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FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
FEDERAL ACT ON DIRECT FEDERAL TAX
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
FEDERAL ACT ON MEDICINAL PRODUCTS AND MEDICAL DEVICES
TAX HARMONISATION ACT
I. Origins
1 Article 64, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of May 29, 1874 (aCst.) first granted the Confederation the authority to legislate in certain areas of civil law or “substantive” private law, namely legal capacity, all matters of law relating to commerce and transactions involving movable property (law of obligations, including commercial law and exchange law), literary and artistic property, as well as debt collection and bankruptcy. The Confederation’s authority to legislate on the protection of industrial inventions, including designs and models, was added in 1887 and 1905. In 1898, the Confederation also obtained the authority to legislate on “other matters of [substantive] civil law” (Art. 64, para. 2, aCst.) . The entry into force of Art. 64, para. 1, of the Old Constitution in 1874 paved the way for the adoption of the Old Code of Obligations of June 14, 1881, as well as the Federal Act of April 11, 1889, on Debt Collection and Bankruptcy (DEBA). The introduction of Art. 64, para. 2 of the Old Constitution in 1898, in turn, paved the way for the adoption of the Civil Code of December 10, 1907 (CC) as well as for the revision of the aCO, leading to the adoption of the Code of Obligations of March 30, 1911 (CO).
2 Art. 64, para. 3 of the old Constitution provided that civil procedure remained a cantonal competence. The same applied to the organization of the judiciary and the administration of justice.
3 During the comprehensive constitutional revision that led to the Constitution of April 18, 1999, Art. 64 of the old Constitution (aCst.) was replaced by Art. 122. Paragraph 1 of that article provided that legislation concerning “substantive” civil law was a federal competence. Article 122, paragraph 2, provided that the organization of the judiciary, procedure, and the administration of justice in civil matters fell within the jurisdiction of the cantons. Finally, Article 122, paragraph 3, provided that civil judgments that had become final were enforceable throughout Switzerland.
4 Following the 1999 judicial reform, the Confederation gained the authority to legislate on civil procedure. As part of this reform, paragraph 3 of Art. 122 of the Constitution—whose usefulness had become questionable following the unification of substantive civil law (N. 1)—was repealed. Article 122 in its current form entered into force on January 1, 2007, and now provides that “legislation in matters of civil law and civil procedure falls within the jurisdiction of the Confederation” (para. 1) and that “the organization of the courts and the administration of justice in civil matters fall within the jurisdiction of the cantons, unless otherwise provided by law” (para. 2).
II. Background
5 The phased development (N. 1–4) of the unification of civil law (substantive and procedural) perfectly illustrates the Swiss conception of federalism, according to which original sovereignty belongs to the cantons and not to the Confederation. The cantons delegate their powers to the Confederation only when absolutely necessary. The fact that original sovereignty belongs to the cantons is also expressed in Art. 3 of the Constitution (supplemented by Arts. 42–43a of the Constitution) as well as in Art. 5a of the Constitution. The Confederation has only those powers assigned to it by the Constitution, and the cantons exercise all prerogatives not delegated to the Confederation. The same principle applies, for example, in Germany and Austria, whereas Canada, for instance, operates under precisely the opposite mechanism.
6 Given its major importance in the conduct of private economic activities, we believe it is justified that civil law (like criminal law [Art. 123 of the Constitution]) be subject to uniform regulation at the federal level rather than being governed by 26 disparate cantonal regimes. In the field of civil law, however, the Confederation enjoys only “concurrent legislative authority not limited to principles” or “concurrent authority with subsequent derogatory effect” ([konkurrierende] Bundeskompetenz mit nachträglich derogierender Kraft/nachträglich derogierende Bundeskompetenz) . This means that the mere conferral of legislative authority on the Confederation in matters of civil law (substantive and procedural) does not immediately result in the termination of cantonal authority in this area. As we shall see, the Confederation has made full use of its authority in both substantive civil law (N. 7) and civil procedure (N. 22).
III. Commentary Proper
A. Federal Jurisdiction in Civil Law (Art. 122, para. 1, 1st part, Const.)
1. General Remarks
7 As we have seen (N. 1 and N. 3), the Confederation has, since 1898, had full authority to legislate in the area of substantive civil law. The Confederation has fully exercised its authority in this area by enacting the Swiss Civil Code (CC) and the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO), as well as various other special laws in the field of private law (e.g., the Federal Act of August 28, 1992, on the Protection of Trademarks [LPM] or the Federal Act of December 19, 1986, against Unfair Competition [LCD]).
8 Consequently, the cantons may now adopt civil law rules only to the extent that federal civil law reserves (explicitly or implicitly) cantonal legislative authority (Art. 5(1) CC). Such reservations conferring authority in favor of cantonal law are found, for example, in Art. 688 CC, which authorizes the cantons to determine the distance that landowners are required to maintain between their plantations, or in Art. 359(2) of the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO), which requires the cantons to enact standard employment contracts for agricultural workers and domestic staff.
9 On the other hand, the cantons retain, in principle, the authority to adopt provisions of cantonal public law (Art. 6(1) CC). The civil laws of the Confederation thus preserve cantonal jurisdiction in matters of public law. Although it cannot be reduced to this function alone, Art. 6, para. 1 CC thus has a declaratory value, insofar as it reiterates the principle set forth in Art. 3 of the Constitution, which provides that the cantons are sovereign to the extent that their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution. Cantonal public law may not, however, conflict with the spirit and purpose of federal civil law or even impede its application.
10 It is therefore important to clearly distinguish between private law and public law in order to determine what falls under federal jurisdiction and what falls under cantonal jurisdiction.
2. General Criteria for Distinguishing Between Civil Law and Public Law
11 In order to distinguish between private law provisions and public law provisions, case law and legal doctrine have developed several general criteria for distinction, namely:
The criterion of interests. According to this criterion, provisions whose purpose is exclusively or primarily to safeguard the public interest fall under public law. Provisions whose exclusive or primary objective is to protect private interests, on the other hand, fall under private law. For example, Art. 18 of the Federal Act of March 13, 1964, on Labor in Industry, Crafts, and Commerce (Labor Act [LTr]) falls under public law, since it aims to protect the general interest of workers by establishing a general prohibition on working on Sundays. Conversely, Articles 21 CO and 23–31 CO are provisions of private law, since they aim to protect the individual interests of the parties entering into a contract.
The functional criterion. According to this criterion, which is similar to the interest-based criterion, a provision falls under public law when it directly regulates the performance of a public function. Thus, provisions governing the activities of notaries in the exercise of public duties entrusted to them (e.g., the drafting of authentic instruments) fall under public law.
The subordination criterion. According to this criterion, public law provisions are those that confer on one party a legal position superior to that of the other, whereas private law provisions establish relationships in which the parties act legally on an equal footing. Thus, Art. 319 of the Swiss Civil Code (CO), for example, falls under private law, since this provision governs a situation in which the parties formally deal with each other as equals (regardless of whether, in practice, one party [in this case, the employer] holds a dominant position over the other [in this case, the employee]).
The Modal Criterion (or Sanction Criterion). According to this criterion, a provision falls under private law or public law depending on whether its violation results in a private-law sanction (e.g., the nullity of a legal act) or a public-law sanction (e.g., the revocation of a permit). Art. 26(2)(a) of the Act of December 16, 1983, on the Acquisition of Real Property by Foreigners (LFAIE) thus falls under private law, since this provision stipulates that a legal act performed without authorization is void.
12 According to the Federal Supreme Court, “none of these theories takes precedence a priori over the others […]. Rather, it is necessary to examine in each specific case which distinguishing criterion is most appropriate to the concrete circumstances.”
13 We may also mention other distinguishing criteria between private law and public law. However, these criteria are somewhat outdated today and are therefore primarily of historical interest:
The fiscal criterion. According to this criterion, property disputes between citizens and the government fall under private law, while other disputes fall under public law.
The subject criterion. According to this criterion, a relationship is considered to be one of public law when the State or a public-law entity is a party to said relationship.
The mandatory law criterion. According to this criterion, dispositive rules belong to private law, while mandatory rules belong to public law.
3. The Distinction Between Civil Law and Public Law Based on the Theory of Scope of Application
14 Private law can also be distinguished from public law using the so-called “theory of scope of application” (Sachbereichstheorie). This theory involves defining the areas that fall under civil law without focusing on the specific rules—which may therefore be either private or public law—that are then used to implement those areas. This approach was used in Art. 64, para. 1 of the former Constitution, which listed areas falling under private law and for which legislation was within the jurisdiction of the Confederation (N. 1).
15 The approach of defining civil law based on its areas of application has the advantage of reflecting the practical reality of private law. Indeed, private law contains a multitude of provisions that, although formally linked to civil law, substantively fall under public law. In this context, one speaks of “formal civil law” or “accessory public law ” (formelles Zivilrecht or ergänzendes öffentliches Recht). For example, the civil law governing foundations set forth in Articles 80 through 89a of the Swiss Civil Code (CC) also includes provisions addressing state supervision of private-law foundations, namely Articles 84–84b CC, which formally fall under public law.
4. Federal Practice in Private Law Based on the Typological Method
16 The general criteria set forth above (N. 11) do not allow for an effective distinction between provisions that fall under private law and those that fall under public law. Indeed, none of these criteria is sufficient on its own, as the Federal Supreme Court has acknowledged (N. 12). Furthermore, applying one criterion may lead to classifying a provision as private law, whereas applying another criterion may lead to classifying the same provision as public law. For example, Art. 8 of the Unfair Competition Act (LCD) is a rule of private law according to the criterion of subordination, since it concerns a situation in which neither party is legally subordinate to the other. Conversely, applying the criterion of interests would tend to classify Article 8 of the LCD as a rule of public law, given that this provision generally aims to protect consumers against the risks posed by pre-formulated contracts drawn up by professionals.
17 The theory of scope of application (N. 14) is also not entirely satisfactory. Indeed, this theory presupposes, first of all, that the areas to which private law applies are precisely enumerated. Furthermore, while the theory of scope of application could historically be based on Art. 64 aCst., the new wording of Art. 122(1) of the Constitution strips it of any basis.
18 This is why the federal authorities rely neither on general criteria nor on the theory of scope of application to delineate the Confederation’s jurisdiction in relation to the public law of the cantons. In fact, the Federal Office of Justice—whose approach is adopted by the Federal Council—interprets federal jurisdiction in civil law matters according to the so-called “typological” method” (typologische Methode). According to this approach, which constitutes an intermediate method, a provision is considered to be a matter of private law—and thus falls within federal jurisdiction under Art. 122(1) of the Constitution—when it defines the conditions for the autonomous development of private law, is traditionally related to the codification of private law, and pursues objectives that are typically within the scope of private law. All norms aimed at mitigating structural inequalities between contracting parties (protection of the weaker party) are also considered to be matters of private law. Areas that fall outside the scope of civil law’s objectives are therefore not covered by federal jurisdiction in civil law matters and thus require a special constitutional basis to justify federal intervention.
19 The typological method is therefore based on criteria similar to those underlying the theory of interests (N. 11). This method must be endorsed because the distinction between public law and private law necessarily requires a nuanced and pragmatic approach. And by taking into account the purpose pursued by the provision in question, the typological method is more in line with this approach.
20 The typological method can, for example, explain why the Confederation based the Federal Act on the Acquisition of Real Property by Persons Abroad (LFAIE) on the federal authority to legislate in matters of private law. Indeed, in the Message on the LFAIE, the Federal Council emphasizes that the restrictions contained in the LFAIE are sufficiently linked to a traditional area of private law—namely, property—to justify basing this law on Art. 64, para. 2, of the former Constitution (now Art. 122, para. 1, 1st part, of the Constitution) .
21 To the best of our knowledge, however, the typological method does not (yet) appear to have been expressly adopted in federal case law. Nevertheless, the Federal Supreme Court, despite not formally endorsing this method, nevertheless adopts reasoning that is very close to it. Indeed, in addition to refusing to consider a single criterion for distinction, our High Court examines the context in which a provision is situated in order to classify it as a rule of private law or public law.
B. Federal Jurisdiction in Civil Procedure (Art. 122, para. 1, 2nd part, Const.)
22 Since the judicial reform initiated in 1999 (N. 4), the Confederation has had the authority to legislate in matters of civil procedure. As previously noted (N. 6), the Confederation’s jurisdiction is not parallel to that of the cantons. On the contrary, it is a concurrent jurisdiction with subsequent derogatory effect. The Confederation has fully exercised this jurisdiction by enacting the Code of Civil Procedure of December 19, 2008 (CPC). Before the Confederation obtained the authority to legislate in matters of civil procedure, however, there was already an “ unwritten federal civil procedure” (ungeschriebenes Zivilprozessrecht des Bundes) that arose from the case law of the Federal Supreme Court as well as various procedural provisions scattered throughout federal legislation. These norms were based on the unwritten constitutional principle that the Confederation had the authority to legislate in matters of civil procedure, to the extent that this was indispensable for the implementation of substantive civil law.
23 The term civil procedure should not be understood to refer solely to proceedings aimed at rendering a final and binding decision on relative or absolute private rights and conducted on an adversarial basis—that is, contentious civil proceedings (generally preceded by a conciliation phase between the parties) (Art. 1(a) CPC)— but also the rules designed to ensure the enforcement of judgments that do not concern monetary payments or the provision of security (the enforcement of decisions ordering the payment of a sum of money or the provision of security being governed by the Federal Act of April 11, 1889, on Debt Collection and Bankruptcy [DEBA] [Art. 38, para. 1 DEBA]). Also falling within the scope of civil procedure—and thus within the Confederation’s jurisdiction in this matter—are the rules applicable to judicial decisions in civil matters issued by non-contentious courts (Art. 1(b) CPC).
24 Arbitration—whether domestic (see Art. 1(d) and 353 et seq. CPC) or international (see Art. 176 et seq. of the Federal Act of December 18, 1987, on Private International Law [LDIP])—also falls within the scope of civil procedure. By contrast, civil mediation is not part of civil procedure. This is, after all, logical, insofar as these two alternative dispute resolution methods pursue different goals: while arbitration results in a binding decision that resolves a dispute—which is treated as a judgment of a state court and produces the same effects (notably res judicata and enforceability [for domestic arbitration, see Art. 387 CPC; and for international arbitration, see Art. 190(1) and 193(2) LDIP]), mediation, on the other hand, aims to reach an amicable settlement of a dispute. Thus, the cantons generally retain the authority to legislate on civil mediation. Some cantons (e.g., Geneva and Neuchâtel) have already adopted special regulations in this regard. In exercising their regulatory powers, however, the cantons must ensure compliance with the requirements of federal law set forth in Art. 213 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code (CPC), and in particular the requirement not to restrict the parties’ freedom to organize their mediation as they see fit (see Art. 215 CPC).
25 The cantons may now enact rules of civil procedure only if this is expressly provided for by the CPC. Such express provisions are found, for example, in Art. 4 CPC (substantive and functional jurisdiction of the courts), Art. 6 CPC (authority to establish a commercial court), Art. 68(2)(b) CPC (professional representation by licensed business agents and legal agents), and Art. 96 CPC (para. 1: determination of court fees and costs; and para. 2: possibility of providing for the allocation of costs in favor of attorneys).
26 The cantons, however, retain full jurisdiction to regulate the administrative proceedings that must be conducted before a cantonal authority. The same applies to proceedings concerning a civil matter that must be handled by a cantonal administrative authority (Art. 54, para. 3, Final Provisions of the Swiss Civil Code). For example, the cantons have jurisdiction to regulate proceedings concerning a name change (Art. 30 CC) or an adoption (Art. 268 CC), insofar as the competent cantonal authority is an administrative authority.
C. Cantonal Jurisdiction Over Judicial Organization and the Administration of Civil Justice (Art. 122, para. 2, Cst. )
1. Scope
27 Since the 1999 judicial reform (N. 4), we have seen that the Confederation has obtained the authority to legislate on civil procedure in the strict sense. The authority to legislate on the organization of the judiciary and the administration of civil justice, however, has remained within the purview of the cantons.
28 In our view, theadministration of justice in civil law matters has no independent significance with respect to the judicial system, insofar as the former derives from the latter and is therefore encompassed by that concept. Admittedly, the German text of Art. 122(2) of the Constitution, which refers to “Rechtsprechung in Zivilsachen,” might at first glance suggest that this latter concept has an independent existence with respect to the organization of the judiciary. This is, in fact, the view held by certain scholars. However, a more thorough examination also reveals the cause-and-effect relationship with the organization of the civil judiciary: indeed, it seems logical that civil courts—organized in accordance with cantonal law—must, at the conclusion of civil proceedings, “apply” civil law.
29 Cantonal jurisdiction over the judicial organization—which is also reiterated in Art. 3 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code (CPC)—means that the cantons are specifically authorized to regulate the following matters:
the composition of the courts, namely whether the court consists of a single judge (which is frequently the case in the 1st instance for “minor” cases—that is, cases that do not present significant legal difficulties)—or whether it is a collegial body (which is the rule in the 2nd instance as well as in the 1st instance for more complex cases);
the professional training required to serve as a judge, although federal constitutional law does not require that a judge necessarily have a legal education. The cantons would thus be free to establish a specific training program for professional judges modeled after a judicial academy;
the method of electing judges. The cantons are therefore free to set the eligibility requirements for judges (e.g., proficiency in the canton’s official languages, residence, etc.) and to designate the authorities (the people, the cantonal parliament, the cantonal government, or a higher court) responsible for electing judges;
the allocation of cases within the various cantonal courts, e.g., assigning certain complex disputes to a specialized chamber within an ordinary court or establishing special courts for specific types of cases (e.g., labor courts, rent courts, or commercial courts [within the limits set by Art. 6 CPC]); or
territorial organization (e.g., into judicial districts or districts) and the names of the courts (e.g., “justice of the peace,” “cantonal court,” “court of justice,” etc.).
2. Limitations
a. In general
30 Generally speaking, the cantons’ judicial organization must allow for the application of civil law (both substantive and procedural). Consequently, the cantons may not enact rules governing judicial organization that would prevent the application of civil law.
b. Constitutional and treaty-based limitations
31 The Constitution as well as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950 (ECHR) also contain several provisions that restrict cantonal authority regarding the organization of the civil judiciary. We may, for example, cite the following provisions:
Art. 29(1) of the Constitution, which requires the cantons to establish a judicial system sufficiently efficient to satisfy the principle of prompt adjudication;
Art. 29a of the Constitution, which guarantees every person the right to have their case adjudicated by a judicial authority with full power to review both the facts and the law;
Article 30(1) of the Constitution and Article 6(1) of the ECHR, which provide that any person whose case is to be adjudicated in judicial proceedings has the right to have their case heard by a court established by law that is independent and impartial; or
Article 191b(1) of the Constitution —which gives concrete effect to Art. 29a of the Constitution—which requires the cantons to establish judicial authorities to hear civil law disputes; the cantons may not, therefore, entrust the resolution of such disputes to administrative authorities. This provision does not, however, impose any further restrictions on cantonal sovereignty regarding the organization of the judiciary (N. 27).
c. Limitations Arising from Federal Laws
32 Specific restrictions on the cantons’ jurisdiction regarding the organization of the civil judiciary may ultimately result from a formal federal law within the meaning of Art. 164 of the Constitution. Indeed, Art. 122, para. 2 of the Constitution expressly provides that the organization of the judiciary falls within the jurisdiction of the cantons “unless otherwise provided by law .” This reservation in favor of the Confederation must not, however, be understood as a blank check allowing the Confederation to intervene at will in the cantons’ judicial organization. Indeed, the Confederation may intervene in cantonal organization only to the extent necessary to ensure the uniform application of civil law (substantive or procedural). In other words, if it wishes to legislate in a matter pertaining to the organization of the civil judiciary, the Confederation must have legitimate concerns that the cantonal organization would prevent or at least impede the application of federal civil law. The mere fact that harmonization at the federal level is desirable or more appropriate would therefore not, in and of itself, justify intervention by the federal legislature. Moreover, the federal legislature may only limit—and not completely abolish—cantonal jurisdiction over the organization of the civil judiciary. We can cite, in particular, the following examples of federal legal restrictions on cantonal jurisdiction regarding the organization of the civil judiciary:
Art. 75(2) of the Federal Supreme Court Act of June 17, 2005 (LTF), which requires the cantons to establish a two-tier system for civil matters;
Article 200 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which requires the cantons to establish joint conciliation bodies for disputes concerning residential or commercial lease agreements, as well as for disputes falling under the Federal Act of March 24, 1995, on Gender Equality (Gender Equality Act [LEg]);
Article 5(1) of the CPC, which requires the cantons to establish a single judicial instance in certain areas;
Article 6(2) of the CPC, which defines the conditions under which a dispute is considered commercial and may therefore be brought before a commercial court, with the cantons also having the authority to assign certain international commercial disputes to their commercial courts (see Article 6(4)(c) of the CPC);
Article 8(1) of the CPC, which sets forth the conditions that must be met for an action to be brought directly before the higher cantonal court; or
Article 47 of the CPC, which prescribes the grounds for recusal of judges.
33 Finally, it should be noted that, although they do not directly affect cantonal judicial organizations, the amendments to the CPC introduced by the latest revision of the CPC (improving the practicability and application of the law) and effective as of January 1, 2025, may in some cases require adjustments in this area (e.g., in cantons that already have commercial courts) . These amendments are therefore constitutional, as they are based on the Confederation’s exclusive jurisdiction over civil procedure and respect the cantons’ general jurisdiction regarding the organization of civil courts.
About the Author
Damien Oppliger, Dr. iur. and licensed attorney, works as a research associate in the Civil Law and Civil Procedure Unit of the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) in Bern.
The author would like to thank Mr. Philipp Weber, lic. iur., attorney-at-law, and head of the Civil Law and Civil Procedure Unit at the FOJ, for his valuable comments and remarks. It should be noted, however, that the opinions expressed in this commentary are the author’s personal views and do not represent the position of the FOJ.
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