I. Financial intermediaries' duty to join an SRO (para. 1)

1 When FinIA entered into force on January 1, 2020, the dual control system of the AMLA, which offered a choice between direct supervision by FINMA and affiliation to an SRO, was replaced by an exclusive SRO control system. The duty of financial intermediaries under Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA to join a self-regulatory organization (SRO) was enshrined in Art. 14 para. 1 AMLA.

A. Financial intermediaries under Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA

2 Financial intermediaries in accordance with Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA are persons who professionally accept, hold or assist in the investment or transfer of assets belonging to third parties. Examples of such financial intermediaries can be found in Art. 2 para. 3 let. a–c, f and g. The definition of such a financial intermediary is specified in the AMLO and in FINMA Circular 2011/1.

B. Self-regulatory organization

3 This refers to the self-regulatory organization under Art. 24 AMLA.

C. Affiliation requirement

4 Art. 14 para. 1 AMLA establishes the obligation for financial intermediaries as defined in Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA to join a self-regulatory organization (SRO). Such membership is mandatory: When commencing professional activity as a financial intermediary in accordance with Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA, the application for admission to an SRO must be submitted within two months (Art. 11 para. 1 let. b AMLO). Until they are affiliated, these financial intermediaries are prohibited from taking any action other than that which is strictly necessary to safeguard the assets (Art. 11 para. 2 AMLO). If a financial intermediary leaves or is excluded from an SRO, it must also apply to join another SRO within two months (Art. 12 para. 1 AMLO). It may continue its activities until it is admitted to the new SRO, but only within the framework of existing business relationships (Art. 12 para. 2 AMLO).

5 E contrario, a financial intermediary within the meaning of Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA is prohibited from operating without being affiliated to an SRO, subject to the deadlines set out in Art. 11 para. 2 and Art. 12 para. 2 AMLO. Violation of the duty to join an SRO constitutes illegal activity as a financial intermediary, which can be punished with a custodial sentence of up to three years or a monetary penalty in the case of intent, or a fine of up to CHF 250,000 in the case of negligence (Art. 44 FINMASA). In addition, FINMA may take supervisory measures against the financial intermediary in accordance with Art. 29–37 FINMASA or order its dissolution (Art. 20 AMLA).

6 An SRO is not prohibited from admitting financial intermediaries that it knows or must assume have violated the two-month time limit in accordance with Art. 11 para. 1 let. b or Art. 12 para. 2 AMLO and are therefore already operating illegally. In such cases, however, the SRO is subject to an immediate reporting obligation to FINMA, which must contain all relevant information known to it.

II. The financial intermediary's right of affiliation (para. 2), substantive requirements

7 Art. 14 para. 2 AMLA sets out the conditions under which a financial intermediary is entitled to affiliate with an SRO. These conditions must be met cumulatively.

A. Internal regulations and operational organization (lit. a)

8 Art. 14, para. 2, let. a AMLA requires sufficient internal regulations and an appropriate operational organization to ensure compliance with the obligations under the AMLA.

9 The requirements that the internal regulations and the operational organization must meet are based on the regulations of the SRO applicable to the respective financial intermediary in accordance with Art. 25 AMLA, which specify the legal obligations. AMLO-FINMA is not directly applicable to financial intermediaries in accordance with Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA. Nevertheless, FINMA bases its approval of SRO regulations on the key parameters of AMLO-FINMA (Art. 1 para. 2 AMLO-FINMA). This means that although SRO regulations may contain deviations from AMLO-FINMA, these deviations must be clearly identified (Art. 1 para. 3 AMLO-FINMA).

10 In the sense of this “indirect” applicability of AMLO-FINMA to financial intermediaries in accordance with Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA, the points listed under Art. 26 para. 2 AMLO-FINMA provide at least some indications of what should be regulated by the financial intermediaries. Accordingly, the following points should be set out in an internal directive on combating money laundering and terrorist financing:

a. the criteria for identifying higher-risk business relationships in accordance with Art. 13 AMLO-FINMA;

b. the criteria for identifying higher-risk transactions in accordance with Art. 14 para. 1 and 2 AMLO-FINMA;

c. the principles of transaction monitoring in accordance with Art. 20 AMLO-FINMA;

d. the cases in which the internal anti-money laundering unit must be consulted and the most senior management body must be informed;

e. the principles of staff training;

f. the business policy for dealing with politically exposed persons;

g. the responsibility for reporting to the Money Laundering Reporting Office;

h. the modalities by which the financial intermediary records, limits and monitors increased risks;

i. the amount limits in accordance with Article 13 para. 2 e) and f) and Article 14 para. 2 a) AMLO-FINMA;

j. the criteria for the involvement of third parties in accordance with Art. 28 AMLO-FINMA;

k. the internal allocation of tasks and competencies between the anti-money laundering unit and the other business units responsible for the application of the duties of due diligence;

l. the updating of client documentation.

11 In order to implement these provisions, the financial intermediary must have an appropriate operational structure. For the interpretation of the concept of operational structure, Art. 8 AMLA in connection with Art. 23 ff. AMLO-FINMA – subject to the applicable SRO regulations. In particular, the financial intermediary must set up an office specializing in money laundering, consisting of one or more qualified persons (Art. 24 para. 1 AMLO-FINMA), which performs the tasks set out in Art. 24 f. AMLO-FINMA. The SRO regulations may stipulate that the anti-money laundering unit of a financial intermediary only has to fulfill the tasks specified in Article 24 AMLO-FINMA (or in the corresponding provision of the SRO regulations) if the financial intermediary has a staff complement of five or fewer full-time employees or an annual gross income of less than CHF 2 million and pursues a business model without increased risks (by analogy with Art. 75 para. 1 AMLO-FINMA). In any case, the SRO may require that the anti-money laundering unit also fulfill the tasks according to Art. 25 AMLO-FINMA (or according to the corresponding provision of the SRO regulations), if this is necessary to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (by analogy with Art. 75 para. 2 AMLO-FINMA).

12 Regarding the formal scope of the documentary evidence that a financial intermediary must submit to the SRO as part of the application for affiliation as proof of compliance with the conditions of article 14, para. 2, letter a, it is recommended that the SRO should request not only the AMLA directive but also the organizational regulations, the statutes, an organizational chart and, where applicable, contracts for the delegation of tasks in the area of the AMLA.

B. Guarantee and good reputation of the financial intermediary (lit. b)

13 The guarantee requirement was originally enshrined in the Banking Act (Art. 3 para. 2 let. c BankG) to ensure that a bank is “managed by reliable and professionally capable persons”. In the meantime, the guarantee requirement can be found in most financial market laws. It is an indeterminate legal concept. It is debatable whether the practice developed in banking and stock exchange law can be used for interpretation, since the concept of “guarantee” according to Art. 14 AMLA differs from that in BankG: Pursuant to Art. 14 para. 2 let. b and c AMLA, the financial intermediary must only offer “guarantee of fulfilment of the obligations under the AMLA” and not, as in banking and stock exchange law, “guarantee of proper business conduct” in general. The latter guarantee requirement demands not only compliance with the relevant laws, but also, in general, compliance with the entire legal system. In view of the clear wording of Art. 14 AMLA, according to the Federal Supreme Court, it cannot be assumed that the guarantee requirement in the AMLA is to be interpreted in the same way as in banking and stock exchange law. Different treatment is also justified by the different purposes of the laws: The banking and stock exchange legislation is primarily aimed at protecting customers and investors, while the AMLA is primarily intended to combat money laundering. Despite these relativizing remarks, the Federal Supreme Court concludes that the requirement of “guarantee” under Art. 14 AMLA, in the sense of a person's “ability to comply with the law”, can be called into question if a financial intermediary violates provisions other than those of the AMLA under Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA. However, a certain level of seriousness is required for violations of the law to be assumed to mean that the guarantee of compliance with the AMLA is no longer fulfilled. Such seriousness is deemed to exist in particular if the violations and the conduct of the financial intermediary in this context indicate that the financial intermediary “is not willing or able to comply with the obligations arising from the Anti-Money Laundering Act or the corresponding orders of the supervisory authority”.

14 Compliance with the requirement for proper business conduct must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, based on the specific tasks and functions and with regard to the financial intermediary's specific legal obligations.

15 Pursuant to Article 1a of the FINMA Data Ordinance, FINMA includes data on persons whose proper business conduct is in doubt or cannot be guaranteed in a data collection (para. 1). This data collection, known as the “watchlist”, serves to ensure that only persons who can guarantee proper business conduct are entrusted with the administration or management of supervised institutions (para. 2 let. a) or hold a significant interest in the supervised institution (para. 2 let. b). The watchlist is registered with the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC), but is not publicly accessible and is intended for internal use only. It may only contain corroborated and reliable data on a person, such as information on criminal and administrative, supervisory and disciplinary proceedings. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations or allegations may not be included.

16 In addition to the requirement to provide guarantees, it is also assumed that the financial intermediary has a good reputation. In contrast to the requirement to provide guarantees, which is based on the applicable legal system, the assessment of good reputation is linked to moral conditions: a good reputation encompasses characteristics such as respect, esteem and trustworthiness, whereby particular attention is paid to integrity, honesty, conscientiousness and diligence. Nevertheless, the two legal concepts overlap in many areas.

17 To assess the guarantee and good reputation, SROs usually require extracts from the criminal and debt collection registers, as well as written confirmations that no criminal, civil or administrative proceedings are pending. In addition, they require proof of educational qualifications, employment references and CVs with references.

C. Guarantee and good reputation of the most senior management (lit. c)

18 The guarantee requirement concerns not only the “depersonalized” guarantee of the financial intermediary but also the most senior management, i.e. the persons entrusted with administration and management. This includes not only the formal bodies but also, in principle, all persons who have a decisive influence on the financial intermediary's key strategic or operational decisions. It is not the job title that is important, but the function actually exercised. The interpretation described in the commentary on Article 14, para. 2, let. b AMLA can also be applied accordingly to the requirements for natural persons in accordance with Article 14, para. 2, let. c AMLA.

D. Requirement for qualified participants (let. d)

19 The holders of qualified participations in a financial intermediary are also subject to a duty to provide a guarantee, which is, however, limited to their good reputation and their influence on business activities. The threshold for a qualified participation is generally 10% of the capital or votes. An exception is the SRO PolyReg, which sets the threshold at 20%. The SRO Leasingverband requires, in addition to the disclosure of all shareholders or partners with a holding of more than 10%, the disclosure of the financial intermediary's controlling persons, analogous to the definition in Art. 2a para. 3 AMLA.

III. Right of the financial intermediary to affiliation (para. 2), legal consequence

20 Art. 14 para. 2 AMLA stipulates that the financial intermediary has a legal right to join an SRO if he cumulatively fulfils the conditions of para. 2, letters a to d. This legal right is subject only to the sector-specific restrictions which may be determined by the SRO in accordance with Art. 14 para. 3 AMLA. If the financial intermediary meets the membership requirements, the SRO is in principle obliged to accept him.

21 According to the Federal Court, self-regulatory organizations perform a state function in the fight against money laundering and are therefore bound by the fundamental rights under Article 35, para. 2 FC. The admission procedure must therefore comply with the principle of equality before the law (Art. 8 FC) and the prohibition of arbitrariness (Art. 9 FC), both with regard to the statutes and regulations and with regard to the specific admission decisions. Admission decisions that treat financial intermediaries willing to join the scheme differently despite the same conditions, or rejection decisions that are not based on any objective reasons, are not permitted. In addition, the financial intermediary willing to join the scheme must be granted the right to a legal hearing (Art. 29 para. 2 FC), which includes in particular the right to a reasoned decision.

22 A rejected financial intermediary may request that FINMA review the refusal of affiliation. Since FINMA is obliged under Art. 31 FINMASA to restore order in the event of violations of the law or other abuses, it would have to enforce the financial intermediary's affiliation in the event of an unlawful refusal of affiliation on the part of the SRO. Pursuant to Art. 53 FINMASA, FINMA would also be entitled to issue a formal ruling in terms of Art. 5 para. 1 (a) APA: since admission to an SRO is formally a matter of private law, it cannot be ordered by decree. However, FINMA is able to issue a declaratory decision stating that the refusal of admission was unlawful and that only the admission of the financial intermediary can restore compliance with the regulations.

23 It should be noted that the legal classification of admission to an SRO as a purely private matter has recently been challenged by case law. In its judgment of November 21, 2023, the Federal Administrative Court ruled that the SRO VQF's decision not to accept an applicant was a ruling that fell under public law. In general, when assessing the legal relationship between the SRO and its members, there appears to be a tendency towards a weighting in favour of public law, which has been supported not least by the introduction of the supervisory organizations under Art. 43a FINMASA. In its judgment 2C_887/2017 of March 23, 2021, the Federal Supreme Court confirmed the private-law character of the sanctioning mechanism of the SRO PolyReg, but emphasized that due to the development of the fight against money laundering in Switzerland in recent decades – from an initial purely private self-regulation to an essential public task – it is possible that in the future the Federal Supreme Court could qualify sanctions under money laundering law as public law.

IV. Industry-specific restrictions of the SRO (para. 3)

24 Art. 14 para. 3 AMLA allows self-regulatory organizations to make affiliation dependent on the activityin certain areas. This entitles SROs to limit their membership to financial intermediaries from a particular professional group. In order to meet the requirements of an admission procedure that complies with fundamental rights, the definition of these areas must be based on objective and factually comprehensible criteria that can stand up to independent judicial review. As of the cut-off date (July 1, 2024), the following SROs were authorized by FINMA:

• AOOS - Swiss Company for Supervision (AOOS);

• ASSOCIATION ROMANDE DES INTERMEDIAIRES FINANCIERS (ARIF);

• Organisme de Surveillance pour Intermédiaires Financiers & Trustees SO-FIT (Supervisory Organization for Financial Intermediaries & Trustees SO-FIT);

• Organismo di Autodisciplina dei Fiduciari del Cantone Ticino (OAD FCT);

• PolyReg General Self-Regulation Association;

• Swiss Leasing Association (SRO SLV);

• Self-regulatory organization of the Swiss Bar Association and the Swiss Association of Notaries (SRO SAV/SNV);

• Self-regulatory organization of the Swiss Insurance Association (SRO-SVV);

• Self-regulatory organization of the Swiss Association of Investment Companies (SRO SVIG);

• SRO-Treuhand Suisse;

• VQF Financial Services Standards Association (SRO VQF).

Classic industry SROs, which link their membership to a specific profession, are the SRO SLV, SRO SAV/SNV, SRO-SVV, SRO SVIG and SRO Treuhand Suisse. The OAD FCT, SRO PolyReg and SRO VQF are cross-industry SROs.

25 AOOS and SO-FIT have both an authorization as an SRO and an authorization as a supervisory organization under Article 43a FINMASA. Affiliation with the AOOS and SO-FIT self-regulatory organizations was open to asset managers and trustees until the end of the transitional period under Article 74 para. 2 FinIA, i.e. until December 31, 2022. Since that date, asset managers and trustees have been required to apply to FINMA for a license as an asset manager (pursuant to Art. 17 para. 1 FinIA) and/or as a trustee (pursuant to Art. 17 para. 2 FinIA) and to be subject to the supervision of a supervisory organization in accordance with Art. 43a FINMASA.

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Materials

Association romande des intermédiaires financiers (ARIF), (nicht datiertes) Selbstregulierungsreglement, abrufbar unter https://arif.ch/IMG/pdf/reglementoar_d.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Selbstregulierungsreglement ARIF).

Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Revision des Bankengesetzes vom 13. Mai 1970, BBl 1970 1144, abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1970/1_1144__/de, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Botschaft BankG 1970).

Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei im Finanzsektor (Geldwäschereigesetz, GwG) vom 17.6.1996, BBl 1996 III 1101, abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1996/3_1101_1057_993/de, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Botschaft GwG 1996).

Botschaft zum Finanzdienstleistungsgesetz (FIDLEG) und zum Finanzinstitutsgesetz (FINIG) vom 4.11.2015, BBl 2015 8901, abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/filestore/fedlex.data.admin.ch/eli/fga/2015/2141/de/pdf-a/fedlex-data-admin-ch-eli-fga-2015-2141-de-pdf-a.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Botschaft FIDLEG/FINIG 2015).

Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht (FINMA), Rundschreiben 2008/17 Informationsaustausch zwischen den SRO und der FINMA betreffend Anschlüsse, Ausschlüsse und Austritte von Finanzintermediären vom 20.11.2008, abrufbar unter https://www.finma.ch/de/~/media/finma/dokumente/dokumentencenter/myfinma/rundschreiben/finma-rs-2008-17.pdf?sc_lang=de&hash=71FFD4758724C36DBC692710A9C8477B, besucht am 23.8.2024.

Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht (FINMA), Rundschreiben 2011/1 Tätigkeit als Finanzintermediär nach GwG, Ausführungen zur Geldwäschereiverordnung (GwV) vom 20.10.2010, abrufbar unter https://www.finma.ch/de/~/media/finma/dokumente/dokumentencenter/myfinma/rundschreiben/finma-rs-2011-01-01-01-2017.pdf?la=de, besucht am 23.8.2024.

Geschäftsbericht 2021 des Bundesgerichts vom 17.2.2022, abrufbar unter https://www.eidgenoessischegerichte.ch/de/files/geschaeftsberichte/GB_2021_d.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Geschäftsbericht 2021 des Bundesgerichts).

Liste der von der FINMA anerkannten Selbstregulierungsorganisationen (SRO), abrufbar unter https://www.finma.ch/de/bewilligung/selbstregulierungsorganisationen-sro/, besucht am 23.8.2024.

Organisme de Surveillance pour Intermédiaires Financiers & Trustees (SO-FIT), Règlement relatif aux obligations des affiliés à l’organisme d’autorégulation du 1.10.2020, abrufbar unter https://so-fit.ch/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Re%CC%80glement-daffiliation.OAR_.SO-FIT.2021.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Reglement SO-FIT).

Organismo di Autodisciplina dei Fiduciari del Cantone Ticino (OAD FCT), Statuti dell’organismo di autodisciplina dei fiduciari del cantone Ticino del 1.1.2020, abrufbar unter https://oadfct.ch/Regolamenti/, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Statuten OAD FCT).

PolyReg Allg. Selbstregulierungs-Verein, Aufnahmegesuch, abrufbar unter https://www.polyreg.ch/uploads/Dokumente/de/Aufnahmegesuch.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Aufnahmegesuch SRO PolyReg).

PolyReg Allg. Selbstregulierungs-Verein, Statuten vom 1.7.2023, abrufbar unter https://www.polyreg.ch/uploads/Polyreg_Statuten.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Statuten SRO PolyReg).

Schweizer Verband der Investmentgesellschaften (SVIG), Reglement zur SRO-Zugehörigkeit vom 1.1.2016, abrufbar unter https://www.svig.org/sites/default/files/downloads/reglement%201-9%2C%20v01.01.2016.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Reglement SRO-Zugehörigkeit SRO SVIG).

Schweizerische Aktiengesellschaft für Aufsicht (AOOS), Anschlussvertrag an die Selbstregulierungsorganisation nach Geldwäschereigesetz, abrufbar unter https://www.aoos.ch/dataset/file/9018-aoos-sro-anschlussvertrag-pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Anschlussvertrag AOOS).

Selbstregulierungsorganisation des Schweizerischen Anwaltsverbandes und des Schweizer Notarenverbandes (SRO SAV/SNV), Reglement vom 27.6.2023, abrufbar unter https://sro-sav-snv.ch/rechtliche-grundlagen/regelwerke, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Reglement SRO SAV/SNV).

Selbstregulierungsorganisation des Schweizerischen Leasingverbandes SRO/SLV, Anschlussantrag, abrufbar unter https://www.leasingverband.ch/cms/upload/fullsearch_documents/Administrator/Anschlussantrag.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Anschlussantrag SRO/SLV).

Selbstregulierungsorganisation des Schweizerischen Leasingverbandes SRO/SLV, Reglement für Anschluss, Austritt und Ausschluss von Finanzintermediären vom 15.12.1999 (Fassung vom 13.1.2016), abrufbar unter https://www.leasingverband.ch/cms/upload/fullsearch_documents/Administrator/Reglement_fuer_Anschluss_Austritt_und_Ausschluss_von_Finanz-intermediaeren.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Anschlussreglement SRO/SLV).

Selbstregulierungsorganisation des Schweizerischen Leasingverbandes SRO/SLV, Selbstregulierungsreglement SRO/SLV vom 15.12.1999 (Fassung vom 19.1.2023), abrufbar unter https://www.leasingverband.ch/cms/upload/Selbstregulierungsreglement_SRR_12._Fassung_vom_19._Januar_2023_gltig_ab_01.04.2023.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Selbstregulierungsreglement SRO/SLV).

Selbstregulierungsorganisation Schweizerischer Treuhandverband (SRO-Treuhand|Suisse), Statuten vom 1.7.2021, abrufbar unter https://sro-treuhandsuisse.ch/fileadmin/Aktuelles/Finanzintermediaer/Regelwerke_der_SRO/SRO_Statuten_gueltig_ab_01072021.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Statuten SRO-Treuhand|Suisse).

Verein Selbstregulierungsorganisation des Schweizerischen Versicherungsverbandes (SRO-SVV), Statuten vom 21.8.2020, abrufbar unter https://www.sro-svv.ch/images/pdf/de_regelwerk/Statuten_SRO-SVV.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Statuten SRO-SVV).

VQF Verein zur Qualitätssicherung von Finanzdienstleistungen (SRO VQF), Statuten vom 1.7.2023, abrufbar unter https://www.vqf.ch/de/vqf-downloads, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Statuten SRO VQF).