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- Art. 3 FC
- Art. 5a FC
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- Art. 26 FC
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- Art. 96 para. 1 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
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- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Art. 808c CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
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- Art. 1a IMAC
- Art. 3 para. 1 and 2 IMAC
- Art. 8 IMAC
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- Art. 11b IMAC
- Art. 16 IMAC
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 4 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. c FADP
- Art. 5 lit. d FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 para. 3-5 FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
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- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 16 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 18 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 27 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 28 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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- Art. 2 para. 1 AMLA
- Art. 2a para. 1-2 and 4-5 AMLA
- Art. 2 para. 2 AMLA
- Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA
- Art. 3 AMLA
- Art. 7 AMLA
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- Art. 31a AMLA
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- Art. 38 AMLA
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
FEDERAL ACT ON DIRECT FEDERAL TAX
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
FEDERAL ACT ON MEDICINAL PRODUCTS AND MEDICAL DEVICES
TAX HARMONISATION ACT
- I. Historical Background
- II. Commentary in the Strict Sense
- Recommended further reading
- Bibliography
I. Historical Background
1 Like Art. 51 of the FC, Art. 52 of the FC dates back to the founding of the federal state. Systematically, it not only stands alongside Art. 51 of the FC but is also substantively linked to it. Art. 52 para. 1 of the FC defines the Confederation’s duty to guarantee the protection of the constitutional order of the cantons. Art. 52 para. 2 regulates the most significant measure for fulfilling this duty of guarantee: federal intervention.
2 Art. 52 of the FC is the result of the most recent total revision of the FC (so-called “updating”): Its provisions were previously regulated in Art. 5 of the FC of 1848 and 1874 (guarantee of the territory and statehood of the cantons) and Art. 16 of the FC of 1848 and 1874 (federal intervention). During the update, these provisions were largely consolidated, shortened, and in part transferred to other provisions (see N. 3, and also N. 8 et seq.).
3 Art. 5 of the FC of 1848 and 1874, which is now enshrined in Art. 52 para. 1 of the FC, originally guaranteed the territory, sovereignty, and constitutional order of the cantons by the Confederation and additionally guaranteed the freedom and rights of the people as well as the constitutional rights of “citizens.” Thus, the predecessor provision went further than the current norm: the federal guarantee of legal recourse to protect the fundamental rights enshrined in the cantonal constitutions was transferred to Art. 189 para. 1 lit. d and f of the FC. According to the current wording of Art. 52 para. 1 of the FC, individual protection of fundamental rights is, in principle, no longer part of this federal guarantee. The territorial and property guarantees, also mentioned in the original version, are now found in Art. 53 of the FC. The “sovereignty” referred to is no longer listed separately apart from the general provision in Art. 3 of the FC. Art. 52 para. 1 of the FC therefore now covers only the protection of the constitutional order.
4 Art. 52 para. 2 of the FC, in turn, regulates federal intervention, which was previously enshrined in Art. 16 para. 1–4 of the FC of 1848 and 1874. Through federal intervention, the Confederation was intended to restore internal security and order in a canton if the canton in question was unable or no longer able to do so. Art. 16 of the FC of 1848 and 1874 still distinguished between (1) the prerequisites and (2) the modalities of federal intervention. In the view of the constitutional framers of that time, in the event of serious disturbances to internal security, cantonal governments would first request assistance from the Federal Council and then from other cantons, provided the Confederation was unable to help. In addition, intervention by the competent federal authority—which may vary depending on the specific case (see the measures under N. 13)—was envisaged in the event of a threat to, and not merely a disturbance of, Switzerland’s security (Art. 16 para. 2 of the FC of 1848 and 1874). Under the heading of “necessary measures,” a distinction was made between unarmed and armed federal interventions (Art. 16, para. 1 of the FC of 1848 and 1874). After the Second World War, the conviction prevailed that domestic military operations should be avoided and that civilian police resources of the cantons should be used instead. A federal intervention should constitute an absolute exception. This “ultima ratio” principle continues to shape federal intervention to this day. The reformulation of Art. 52 of the 1999 FC dispenses with all these distinctions compared to the (identical) versions of 1848 and 1874. What remains is the principle of subsidiarity.
5 Against this backdrop, federal intervention has no practical significance today. The last federal intervention dates back to 1932; the other nine took place in the 19th century. Most interventions occurred in the canton of Ticino, though they involved quite different operations, such as addressing the decades-long conflict between liberals and conservatives in the canton or defending against external threats. The last federal intervention was that of November 9, 1932, in the canton of Geneva, during which the Lausanne Recruit School was tasked with containing the conflict between radical socialists and right-wing extremists.
6 However, the fact that there are only a few examples of federal interventions does not mean that the federal guarantee under Art. 52 of the FC should be called into question as such: due to its historical legitimacy and its preventive effect as a warning signal under federal law, this provision is indispensable. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the guarantee of the protection of the constitutional order is today primarily a task of the Federal Supreme Court. Through its case law, the Federal Supreme Court, as the highest court and court of last resort, succeeds in contributing to the maintenance of the constitutional order of the cantons in a more subtle manner. One example is the voting rights complaint under Art. 82(c) BGG, in which the Federal Supreme Court may freely review cantonal constitutional, statutory, and regulatory law, provided that it is closely related to the right to vote and stand for election.
II. Commentary in the Strict Sense
A. The Confederation’s Duty to Protect (Art. 52 para. 1 of the FC)
7 The federal guarantee requires the Confederation (see note 19 regarding jurisdiction) to protect the rule of law in the cantons from imminent serious disturbances such as unrest or constitutional crises. The provision on the constitutional order establishes the Confederation as the guarantor “of the universal respect for all significant components of cantonal sovereignty: the constitutional order and the rights and freedoms of the cantonal people.”
8 The term “constitutional order” is interpreted differently in the literature. It fundamentally refers to cantonal constitutional law as a whole. The constitutional order refers to the foundations of the Swiss Confederation and is thus a constitutional prerequisite of the Swiss federal state. In conjunction with Art. 51 of the FC, this can therefore only refer to what has been guaranteed by the Confederation. However, the interplay between Art. 51 of the FC and Art. 52 of the FC implies that cantonal autonomy as such is also protected. Together with Art. 47 of the FC, according to which the Confederation safeguards the autonomy of the cantons, Art. 51 and Art. 52 of the FC thus also stand for cantonal autonomy.
9 It follows from the provision’s function as a federal guarantee that the point of reference for the guarantee is the constitutional order of the cantons. Thus, it is not the constitutional order of the Confederation that is guaranteed, but rather that of the cantons, which the Confederation undertakes to protect and uphold. At the same time, history and the previous versions of the FC show that the phrase “constitutional order” encompasses more than the current wording suggests. Indeed, the previous wording is crucial for understanding the constitutional order: According to Art. 5 of the FC of 1848 and 1874, “the sovereignty and the constitutional order of the cantons” were protected. The current wording of Art. 52 of the FC refers only to the constitutional order, while sovereignty no longer appears in the current wording of this provision. However, there is no documentation that there was an intention to deviate from the content of the constitutional order, as it was still described as “the sovereignty and constitutional order of the cantons.” Although unstated, it remains part of Art. 52 of the FC that a canton’s sovereignty is part of its constitutional order. In other words, there is no indication that the division of Art. 5 of the FC of 1848 and 1874 into several separate provisions was intended to be accompanied by a narrower understanding of the constitutional order. The term “sovereignty” within the meaning of Art. 3 of the FC (“The cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not restricted by the FC”) is, in turn, open to interpretation. It refers to what constitutes the canton as a constitutional “state.” This includes, among other things, cantonal autonomy in all its facets. These historical considerations therefore argue for a broad understanding of the constitutional order (regarding the distinction from federal supervision under Art. 49 para. 2 of the FC, see N. 16). The constitutional order of the cantons encompasses all norms that form part of the cantons’ constitutional order (and thus, in particular, cantonal autonomy).
10 The literature states that the Confederation’s duty under Art. 52 para. 1 of the FC exists regardless of whether a disturbance or threat within the meaning of Art. 52 para. 2 of the FC is present. However, it is difficult to conceive of cases in which there is not simultaneously a disturbance or threat to the constitutional order. In practice, therefore, the obligation to protect applies primarily in cases of disturbances or threats, because only then does a need for protection arise: This primarily concerns the protection of cantonal rule of law against unlawful attacks by other cantons, but also against insurrectionary movements and against interventions by the federal government itself (if the disturbances or threats originate from federal authorities). These include, in particular, abuse of power, riots, acts of sabotage, regional civil wars, or coup attempts. Disruptions or threats to the constitutional order manifest in various ways: Intra-cantonal problems can range from issues with the separation of powers (such as when the executive branch systematically ignores the legislative branch) to complete inaction (such as when an authority refuses to hold a referendum despite a legal obligation to do so). A canton’s constitutional order can also be compromised if the cantonal authorities are no longer functional, for example because the democratically elected government can no longer carry out its official duties. What these situations have in common is that they involve cases where the cantonal security forces are overwhelmed. The Confederation is obligated to ensure that political disputes within the cantons, as well as relations between the cantons, remain within the constitutional framework. In doing so, it helps prevent cantonal conflicts from escalating to the point where they destabilize the Confederation itself.
11 In this context, order throughout the entire canton need not be affected; rather, it is sufficient for such a situation to occur anywhere within the canton’s territory. Drawing the line between this and a state of emergency not covered by Art. 52 of the FC—which involves multiple cantons and permits emergency law—is difficult. This is due in no small part to the fact that the state of emergency or emergency law is not expressly regulated, but can be implicitly derived from Art. 165, Art. 184, and Art. 185 of the FC. By its very nature, Art. 52 of the FC generally applies whenever only one or, at most, two cantons are involved. If, however, the conflict becomes a problem affecting the whole of Switzerland, action should be taken based on the constitutional right of urgency.
12 Unlike para. 2, Art. 52(1) of the FC does not address the question of when the Confederation must act. Due to their extensive organizational autonomy, the cantons are in principle responsible for ensuring the protection of their own constitutional order. Thus, the protective obligations under Art. 52 of the FC constitute only subsidiary federal requirements with limited practical effect. If a canton cannot avert the acute threat or impairment on its own, the duty to protect under Art. 52 para. 1 of the FC applies, and the federal government’s right to intervene under Art. 52 para. 2 of the FC comes into play.
13 The measures by which the Confederation can fulfill its duty of guarantee are diverse and are not listed in Art. 52 of the FC (on the relationship to federal intervention, see N. 15, and on the distinction from federal supervision, see N. 16). An important option is the legal remedy, which remains available even in the event of unrest and constitutional crises. Appeals in matters of public law (or, depending on the case, subsidiary constitutional complaints) may be filed with the Federal Supreme Court against sovereign acts of cantonal courts of last instance. Private individuals may challenge the violation of constitutional rights as well as the principle of the separation of powers. However, this step is only of limited use as a measure within the meaning of Art. 52 of the FC, because the Federal Supreme Court can only adopt a case-by-case perspective. Nevertheless, within the framework of abstract judicial review, the Federal Supreme Court can apply a broader perspective than when reviewing individual acts. A further limitation on the legal remedy arises from the fact that the federal judicial system does not provide for litigation procedures for intra-cantonal disputes between state organs, which regularly underlie the cases of application of Art. 52 of the FC. Appeals by federal authorities can be attributed to federal supervision (see N. 16). When selecting measures to fulfill the duty to guarantee, the general principles of the rule of law must be observed.
14 The cantons must, in principle, ensure that the constitutional order is maintained, if necessary by police means. If cantonal measures fail or prove insufficient from the outset, assistance must be sought from other cantons. If these too prove insufficient, the canton may request the Confederation to mobilize troops for public order duties. In doing so, the Confederation always reserves the right to decide on the mobilization and command. Public order duties, however, have little practical significance. Army deployment today takes the form of assistance duties, as was recently the case during the COVID-19 pandemic. The role of the army is limited to assisting the civil authorities at their request. Mobilization and assignment to the cantons are carried out by the federal government.
B. Duty to Intervene (Art. 52 para. 2 of the FC)
15 Art. 52 para. 2 devotes a separate para. to federal intervention. This reflects a historically significant application of the guarantee measures. The term “federal intervention” (or “Eidgenössische Intervention”; “Intervention de la Confédération”; “Intervento della Confederazione”) refers to the intervention of the Confederation in the event of a disturbance or an imminent threat to public order in a canton. The purpose of federal intervention is to restore public order in a canton that has been disrupted. The relationship to the other measures for fulfilling the guarantee obligation is sometimes unclear and is not explicitly addressed. While some measures under Art. 52 para. 1 of the FC may have a preventive character (e.g., assistance from the armed forces or an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court), federal intervention is fundamentally repressive due to its additional requirements (N. 17). However, this does not preclude the simultaneous ordering of other (milder) measures within the framework of a federal intervention.
16 The distinction from federal supervision under Art. 49 para. 2 of the FC remains questionable. Under Art. 49 para. 2 of the FC, the Confederation monitors the cantons’ compliance with federal law. For Schweizer/Müller, federal supervision constitutes an instrument of the Confederation to fulfill the federal guarantee under Art. 52 of the FC. Biaggini, on the other hand, distinguishes between action taken within the framework of federal supervision and federal execution under Art. 49 of the FC, even though he acknowledges that the scopes of application may overlap. Unlike federal execution, which is dedicated to the enforcement of federal law, federal intervention aims to protect authorities that are loyal to the federal government but overwhelmed. While federal intervention measures thus generally benefit a canton, federal execution, on the other hand, involves federal intervention within the framework of its supervision of a canton. The boundaries can be fluid.
17 Federal intervention is subject to two cumulative conditions: First, there must be an imminent or already existing disruption or threat to the constitutional order of the cantons. The disturbance must be understood in a qualified sense; this covers events that are difficult to control (attempted coups, uprisings, or even serious threats to critical infrastructure) that could destabilize the canton as an institution (see N. 10).
18 Second, the principle of subsidiarity must be upheld; federal intervention is only an option if the affected canton is unable to resolve the disturbance on its own or with the help of other cantons. Assistance from other cantons may involve calling in police forces from other cantons through concordats or the IKAPOL. The cantons must do everything in their power to prevent a disturbance and to restore public order in the event of a disturbance. The Confederation bears only a subsidiary ultimate responsibility.
19 Federal intervention may be ordered by both the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council (Art. 173 para. 1 lit. b of the FC and Art. 185 para. 2 of the FC). The competence of the Federal Council is particularly relevant outside of parliamentary sessions and in urgent cases. The decision to intervene is issued ex officio or at the request of a canton.
20 A wide range of measures may be considered as intervention measures—these possibilities are limited in particular by the principle of proportionality. The competent authorities have a margin of discretion. This has far-reaching implications: As far as can be seen, the literature has not addressed whether federal intervention also authorizes the circumvention of the constitutional division of powers. In other words, is the federal government permitted to do more simply because it meets the requirements for federal intervention? This is certainly supported by the fact that a key requirement for federal intervention is precisely to intervene in areas of cantonal autonomy. A cantonal government that is no longer functioning (for example, due to inaction or the resignation of all members without successors) is, in principle, a cantonal matter. If the federal government intervenes in such a case, it formally violates the constitutional division of powers. However, this issue is mitigated by the fact that federal intervention, in the broadest sense, is carried out for the benefit of the affected canton and is subject to conditions that respect the division of powers and call for a cautious approach. The canton therefore has an interest in the federal government intervening. Theoretically, however, the choice and implementation of intervention measures remain susceptible to abuse.
21 The primary intervention measures available are the dispatch of a commissioner or an army deployment. The mandate remains the same, namely to restore order in the canton. This appointed individual represents the Federal Council on site and may issue any orders deemed necessary under the circumstances. This provision grants them almost unlimited discretion. This flexibility comes at the expense of accountability: without clear guidelines, the legality of the action cannot be verified.
22 When deploying the Army by order of the Confederation as part of a federal intervention, the specific competences that exist in this area must be observed: The Federal Assembly is initially responsible for the mobilization of troops pursuant to Art. 173 para. 1 lit. d of the FC. In urgent cases, the FC assigns this authority to the Federal Council (Art. 185 para. 4 sentence 1 of the FC). If more than 4,000 members of the armed forces are mobilized, or if it appears that the deployment will last more than three weeks, the Federal Council must convene the Federal Assembly and allow it to decide (Art. 185 para. 4 sentence 2 of the FC).
23 The Federal Assembly decides on the allocation of the costs of the federal intervention that has taken place. Unlike Art. 43 of the 1996 Draft and its earlier versions, para. 2 does not contain an explicit provision on cost allocation. During the parliamentary debate, the provision on cost allocation was deemed unconstitutional.
24 While the Confederation must intervene when the conditions are met, it is unclear at what point the Confederation may intervene (right to intervene vs. duty to intervene). The principles of proportionality may, at most, also support a right to intervene prematurely. However, a look at the previous version of Art. 52 para. 2 of the FC (Art. 16 of the FC of 1848 and 1874) shows that the provision is also intended to respect the system of the distribution of powers, which is why early intervention might not be compatible with cantonal primacy. With the constitutional revision of 1999, the constitutional legislator significantly simplified the intervention provision compared to the previous version, which is why preventive measures are now possible in principle. However, in accordance with Art. 44 para. 1 of the FC (Cooperation between the Confederation and the Cantons), which specifically encompasses the principle of exercising authority with restraint, the Confederation will not intervene before it has clarified the situation and the options for intervention with the cantons. Given the extensive scope of these possibilities, the right to intervene should be exercised with restraint.
25 It is also controversial against whom a federal intervention may be directed. To give effect to the protective nature of Art. 52 para. 2 of the FC, no restrictive practice should apply here. It should certainly also cover persons who, regardless of their function, endanger the constitutional order (such as terrorist groups or former public officials). On the other hand, it should be clear that fundamental rights protection continues to apply even in the event of federal intervention. In the case of unlawful acts or erroneous decisions resulting from federal interventions, any claims for damages must be handled in accordance with Art. 135 et seq. of the Military Act and, subsidiarily, under the Liability Act.
About the Author
Dr. Renata Trajkova is a lecturer in constitutional and administrative law at the Zurich University of Applied Sciences (School of Management and Law) and conducts research at the Institute for Regulation and Competition on various research projects addressing issues in spatial planning, construction, and environmental law. She is co-chair of the Expert Group on Spatial Planning Law and is writing a postdoctoral thesis on spatial planning law at the University of St. Gallen. In addition, she is an independent attorney and a lecturer at the University of Zurich.
Recommended further reading
Bernard Frédéric, État de droit et situations extraordinaires, in: Diggelmann Oliver et al. (Hrsg.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, Bd. II, Zürich 2020, S. 979 ff.
Eichenberger Kurt, Die Sorge für den inneren Frieden als primäre Staatsaufgabe, ZBl 1977,
S. 433 ff.
Jaag Tobias, Die Rechtsstellung der Kantone in der Bundesverfassung, in: Thürer Daniel et al. (Hrsg.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz, Zürich 2001, § 30, S. 473 ff.
Lienhard Andreas/Häsler Philipp, Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen des Sicherheitsrechts, in: Schweizer Rainer J. (Hrsg.), Sicherheits- und Ordnungsrecht des Bundes, SBVR III/1, Basel 2008,
S. 95 ff.
Müller Reto Patrick, Innere Sicherheit Schweiz, Diss. Basel, Egg 2009.
Ruch Alexander, Äussere und innere Sicherheit, VRdCH, S. 889 ff.
Trajkova Renata, Kommentierung zu Art. 51 BV, in: Stefan Schlegel/Odile Ammann (Hrsg.), Onlinekommentar zur Bundesverfassung, https://onlinekommentar.ch/de/kommentare/bv51, Version 08.06.2026.
Vez Jean-Luc, Le pouvoir de disposer des moyens stratégiques dans la défense générale, Diss., Freiburg 1985.
Zeller René, Ruhe und Ordnung in der Schweiz, Diss., Zürich 1990.
Bibliography
Aubert Jean-François, Kommentierung zu Art. 52 BV, in: Aubert Jean-François/Mahon Pascal (Hrsg.), Petit commentaire de la Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse di 18 avril 1999, Zürich et al. 2003 (zit. Comm.).
Auer Andreas, Staatsrecht der schweizerischen Kantone, Bern 2016
Belser Eva Maria/Massüger Nina, Kommentierung zu Art. 52 BV, in: Waldmann Bernhard/Belser Eva Maria/Epiney Astrid (Hrsg.), Schweizerische Bundesverfassung, Basler Kommentar,2. Aufl., Basel 2025.
Biaggini Giovanni, Kommentierung zu Art. 52 BV, Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, Kommentar, 2. Aufl., Zürich 2017.
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