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- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
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- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
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- Art. 35 FADP
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- Art. 72a FADP
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FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. History of origin
- II. Context
- III. Specific participation rights of the cantons in foreign policy decisions
- Recommended further reading
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. History of origin
1 In the course of the acceleration of the European integration process and in particular the negotiations for Switzerland's accession to the European Economic Area (EEA), it became clear how strongly the responsibilities of the cantons can be affected by international treaties. As part of the EEA negotiations, the involvement of the cantons was therefore strengthened by relying on the then existing federal-cantonal contact committee for coordination. However, the close interdependence made it clear that greater institutionalization of cantonal involvement was necessary. Accordingly, the cantons would have been granted information and participation rights under constitutional law upon accession and with regard to the implementation and further development of EEA law. In this way, information and consultation at short notice and greater cantonal participation in the Confederation's European policy would have been constitutionally guaranteed. However, the Federal Council already stated in its dispatch on EEA accession that the involvement of the cantons was self-evident anyway. Consequently, it only considered "[a]fter political, not legal reasons [...] a constitutional provision on the consultation rights of the cantons to be opportune."
2 After the failure of EEA accession at the ballot box, the Federal Council and the cantonal governments agreed to continue cooperation in accordance with the constitutional provision proposed at the time in the Federal Decree on the EEA of October 9, 1992. The Federal Council subsequently agreed to examine the creation of a legal basis for cantonal participation in foreign policy. In doing so, it followed the proposal of the Conference of Cantonal Governments (KdK), which had been constituted in the meantime and suggested the establishment of a working group with equal representation from the Confederation and the cantons for this purpose. With the help of the Institute for Federalism at the University of Fribourg, the joint working group on cantonal participation then drew up a draft federal law on cantonal participation in foreign policy. At the request of the KdK, the spirit of the draft was provisionally applied from fall 1996 and thus before it came into force. The Federal Assembly only passed the Federal Act in 1999 after extensive discussions. At the heart of the parliamentary debate was the questionable necessity of the federal law. Following Montesquieu's dictum that "[...] les lois inutiles affaiblissent les lois nécessaires [...]", it was argued that cooperation was already working well in practice on the basis of existing law and that the new constitutional article already contained all the important points on participation. In the final vote on December 22, 1999, however, both the National Council and the Council of States clearly approved the draft law. The Federal Act on the Participation of the Cantons in Foreign Policy (BGMK) came into force on July 1, 2000.
3 As part of the total revision of the Federal Constitution, the cantons' participation rights were initially introduced as a variant of the general provision on competence in foreign affairs. The proposed variant largely corresponded to the constitutional provision contained in the Federal Decree on the EEA of October 9, 1992. In the 1996 draft constitution, the cantonal participation rights were then transferred to an independent constitutional provision. As this was an existing practice that was to be enshrined in the constitution, the proposal in its form did not represent a legal policy innovation. The parliamentary debates showed a high level of approval for the Federal Council's draft. The only substantive change was the deletion of Art. 50 para. 3 VE (1996), according to which the cantons must implement those international obligations of Switzerland that fall within their area of responsibility. The deletion was justified by the fact that the cantons' general duty to implement federal law, which also includes international law, was already enshrined elsewhere and in principle in the draft constitution.
II. Context
A. Significance
4 The comprehensive federal competence in the area of foreign affairs is undisputed today due to its positive legal anchoring in Art. 54 para. 1 FC. In the early years of the federal state, however, this area was still the subject of a largely unresolved competence dispute. The Confederation followed the principle of "unity of the members of the Confederation externally, independence of the same internally", which is why it concluded numerous agreements in areas that were the responsibility of the cantons internally. However, individual cantons were not willing to accept such comprehensive federal competence: "The peripheral cantons of Ticino, Baselland and Geneva in particular repeatedly lobbied against the federal spike." The resistance of individual cantons was clearly demonstrated by the 1864 treaty between Switzerland and France, in which the Confederation disregarded the constitutional order of competences applicable to internal relations by granting freedom of establishment to all French nationals without distinction and with the provisions on the protection of the intellectual property of French artists. Subsequently, both the government of the canton of Basel-Landschaft lodged a complaint and a petition in the canton of Geneva complained that the constitutionally guaranteed order of jurisdiction had been violated. This ultimately called into question the applicability of the relevant international treaties. Such nullification efforts, through which the cantons, for example, complained about the unconstitutionality of international treaties, were the actual trigger for the primacy of international law as it is found today in Art. 190 FC.
5 As a result of the considerable expansion of legislative powers at federal level in the course of the 20th century, the asymmetry between the power to conclude treaties and the power to legislate was weakened. International treaties increasingly affected areas that were directly related to federal competences. With the exception of civil and criminal procedural law, which were only harmonized in the new millennium, there were still substantial points of reference to cantonal competences in the areas of (double) taxation, culture, education and criminal prosecution. The federal tension only became apparent again in the course of the qualitative and quantitative increase in the importance of international law. The focus was on increasing European integration, which had an impact on numerous cantonal areas of responsibility. As explained at the beginning (see n. 1 ff.), this then led to the institutionalization and constitutionalization of cantonal participation rights, as they are laid down today in Art. 55 FC and in the BGMK.
6 The constitutional-historical context makes it clear that the genesis of Art. 55 FC is closely linked to the development of a comprehensive federal competence to conclude international treaties. It also shows that the significance of the rights of participation lies in a partial compensation of the comprehensive competence of the Confederation in foreign affairs. This is because, due to the centralization of foreign power currently enshrined in Art. 54 para. 1 FC and the associated comprehensive power to conclude treaties, the Confederation can go beyond what is constitutionally granted to it domestically through its legislative powers in the matters to be regulated. From a federalist point of view, there is a risk that the domestic distribution of competences will be gradually undermined via the detour of international treaties. For this reason, the Confederation has always exercised federalist restraint when international treaties affect the competences of the cantons. Today, it is expressly obliged to exercise this courtoisie fédéraliste in Art. 54 para. 3 FC. Art. 55 FC then provides the instruments with which the Confederation's duty of consideration set out in Art. 54 para. 3 FC is to be implemented in concrete terms. In this way, the instruments laid down in Art. 55 FC and in the BGMK serve as a concrete form of a federal counterweight to the comprehensive power to conclude treaties.
B. Purpose
7 The purpose of cantonal participation rights is expressly - but not exhaustively - defined in Art. 2 BGMK. Participation is intended to ensure that cantonal interests are taken into account in the preparation and implementation of federal foreign policy decisions (lit. a). This is intended to ensure that cantonal interests are included at an early stage in federal foreign policy projects that are of importance to the cantons.
8 Participation should also help to ensure that the responsibilities of the cantons are safeguarded as far as possible when international treaties are concluded, amended or terminated (b). This is intended to prevent or at least reduce the threat of the cantons losing jurisdiction as a result of increasing international interdependence.
9 In addition to the effective protection of cantonal interests and responsibilities, the participation structures should also ensure better domestic support for the Confederation's foreign policy (lit. c). Close coordination with the cantons in the preparation of decisions makes sense, not least because they are generally responsible for the implementation of international treaties with legislative provisions.
C. Barrier
10 The solution chosen in Art. 55 FC for cantonal involvement in the Confederation's foreign policy cannot fully compensate for the Confederation's comprehensive competence in foreign affairs. Compensation exists only to the extent that the cantons are granted constitutional rights of participation in the foreign policy of the Confederation. As a limit, Art. 1 para. 3 BGMK therefore also stipulates that participation must not impair the Confederation's ability to act in foreign policy. In principle, this already follows from the constitutional division of powers in the area of foreign affairs. By mentioning this restriction, however, the BGMK expressly defines the framework of what is legally permissible.
11 The cantons have neither a right to issue instructions nor a right to co-decide on foreign policy decisions that concern their competences or affect their essential interests. The Confederation can therefore "[...] if necessary, also take decisions that do not correspond to the ideas of the cantons." The function of Art. 55 FC is thus limited to creating participation structures in the preparation of foreign policy decisions. This ultimately expresses a cooperative understanding of federalism that relies less on a strict delimitation of competences and more on cooperation in a spirit of partnership.
D. Implementation
12 With the enactment of the BGMK, the constitutional principles of participation proposed in the course of the EEA negotiations, which later found their way into Art. 55 FC, were implemented in law. However, the implementation at the legislative level hardly goes beyond the constitutional guarantees of participation in Art. 55 FC. Accordingly, the statutory provisions have little independent normative content. Concretizations of Art. 55 FC can occasionally be seen in the fact that the domestic support of the Confederation's foreign policy is listed as an additional purpose (Art. 2 lit. c BGMK) and that the Confederation has a duty to give reasons if it deviates from the opinions of the cantons within the framework of the special weighting under Art. 55 para. 3 FC (Art. 4 para. 3 BGMK). Other differences are that the BGMK expressly names the Confederation's ability to act in foreign policy as a barrier to cantonal participation (Art. 1 para. 3 BGMK) and that a reciprocal duty to provide information is provided for (Art. 3 para. 1 BGMK).
13 The agreement between the Confederation and the cantons on the implementation, application and development of the Schengen/Dublin acquis provides a more concrete example of this in practice (see n. 17). In an overarching assessment, however, it should be noted that the open and undefined formulations of the rights of participation in Art. 55 FC and in the BGMK hardly allow any concrete specifications to be derived for the normative design of the rights of participation. Both Art. 55 FC and its current concretization in the BGMK establish only weakly formalized forms of participation. This openness makes it possible to flexibly shape the degree of cantonal involvement with regard to the specific foreign policy decision and to make rapid adjustments in the event of a change in the foreign policy situation. However, the openness comes at the expense of a differentiated structure that could regulate the scope and timing of information, early involvement in exploration and a sufficient deadline for the submission and binding effect of opinions in a more substantial manner. The extent to which participation in the preparation of decisions is sufficient to effectively safeguard cantonal interests therefore depends primarily on the specific form of cooperation in practice.
E. Legal protection
14 Art. 55 FC is not a mandate to the legislature to enact implementing provisions. Despite their open formulation, the constitutional rights of participation in the form of information and consultation constitute justiciable legal claims, which is why they can be challenged even without statutory implementation. Disputes relating to cantonal participation rights (scope, content or modalities) fall under the action procedure pursuant to Art. 120 BGG. The direct route to the Federal Supreme Court is therefore open in accordance with Art. 189 para. 2 FC.
15 However, this does not guarantee effective legal protection for the enforcement of cantonal participation rights:
Firstly, the legal action procedure is considerably restricted by Art. 190 FC. Insofar as the disputed foreign policy decision has become binding under international law, it is subject to the primacy of international law. Even in the event of unconstitutionality, the Federal Supreme Court is obliged to apply international law. Art. 190 FC continues to fulfill its original federal purpose here (see n. 4).
Secondly, the action procedure is also largely undermined if a foreign policy decision is not yet binding under international law or is based on another form of foreign policy action. It is true that the priority of application of Art. 190 FC does not apply, which is why the action procedure is in principle open. However, it is questionable whether the duration of the legal proceedings offers effective legal protection in view of the autonomous nature of foreign policy. Decisions in foreign policy often require - at least outside of the ordinary treaty conclusion procedure - a rapid internal opinion-forming process. The adoption of precautionary measures will also often fail due to the fact that foreign policy decisions generally do not allow for a delay, either legally or factually.
Thirdly, due to the undefined legal terms used in Art. 55 FC, it will regularly be difficult to conclusively assess whether the scope, content or modalities of cantonal participation rights have been violated in practice. This was demonstrated in the so-called Libya affair: the diplomatic crisis was triggered by the arrest of Hannibal Gaddafi, son of the then Libyan revolutionary leader, and his wife by the Geneva police. As a result, two Swiss citizens were detained in Libya for months. As part of the efforts to secure the release of the last Swiss citizen detained in Libya, the then President of the Swiss Confederation signed an agreement with Libya on August 20, 2009, which provided, among other things, for the circumstances of the arrest in Geneva to be investigated by an international court of arbitration. While the KdK was of the opinion that the constitutional rights of participation of the affected canton of Geneva had been violated by the unilateral action of the then President of the Swiss Confederation, the Control Committee of the Council of States left the question open with reference to two legal opinions that came to the opposite conclusion.
16 The most likely way to strengthen legal protection de lege ferenda would be to introduce a submission and preliminary review procedure before the Federal Supreme Court. Meanwhile, it seems more obvious that disputes between the Confederation and the cantons regarding participation rights should be settled through selective negotiation and mediation, even though this by no means guarantees that participation rights will be respected in the future.
F. European integration
17 With regard to the Schengen Association Agreement and the Dublin Association Agreement, the Confederation and the cantons have laid down the rights of participation in a framework agreement. The agreement specifies the principles of participation set out in Art. 55 FC and the BGMK with regard to the implementation and adoption of further developments of the Schengen/Dublin acquis. On the one hand, this step was necessary due to the special nature of the agreements: the agreements require a dynamic adoption of further developments, which is why they also grant Switzerland the opportunity to have a say (decision shaping) in the drafting of new legal acts by the European Union. On the other hand, Schengen cooperation primarily affects cantonal competences such as police and judicial sovereignty. This resulted in the need to make cooperation and procedures between the Confederation and the cantons in this area efficient and transparent. For example, the framework agreement regulates the immediate transmission of information, internal coordination of opinions, the participation of the cantons in the joint committees and the EU working groups as well as conflict resolution in the event of disputes arising from the framework agreement.
18 Efforts to make general cooperation in European policy transparent and coordinated led to the agreement on the European Dialogue in 2012. This regulates the political dialog between the Confederation and the cantons on European issues and establishes a permanent leading political body for the exchange of information. The agreement may contribute to better strategic coordination at the political level, but it does not strengthen the specific rights of participation under Art. 55 FC with regard to specific foreign policy decisions.
19 If the institutional framework agreement with the EU had been concluded, the Federal Council would have requested the adoption of two motions with the same wording. These called for the creation of a legal basis to guarantee cantonal participation in the dynamic adoption of EU law. Following the Federal Council's decision not to sign the institutional framework agreement, a postulate demanded that the Federal Council should continue to examine the general options for binding cantonal participation in foreign policy decisions. However, with reference to Art. 54 and Art. 55 of the FC, the Federal Council requested that the postulate be rejected; the Council of States followed this request.
20 The various agreements and political initiatives show that relations with the EU represent a constant challenge for the safeguarding of cantonal participation rights. Cantonal responsibilities and interests are permanently and strongly affected; cooperation and coordination must be carried out under great pressure to adapt in terms of content and timing, which is particularly evident in the case of dynamic adoption. On the basis of Art. 55 FC and the BGMK, this challenge can be met by concretizing cooperation and procedures. Such concretization - as in the case of Schengen/Dublin with the framework agreement - allows for close, transparent and swift coordination between the Confederation and the cantons. Particularly in relation to the EU, however, the question arises as to whether the participation rights provided for in the Constitution and the BGMK enable the cantons' responsibilities and interests to be effectively safeguarded. The cantons must actually and legally be able to effectively introduce their concerns into the foreign policy decision-making process. If the cantonal system of competences threatens to be restricted by increasing institutional and supranational interdependence, the federalist balance must be restored by dynamically adapting the established mechanisms and participation structures. Such an adjustment would require, for example, a stronger involvement of the cantons in terms of both content and personnel or the creation of new forms of participation. If mere participation in the preparation of decisions is no longer sufficient to effectively safeguard interests, an adjustment of the legal framework is not ruled out, but is in fact necessary. Demands such as the creation of a new legal basis or a more binding participation of the cantons, which were raised during and after the failed institutional framework agreement, may therefore become more important again in the future.
III. Specific participation rights of the cantons in foreign policy decisions
A. Principle of participation (para. 1)
21 Art. 55 para. 1 FC enshrines the constitutional principle that the cantons may participate in the preparation of foreign policy decisions insofar as these relate to their competences or affect their essential interests. In para. 1, in addition to the group of addressees and the sponsors, the material scope of participation is also defined by determining the subject matter (foreign policy decisions) and the conditions for participation (whether competences or essential interests are affected). Finally, the temporal scope of application of the constitutional provision is defined by specifying that the cantons participate in the preparation of decisions.
1. Addressees and holders of participation rights
22 The addressees of Art. 55 FC are the federal bodies that take foreign policy decisions. Due to its general foreign policy management function under Art. 184 FC, the Federal Council is primarily addressed. The Federal Council and the Federal Administration under its authority are therefore obliged to involve the cantons in the preparation of foreign policy decisions that affect the competence of the cantons or their essential interests by informing and consulting them. The Federal Assembly is also a norm addressee if it makes a foreign policy decision in its area of responsibility. For example, the Federal Assembly can adopt policy and planning resolutions in the area of foreign policy (Art. 28 para. 2 and 3 ParlA). In general, it should be noted that the cantons are often involved before the parliamentary procedure is initiated. Accordingly, they usually have the opportunity to express their views on a specific foreign policy issue at the stage of preparing a decision for the Federal Council. Biaggini therefore also emphasizes that the obligation to be consulted in the parliamentary procedure is updated in particular if there are more than just minor changes compared to the Federal Council's original proposals.
23 The individual cantons are responsible for the rights of participation. The 1996 draft constitution still provided for the Confederation to inform the cantons or their joint organizations comprehensively and in good time and to obtain their opinion. However, the Federal Assembly removed the reference to the joint organizations from the draft constitution. The main reason for this was that these joint organizations - primarily the KdK - should not be constitutionalized. Rather, it is up to the organizational autonomy of the cantons to determine whether and in what form recourse to joint structures is appropriate in order to ensure the effective safeguarding of interests in the preparation of foreign policy decisions.
2. Foreign policy decisions
24 The term "foreign policy decisions" refers to participation in the Confederation's foreign policy. Foreign policy represents the core of foreign affairs. Foreign affairs encompass all cross-border activities between the Swiss authorities and foreign, international or supranational subjects of international law as well as other actors in the international community; foreign policy, on the other hand, is defined more narrowly. It relates to the pursuit of Switzerland's political objectives and interests. The orientation of foreign policy is determined in a non-exhaustive manner by the objectives set out in Art. 54 para. 2 FC. As a result, the participation of the cantons extends only to the narrower concept of foreign policy and is thus limited to decisions in connection with the pursuit of Switzerland's foreign policy objectives and interests. Other acts or forms of action in foreign affairs, such as maintaining international contacts, consular affairs or administrative activities, are not covered.
25 The term "decision" is not defined in the Federal Constitution or the BGMK. There are therefore no specific requirements as to its material or formal nature. Waldmann also states that the term is not to be understood technically. In addition to involvement in the preparation and negotiation of international treaties, all other measures that aim to achieve a foreign policy decision are therefore also subject to cantonal participation rights. These include, for example, the adoption of resolutions by international organizations or the adoption of unilateral legal acts. As a result, Art. 55 FC gives the cantons a constitutional right to participate in the opinion-forming and decision-making process for all foreign policy decisions. This right must therefore also be safeguarded outside of the traditional procedures based on international treaties. For example, participation in other forms of international agreements, such as soft law, is also appropriate if the competences or essential interests of the cantons are affected.
3. Affecting competences or essential interests
26 The rights of participation under Art. 55 FC come into play if foreign policy decisions either affect cantonal competences or affect essential cantonal interests. If this is not the case, the cantons are not entitled to participation under Art. 55 FC. Nevertheless, the Confederation is free to apply the rights of participation under Art. 55 FC in such cases if it deems this appropriate. Art. 55 FC represents a constitutional minimum guarantee, which is why the Confederation can extend the rights of participation beyond Art. 55 FC.
27 With regard to cantonal competences, Art. 2 lit. b BGMK states that the participation of the cantons should contribute to safeguarding the competences of the cantons in the conclusion, amendment and termination of international treaties as far as possible. This formulation in the BGMK is too treaty-centered, even if international treaties may represent the main case of application. The guarantee of participation always applies if a foreign policy decision is likely to affect cantonal competences in terms of its content or impact. The determination of cantonal competences is based on Art. 3 FC. If the Constitution does not expressly assign an area of competence to the Confederation, the original cantonal legislative competences are affected. However, competences granted by federal law, such as enforcement and "minor foreign policy" pursuant to Art. 56 FC, may also be affected by a foreign policy decision. The extent to which a foreign policy decision affects cantonal competences is not always clear from the outset. If it only becomes apparent in the course of preparing the decision that cantonal responsibilities are affected, the cantons must be involved in the process without delay.
28 Involvement in the preparation of the decision does not require that cantonal responsibilities are affected. It is sufficient for a foreign policy decision to affect the essential interests of the cantons. This constellation applies to cases in which a foreign policy decision affects the competences of the Confederation, but at the same time affects the essential interests of the cantons. In any case, participation is justified if the foreign policy decision could undermine, damage or impair the constitutional position of the cantons. This is the case if the constitutional status of the cantons is affected or if the cantons' essential organizational, material and financial responsibilities are interfered with. Art. 1 para. 2 BGMK also states in an exemplary manner that the essential interests are affected if the foreign policy decision affects important implementation tasks of the cantons.
29 The concept of essential interests is in great need of concretization. In contrast to the link to cantonal responsibilities, it leaves room for opportunity considerations. In this regard, the dispatch on the BGMK states that the definition leaves room for the cantons to participate in other areas that are essential to them, whereby these areas would have to be identified in dialog and practical cooperation between the Confederation and the cantons. Since in practice it is up to the Confederation to decide on the materiality of the cantonal interests, it also de facto decides on their inclusion in the preparation of decisions.
4. Preparation of decisions
30 According to its wording, Art. 55 para. 1 FC refers to the phase of preparing foreign policy decisions. This includes the preparation and definition of negotiating mandates as well as the preparation of negotiations and the negotiations themselves. However, the preparation of decisions also includes all other processes that precede a foreign policy decision. Strategic decisions of principle, informal contacts and exploratory talks with foreign partners on the commencement of negotiations are therefore also covered by the rights of participation. The temporal limitation of cantonal participation rights to the preparation of decisions is also compatible with the purpose of the law, which requires early involvement in order to ensure that interests are effectively safeguarded (see n. 40). Sturny also derives the time restriction from the wording of Art. 4 para. 3 BGMK, according to which the Federal Council must take into account the opinions of the cantons. The focus on the Federal Council makes it clear that the Federal Council is the actual addressee of the cantons' participation rights and that the cantons' participation rights accordingly extend to the preparatory acts up to the conclusion of the treaty negotiations. Due to this temporal limitation, national approval, for example, is not part of the preparation of the decision and therefore does not fall within the scope of application of Art. 55 FC. Cantonal participation in the domestic approval process is based on the usual participation rights (see n. 32).
31 The decision preparation phase can be distinguished in two ways. It is preceded by the federal government's internal opinion-forming on general foreign policy issues, which is not already aimed at a foreign policy decision. Similarly, the cantons' rights of participation do not constitute co-decision-making powers. They therefore do not apply if the Confederation takes a decision at the decision-making stage as part of its comprehensive federal powers under Art. 54 FC, such as the ratification of an international treaty. Art. 55 FC does not give the cantons a right of veto. Accordingly, Art. 1 para. 3 BGMK stipulates that cantonal participation must not impair the Confederation's ability to act in foreign policy matters.
32 In the case of decisions with foreign policy implications, different forms of cantonal participation under constitutional law may apply. These forms of participation complement each other. In the case of domestic legal acts, the usual rights of participation under Art. 45 FC apply. These guarantee the cantons participation in legislation and other federal projects. For example, the participation of the cantons in the domestic approval or enactment of a federal act that implements an international treaty is governed by Art. 45 FC. Art. 147 FC also allows the cantons to participate in important international treaties as part of the consultation procedure, even if the interests of the cantons are not affected. The consultation procedure is usually carried out after negotiations have been concluded. The cantons are given another opportunity to comment at this time. However, neither Art. 45 FC nor the consultation procedure provide for any special weighting of the cantons' opinions. Both forms of cantonal participation are selective opinions that can no longer be used to influence the outcome of the negotiations or the content of the treaty. Art. 55 FC supplements these selective forms of participation by granting the cantons participation rights in advance - throughout the entire duration of the foreign policy decision-making process - insofar as their competences or essential interests are affected. Both the time of involvement and the special participation rights under para. 3 enable the cantons to influence foreign policy decisions in a way that goes beyond the other forms of participation.
B. Forms of participation rights (para. 2)
33 If a foreign policy decision affects the competences or essential interests of the cantons, they may participate in it. The cantons are entitled to participation rights directly under the Constitution. The effective exercise of participation rights is guaranteed in particular by the forms specified in Art. 55 para. 2 FC. The Confederation is obliged to inform the cantons comprehensively and in good time and to obtain their opinions. The content can be specified in a federal law (see BGMK) or in joint agreements.
1. Right to information
34 Art. 3 para. 1 BGMK specifies the federal government's duty to provide information set out in Art. 55 para. 2 FC. The legal provision states that the basis of cooperation is mutual information. Art. 3 para. 2 BGMK further states that the Confederation shall inform the cantons in a timely and comprehensive manner about foreign policy projects that affect the competences of the cantons or affect their essential interests. Timely and comprehensive information is of crucial importance as it is the only way to ensure effective cooperation.
35 The guiding principle is always the effective safeguarding of interests. Timely information in this sense means that information is provided early enough for the cantons to be able to effectively incorporate their interests and concerns into the decision-making process. The information should be forwarded directly and continuously to the cantons. From the point of view of effectively safeguarding interests, it is not appropriate to withhold information until a certain point in time for strategic reasons. Although at the beginning of institutionalized participation rights there may have been occasional mistrust of the generous disclosure of information, this should no longer be an obstacle after many years of established practice. Moreover, Art. 6 BGMK guarantees sufficient confidentiality of the information.
36 The determination of the scope of the information is also based on the effective protection of interests. In this regard, Art. 55 para. 2 FC states that the Confederation shall provide the cantons with comprehensive information. This includes, among other things, the exchange of relevant data, political analyses and up-to-date information on ongoing negotiations and international agreements. In the French-language version, the expression "[...] de manière détaillée [...]" is used in this context, which expresses the fact that comprehensive information also includes details. As a result, the scope must include all relevant information, documents and data that are important for effective participation and safeguarding of interests.
37 In order to effectively incorporate the interests of the cantons into the decision-making process, not only the necessary amount of information is required, but also the capacity to evaluate and process the information. The federal government should not overload the cantons with too much information. However, it is up to the cantons to (jointly) create the appropriate channels and bodies to ensure effective participation on the basis of the information received. In this context, participation rights can be understood not only as a consequence of the centralization of foreign policy, but also as a reflection of the centralization shift from the parliamentary to the executive level. This is because the KdK is in charge of foreign policy projects. As a rule, it is responsible for information and consultation. The KdK also ensures information and coordination between the cantonal governments and the directors' conferences. Furthermore, the cantons' information officers in the Europe Division of the State Secretariat of the FDFA and at the Swiss Mission to the EU ensure the daily flow of information. In practice, these interfaces are important for early and close coordination and an indispensable reciprocal flow of information between the Confederation and the cantons as well as between the cantons.
2. Consultation of the cantons
38 Pursuant to Art. 55 para. 2 FC, the Confederation is obliged to obtain opinions from the cantons if foreign policy decisions affect their competences or essential interests. If the cantons are affected within the meaning of para. 1, the Confederation must obtain the cantons' opinions through consultations on its own initiative. If it fails to do so, the cantons may request a consultation at any time or submit a statement without being requested to do so. However, they are not obliged to submit a statement. At the legislative level, Art. 4 para. 1 BGMK stipulates that the Confederation shall consult the cantons at their request when preparing foreign policy decisions that affect cantonal competences or affect essential cantonal interests (sentence 1). Furthermore, the Confederation may also consult the cantons on its own initiative (sentence 2) if it considers this to be appropriate, as stated in the dispatch. According to Fassbender, Art. 4 para. 1 BGMK with this wording "[...] does not comply with the constitutional provision [...]". Waldmann also states that "[t]he concretization [...] in the light of Art. 55 FC already has a restrictive effect [...]." From a constitutional point of view, the wording in Art. 4 para. 1 BGMK is indeed objectionable. As soon as the legal prerequisite is met (competences or essential interests affected), the Confederation is obliged to grant the cantons participation in accordance with Art. 55 FC. The legal provision does not exclude participation. However, it does indicate that the cantons will only be consulted if necessary ("[...] if they so request [...]") or based on considerations of opportunity (expediency). In view of the constitutional entitlement under Art. 55 FC, this formulation is too restrictive.
39 As with the timing and scope of the duty to inform, the specific form of the duty to consult is determined by the effective safeguarding of interests. The cantons must be granted sufficient time to submit their comments. A tight deadline due to high foreign policy urgency must be the exception. A short deadline must not mean that the cantons are in fact no longer in a position to comment at all. When determining the deadline, the complexity of the foreign policy project must be taken into account, as well as the fact that consolidation via the joint institutional bodies takes time.
40 An effective safeguarding of interests requires open consultation on the content at a time when the cantons can actually still assert their influence and their points of criticism with regard to foreign policy decision-making. If the foreign policy plans include negotiations, the consultation should, as a rule, take place prior to their commencement in accordance with Art. 4 para. 2 BGMK. This allows the views of the cantons to be incorporated into the definition of the negotiating mandate and into the negotiations. Consultation exclusively at the time of the national approval procedure would not be sufficient to effectively safeguard interests. The text of the agreement is then already binding, which is why changes to the content can no longer be made. The federal government can no longer take the interests of the cantons into account at this point. Only consultation prior to the start of negotiations allows the cantons to exert their influence in a targeted manner on foreign policy decisions that affect their competences or essential interests. In addition, this procedure allows the Confederation to adapt the mandate in such a way that it is more broadly supported by the cantons in terms of domestic policy (Art. 2 lit. c BGMK). Finally, the early timing ensures that the cantons' concerns are not only heard at the political level, but are also actually taken into account at the technical level and thus at the administrative level of the Confederation.
41 With regard to the binding effect, an obligation to take note can be derived from Art. 55 FC. This is confirmed in Art. 4 para. 3 BGMK, according to which the Federal Council takes into account the opinions of the cantons. The binding effect is tantamount to an obligation de moyen, which requires the federal government to deal with the cantonal opinions in the decision-making process, without this resulting in a substantive obligation to comply. The obligation to take note arises from the fact that the participation of the cantons does not constitute a right to issue instructions or co-decide, which it would be if there were an obligation to comply with the content. It cannot therefore anticipate any substantive decision in the area of foreign policy. The constitutional order of competences in foreign policy, which grants the Confederation comprehensive competence and assigns the Federal Council the general foreign policy management function, grants the Confederation, as the decision-maker, a corresponding margin of discretion.
C. Special rights of participation (para. 3)
42 Art. 55 para. 3 FC provides for special rights of participation if a foreign policy decision affects the competences of the cantons. In these cases, the Constitution requires, firstly, that the cantons' opinion be given special weight and, secondly, that the cantons participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner. In contrast, these special rights of participation do not apply if a foreign policy decision only affects the cantons' essential interests.
1. Qualified right of consideration
43 The opinions are accorded special weight if a foreign policy decision affects the constitutional competences of the cantons. The special weighting may arise for various reasons: On the one hand, a special weighting may be indicated by the degree of involvement: The more the cantonal competences are affected by a decision, the more weight must be given to the opinions of the cantons. On the other hand, special weighting also results from the degree of unity: if the cantons speak with one voice or if an opinion is supported by a large majority of the cantons, it must also be given special weight. A joint opinion on behalf of the cantonal governments is issued if it is supported by at least 18 cantonal governments. The special weight of the cantonal opinions is reflected in the fact that they must be given special consideration in the decision-making process in relation to the foreign policy interests of the Confederation. The opinions of the cantons must also be given special weight vis-à-vis other actors and interested parties who express themselves in the context of foreign policy decision-making.
44 The special weighting does not translate into a substantive obligation to comply. It does not constitute an obligation de résultat that obliges the Confederation to comply with the content of the cantons' opinions. However, the federal government has a constitutional duty to take note of the opinions and to attach great weight to them when making decisions. However, it can deviate from the opinions, as these are not binding. In the case of the total revision of the Federal Constitution, the KdK demanded an obligation to comply with the content in the event that the cantons express a uniform opinion within the framework of a statement. Such a binding effect was not included in the constitutional provision. With the special weighting of cantonal opinions, the Constitution does not impose a limit on foreign policy decision-making, but rather provides the Confederation with a qualified criterion for exercising its discretion. Art. 4 para. 3 BGMK stipulates that the Confederation shall inform the cantons of the reasons if it deviates from the opinions within the framework of the special weighting pursuant to Art. 55 para. 3 FC. This serves the transparent presentation of the reasons for the Confederation's decision and enables a subsequent review of the appropriateness of the reasons that prompted the Confederation to take a particular foreign policy decision.
45 With regard to cantonal participation in European affairs, the KdK continues to call for an increased binding effect in its position statement from 2013. According to the proposal, the Confederation should only be able to deviate from a uniform or majority opinion for overriding foreign policy reasons. A similar provision can be found in Germany (Art. 23 para. 5 GG) and Austria (Art. 23d para. 2 B-VG) with regard to European policy. Such a relative binding effect does not currently result from either Art. 55 FC or the BGMK. However, Waldmann rightly points out that such a binding effect would be compatible with the normative meaning and content of Art. 55 FC. It would not yet lead to a cantonal power of co-decision or a right of veto. It would also not diminish the Confederation's ability to act in foreign policy, as it could continue to act swiftly in cases of foreign policy urgency and on the basis of overriding foreign policy reasons and deviate from cantonal positions. However, a relative binding effect would first have to be introduced by means of a statutory specification.
2. Right to participate in negotiations
46 If a foreign policy decision affects the constitutional competences of the cantons, they may participate in international negotiations in an appropriate manner in accordance with Art. 55 para. 3 sentence 2 FC. Depending on the subject matter, the negotiating mandate must be formulated flexibly and openly. In such cases, it is not sufficient to effectively protect the concerns of the cantons by involving them in the definition of the negotiating mandate. Rather, the cantons must have the opportunity to have their concerns directly incorporated into the negotiations. The cantonal representatives can contribute the cantons' experience and expertise to the negotiations, which ultimately leads to negotiated solutions that are more firmly anchored in domestic policy and allow for easier implementation.
47 Art. 55 para. 3 FC speaks of participation in negotiations in an appropriate manner. This refers to both the modalities and the form as well as the intensity of participation. This refers to aspects such as the number of representatives of the cantons who participate in the negotiating delegation, the manner in which these representatives are selected, the delegation of the leadership of the delegation to the cantons and, finally, the duration of the involvement and thus the question of whether the representatives should participate in each individual negotiating session or only selectively. The form and intensity of participation must ultimately enable an effective representation of interests.
48 In contrast, the right to participation in and of itself is not a question of suitability. Both the constitutional text and the legal text are too restrictive in this respect. Art. 5 para. 1 BGMK specifies that the Confederation shall "[...] as a rule [...]" involve representatives of the cantons in foreign policy projects that affect the competences of the cantons. However, cantonal participation may only be refused in exceptional cases. Art. 5 para. 2 BGMK also allows the Confederation to involve the cantons, even if their responsibilities are not affected. In these cases, however, the cantons are not entitled to participate.
49 Pursuant to Art. 5 para. 3 BGMK, the Confederation appoints the representatives on the proposal of the cantons. The selection procedure ensures that the interests of the Confederation and the cantons are taken into account in the selection process. As participation should take place in an appropriate manner, the cantons are not entitled to one representative per canton. A negotiating delegation that is too large would have a negative impact on the efficiency of the negotiations. The cantons must therefore coordinate closely so that either individual representatives or a small group can represent several or even all cantons. The cantons can draw on existing institutional structures and joint organizations such as the KdK to coordinate and determine the proposal. As far as can be seen, this is how it is handled, as can be seen from the Canton of Zurich's 2019-2022 external relations report. It states that the representatives are each mandated by the KdK. For example, the Canton of Zurich is the cantonal representative on the Joint Committee on the Air Transport Agreement with the EU.
About the author
Doctoral candidate and lecturer in public law at the University of Fribourg.
Recommended further reading
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Pfisterer Thomas, Die Kantone mit dem Bund in der EU-Zusammenarbeit, Art. 54 Abs. 3, Art. 55 und 56 BV und deren Anwendung auf die bilateralen Verträge, Zürich/St. Gallen 2014.
Portmann Roland, Foreign Affairs Federalism in Switzerland, in: Bradley Curtis A. (Hrsg.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law, New York 2019, S. 297–313.
Sturny Thiemo, Mitwirkungsrechte der Kantone an der Aussenpolitik des Bundes, Diss. Freiburg, Freiburg 1998.
Waldmann Bernhard, Schranken der Bundeskompetenz in auswärtigen Angelegenheiten aus föderalistischer Sicht, in: Waldmann Bernhard/Hänni Peter/Belser Eva Maria (Hrsg.), Föderalismus 2.0 – Denkanstösse und Ausblicke, Fédéralisme 2.0 – Réflexions et perspectives, Bern 2011, S. 153–220.
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Bericht des Bundesrates in Erfüllung des Postulats Hans Fehr 10.3857 vom 1.10.2010. Konsequenzen des Schengen-Anpassungszwangs, BBl 2013 6319 ff. (zit. Schengen-Bericht 2013).
Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung, betreffend die Verträge mit Frankreich, BBl 1864 II 253 ff. (zit. Botschaft Verträge mit Frankreich 1864).
Botschaft des Bundesrates an die vereinigte Bundesversammlung, betreffend die von der Regierung von Basel-Landschaft an französische Israeliten verweigerte Niederlassung, BBl 1865 III 801 ff. (zit. Botschaft Basel-Landschaft 1865).
Botschaft zur Genehmigung des Abkommens über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum vom 18.5.1992, BBl 1992 IV 1 ff. (zit. Botschaft EWR).
Botschaft über das Folgeprogramm nach der Ablehnung des EWR-Abkommens vom 24.2.1993, BBl 1993 I 805 ff. (zit. Botschaft Folgeprogramm 1993).
Botschaft über eine neue Bundesverfassung vom 20.11.1996, BBl 1997 I 1 ff. (zit. Botschaft BV).
Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die Mitwirkung der Kantone an der Aussenpolitik des Bundes vom 15.12.1997, BBl 1998 II 1163 ff. (zit. Botschaft BGMK).
Botschaft zur Genehmigung der bilateralen Abkommen zwischen der Schweiz und der Europäischen Union, einschliesslich der Erlasse zur Umsetzung der Abkommen («Bilaterale II»), BBl 2004 5965 ff. (zit. Botschaft Bilaterale II).
Bundesbeschluss über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR) vom 9.10.1992, BBl 1992 VI 56 f. (zit. Bundesbeschluss EWR).
Bundesbeschluss über den UNO-Migrationspakt (Entwurf), BBl 2021 360 (zit. Entwurf Bundesbeschluss UNO-Migrationspakt).
Europabericht 2006, BBl 2006 6815 ff. (zit. Europabericht 2006).
KdK, Innerstaatliche Reformen zur Festigung der föderalistischen und demokratischen Staatsorganisation im Rahmen der Europapolitik des Bundes, Positionsbezug der Kantonsregierungen, 24.6.2011, https://kdk.ch/fileadmin/redaktion/themen/europapolitik/standortbestimmung/2_positionsbezug_vom_24_juni_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD5E-6FRJ], besucht am 7.3.2024 (zit. KdK, Positionsbezug 2011).
KdK, Positionsbezug zu den innerstaatlichen Reformen, Stellungnahme vom 13.12.2013, https://kdk.ch/fileadmin/redaktion/aktuell/stellungnahmen/stelg-innere_reformen-20131213.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5N5-KV4R], besucht am 7.3.2024 (zit. KdK, Positionsbezug 2013).
Reform der Bundesverfassung, Erläuterungen zum Verfassungsentwurf 1995, https://www.bj.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/staat/gesetzgebung/archiv/bundesverfassung/vn-ber-d.pdf [https://perma.cc/43WZ-GQQ9], besucht am 7.3.2024 (zit. Erläuterungen VE 1995).
Regierungsrat des Kantons Zürich, Bericht Aussenbeziehungen 2019–2022, Februar 2023, https://www.zh.ch/content/dam/zhweb/bilder-dokumente/organisation/staatskanzlei/aussenbeziehungen/Bericht_Aussenbeziehungen%202019-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z45Q-R74U], besucht am 7.3.2024 (zit. Kanton Zürich, Aussenbeziehungen 2019–2022).