I. Adoption of regulations by the self-regulatory organization (para. 1)

A. General

1 Article 25 para. 1 stipulates that self-regulatory organizations (SRO) must adopt regulations. This provision has no independent significance, since the SRO regulations already constitute a requirement for the recognition of the SRO based on Art. 24 para. 1 let. a.

B. Limited autonomy of SROs in the design of regulations

2 According to the message, the Money Laundering Act is characterized by the idea of self-regulation. The legislator intended to create a framework law that regulates the duties imposed on financial intermediaries in a correspondingly restrained and less detailed manner, in order to leave the substantiating function to the self-regulatory organizations. However, the autonomy of the SROs, as formulated by the legislator, to freely determine the content of their regulations in compliance with the legal requirements, is limited: FINMA bases its approval of SRO regulations on the key provisions of AMLO-FINMA (Art. 1 para. 2 AMLO-FINMA).

3 Deviations from AMLO-FINMA are possible, but must be indicated in the SRO regulations (Art. 1 para. 3 AMLO-FINMA). In line with the legislator's aim of achieving the greatest possible uniformity in the application of the law, the Federal Supreme Court assumes that deviating SRO regulations should be limited to objectively justified, industry-specific peculiarities: This is to prevent individual deviating SRO regulations from jeopardizing the entire system of money laundering prevention through so-called “regulatory arbitrage” or a “race to the bottom”. Accordingly, FINMA should exercise restraint when dealing with SRO regulations that differ from AMLO-FINMA and are based on industry-specific features; however, tighter rules in the SRO regulations compared to the provisions of the AMLA and AMLO-FINMA should always be permissible.

4 As a result, the provisions of the SRO regulations that substantiate the due diligence requirements are largely identical to the provisions of AMLO-FINMA.

5 If FINMA intervenes in the content of the SRO regulations beyond the provisions of the AMLA, the question of compliance with the principle of legality arises: a regulation issued in the material sense in accordance with competence – i.e. a legislative or executive ordinance such as AMLO-FINMA – is sufficient when subordinate technical standards are involved; however, if fundamentally new obligations are to be created, a legal basis is required, i.e. an amendment to the AMLA. In this context, the line between permissible FINMA requirements and those that are no longer covered by the law is blurred. In the landmark decision BGE 143 II 162, the Federal Supreme Court largely supported FINMA when it implemented the FATF recommendations – without first amending the AMLA – on the basis of AMLO-FINMA and subsequently called on the SROs to amend their regulations accordingly. In fact, the Federal Supreme Court considered the FATF recommendations as “technical clarifications to ensure a nationally or internationally recognized ‘minimum standard’”, the implementation of which FINMA is allowed to enforce on the basis of AMLO-FINMA.

II. Content of the regulations (para. 2 and 3)

A. Specification of the due diligence requirements under Chapter 2 (para. 2)

6 Pursuant to Art. 25 para. 2 AMLA, the SRO regulations must specify the due diligence requirements for financial intermediaries under Chapter 2 (1) and (2) define how these obligations are to be fulfilled. Since the “specification of” the due diligence requirements naturally includes the “definition of how they are to be fulfilled”, the second part of the sentence has no independent meaning.

7 It is questionable which provisions fall under the “due diligence requirements for financial intermediaries in accordance with the second chapter”. The provisions of the second chapter that relate to dealers are clearly excluded, since dealers are not subject to SRO supervision and are therefore not the addressees of the SRO regulations. Grammatical interpretation indicates that the scope of application of Article 25, para. 2 AMLA is limited to the first section of the second chapter, entitled “Due diligence requirements of financial intermediaries”, which includes Articles 3 to 8 AMLA. The same conclusion is reached by the systematic interpretation in connection with Art. 25 para. 3 let. b AMLA, which refers to the entire second chapter entitled “Duties”. In terms of content, Articles 9 to 11a AMLA, due to their high level of detail, correspond less to the provisions of framework legislation and therefore require less concretization than Articles 3 to 8 AMLA. FINMA also appears to take this view, since the SRO regulations it has approved either adopt the wording of Arts. 9 to 11a AMLA unchanged or simply refer to the relevant legal provisions.

8 As explained above, the provisions of the SRO regulations that substantiate the due diligence requirements essentially correspond to the provisions of AMLO-FINMA. This applies all the more to organizations that, in addition to being recognized as a self-regulatory organization, are also licensed as a supervisory organization in accordance with Article 43a FINMASA: Their SRO regulations refer directly to the AMLO-FINMA.

B. Requirements for the affiliation and exclusion of financial intermediaries (para. 3 let. a)

9 According to Art. 25 para. 3 let. a AMLA, the SRO regulations must govern the requirements for the affiliation and exclusion of financial intermediaries. Although Art. 25 AMLA assumes “one set of regulations”, it is possible to regulate the contents in accordance with Art. 25 paras. 2 and 3 AMLA in several sets of regulations or in the statutes of the SRO; in this case, all these regulations must be submitted to FINMA for approval in accordance with Art. 18 para. 1 let. c AMLA.

10 With regard to the conditions for joining an SRO, Art. 14, para. 2 and 3 AMLA must be observed: Pursuant to Art. 14, para. 2 AMLA, a financial intermediary is entitled to join an SRO if (a) it ensures compliance with the obligations under the AMLA by means of its internal regulations and operational organization, (b) it enjoys a good reputation and offers a guarantee of compliance with the obligations AMLA, (c) the persons who are entrusted with its administration and management also fulfill the conditions set out in lit. b, and (d) the qualified participants in it enjoy a good reputation and guarantee that their influence will not be detrimental to prudent and sound business activity. Pursuant to Art. 14 para. 3 AMLA, the SRO may also make affiliation dependent on activities in certain areas. The SRO regulations may not provide for any affiliation requirements that go beyond the conditions expressly stated in Art. 14 para. 2 and 3 AMLA, as these are “maximum requirements”.

11 The conditions for the exclusion of financial intermediaries arise from both supervisory and private law: an exclusion, i.e. the involuntary loss of membership, can be based either on violations of anti-money-laundering legislation (including criminal provisions) or on the violation of mere membership obligations, such as non-payment of membership fees. While exclusion under anti-money-laundering legislation is the ultima ratio sanction for violations of the law, for (most) SROs organized as an association under Art. 60 et seq. CC) – it is also the most important sanction that can be imposed on an SRO. The law on associations (Art. 72 CC) stipulates that a member must have committed a ground for exclusion. If there is no specific provision for the grounds for exclusion, an exclusion is only permissible for good cause (Art. 72 para. 3 CC).

12 If membership is based on a legal claim, such that there is an entitlement to admission – as is the case for financial intermediaries under Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA based on Art. 14 para. 2 AMLA – exclusion is only permissible if there are important reasons. Even though the legislator left the provision unchanged despite the introduction of the right of admission under Art. 14 AMLA, it cannot be automatically concluded that conditions for exclusion can be defined outside the scope of important reasons. Even before the introduction of the right of admission under Article 14, para. 2 AMLA, when the financial intermediary could still choose between SRO affiliation and direct supervision by FINMA, the prevailing doctrine affirmed that financial intermediaries were subject to compulsory admission, so that the SRO's right of exclusion was already restricted at that time and could only be exercised for important reasons. In its judgment BGE 123 III 193, the Federal Supreme Court also ruled that if “[...] an association presents itself to the public as well as to authorities, potential clients of its members, etc. as the authoritative organization of the profession or economic sector in question,” there must be good cause for exclusion: Without such a reason, the (de facto) ban on activity associated with exclusion cannot be justified in view of the right of personality to economic development (Art. 28 CC). Christen/Kuert assume that, in accordance with this Federal Supreme Court practice, good cause for exclusion must exist only if the consequence is that the financial intermediary can no longer carry out financial intermediary activities in Switzerland. This applies above all to financial intermediaries for whom only a single industry SRO is available, but less so for those who have the option of joining another SRO.

13 Although an SRO may not stipulate “failure to be excluded from an SRO” in its regulations as an (additional) condition for affiliation, since Art. 14, para. 2 and 3 AMLA are of an exhaustive nature. However, the exclusion or the facts that led to the exclusion may have a negative impact when examining the good reputation and the guarantee of the financial intermediary and/or its governing bodies in accordance with Art. 14 para. 2 lit. b and c AMLA. For this reason, the view expressed here is that caution is required when defining exclusion requirements outside the area of important reasons: Any exclusion requirements defined outside the area of important reasons must therefore be based on violations of anti-money laundering legislation (including criminal provisions) and meet the requirements for prudential supervisory sanctions under Art. 25 para. 3 let. c AMLA, i.e. they must be “appropriate” (Art. 25 para. 3 let. c AMLA) or “proportionate”.

C. Monitoring compliance with the duties under Chapter 2 (para. 3 let. b)

14 According to Art. 25 para. 3 let. b AMLA, the regulations must also define “how compliance with the duties under Chapter 2 is monitored”. The wording of this provision is thus broader than that of Art. 25 para. 2 AMLA, which mentions “the due diligence requirements in accordance with Chapter 2”: It includes “the obligations under Chapter 2”, thus not only Art. 3 to 8 AMLA, but also Art. 9 to 11a AMLA, excluding the provisions of Chapter 2 concerning dealers. SROs must therefore monitor compliance not only with the duties of due diligence under Arts. 3 to 8 AMLA, as specified in the SRO regulations, but also with Arts. 9 to 11a AMLA. With regard to the latter provisions, the SROs must only monitor compliance with the statutory provisions, as Art. 9 to 11a AMLA do not fall within the scope of Art. 25, para. 2 AMLA and therefore do not have to be specified by the SROs, nor are they allowed to do so.

15 The fact that an SRO must be in a position to monitor whether the affiliated financial intermediaries are complying with their duties in accordance with Chapter 2 is already a condition for recognizing the SRO (Art. 24, para. 1, let. b AMLA). From the point of view of the doctrine, this includes adequate organization, sufficient staff and sufficient financial resources.

16 Art. 25, para. 3, let. b AMLA also requires that the manner in which the control of compliance with the duties under Art. 3 to 11a AMLA is regulated in the SRO regulations (“how”). According to the legislator, this should be done “by means of suitable procedural standards”. In all other respects, the legislator leaves the determination of the control modalities to the SROs. According to the doctrine, the regulations of an SRO must contain a control concept and answer a minimum set of questions, such as whether the AMLA audit is carried out by internal or external auditors, whether or not the AMLA audit is announced, and in what form the SRO reports.

17 Analysis of the SRO regulations shows that the answers given by the SROs to these questions vary. There are a number of differences, including the audit frequency and the sampling method, which are highlighted below as examples. Firstly, the ordinary audit is usually carried out annually. Depending on the SRO and risk category, however, the audit frequency can be increased to a maximum of two or three years on a risk-based approach. While certain SROs increase the audit frequency on their own initiative as part of the risk analysis, with other SROs this is only possible at the request of the financial intermediary. On the other hand, there are differences in the sampling method. Their selection and scope is determined by a risk-based approach, sometimes combined with tabular specifications that determine the sample size of the mandates in numerical terms, or the obligation to audit all business relationships with increased risks. It follows that FINMA, as the approval authority for SRO regulations, appears to support the autonomy of the SRO in designing its control modalities.

D. Appropriate sanctions (para. 3 let. c)

18 Based on Art. 25 para. 3 let. c AMLA, the regulations must define “appropriate sanctions”. The systematic approach of Art. 25 AMLA determines which violations of obligations the regulations must provide for “appropriate sanctions”: Since the regulations, based on Art. 25 para. 3 let. b AMLA, must govern the control of compliance with all the obligations of the second chapter, i.e. Art. 3 to 11a AMLA (excluding the duties applying only to dealers), it can be assumed that, as a consequence, Art. 25 para. 3 let. c AMLA requires sanctions for violations of all duties of the second chapter.

19 From the perspective of the doctrine, a sanction is “appropriate” if it is “proportionate”, whereby the standard of the sanctions of FINMA according to Art. 31 et seq. FINMASA can be applied by analogy. In addition to examining the objective breach of duty, i.e. the violation of a regulatory or legal duty by an action or omission, the proportionality test requires that the fault of the person concerned be taken into account. In this sense, the present provision not only requires that the principle of proportionality be observed in the specific case (at the “application of the law” level), but also at the “law-making” level, i.e. when the generally abstract provisions of the regulations are being defined. Although this understanding of proportionality can only be taken into account to a limited extent in the context of “law-making”, it nevertheless requires a well-thought-out cascade of sanctions as a basis for an appropriate sanction in the context of “law enforcement”. Against this background, regulations generally provide for the following types of sanction, in ascending order of severity: a warning, a fine and exclusion from the SRO.

20 According to the legislator, case law and doctrine, SRO sanctions are of a private nature. Accordingly, the fines are contractual penalties within the meaning of Art. 160, para. 1 CO.

21 It should be noted that in the assessment of the legal relationship between the SRO and its affiliated members, there appears to be a general tendency towards a weighting in the direction of public law, which has been reinforced not least by the introduction of the supervisory organizations under Art. 43a FINMASA. In its judgment 2C_887/2017 of 23 March 2021, the Federal Supreme Court confirmed the private-law character of the sanctioning mechanism of the SRO PolyReg; however, it emphasized that due to the development of the fight against money laundering in Switzerland in recent decades – from its initial form of purely private self-regulation to an essential public task – the Federal Supreme Court does not rule out the possibility that in the future the sanctions under money laundering law will be qualified as public law.

22 According to the view represented here, SROs are in any case bound by fundamental rights based on the assumption of state functions according to Art. 35 para. 2 FC and must observe the principles of state action according to Art. 5 para. 2 FC. The sanctioning procedure is therefore subject to the principle of equality before the law (Art. 8 FC) and the prohibition of arbitrariness (Art. 9 FC), both in terms of “law-making”, i.e. with regard to the sanctioning provisions of the regulations, and in terms of “law-enforcement”, i.e. with regard to the specific sanctioning decisions. In the framework of the sanctioning procedure, the financial intermediary must also be granted the right to be heard (Art. 29, para. 2 FC), which specifically entails the right to a reasoned decision.

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Materials

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Geschäftsbericht 2021 des Bundesgerichts vom 17.2.2022, abrufbar unter https://www.eidgenoessischegerichte.ch/de/files/geschaeftsberichte/GB_2021_d.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Geschäftsbericht 2021 des Bundesgerichts).

Organisme de Surveillance pour Intermédiaires Financiers & Trustees (SO-FIT), Règlement relatif aux obligations des affiliés à l’organisme d’autorégulation du 1.10.2020, abrufbar unter https://so-fit.ch/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Re%CC%80glement-daffiliation.OAR_.SO-FIT.2021.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Reglement SO-FIT).

PolyReg Allg. Selbstregulierungs-Verein, Reglement vom 1.3.2023, abrufbar unterhttps://www.polyreg.ch/uploads/20230216.reglement.final.de.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Reglement SRO PolyReg).

Schweizer Verband der Investmentgesellschaften (SVIG), Prüfungsreglement vom 1.4.2023, abrufbar unter https://www.svig.org/sites/default/files/downloads/sro-pruefungsreglement_v.01.01.2023.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Prüfungsreglement SRO SVIG).

Schweizerische Aktiengesellschaft für Aufsicht (AOOS), Reglement der Selbstregulierungsorganisation nach Geldwäschereigesetz, abrufbar unter https://www.aoos.ch/dataset/file/3131-20230306-aoos-sro-reglement-pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Reglement AOOS).

Selbstregulierungsorganisation des Schweizerischen Anwaltsverbandes und des Schweizer Notarenverbandes (SRO SAV/SNV), Reglement vom 27.6.2023, abrufbar unter https://sro-sav-snv.ch/rechtliche-grundlagen/regelwerke, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Reglement SRO SAV/SNV).

Selbstregulierungsorganisation des Schweizerischen Leasingverbandes SRO/SLV, Reglement Kontrollverfahren vom 23.8.2006 (Fassung vom 10.11.2023), abrufbar unter https://www.leasingverband.ch/de/downloadFileContent?id=17326710-4035-418D-961F-14ECFEC7C80F, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Reglement Kontrollverfahren SRO/SLV).

Selbstregulierungsorganisation Schweizerischer Treuhandverband (SRO-Treuhand|Suisse), Prüfgrundsätze vom 1.1.2023, abrufbar unter https://sro-treuhandsuisse.ch/fileadmin/Pruefer/Pruefgrundsaetze/Pruefgrundsaetze_2023_def.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Prüfgrundsätze SRO-Treuhand|Suisse).

Verein Selbstregulierungsorganisation des Schweizerischen Versicherungsverbandes (SRO-SVV), Kontroll-, Prüf- und Sanktionsreglement, abrufbar unter https://www.sro-svv.ch/images/pdf/de_regelwerk/KPS_SRO-SVV.pdf, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. KPS-Reglement SRO-SVV).

VQF Verein zur Qualitätssicherung von Finanzdienstleistungen (SRO VQF), Aufsichtskonzept der Selbstregulierungsorganisation nach Geldwäschereigesetz des VQF Verein zur Qualitätssicherung von Finanzdienstleistungen in Sachen Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei und Terrorismusfinanzierung vom 21. September 2023, abrufbar unter https://www.vqf.ch/de/vqf-downloads, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Aufsichtskonzept SRO VQF).

VQF Verein zur Qualitätssicherung von Finanzdienstleistungen (SRO VQF), Reglement der Selbstregulierungsorganisation nach Geldwäschereigesetz des VQF Verein zur Qualitätssicherung von Finanzdienstleistungen in Sachen Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei und Terrorismusfinanzierung vom 30.1.2023, abrufbar unter https://www.vqf.ch/de/vqf-downloads, besucht am 23.8.2024 (zit. Reglement SRO VQF).