not realize any representational ideas in the composition of parliament - whether in the sense of proportional representation or majority. Instead, chance decides. Once again, it must be pointed out that this case will occur extremely rarely. At the same time, an election must necessarily lead to a result, which this regulation guarantees. This legislative arrangement is therefore also constitutional.
B. Para. 2: Distribution of mandates in succession
32 Para. 1 already states that all mandates undistributed after the initial distribution shall be distributed individually and successively in accordance with the rules described above. Para. 2 repeats this principle.
I would like to thank Prof. em. Dr. Friedrich Pukelsheim and Prof. Dr. Grégoire Nicollier for their helpful explanations of the mathematical principles. I would also like to thank Elias Studer (MLaw), Joey Jüstrich and Matthias Zinniker, assistant professors at the Center for Democracy Aarau, for their stimulating comments, assistance in researching the material and reviewing the text.
Materials
Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Wahl des Nationalrates nach dem Grundsatze der Proportionalität vom 26.11.1918, BBl 1918 V S. 121 ff. (zit. Botschaft NWG).
Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung zu einem Bundesgesetz über die politischen Rechte vom 9.4.1975, BBl 1975 I S. 1317 ff. (zit. Botschaft BPR 1975).
Botschaft über eine Teiländerung der Bundesgesetzgebung über die politischen Rechte vom 1.9.1993, BBl 1993 III S. 445 ff. (zit. Botschaft BPR-Revision 1993).
Bericht des Bundesrats an den Nationalrat über die Nationalratswahlen für die 51. Legislaturperiode vom 13.11.2019, BBl 2019 S. 7461 ff. (zit. Bericht Nationalratswahlen 2019).
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Weber Anina, Schweizerisches Wahlrecht und die Garantie der politischen Rechte – Eine Untersuchung ausgewählter praktischer Probleme mit Schwerpunkt Proporzwahlen und ihre Vereinbarkeit mit der Bundesverfassung, Zürich 2016.