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- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. General information
- II. Scope of application
- III. Presumption of innocence (para. 1)
- IV. Right to information (para. 2 sentence 1)
- V. Effective defense (para. 2 sentence 2)
- VI. Judicial review (para. 3)
- Recommended further reading
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. General information
A. History of origin
1 The FC 1874 had no provision on the various guarantees in criminal proceedings like today's Art. 32 FC. Nevertheless, these were largely derived from Art. 4 FC 1874 by case law with the consent of the literature. This applies in particular to the rights of the defense, the presumption of innocence and double-instance jurisdiction in criminal proceedings.
2 With the total revision of the Federal Constitution in 1999, the constitutional practice with the international minimum guarantees of a fair trial, in particular those of the ECHR and UN Covenant II, were cast in a new constitutional norm, which concretized the general procedural guarantees under Art. 29 FC for the area of criminal proceedings. To this end, Art. 32 FC was divided into three paragraphs with different objectives, which are intended to guarantee persons subject to the law a fair criminal procedure. Nevertheless, essential guarantees of criminal proceedings such as the prohibition of double prosecution and punishment or the right to compensation in the event of miscarriages of justice or unlawful imprisonment were not included in Art. 32 FC.
3 At present, Art. 32 FC is to be regarded as a constitutional link between different normative levels, which concretizes aspects of fairness for criminal proceedings:
Together with Art. 5 para. 4 in conjunction with Art. Art. 190 FC constitutes the link to the international level, in particular to Art. 6 ECHR and its interpretation by the ECtHR.
At the federal constitutional level, Art. 32 FC articulates a special provision for criminal proceedings compared to other procedural guarantees (Art. 29 et seq. FC).
Finally, at the statutory level, Art. 32 FC represents the constitutional premise for the legally enshrined rights of accused persons.
B. Constitutional significance
1. State criminal proceedings and the protection of fundamental rights
4 Art. 32 FC is a fundamental norm of the rule of law. A democratic constitutional state can exercise its criminal power very extensively, but in order to remain a constitutional state it must effectively guarantee basic legal elements such as civil and human rights, the legality of executive power, control by an independent judiciary and predictable and calculable action by the state.
5 Criminal sovereignty must be contained by the rule of law, because of all the areas of law available to the constitutional state, criminal law is the most invasive state instrument from the perspective of fundamental rights: it legitimizes state interference in personal freedom and psychological integrity, in private and family life, in personal honour and in property and therefore has a massive, state-induced impact on core aspects of life. For this reason, state criminal law requires legitimation and protection mechanisms, which must be developed in criminal procedural law in particular.
6 Consequently, fundamental rights are of particular importance in criminal proceedings. This is not primarily a matter of traditional defensive rights against state authority ("duty to respect"), but primarily of positive state duties to protect the free exercise of fundamental rights ("duty to protect") and to ensure their structural and systemic guarantee ("duty to fulfill"). For fundamental procedural rights in criminal proceedings, this means that, in addition to refraining from interfering with the exercise of fundamental rights in criminal proceedings, the state must also implement positive measures so that the persons concerned can effectively exercise their fundamental procedural rights and be adequately protected from unlawful state restrictions.
7 At its core, Art. 32 FC therefore protects the party status of the accused in criminal proceedings. This means that the accused person is not merely an object of the proceedings, but should have concrete opportunities to participate as a "subject of the proceedings". At the legislative level, this guiding principle is derived from Art. 3 para. 1, 2 lit. c CrimPC, repeating constitutional maxims (Art. 7 and 29 para. 1 FC). The democratic constitutional state must effectively guarantee elementary fundamental procedural rights in order to provide a sufficiently legitimate basis for interventions in elementary fundamental rights initiated by the state through criminal proceedings.
8 The fundamental procedural rights in Art. 32 FC are based on the party status of the persons involved in the proceedings and on human dignity (Art. 7 FC). This is related to the scope of application of fundamental procedural rights vis-à-vis natural and legal persons: Since legal persons have party status in criminal proceedings (Art. 112 CrimPC) but no human dignity, the scope of Art. 32 FC does not extend to them to the same extent as to natural persons.
2. Fair criminal proceedings
9 Fair criminal proceedings ("fair trial", "procès équitable") are required for sovereign interference with elementary fundamental rights to be constitutionally acceptable. Criminal law and criminal procedural law can have serious consequences for the persons concerned. Fairness in criminal proceedings is intended to limit the inherent potential of this ius terrible to endanger fundamental rights (and make it susceptible to abuse) in favor of those affected. Nevertheless, fairness also takes legitimate prosecution interests into account. In this respect, the principle of fairness is the constitutional guiding principle of the constitutional criminal process. Although there is no explicit reference to fair criminal proceedings in the FC, for Switzerland this arises from Art. 3 et seq. CrimPC and international obligations (in particular Art. 6 ECHR, Art. 14 UN Covenant II).
10 Specifically, fairness in constitutional criminal proceedings requires not only the establishment and conduct of proceedings before independent courts but also, in particular, the guarantee of the effective participation of the accused person in the preparation of the basis for the criminal judgment, which is conveyed through the criminal proceedings. The principle of participation in criminal proceedings set out in Art. 32 FC specifies the principle of the right to be heard (Art. 29 para. 2 FC) and the associated rights to information, preparation, representation and participation, which are ultimately intended to create equality of arms between the prosecuting authorities and the accused.
11 Criminal proceedings are to be regarded as "fair" if the criminal procedural framework does not determine decisions from the outset (open-endedness of criminal proceedings) and accused persons are able to exhaustively present their perspectives and interests by means of procedural rights: they should be able to assume that these will be adequately (and seriously) taken into account in reaching a verdict.
C. Legal source triad of FC, ECHR and CrimPC
12 For a long time, the constitutional significance of Art. 32 FC was evident in the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, as many questions of interpretation of criminal procedure law were discussed as constitutional issues. The standardization of the CrimPC at the federal level as of 1.1.2011 has quantitatively reduced the case law appeal to Art. 32 FC, but as a minimum guarantee of criminal procedure law at the constitutional level, the norm is still significant in the light of a judicially progressive understanding of fundamental rights. Overall, Art. 32 FC specifies the general fundamental procedural rights in criminal proceedings with minimum constitutional provisions and must be read in conjunction with Art. 29, 29a and 30 FC.
13 At the same time, Art. 32 FC must be interpreted in concordance with the procedural guarantees of the ECHR (in particular Art. 6 ECHR) and ECtHR case law. This results from the constitutional status of the ECHR and its interpretation, but also from the obligations in Art. 190 FC in conjunction with Art. 5 para. 4 FC. Art. 5 para. 4 FC. In practice, the fundamental procedural rights in Art. 6 para. 2 and 3 ECHR represent a significant driving force for the development of constitutional guarantees vis-à-vis the prosecution authorities.
14 This applies primarily to ECHR judgments against Switzerland, which, like every other Convention state, is obliged to comply with judgments of the Strasbourg Court under Art. 46 ECHR ("inter partes" effect). In addition, ECHR judgments on other Convention states in accordance with Art. 1 and Art. 19 ECHR have an orientation effect for Switzerland for comparable problems ("erga-omnes" effect): Since the Convention states have accepted the ECHR as the minimum standard of a pan-European human rights catalog, their obligation includes proactive cooperation in fulfilling this minimum standard to avoid future convictions.
15 The guarantees of Art. 32 FC are further differentiated at the statutory level in the CrimPC. While the minimum provisions of the FC and the ECHR concretize the ordinary law provisions of the CrimPC, the CrimPC guarantees are expanded via the constitutional (or ECHR-compliant) interpretation, should their normative content offer less protection. For example, the orientation of the accused person to their right to a defense (Art. 158 para. 1 lit. c. Alt. 1 CrimPC) must be interpreted in conformity with the constitution to the effect that they must be given the right to a defense of their choice in a practical and effective manner.
D. International developments
16 Procedural guarantees in criminal proceedings can be found in various international agreements, for example in Art. 6 para. 2 and 3 ECHR and Art. 2 ECHR ZP VII and in Art. 14 UN Covenant II. A direct comparison of these norms with Art. 32 FC reveals that the wording of the former is more detailed. For example, while Art. 32 para. 2 sentence 2 FC speaks generally of the possibility of the accused person to assert the "rights of defense to which he is entitled", Art. 6 para. 3 lit. b-e ECHR and Art. 14 para. 3 lit. b, d-g UN Covenant II provide detailed defense guarantees for criminal proceedings. This discrepancy in the level of detail, which is sometimes criticized in the literature as "incompleteness", is not fundamentally objectionable. This is because the international law standards set out minimum guarantees guaranteed by international treaties, which the contracting states implement in their legal systems at constitutional and, in particular, at statutory level.
17 Beyond the ECHR and UN Covenant II, fundamental rights under criminal procedure law can be found in international human rights treaties and declarations, namely in Art. 10-11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10.12.1948, Art. 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights of the Organization of American States of 22. 11.1969, Art. 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter) of 27.6.1981, Art. 12-13 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights of 22.5.2004 and Art. 20 of the Declaration of Human Rights of 18.11.2012 of the Southeast Asian group of states ASEAN.
18 In addition, the statutes of international criminal tribunals contain fundamental procedural rights under criminal law, as in the statutes of the ad hoc criminal tribunals, namely the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Art. 10, 18 para. 3, 20, 21 ICTY Statute) and that for Rwanda (Art. 9, 17 para. 3, 19, 20 ICTR Statute) as well as in the Statute of the Residual Mechanism for the two criminal tribunals (Art. 7, 16 para. 3, 18, 19 MICT Statute), which brings their activities to a close. Higher standards on procedural rights can be found in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, as Art. 67 of the Rome Statute as the central norm for rights of defence is to be interpreted consistently with internationally recognized human rights standards in accordance with Art. 21 para. 3 of the Rome Statute. Further rights of defense can be found in Art. 20 ("ne bis in idem"), 55, 60, 63, 66 f. Rome Statute.
19 For the EU Member States, fundamental rights in criminal proceedings are expressly enshrined in EU primary law in Art. 47-50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), which entered into force with the Treaty of Lisbon on December 1, 2009. These EU procedural safeguards are thus additional to the minimum safeguards of the ECHR, but go beyond a mere minimum standard.
20 In order to implement the requirements of the CFR and in the sense of standardizing existing criminal procedural rights (primarily from the ECHR), aroadmapwas launched to strengthen the procedural rights of suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings in order to strengthen the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgments in criminal matters as well as police and criminal justice cooperation in cross-border cases. To implement this, several directives with minimum provisions for the criminal procedure codes of the member states were provided for. Ultimately, a new minimum standard of fundamental procedural rights applies in the EU Member States, which fills gaps in the ECHR minimum guarantees or even expands on them. An extended roadmap for the expansion of further fundamental rights in criminal proceedings is now being discussed.
21 Furthermore, supranational EU prosecution institutions such as EU agencies and authorities are bound by corresponding fundamental and procedural rights on the basis of Art. 51 para. 1 CFR and because of their legal basis. This also applies to the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), which took up its work on June 1, 2021. Procedural safeguards for suspects and the guarantee of judicial review are listed in particular in Art. 41 and 42 of the legal basis of the EPPO.
II. Scope of application
A. Personal scope of application: "Every person"
22 Art. 32 FC basically covers all persons who actually or objectively appear to be suspected of a criminal offense. In addition to this material consideration, the status of suspect is formally established at the latest when an official notification of the alleged offense is issued. Therefore, all natural persons who are suspected, accused or charged with a criminal offense by means of a criminal complaint or criminal application or as part of an official procedural act (Art. 111 para. 1 CrimPC) are entitled to basic procedural rights.
23 The extent to which the fundamental procedural rights under Art. 32 FC also apply to accused legal entities is disputed. According to the literature, companies are in principle entitled to the same procedural rights as natural persons under Art. 112 CrimPC, unless the SCC or CrimPC contain provisions to the contrary. For this reason, large parts of the guarantee of fairness should also apply to legal persons. Although the FSC grants certain procedural rights to legal persons accused of criminal offenses, it handles the scope of protection in a differentiated and restrictive manner compared to that of natural persons. From an international perspective, the ECHR has yet to issue a leading decision in this regard, although various Art. 6 ECHR guarantees have been declared applicable to companies. The procedural rights of legal persons include, for example, the presumption of innocence, the principle of "in dubio pro reo", the right to remain silent and the freedom to cooperate, the right to information about the rights of the accused and the content of the criminal accusation, the guarantees arising from the right to be heard and the right to appeal. Legal persons are to be exempt from the right to the free administration of justice (Art. 130 et seq., 136 et seq. CrimPC).
24 The procedural rights enshrined in Art. 32 FC do not apply (directly) to other persons involved in the criminal proceedings, namely witnesses, injured parties (Art. 115 CrimPC), victims (Art. 116 para. 1 CrimPC, Art. 1 para. 1 OHG), private claimants (Art. 118 CrimPC) and their legal representatives (Art. 127 CrimPC). Furthermore, Art. 32 FC does not apply directly to the legal representation of accused persons. The rights of the defense counsel are derived indirectly from their position as legal counsel for the accused.
B. Material scope of application: "criminal proceedings"
1. Criminal proceedings in the narrow sense
25 Art. 32 FC refers to criminal proceedings. These are state court proceedings in which a decision is made on the application of standards that provide for a sanction (namely a custodial sentence, fine, fine and outpatient or inpatient measures). The material scope of application covers all standards that are attributable to criminal law. This is illustrated by the case law on Art. 78 BGG: The term "criminal matter" used there includes "all decisions based on substantive criminal law or criminal procedural law". Nevertheless, the concept of criminal proceedings within the meaning of Art. 32 FC is to be understood functionally; it includes all proceedings which, due to their legal nature, enable the imposition of preventive or repressive sanctions.
2. "Engel criteria"
26 In the opinion of the FSC, the ECtHR case law must be taken into account when defining the functional understanding of the term. Based on the concept of "criminal charges" under Art. 6 ECHR, the Strasbourg Court has developed an autonomous understanding of the concept of criminal proceedings. Since its leading decision in 1976, the classification of types of proceedings as "criminal proceedings" has been based on the so-called "Engel criteria". These three criteria are generally examined alternatively, although the ECtHR carries out a cumulative examination in individual cases. For the criminal classification of state sanctions according to the Engel criteria, the extent to which the legal basis to be examined pursues a punitive-deterrent concept in its normative context and not a civil-law-compensatory or security-law-preventive approach appears to be essential.
27 According to the first Engel criterion, it depends on the classification of the respective norm in national law, namely the extent to which the provision in question belongs to criminal law (in particular the SCC or other statutory criminal provisions).
28 If the first criterion is unproductive, the Court takes into account the nature of the offense according to the second and probably most important Engel criterion. In order to examine the legal nature of the offense for its preventive or repressive character, both the legal consequences and the elements of the offense are taken into account. It is examined whether the legal provision in question has a general or specific group of addressees, whether it pursues punitive or deterrent purposes, whether it protects general social interests, whether a finding of guilt is necessary for the imposition of a sanction, whether the proceedings were initiated by a public authority authorized to enforce the law and how other Convention states classify comparable proceedings.
29 If there is no clear classification from the previous criteria, the ECtHR applies the third Engel criterion on the nature and severity of the sanction and the associated communicative effect of a social stigma of punishment. Both the abstract threat of sanction and any alternative measures are important here. Thus, a minor fine also has a criminal character if non-payment leads to a substitute custodial sentence or the confiscation of property.
3. Criminal proceedings in the broad sense
30 In addition to criminal proceedings and juvenile criminal proceedings (Art. 3 para. 1 JStPO), the material scope of Art. 32 FC also includes misdemeanor proceedings, administrative criminal proceedings (Art. 82 VStrR) and criminal tax proceedings (Art. 188 para. 2 DBG). Antitrust sanctions (Art. 49a Cartel Act) and customs proceedings are also covered.
31 Disciplinary proceedings (insofar as they only impose minor disciplinary measures), preventive police measures (e.g. measures to safeguard internal security), tax proceedings and international administrative assistance in tax matters fall outside the material scope of Art. 32 FC. Independent confiscation proceedings are also not regarded as criminal proceedings (with regard to the presumption of innocence enshrined in Art. 32 para. 1 FC), but as proceedings against property and assets.
4. Criminal legal assistance
32 The material scope of application of Art. 32 FC for international legal assistance in criminal matters is complex. According to the legislature and case law, mutual assistance in criminal matters is not to be classified as criminal proceedings but as administrative proceedings, which means that the scope of Art. 32 FC does not apply. This position, which is also prevalent in the literature, can be assigned to the so-called "legal assistance theory", according to which criminal legal assistance is not geared towards (domestic) criminal proceedings, but is merely initiated by a foreign country in order to promote foreign criminal proceedings. Mutual legal assistance is aimed at the performance of public duties (implementation of intergovernmental cooperation; compliance with obligations under international law).
33 The opposing view (the so-called "Rechtspflegetheorie") advocates the criminal procedural nature of international mutual assistance in criminal matters. According to this view, the measures in the requested state contribute functionally to the criminal proceedings in the requesting state in the same way as a domestic measure, because the requested state substitutes for the requesting state and the requested measure remains an act of criminal procedure within the state. Consequently, the scope of Art. 32 FC would be opened.
34 This dichotomy between the theories focuses only on two dimensions of mutual legal assistance: the requesting and the requested state. In the meantime, the discussion has been given new food for thought by focusing on the individual as a third dimension. Based on the model of "international criminal proceedings based on the division of labor", mutual assistance in criminal matters is thus said to have a "dual legal nature". It is true that neither the theory of mutual legal assistance nor the theory of legal proceedings can comprehensively reflect the legal nature of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters; the administrative nature of mutual legal assistance appears just as unconvincing in view of the genuine criminal procedural measures in the requested state as the criminal procedural nature of mutual legal assistance, especially since central criminal law issues are clarified in the requesting state. The practicability of the characterization as a dual nature sui generis is doubtful, as this classification does not provide any orientation for the practically decisive question of the applicability of fundamental criminal procedural rights in mutual legal assistance proceedings.
35 It seems preferable to differentiate the legal nature according to individual forms of mutual assistance. Since enforcement assistance under Art. 94 et seq. IMAC concerns criminal proceedings that have already been concluded, the guarantees of criminal proceedings do not apply for this reason alone. The situation is different in the case of extradition for the purpose of criminal prosecution and so-called mutual legal assistance. Here, domestic mutual legal assistance functionally replaces investigative measures in the foreign state, which would in principle speak in favor of opening up the material scope of application of Art. 32 FC. Based on the model of international criminal proceedings based on the division of labor, criminal procedural guarantees must be guaranteed in the overall context of the criminal proceedings - and not completely and fully in the respective national context. Therefore, if, from an overall perspective, criminal procedural guarantees are shifted to foreign criminal proceedings and must be exercised there, the non-applicability of Art. 32 FC in domestic mutual legal assistance proceedings is not objectionable. This mediating approach with a strong case-by-case approach claims to build on the more recent ECtHR case law on the fundamental rights of inter-state cooperation obligations in mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
III. Presumption of innocence (para. 1)
36 The presumption of innocence is the first procedural guarantee mentioned in Art. 32 FC. The wording of Art. 32 para. 1 FC is based on the international models in Art. 6 para. 2 ECHR and Art. 14 para. 2 UN Covenant II. At the federal level, the presumption of innocence is enshrined in Art. 10 CrimPC. It is also related to other aspects of procedural law, such as public information (Art. 74 para. 3 CrimPC), the freedom of the accused to incriminate themselves and cooperate (Art. 113 para. 1 CrimPC) and the consequences of costs and compensation in the event of acquittal or discontinuation of proceedings (Art. 426 para. 2 and Art. 430 para. 1 lit. a CrimPC).
37 The core of the presumption of innocence is the protection of the open-ended nature of criminal proceedings, as fair criminal proceedings start without a predetermined outcome and therefore with an uncertain outcome. Only regular criminal proceedings bring certainty about criminal responsibility and sentencing.
38 The presumption of innocence results in the prohibition of the punitive nature of criminal proceedings: Punishments may not be anticipated in ongoing criminal proceedings before the outcome of the judgment. Consequently, according to Art. 234 para. 1 CrimPC, there is a strict separation between convicted persons in prison (primarily for the purpose of resocialization) and prisoners in criminal detention (primarily for the purpose of securing the presence of the accused and gathering evidence), including different forms of detention regimes.
A. Material scope of protection
39 With regard to the material scope of the presumption of innocence, reference should be made to the above explanations. Mutual assistance proceedings may fall within the scope of Art. 32 FC on a case-by-case basis (in particular in extradition proceedings for criminal prosecution) if there are indications that the presumption of innocence is not sufficiently taken into account in foreign criminal proceedings or if there are indications of previous convictions from the conduct and documents of the foreign mutual assistance authorities.
B. Temporal scope of protection
40 The protection of the presumption of innocence is granted to the person concerned from the time at which he or she materially becomes an accused person (Art. 111 CrimPC). The beginning of the guarantee of the presumption of innocence therefore coincides with the formal notification of investigations against the person concerned or implicitly with the implementation of measures directed against them as the accused. The final (legally binding) court decision on the accusation of guilt marks the end of the presumption of innocence: the decisive factor is the extent to which judicial proceedings are still ongoing in which a court can still materially deal with the question of guilt.
41 In some cases, the presumption of innocence extends beyond the end of the criminal proceedings ("second protective dimension of the presumption of innocence"). This applies to cases of acquittals or discontinuation of proceedings (e.g. due to the statute of limitations) in which no residual suspicion may be maintained. Decisions on costs to the detriment of the acquitted accused person are only permissible if the accused person caused the criminal proceedings against them to be opened or obstructed their progress (Art. 426 para. 2 CrimPC).
C. Individual protective contents
1. Evaluation of evidence
42 The Federal Supreme Court has established the presumption of innocence in particular as a rule for the assessment of evidence. In a leading decision, it clarified that the criminal court "may not declare itself convinced of the existence of facts unfavourable to the accused if, when viewed objectively, there are considerable and unquestionable doubts as to whether the facts have materialized in this way". This guiding decision is reflected today in the wording of Art. 10 para. 3 CrimPC ("If there are insurmountable doubts as to the fulfillment of the factual requirements of the charged offense, [...]") (rightly criticized by the literature). Reasonable doubts about the guilt of the accused person must work in their favor ("in dubio pro reo"). This only concerns factual issues, not legal issues. In practice, the procedural principle is reviewed very cautiously: A violation of the rule of evidence "beyond reasonable doubt" occurs if the accused person is convicted "although, on an objective assessment of the evidence, there remained manifestly substantial or absolutely unquellable doubts as to [their] guilt". Ultimately, the Federal Supreme Court examines questions of the assessment of evidence on the presumption of innocence within the narrow limits of the protection against arbitrariness. Arbitrariness exists if the court "assumes facts that are in clear contradiction with the actual situation, are based on a manifest error or are contrary to the concept of justice in an offensive manner".
43 Functionally, this protection ensures the impartiality of the persons involved in a judicial decision (Art. 30 para. 1 FC). They must not enter the proceedings with a preconceived opinion. Only if judges enter the proceedings with an open mind can requests for evidence be considered fairly and evidence presented be assessed impartially.
44 This procedural principle does not apply at the end of the criminal investigation; in case of doubt, the decision between discontinuing the proceedings or bringing charges must be made in favor of the latter ("in dubio pro duriore", Art. 324 in conjunction with Art. 319 CrimPC). In contrast to the assessment of evidence in the broad sense (overall procedure for establishing the facts), the procedural principle of "in dubio pro durore" applies to the assessment of evidence in the narrow sense (collection and review of evidence admissible in proceedings in accordance with Art. 139 et seq. CrimPC), the procedural principle of "in dubio pro reo" does not apply. The "in dubio pro reo" principle only becomes applicable after all necessary evidence has been collected and examined: If, on the basis of the evidence, reasonable doubt remains as to the criminal responsibility of the accused person, he or she must be acquitted of the charges. Furthermore, the principle is not applicable to prognosis decisions with regard to the detention of mentally abnormal persons, decisions on preventive detention or preventive police measures based on the Concordat on Measures against Violence at Sporting Events, as these do not involve questions of criminal guilt.
45 Anticipated assessment of evidence is difficult to reconcile with the presumption of innocence. Here, the court decides in advance whether evidence to be collected later is likely to support the statements made. Contrary to the advice of the literature, the legislator has decided to retain the anticipated assessment of evidence (to the detriment of the accused person), although it has regulated this cautiously in Art. 139 para. 2 and Art. 318 para. 2 CrimPC. The main problem with this is that it restricts the open-endedness of factual investigations, which is guaranteed by the presumption of innocence. Nevertheless, case law and some of the literature support the admissibility of anticipating the assessment of evidence if the court "can assume without arbitrariness in anticipating the assessment of evidence that its conviction would not be changed by further evidence". According to established case law, it is essential for admissibility that the court arrives at a corresponding, arbitrary conviction based on evidence that has already been taken. Review by the Federal Supreme Court is limited to an examination of arbitrariness (Art. 9 FC). In contrast, another part of the literature calls for a more restrictive approach. The anticipated assessment of evidence in criminal proceedings should at most be possible in the case of undisputed factual elements to exonerate the accused.
2. Distribution of the burden of proof
46 As a rule of burden of proof, the presumption of innocence ensures that the state conducting the proceedings bears the responsibility for proving guilt: The prosecuting authorities must prove the guilt of the accused person. Conversely, the accused person does not have to prove their innocence; such a reversal of the burden of proof would be inadmissible in principle. This implies, for example, the prohibition of drawing negative conclusions from their silence. Because the burden of proof lies with the state conducting the proceedings and doubts therefore work in favor of the accused person, the burden of proof rule is closely related to the rule on the assessment of evidence.
47 Nevertheless, the presumption of innocence is not absolute: it does not prohibit certain presumptions in substantive criminal law. For example, criminal offences such as abstract endangerment offences, pre-criminalization or possession offences are compatible with the presumption of innocence. According to the literature, the same applies to the construction of reversals of the burden of proof in defamation offenses under Art. 173 no. 2 SCC.
48 Even in procedural criminal law, the presumption of innocence is not absolute, but offers scope for legally enshrined presumption and evidence rules. Their admissibility depends on their rebuttability in the proceedings; the decisive factor is whether a judicial assessment of the evidence is admissible and whether the accused person has sufficient opportunity to provide counter-evidence. Furthermore, these presumption rules must serve a permissible purpose and be reasonably limitable. Particularly in the most important cases in practice, namely the confiscation of proceeds from suspected criminal activity (Art. 70 para. 1 SCC), the Federal Supreme Court assumes a reversal of the burden of proof, which is rightly criticized in the literature. Duties of acquiescence in criminal proceedings within the meaning of Art. 113 para. 1 sentence 3 CrimPC (or even minimal duties to cooperate, such as when testing breath or blood alcohol) do not violate the presumption of innocence.
49 Ultimately, the presumption of innocence in Art. 32 para. 1 FC is directed at both the prosecuting authorities and the legislative bodies: it is up to the legislative power to lay down rules of evidence and presumption in conformity with fundamental rights.
3. Freedom from self-incrimination and cooperation
50 The principle of "nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare" is closely linked to the presumption of innocence and the inherent distribution of the burden of proof, which is primarily enshrined in simple law in Art. 113 para. 1 CrimPC. The "nemotenetur" guarantee essentially contains two elements of protection. On the one hand, the accused person is not obliged to testify in criminal proceedings or to contribute to their incrimination (freedom from self-incrimination). On the other hand, the accused person is free to cooperate with the prosecuting authorities (freedom tocooperate). In this respect, the authorities may not use evidence that has been obtained against the will of the accused, in particular through coercion or pressure. The "nemo tenetur" guarantee protects the role of the accused person as a legal subject in criminal proceedings and thus their right to autonomy in the proceedings.
51 Art. 6 para. 2 ECHR deals with the state's prohibition of forcing the accused person to cooperate in their conviction in any way, which is why self-incrimination is central to ECHR case law. In contrast, the domestic guarantee in Art. 113 para. 1 CrimPC is broader, as it protects the accused person from being forced to cooperate in incriminating themselves in criminal proceedings. Consequently, the free decision of the accused to incriminate themselves and make their own exculpatory statements is a legal right. According to Art. 3 para. 2 lit. d and Art. 140 CrimPC, the accused may not be forced to testify or cooperate either directly (e.g. through torture, threats or deception) or indirectly. Even the threat of adverse consequences for refusing to testify is inadmissible. In addition, the accused must be informed of their right to self-incrimination and freedom to cooperate at an early stage (Art. 158 para. 1 lit. b CrimPC). Against this background, Wohlers aptly describes the "nemo-tenetur" guarantee as a prohibition on the use of evidence. Disregarding this procedural right can lead to a ban on the use of evidence.
52 With regard to the freedom to cooperate in criminal proceedings, literature and case law distinguish between inadmissible coercion and admissible passive duties of acquiescence. Active duties to cooperate on the part of the accused (such as urine tests, squats, 3D facial measurements) are discussed critically because there is a functional threat of undermining the freedom from self-incrimination. However, the core concern of the freedom to cooperate is to protect the accused person from willingly participating in their own conviction. In this respect, coercive measures involving interference with the physical substance of the person concerned are permissible under Art. 196 et seq. of the CrimPC as long as their existence does not depend on their will. Accordingly, the urine sample is permissible, but the use of a lie detector is not.
4. Public and private prior conviction
53 The addressees of the presumption of innocence are primarily the criminal prosecution authorities. They should not exhibit any behavior in the ongoing criminal proceedings that indicates a determination of the guilt of the accused person. This applies both to official statements (court reporting) and informal statements. The public impression of judicial activity is only guaranteed and the criminal court's assessment of evidence is unbiased if no official statements are made that cast doubt on the innocence of an acquitted person or that amount to a prior conviction. It is also intended to protect against the pressure to prejudge that arises when the public is prematurely given the impression of the guilt of the accused person by official conduct. Accordingly, official (even unconscious) statements before and during criminal proceedings that present the guilt of the accused person as proven, even though this has not yet been established in court, are prohibited.
54 In this respect, the active public communication of the prosecution authorities, which takes into account the legitimate need for information of the general public (guaranteed in Art. 17 FC and specifically in criminal proceedings in Art. 74 CrimPC), is quite delicate, especially if it takes place beyond the media through its own supplementary judicial communication. Active media work cannot rule out all influence, which is why great caution, care and restraint are required in communication by the prosecution authorities; in particular, emphasis must be placed on the provisional nature of the information in question. The disclosure of investigative measures and the suspicion of a crime against a person appears to be permissible. What is not permissible, however, is the prejudicial presentation of a person, their designation as a "perpetrator" or, in general, any opinion-forming reporting that creates the impression that he/she has already been proven to be a perpetrator. It is precisely because of the massive stigmatizing effect and the restriction of other fundamental rights (in particular the right to private and family life and the protection of honour against defamation) that names should not be mentioned. Measures to secure proceedings with a highly suggestive visual impact, such as special prison clothing, metal cages or glass cabins, are at least justifiable from the point of view of this guarantee, despite the tensions with the presumption of innocence, if their security character is paramount and acquittal remains an option. However, such measures may violate other provisions of fundamental rights (such as the prohibition of inhumane treatment).
55 In addition to the criminal prosecution authorities, the presumption of innocence must also be guaranteed by other state authorities. Insinuations or allegations of (as yet undetermined) guilt by public officials and employees mislead the public into believing that the accusations made are in fact established. This in turn puts the court involved under pressure to prejudge and undermines both the procedural position of the accused person and their reputation. Finally, in hierarchical authority structures, there is a risk that the prejudicial statements of high-ranking officials will be interpreted as instructions by subordinate employees.
56 Political actors, on the other hand, should be given more leeway, even if they hold public office. In the interests of liberal democracy, there should be room for provocative statements about ongoing criminal proceedings in political debates. However, a distinction must be made depending on the context of the statements: If the political office-holder makes his or her statements in the context of the respective exercise of public office, the above applies. Outside of this context, the standard of the presumption of innocence is lower in favor of the political battle of opinions.
57 Prejudicial media coverage or defamatory campaigns by private individuals can impair the impartiality of the court conducting the proceedings. In such cases, both the presumption of innocence under Art. 32 para. 1 FC and the right to privacy of the person concerned or their protection of personality (Art. 13 FC) are violated. Nevertheless, private media reporting falls within the scope of protection of media freedom within the meaning of Art. 17 FC, which, as a critically analyzing, free and evaluating press, serves important and legitimate information interests of the general public for liberal democracy (so-called public watchdog). In this respect, careful consideration is required in two directions: Journalists should report critically and analytically on the accusation and personality of the accused person (suspicion reporting), but should not be allowed to conduct a campaign against an accused person that, from an objective point of view, makes concerns about a prior conviction appear justified. In addition, in the case of reporting that steers a conviction, the state obligation recognized by the Federal Supreme Court to take appropriate countermeasures in order to bring the reporting back within the limits of necessary objectivity applies. In this respect, the duty to protect of the prosecuting authorities conducting the proceedings may require them to actively intervene in the reporting in order to ensure the guarantees associated with the presumption of innocence. Appeals to the self-responsibility of media professionals are usually not enough. In extreme cases of serious violations of procedural fairness and the presumption of innocence, proceedings should be discontinued.
IV. Right to information (para. 2 sentence 1)
58 In accordance with Art. 6 para. 3 lit. a ECHR and Art. 14 para. 3 lit. a UN Covenant II, Art. 32 para. 2 sentence 1 FC requires the accused person to be informed in detail at an early stage of the criminal proceedings about the nature and grounds of the charges against them in a language they can understand. Art. 32 para. 2 FC thus substantiates the right to be heard in accordance with Art. 29 FC and Art. 3 para. 2 lit. c CrimPC and is related to the accusation maxim in criminal proceedings in accordance with Art. 9 CrimPC. The core purpose of the right to information is to enable the person concerned to prepare their defense and to enable them to defend themselves. In this respect, this right to information is functionally related to the effective right of defense in Art. 32 para. 2 sentence 2 FC and protects against being taken by surprise. Essentially, the accused person's right to information extends to
The nature and assessment of the allegations made (Art. 158 para. 1 lit. a CrimPC; see also Art. 143 para. 1 lit. b CrimPC);
the rights to which the accused is entitled (Art. 143 para. 1 lit. c, Art. 158 para. 1 lit. a-d CrimPC; see also Art. 143 para. 1 lit. c CrimPC);
the right to inspect files (Art. 101, Art. 107 para. 1 lit. a, Art. 225 para. 2 CrimPC).
A. Timing of the information
59 According to Art. 32 para. 2 sentence 1 FC, the "accused" person should receive information about the charges against them "as quickly as possible". This is intended to enable the person concerned to exercise effective rights of defense at an early stage of the proceedings, when decisions on the defense strategy are still effectively open. The concept of the accused under Art. 32 para. 2 sentence 1 FC is detached from the formal filing of charges, as the rights to information exist during the investigation phase. The decisive factor is the status of the accused in accordance with Art. 111 CrimPC. The start of the right to information is marked by the implicit (e.g. taking of a measure) or explicit knowledge of the person concerned that they are under investigation. This is the case at the latest at the first interrogation (Art. 158 CrimPC). If this information is not provided, evidence from the interrogation is absolutely unusable (Art. 158 para. 2 in conjunction with Art. 141 para. 1 CrimPC).
60 The right to information may be subject to restrictions due to legitimate prosecution interests, for example if the success of the investigation is jeopardized by attempts to thwart the accused. Nevertheless, the duty to inform must be linked to the exercise of effective rights of defense. Therefore, the restrictions reach their limits if they are intended to weaken the defense or threaten disadvantages for the subsequent criminal proceedings. If the success of the criminal investigation is only threatened by the exercise of procedural rights, the right to information must be given priority. While in ordinary criminal proceedings the duty to provide information in accordance with Art. 158 f. CrimPC takes place expeditiously due to the explicit official obligations in accordance with Art. 219 para. 1 and 2 CrimPC, there are serious constitutional concerns in administrative criminal proceedings because the accused person has to wait longer for the information to be provided in accordance with Art. 39 para. 3 in conjunction with Art. 55 VStrR. Art. 55 VStrR, the accused may be detained for longer than 72 hours without the presence of legal counsel and without being informed of the charges.
61 If the duty to inform is subject to delays, the notification must be made up for in such a way that there is sufficient opportunity to prepare for the proceedings. The content requirements for orientation vary depending on the stage of the proceedings (notification of the charges at the first hearing in accordance with Art. 158 CrimPC; indictment in accordance with Art. 325 para. 1 lit. f CrimPC). It may be appropriate to suspend the proceedings in order to give the defense sufficient time to prepare. From the perspective of convention law, disadvantages suffered by the accused can at best be remedied through the judicial process. The ECtHR is generous in its treatment of the possibility of curing disadvantages through subsequent information.
B. Substantive requirements for information
62 In terms of content, the right to information extends to the communication of the alleged facts (descriptions of the place, time and subject matter of the alleged offense) as well as the (preliminary) legal assessment of the prosecuting authorities.
63 The accusation and its criminal classification may not only be communicated in abstract terms. In order to provide the accused person with "comprehensive" information, detailed information must be disclosed, depending on the circumstances of the individual case and the respective stage of the proceedings. The extent to which the accused person can understand the content and scope of the criminal charges and prepare their defense within a reasonable period of time must be examined. There is no requirement to list specific evidence.
64 The state of knowledge of the facts and legal assessment in the investigation proceedings may change as the facts of the case progress. If the reason or nature of the accusation changes as a result, the prosecuting authority must provide new information. Only then can the accused person effectively prepare for new or changed allegations.
C. Form and linguistic comprehensibility
65 In principle, the information does not have to be given in writing, but may be given orally. The decisive factor is that the effectiveness of the protective purpose is not undermined, which would be the case, for example, with oral information in a complex case. In view of the importance of the right to information for the effectiveness of the defense and the exceptional psychological situation in which the accused person finds themselves in criminal proceedings, purely oral information seems inappropriate. Written information about the facts of the case is required.
66 It is essential that the accused person is informed directly and personally, and that this information is formally provided to them and their defense. Simply informing the legal counsel is not sufficient, as the right to information aims to protect the procedural subject position of the accused person.
67 The information must be comprehensible so that the accused person can organize their defence effectively. The information must therefore be provided in a language that the accused understands. Challenges exist if the accused person has difficulties understanding the allegations due to mental health problems. In addition to the procedure set out in Art. 155 para. 2 CrimPC, it would appear expedient, as in the case of hearing-impaired or speech-impaired parties to proceedings under Art. 143 para. 7 CrimPC, to draw up a written statement or to allow the assistance of a suitable person.
68 The postulate of comprehensible orientation may require the assistance of a translation in accordance with Art. 68 para. 2 CrimPC if the accused obviously does not understand the language of the court. There is no entitlement to a translation into the accused's own native language; a translation into a language that the person concerned can understand is sufficient. However, the accused person must indicate their need for translation in the case of non-translated procedural steps. Not only Art. 68 para. 2 CrimPC, but also ECtHR case law has so far refrained from requiring a translation of the notification or the indictment, although the Court warns of the disadvantages this would entail for the accused. However, a right to a written translation appears unavoidable for the protective purpose of Art. 32 para. 2 FC and, in view of modern IT aids for automated translation, can be realized at a low threshold.
V. Effective defense (para. 2 sentence 2)
69 Art. 32 para. 2 sentence 2 FC guarantees the accused person the assertion of the rights of defense to which they are entitled. Although no individual rights of defense are expressly mentioned, the core concern of effective defense is to provide the accused with concrete and practical procedural rights of defense in order to ensure their effective participation in the criminal proceedings. Effective participation means being put in a position to defend oneself concretely and effectively against accusations made by the criminal prosecution authorities. This requires specific rights of defense and appropriate framework conditions.
70 For the individual rights of defense, reference should be made to the specialist literature on criminal procedure. Concrete minimum requirements for criminal procedural rights of defense are listed in Art. 6 para. 3 ECHR: Effective defense requires, in particular, sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for the proceedings, self-defense or defense by legal counsel through the defense of choice or official defense, confrontation with witnesses against and incriminating witnesses and, if necessary, the free assistance of an interpreter. The minimum requirements of international and constitutional law are concretized at the statutory level in the CrimPC. According to the legislative will, the procedural guarantees under criminal law must be extended beyond the minimum requirements.
71 The framework conditions for an effective defense include ensuring that the accused person is adequately informed about their rights of defense beyond the factual right to information (Art. 32 para. 2 sentence 1 FC). Since criminal proceedings are extremely complex and have serious consequences for the persons concerned, the accused often needs the support of legal counsel throughout the criminal proceedings in order to be able to defend themselves appropriately. Finally, for an effective defense, the criminal proceedings as a whole must be fair.
A. Information on defense rights
72 In order for the accused person to be able to effectively exercise the rights of defense to which they are entitled, they must be aware of them. Particularly as Art. 32 para. 2 sentence 1 FC only refers to information about the accusations made, the right of the accused person who has not been arrested (Art. 31 para. 2 FC) to be informed of their rights of defense by the prosecution authorities is based on Art. 32 para. 2 sentence 2 FC in conjunction with Art. 158 para. 1 lit. This must take place from the first interrogation (Art. 158 para. 1 CrimPC), so that in particular the status of the accused within the meaning of Art. 111 CrimPC must be taken into account. Both for human rights reasons and in view of the exceptional psychological situation for the accused person, it is necessary to inform them of their rights as soon as they arrive at the police station, for example during police detention in accordance with Art. 215 para. 1 lit. b, c CrimPC.
73 According to the intention of the legislator, it should be sufficient to inform the accused person of their rights of defense once. This is not convincing due to the discrepancy with the duty to inform between the accused and other parties to the proceedings. Rather, Art. 158 para. 1 CrimPC establishes a minimum standard for the legal information to be provided to the accused by the prosecuting authorities during the first interrogation, while Art. 143 para. 1 lit. c CrimPC expressly requires comprehensive legal information. This must be provided irrespective of the accused person's level of knowledge about their position in the proceedings, their procedural rights or the subject matter of the proceedings. Particular attention must be paid to the quality of the information provided so that the right to an effective defense is not undermined.
B. Legal assistance
74 The core concern of the right to legal counsel is to give the accused person the opportunity to participate in their own criminal proceedings in an informed manner and to lend sufficient weight to their position in the proceedings or in the sentencing process. The defense in criminal proceedings is solely committed to their interests (Art. 128 CrimPC). In this respect, every accused person has the right to defend themselves or to call in a defense lawyer. They may call upon a defense counsel of their own choosing and paid for by them (Art. 127 para. 5, Art. 129 CrimPC). This also applies to minor criminal proceedings, but not, according to the Federal Supreme Court, to psychiatric examinations of the accused. The legal counsel of the accused person is to be classified as support for the subject of the proceedings in order to realize his rights of participation. The main decisions on the defense strategy are the responsibility of the accused person, who must have a corresponding information and knowledge base for this.
1. Self-defense
75 Subject to cases of mandatory defense, the accused person has the right to self-defense if they so wish (Art. 129 para. 1 CrimPC). If they choose self-defense, they must carefully observe the corresponding duties to act with regard to the criminal proceedings. To this end, they must have appropriate opportunities to inspect files and have access to legal texts and textbooks.
76 The informed defendant can decide not to contest the accusations and statements of the prosecution and to participate in the proceedings with a trial strategy of defenselessness. It is then crucial that they have recognized the scope of their defence strategy and can participate in their own criminal proceedings as an informed subject of the proceedings as they wish.
77 The prosecuting authorities (in particular the court) may examine whether it appears appropriate in the interests of the administration of justice to appoint legal counsel despite the accused's wish to defend themselves (in particular if the accused is unable to defend themselves). In the event that the accused is unable to defend himself (Art. 130 lit. c CrimPC), the prosecution authorities are obliged to carry out a corresponding review (Art. 131 para. 1 CrimPC). The appointment of legal counsel against the will of the accused person is a serious interference in their defense, but may be permissible if this appears necessary in the interests of the administration of justice and the accused person can continue to influence their own criminal proceedings. The compulsory appointment is legitimate (or necessary in the case of a necessary defense) if, in a specific individual case, access to the file can only be granted to the defense and not to the accused. The legal counsel appointed by force must not adversely affect the defense of the informed accused person.
2. Necessary defense
78 In the cases listed in Art. 130 CrimPC, legal assistance by a defense counsel is mandatory. Compulsory defense limits the right to self-defense in criminal proceedings. Its raison d'être is discussed in many ways and is sometimes interpreted as the state's duty of care (Art. 132 para. 1 lit. a CrimPC) to remedy a lack of legal knowledge and procedural defense skills, to establish the truth and to ensure that the criminal proceedings are conducted in a judicial manner. If the appointment of legal counsel is indicated, the compulsory appointment of such counsel is permissible even if the accused person refuses it, as the prevailing view is that necessary defense cannot be dispensed with. According to the Federal Supreme Court, the necessary defense counsel can be forfeited if the rights of defense are abused, which is rightly viewed critically in the literature.
79 For the requirement of effective defense under Art. 32 para. 2 sentence 2 FC, the time of appointment of counsel is decisive. This is generally described as "without delay" in Art. 131 para. 1 CrimPC and is described in more detail for the preliminary proceedings in Art. 131 para. 2 CrimPC.
3. Elective defense
80 In principle, the accused person has the right to elective or private defense, i.e. to legal representation by a criminal defense lawyer of their choice (Art. 129 CrimPC). The core of elective defense is the independent choice and appointment of legal counsel for the accused in criminal proceedings. Domestically, Art. 127 para. 5 CrimPC refers to Swiss law on lawyers, which in principle reserves professional representation in court to the legal profession in accordance with Art. 2 para. 1 FMLA. This does not affect the exception in Art. 127 para. 5 last sentence CrimPC, which refers to special cantonal provisions for the defense in misdemeanor criminal proceedings.
4. Official defense
81 The official defense is a counterpoint to the electoral defense. In this case, the defense is not appointed by the accused, but by an authority. Compensation is paid by the public authorities (Art. 135 CrimPC). Despite the different legal relationship between the accused and the defense, the legal counsel has the same duty of care, the same independence vis-à-vis the state and the same unilateral protection of the interests of the accused as in the case of elective defense. Official defense extends to the proceedings of the first and second cantonal instance. For criminal appeals to the Federal Supreme Court, the right to an official defense is denied by the Federal Supreme Court (probably contrary to the Convention), but affirmed in the literature.
82 Although the authority conducting the proceedings appoints the defense, the right to choose legal counsel also applies to a certain extent to the official defense. Although there is no right to a defense counsel of one's own choice (Art. 133 para. 2 CrimPC), the preferences of the accused must be sufficiently taken into account, which implies a right to propose an official counsel. In this respect, the director of proceedings may only reject the representation of choice proposed by the accused for objective reasons. Only in this way can the relationship of trust between the client and legal counsel be established and the accused's right to informed participation (Art. 134 para. 2 CrimPC) be safeguarded. It is critical that the language skills of the public defender are not an essential selection criterion and that there is no need under Convention law to consult the accused person before appointing their legal counsel. Furthermore, the right to make proposals and the relationship of trust imply the fundamental right of the accused - albeit subject to high hurdles under Art. 134 para. 2 CrimPC - to bring about a change of counsel; however, restrictions must be accepted in order to ensure the conduct of the proceedings.
83 Art. 132 para. 1 lit. a CrimPC regulates the necessary official defense, which basically concerns four cases. Firstly, there is a necessary official defense if the person can determine their own defense but fails to do so despite being requested to do so (Art. 132 para. 1 lit. a no. 1 CrimPC). Secondly, a necessary defense exists if, in the case of necessary defense in ongoing criminal proceedings, the mandate of the defense of choice is withdrawn or resigned and no new counsel is appointed despite being requested to do so (Art. 132 para. 1 lit. a no. 2 CrimPC). Thirdly, there is a conversion into a necessary official defense if, in the course of a necessary defense, the accused person initially appoints a counsel of choice but is unable to pay for it due to established indigence. Fourthly, the principle of effective defense requires that an official defense be appointed despite the existence of an optional defense if the latter seriously violates its duty to provide assistance.
84 If the accused person is indigent and it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice, the state must provide them with free defense counsel (Art. 132 para. 1 lit. b CrimPC). The institute of free defense in criminal matters enshrined in the CrimPC implements the requirements of Art. 29 para. 3 FC specifically for the requirements of fair criminal proceedings in accordance with Art. 32 para. 2 FC. The first requirement for this is indigence; the reason for this is irrelevant. If the lack of means is only partial, the state can make the appointment of legal counsel dependent on the accused making a contribution. The granting of a free appointment does not necessarily imply permanent exemption from defense costs: If the financial situation of the once indigent accused person improves after his conviction, the charging of defense costs for the convicted person who is no longer indigent is permissible. This principle is reflected in Art. 135 para. 4 CrimPC, which provides for the obligation to reimburse the costs of the official defense if the indigence ceases to exist. The second requirement is the necessity of the defense to safeguard the interests of the accused (Art. 132 para. 2 CrimPC, "interests of justice"), the interpretation of which must be based on the Federal Supreme Court's practice on Art. 29 para. 3 FC. Within the limits of Art. 132 para. 2 CrimPC, this requirement is based on the realistic chance of an effective defense and, consequently, the extent to which the accused person has a concrete and effective defense. The appointment of a defense appears to be mandatory for appeal proceedings. If both conditions are met, the state is obliged to provide the unrepresented accused person with a criminal defense as soon as this appears necessary to exercise the rights of defense (according to Art. 131 CrimPC already in the preliminary proceedings). In principle, official defense remains excluded in accordance with Art. 132 para. 2 in conjunction with Art. 132 para. 3 StPO. para. 3 CrimPC for so-called minor cases, the requirements for which are listed as examples in the law. Due to this wording of the law (para. 2: "in particular"; para. 3: "in any case"), the official defense remains possible as an exception despite falling below the de minimis limits.
5. Legal counsel of the first hour
85 The right to legal assistance from the first police questioning or the first interrogation by the public prosecutor (so-called "first-hourlawyer"), which is based on Art. 159 CrimPC, is an important cornerstone for the realization of equality of arms in criminal proceedings and thus of fair criminal proceedings. This right arises upon detention or at the beginning of the first interrogation (Art. 143 para. 1 lit. c, Art. 158 para. 1 lit. c CrimPC). Functionally, the right to defense counsel already applies in the preliminary proceedings; the accused person has the right to access to legal counsel during the first police interrogation. Since it is in the preliminary proceedings, and in particular in the first interrogation, that the decisive course is set for the criminal defense in the specific case, the right to legal counsel from the outset also gives rise to a right to his presence during the police interrogation. Therefore, access to the defense is decisive for the evaluation of the confession of the accused person and its obtaining in violation of the freedom from self-incrimination.
86 However, the right of access to the defense is not absolute. Compelling circumstances in a specific individual case (e.g. terrorist defense) may make a restriction necessary, whereby the state has a duty to demonstrate this. Even if a restriction appears to be justified, the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings may be affected if the rights of defense of the person concerned are permanently and significantly impaired. Furthermore, the right to legal assistance during police questioning can be waived. In view of the intimidating situation in which an accused person finds themselves and taking into account the difficulty of providing evidence, the ECtHR states that high standards must be set for an effective waiver: The accused person must be sufficiently aware of the implications of a waiver.
6. Communication in defense
87 Art. 159 para. 2 and Art. 235 para. 4 sentence 1 CrimPC guarantee the right of the (detained) accused person to have contact with their legal counsel. In the case of foreign-language speakers, this requires the involvement of a translator for defense discussions. The accused may communicate in person or in writing with their legal counsel without supervision or monitoring. In terms of content, the defense is not subject to a prohibition (in particular not via the duty of confidentiality under Art. 73 para. 2 CrimPC) to inform their client about the content of documents from the criminal files; this would inadmissibly restrict their professional rules.
88 This communication may only be restricted in exceptional cases if there is reasonable suspicion of abuse. In order to preserve the exceptional nature of this restriction, approval by the compulsory measures court is required (Art. 235 para. 4 sentence 2 CrimPC). However, compelling security interests that require accompanying measures in extreme cases must not affect the confidentiality of oral or written communication between the defense and the client.
7. Bad defense
89 Effective defense is not only guaranteed by the appointment or presence of legal counsel; it also requires that the legal counsel effectively exercises the rights of the accused person. Therefore, Art. 32 para. 2 FC (in conjunction with Art. 29 para. 3 FC and Art. 6 para. 3 lit. c ECHR) entitles the accused person to competent, committed and effective representation of their party's interests. In this respect, the suitability of the official defense is taken into account as a result of the revision of the CrimPC (Art. 133 para. 2 CrimPC). However, how to deal with poor defense is not fully clarified in practice. Although the serious neglect of professional and ethical duties by the legal counsel can result in a judicially ascertainable violation of the accused person's rights of defense, not every suboptimal defense leads to the affirmation of its ineffectiveness. The decisive factor is the extent to which the accused person was able to exercise their rights of defense (without unjustifiable errors) through their legal counsel and whether the legal counsel (in consultation with them) implemented a consciously chosen defense strategy.
90 Both the FSC and the ECtHR assume that failures on the part of the legal counsel are in principle attributable to the accused person. The only exception recognized by the FSC applies to gross errors in the context of the necessary defence. However, it should be borne in mind that the accused person is not in a position to supervise their legal counsel. In this respect, the state's duty to intervene to ensure an effective defense appears ambivalent: the need for protection of the person concerned stands in contrast to the state's non-interference in their defense matters, whereby the latter arises both from the autonomy of the person concerned and the legal profession as well as from the partiality of the prosecuting authorities. Under Convention law, it is difficult to conceive of a duty of protection on the part of the state to eliminate or prevent errors in elective or compulsory defense; it is precisely the independence of the legal profession that speaks against state guardianship with powers of intervention. Nevertheless, the Federal Supreme Court and the literature advocate a duty of the prosecution authorities to monitor the fundamental effectiveness of the defense. As an excess control, it only applies in the case of manifestly serious misconduct and is dependent on the respective procedural context, as defense failures can be remedied depending on the phase of the proceedings. According to the Federal Supreme Court, serious breaches of duty by the defense include blatant failure to meet deadlines and appointments, failure to attend important witness hearings, lack of diligence in the preparation of hearings and other procedural acts as well as lack of provision for substitutes. According to the ECtHR, inactivity on the part of the criminal defense, non-attendance at the interrogation of the accused in the preliminary proceedings or failure to take legal action (despite the accused's wishes) are to be regarded as serious neglect of defense duties.
C. Overall fairness
91 Effective participation in criminal proceedings is only possible if the entire criminal proceedings are fair. This requires a balance between different legitimate interests, namely those of the prosecution, the accused and other persons involved in the proceedings, taking into account the particularities of the criminal proceedings. In certain cases, this balance of interests leads to the accused person being placed at a serious disadvantage in criminal proceedings, for example by restricting their rights of defense. The question then arises as to whether the criminal proceedings were nevertheless fair overall. Since this is a central question of criminal proceedings in terms of legitimacy theory, it is not surprising that the fairness of the specific criminal proceedings is protected by Convention law and can be subject to review by the ECtHR.
92 Methodologically, the ECtHR first deals with individual criminal procedural guarantees before, in a final step, examining the balance of all interests involved in the course of the so-called overall fairness of criminal proceedings. In this respect, the ECtHR subjects potentially fairness-endangering interventions to an overall assessment of the fairness of the entire criminal proceedings (including the investigation and appeal proceedings) and also takes into account domestic attempts at remedy and reparation. Furthermore, the overall fairness of expeditiously conducted criminal proceedings (e.g. plea bargaining or abbreviated criminal proceedings) is checked for arbitrary reductions in fairness guarantees, such as the right to evidence. Therefore, any waiver of benefits or claims under the fairness guarantee - which must be declared voluntarily, expressly or tacitly - must be accompanied by a minimum level of guarantees corresponding to the severity of the waiver. In addition, the waiver must not conflict with any important public interests. In addition to the state's interest in prosecution, the ECtHR also considers the perspective of the accused person in its overall fairness assessment. This is intended to protect them from abusive application of procedural rules. The same applies if a special need for protection arises due to their particular vulnerability (e.g. in the prosecution of potential victims of human trafficking).
VI. Judicial review (para. 3)
93 Art. 32 para. 3 FC guarantees every convicted person the right to have their sentence reviewed by a higher court. This provision is based on Art. 2 ECHR ZP VII and Art. 14 para. 5 UN Covenant II. The designation of the judicial guarantee of appeal by Art. 32 para. 3 FC appears significant because its concern goes beyond the ECHR's guarantee of fairness. This is because Art. 6 ECHR only guarantees a review of the criminal charge and not of the court conviction. Art. 13 ECHR (right of appeal) does not cover this either, as this guarantee only ensures a review body and not necessarily a judicial review. Even the guarantee of legal recourse in Art. 29a FC does not include a right to judicial review. In this respect, Art. 32 para. 3 FC is linked to the guarantee of legal recourse (Art. 29a FC) and the judicial procedural guarantees (Art. 30 FC). The exception in Art. 32 para. 3 sentence 2 FC, on the other hand, is no longer relevant to criminal jurisdiction.
94 In terms of constitutional theory, the importance of judicial review of criminal proceedings under the rule of law arises from the invasiveness of interference with fundamental rights under criminal law and the associated institutional perspective on judicial independence (Art. 191c FC). In a constitutional state, (criminal) courts are independent of other state organs. Their legitimacy depends on the extent to which they are able to reach concrete decisions on individual cases without extraneous influences in a fair (just) procedure in accordance with legal principles. Kiener has aptly placed judicial legal protection in the context of an institutional guarantee of fundamental rights: The judicial right of review is essential not only to respect the separation of powers (Art. 30 FC), but also as an "expression of a humane organization of authorities" (Art. 191c FC).
95 The concentration of criminal justice competence in the hands of independent courts appears to be of great importance in view of the different interests and fundamental rights of all parties to the proceedings. For the person convicted in the first instance in particular, a judicial review of the decision is essential, especially as criminal justice with its prosecution, investigation and prosecution function (public prosecutor's office) and clarification, legal protection and decision-making function (criminal courts) "remains a risky undertaking" despite the rule of law safeguards. Judicial review can (only) contain risks that affect both the accused person's rights of cooperation and defense as well as the guarantee that state prosecution and punishment must be carried out solely in compliance with the law. The guarantee of a judicial review mechanism includes the prohibition of a correction of the judgment by non-judicial authorities.
96 The guarantee of judicial review does not contradict the principle of (institutional) independence of the preceding judicial instances. Rather, Art. 32 para. 3 FC safeguards judicial independence within the state organization. Judges inevitably bring subjective views and evaluations into the judicial decision-making process. Therefore, institutional and organizational measures are required to limit subjective influences in court decisions. Only then can we speak of judicial decisions being in line with the rule of law. This containment is achieved by giving the parties to the proceedings the right to participate (strengthening the discursiveness of the specific proceedings) and by involving several people as decision-makers in the specific proceedings (pluralization of judicial subjectivity). In addition to the public nature of the proceedings and collegial decision-making, the judicial process of instances offers a state-organizational safeguard for the fundamental right to justice.
A. Guarantee of appeal
97 Art. 32 para. 3 FC presupposes the conviction of the person concerned; the statements on the material scope of application apply accordingly. According to the Federal Supreme Court, only convicted persons have the right to a double appeal in criminal matters. Its scope of review is neither prescribed by the constitution nor by the Convention. It is up to the legislator
whether it creates a second legal and factual instance (appeal) or an appeal limited solely to legal review (revision),
whether the lodging of an appeal depends on a preliminary admissibility check, or
whether it provides for a de minimis threshold.
98 The forfeiture of an appeal can only occur in the case of an unexcused "total failure" on the part of both the legal counsel and (!) the accused person. If the accused person is convicted in absentia proceedings despite having legal representation, they must have the opportunity to have the conviction reviewed in accordance with Art. 368 CrimPC.
B. Guarantee of legal recourse
99 As Vest aptly points out, Art. 32 para. 3 FC also contains a guarantee of legal recourse, which is prefigured by Art. 29a FC. From Art. 29a, 32 para. 3 and 191b FC in conjunction with Art. 80 para. 2 BGG. Art. 80 para. 2 BGG, the cantons are obliged to provide for judicial recourse for criminal proceedings (obligation of double jurisdiction). In terms of content, the right to judicial review guarantees the right to an appeal with devolutive effect, i.e. a decision on the merits by a higher court instance.
100 This guarantee of legal recourse is waivable; skipping a court instance is permissible with the consent of the person concerned. A waiver of the right to appeal is also permissible in the case of agreements in criminal proceedings, provided that the accused person makes their waiver on the basis of an informed and voluntary decision regarding their fundamental right to a review of the judgment and there are no significant public interests to the contrary.
About the author
Dr. iur. Lukas Staffler, LL.M. (London), is Senior Assistant for Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law at the University of Zurich, Senior Lecturer at MCI | The Entrepreneurial School (Austria), licensed attorney-at-law (RAK Bolzano/Bozen, Italy) Counsel/Lawyer at AWZ Attorneys at Law in Innsbruck, Austria. His teaching and research focuses in particular on the internationalization and Europeanization of criminal law.
Recommended further reading
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Materials
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Botschaft zur Vereinheitlichung des Strafprozessrechts vom 21.12.2005, BBl 2006 1085–1388.