-
- Art. 3 FC
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
-
- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
-
- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 73 PRA
- Art. 73a PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
-
- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
-
- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
- I. Introduction
- II. Influence of international requirements
- III. Content of the regulation
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. Introduction
1 The Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland MROS (hereafter: “Reporting Office” or “MROS”) is the central reporting office for suspected cases of money laundering and terrorist financing in Switzerland and performs the duties of a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). FIU is the internationally accepted term for government agencies that are responsible for investigating financial transactions in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. The reporting office plays an important role in the fight against crime – it tracks down incriminated assets and follows the principle of “follow the money”. In doing so, it makes a significant contribution to the credibility of Switzerland's anti-money laundering system and thus also protects the reputation of the Swiss financial center.
2 The tasks and competencies of MROS are derived from the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), the Ordinance on the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROSO), the MROS/fedpol internal regulations, the international recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the obligations to the Egmont Group. Accordingly, MROS's core tasks include: (1) “Intelligence”: MROS receives reports from financial intermediaries and other persons subject to the AMLA, which are filed in accordance with the Anti-Money Laundering Act and the Swiss Criminal Code. MROS adds further information and conducts its own analysis. MROS then decides in each individual case whether or not the information obtained should be forwarded to a law enforcement agency in the form of a criminal complaint. (2) “Cooperation”: MROS exchanges information with other national authorities and with foreign FIUs in the context of mutual administrative assistance in operational and strategic matters. (3) “Prevention”: MROS contributes to the assessment of the national risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. It conducts strategic analysis (identification of patterns and trends) and shares the knowledge gained with authorities, the financial industry and the public.
3 Art. 23 AMLA forms the legal basis of MROS. It addresses the principles of organization, analysis of suspicious activity reports, and the conditions for reporting and sharing information with law enforcement authorities. However, Art. 23 cannot be viewed in isolation – it is closely linked to Art. 9, 11a, 29–32, 35 and 35a AMLA, as well as the international recommendations of the FATF and the principles of the Egmont Group. At least the core of Article 23 AMLA has not been revised in the past 25 years – in some cases, however, international and technical developments have rendered its wording obsolete. The practice followed by the reporting office and the interpretation of the applicable period of Article 23 AMLA are therefore of central importance.
II. Influence of international requirements
A. General
4 The national system for combating money laundering is heavily influenced by international standards. Switzerland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which was founded in 1989. The FATF is the most important international body for combating and preventing money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing. It sets standards in this area – a total of 40 recommendations define uniform rules of conduct and benchmarks that apply to the entire financial sector and to all persons and professional groups involved. The FATF regularly adopts various interpretative documents, in particular guidance and best practice papers. The FATF promotes the worldwide dissemination of these standards and reviews their implementation in its member states.
5 The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the UN Security Council have recognized the FATF recommendations as international standards, although they are not directly binding and thus only have the status of soft law. More than 180 countries worldwide have committed to adopting the FATF recommendations.
6 In order to comply with the changes in the standard, the AMLA has been fundamentally revised several times over the past 25 years. MROS has also been significantly affected by such amendments, especially since various recommendations, mainly Recommendation 29, but also Recommendations 1 (risk assessment), 2 (national cooperation and coordination), 20 and 23 (suspicious activity reports), 31 (prosecution and investigation authorities), 33 (keeping statistics) and 40 (international cooperation), deal with deal with the role and activities of the FIU or refer to them directly or indirectly.
B. FATF Recommendation 29 – Financial Intelligence Unit
7 FATF Recommendation 29 deals exclusively with the function of the FIU and is expressed in the Interpretative Note on the organization and scope of tasks and their performance. The FATF standard requires that each country has a central reporting office for suspicious activity reports – a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The FIU is responsible at the national level for receiving and analyzing suspicious activity reports regarding money laundering, its predicate offenses and terrorist financing. It forwards its findings from the analysis to the competent authorities, either spontaneously or upon request.
8 To fulfill its tasks, an FIU must be able to obtain additional information from the reporting bodies. It should also have access to relevant information from the authorities (public prosecutor, police, supervisory authorities, other administrative authorities, etc.), which should be as direct and comprehensive as possible. It should also have access to public sources and, if necessary, to commercially available databases.
9 A FIU must also be operationally autonomous, i.e. it must be able to act independently and without instructions in its core activities – receiving reports, prioritizing and triaging, gathering information, analyzing and using the results of the analysis, managing data, forwarding and exchanging information, and cooperating with other authorities. An essential feature of autonomy is that the FIU is provided with adequate financial, human and technical resources to enable it to carry out its tasks. Operational independence does not mean that an FIU must necessarily be an independent authority. It can be part of an already existing authority – but in this case it must be ensured that the core tasks of the FIU are separate from those of the other authority. The same also applies to the handling of data. The FIU must ensure that the security of the data received is guaranteed and that only FIU employees can access the corresponding data processing systems and IT applications.
10 Finally, FATF Recommendation 29 also requires that the FIU apply the Egmont Group's principles for international information sharing. The FATF standard thus effectively requires the FIU to maintain permanent membership in the Egmont Group.
C. Membership in the Egmont Group and compliance with the Egmont Principles
11 Since 1998, MROS has been a member of the Egmont Group, which was founded in 1995 and currently brings together 177 FIUs worldwide. This organization enables the international, secure, rapid and legally permissible exchange of information in the fight against money laundering. Membership of the Egmont Group is essential for a financial center the size and importance of Switzerland's, and there is no alternative. Admission and continued membership are subject to strict qualification criteria. Membership provides a FIU with a kind of quality seal and guarantees a secure and standardized exchange of information at the international level. Membership is now also part of the FATF standards. Furthermore, certain FIUs are only willing to exchange information via the Egmont Secure Web – a secure electronic information system – which requires membership of the Egmont Group.
12 In 2018, the Egmont Group published a document entitled 'Understanding FIU Operational Independence and Autonomy'. The characteristics of an independent FIU are described in chapter 6. In essence, the Egmont Group's requirements regarding operational autonomy go further than FATF Recommendation 29. In particular, the Egmont Standard requires the FIU to be physically separate from other state authorities. There are also more restrictive rules on the appointment of staff, budget authority and the ability to travel on official business, which should be decided at FIU level. Likewise, the appointment and dismissal of the head of the FIU is subject to special criteria that do not necessarily correspond to the personnel law requirements of the respective jurisdiction. The Egmont Group provides a checklist with the relevant criteria for self-assessment of operational independence and autonomy.
13 FIUs that no longer sufficiently comply with and/or violate the constantly evolving principles of the Egmont Group are subject to a so-called non-compliance procedure due to non-compliance with the principles, which, if the identified deficits are not remedied, provides for warnings, suspensions and, as a last resort, exclusion from the Egmont Group.
D. Relationship between soft law and national law
14 Soft law is characterized by the fact that it does not originate from one of the formal sources of international law mentioned in Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute and is therefore not legally binding. Rather, it is legal support or legal supplement. The non-binding nature of soft law means that its disregard does not trigger any international legal responsibility on the part of the state concerned and that reprisals are inadmissible under international law. Meanwhile, retorsions or listings remain permitted. Manifestations of soft law can be, for example, resolutions, declarations, recommendations and codes of conduct of international organizations, standards, best practice, principles and legally non-binding agreements (e.g. memorandum of understanding). One important indication of the existence of soft law is the existence of a monitoring procedure (so-called follow-up procedures) for compliance with the requirements contained in the relevant set of rules.
15 The FATF is not an international organization in the sense of public international law, but a purely political body, which is why its recommendations and publications have no direct binding effect on the participating states and thus only represent “soft law”. However, the FATF and its member states clearly expect their recommendations to be followed. The FATF ensures that its recommendations are taken seriously and adhered to by means of annual self-assessments by member countries and periodic mutual evaluations by assessors from other member states. Three times a year, the FATF publishes lists of countries that show strategic deficits in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing or do not comply with the recommendations. The so-called “blacklist” includes all jurisdictions that pose a risk to the international financial system and also hamper or even prevent international efforts in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. Meanwhile, all those jurisdictions that have not made sufficient progress in remedying the deficits or have not committed to a plan of action developed jointly with the FATF are placed on the so-called “gray list”.
16 Being on the blacklist has no direct consequences for the country in question – the FATF cannot impose any immediate harsh measures. However, it calls on its member states and other jurisdictions to take countermeasures against these countries in order to protect the international financial system from the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. With regard to the countries on the gray list, the FATF calls on its member states to take into account the risks posed by the identified deficiencies. These calls are enshrined in FATF Recommendation 19, and are thus part of the FATF standard and therefore subject to regular review by the FATF. With its own recommendation, the FATF has a strong means of coercion to force member countries to comply.
17 The FATF's “sanction system” is based on the principle of “naming and shaming”. Those who do not comply with the FATF recommendations are pilloried and have to expect countermeasures or harassment from the other member states. The same applies to the Egmont Group. Non-compliance with the Egmont Principles can lead to exclusion from the Egmont Group, which also affects FATF Recommendation 29, i.e. there is a violation of the FATF standard.
18 Switzerland is one of the world's leading financial centers. The financial sector accounts for one-seventh of Switzerland's gross value added. Around ten percent of all jobs in Switzerland are directly or indirectly dependent on the financial sector. The Swiss financial center is an important cornerstone of the Swiss economy. The attractiveness of the Swiss financial center is based on a smoothly functioning range of financial services and an impeccable reputation. Any countermeasures taken by other countries would have a negative impact on the Swiss financial center and thus on the Swiss economy. Violations of the FATF standards and the Egmont principles must therefore be avoided. In the interest of a functioning and credible financial center, Switzerland is thus de facto forced to transform soft law into national law in the area of financial market regulation.
III. Content of the regulation
A. Organization – The Reporting Office as part of fedpol (para. 1)
1. Integration of the Reporting Office in fedpol
19 Based on its tasks and competencies, the Reporting Office is an administrative authority with special tasks, although it has no police powers – specifically, no powers of coercion. Its competencies lie in the analysis and assessment of reported and obtained information. The Reporting Office is neither a police nor a judicial authority, but it is affiliated to fedpol.
20 According to para. 1, the Reporting Office for Money Laundering is managed by the Federal Office of Police fedpol. In the French translation of the law, it is “gérer”, which has more the meaning of “manage”. What is meant by “manage” or “gérer” is not further explained in the law and ordinance. The question of subordination and thus the degree of independence of the reporting office is relevant. Essentially, an FIU must be independent in its core operational processes and, when analyzing cases, it must decide independently whether and what to forward to law enforcement and other national and international authorities. Likewise, the protection of the reporting parties must be guaranteed at all times. A corresponding separation or emancipation from fedpol and the rest of the central administration is therefore necessary.
21 In its report of December 20, 2021, the SFAO states: The question of independence should not be interpreted too absolutely. Ultimately, it makes sense for MROS and the other fedpol divisions to work closely together to combat money laundering. This was also the legislator's intention when MROS was assigned to the former BAP (Federal Office for Police, now fedpol). The Reporting Office can benefit from fedpol's infrastructure. This model is more cost-effective than maintaining an administratively independent unit. MROS receives from fedpol the financial and human resources it needs to carry out its core processes. Meanwhile, the SFAO recommended that fedpol and the reporting office draw up internal rules of procedure similar to those of the internal auditors of the departments and offices and provide a definitive answer to the question of what “managing” MROS by fedpol in accordance with Art. 23 para. 1 AMLA entails.
22 fedpol and MROS implemented the SFAO's recommendation in 2022 and issued internal regulations. MROS's annual report for 2022 states: “The challenge was to define the division of tasks between fedpol and MROS as precisely as possible in order to best meet the requirements of the FATF and the Egmont Group.” On the other hand, the general administrative organization, or the organizational and hierarchical integration of MROS in fedpol, which is clearly anchored in the law, could not be undermined by a regulation. In other words, a set of rules of procedure/regulations must fit within the framework of the general administrative organization. The rules of procedure that came into force on November 1, 2022, are based on four central pillars:
23 no. 1 – Organizational structure: MROS is organizationally and hierarchically attached to the Crime Prevention and Justice Division (KPR). The head of MROS exercises leadership, control and supervision over the operational management of MROS. As part of fedpol, MROS is subject to all organizational, personnel and administrative regulations and directives of the general federal administration, the FDJP and fedpol.
24 no. 2 – Operational tasks of the Reporting Office: The main task is the reporting system – receiving reports of suspicion, analyzing them and passing the information on to the competent law enforcement authorities, as well as national and international mutual assistance. In addition, MROS is a member of the Egmont Group, and as such exercises the associated rights and duties, i.e. it participates in the necessary meetings, working groups and expert panels, maintains active relationships with FIUs abroad and is authorized to independently conclude Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with foreign partner offices. Furthermore, MROS is the specialist unit for combating money laundering and terrorist financing and is dedicated to a range of preventive tasks (raising awareness among financial intermediaries, participating in expert groups, conducting training and further education, etc.). It conducts strategic analysis and shares and publishes its findings with other authorities, the financial sector and third parties. MROS maintains its own data processing system.
25 no. 3 – Reporting Office's operational independence: The Reporting Office decides independently on the manner in which it fulfills and prioritizes the tasks defined in Art. 2. It decides on the deployment of the human resources made available to it. It also independently sets thematic priorities (triage, prioritization, etc.). With regard to the topic of financial and human resources, the rules of procedure point out that fedpol provides these for the tasks to be fulfilled by the reporting office, whereby the organizational and budgetary requirements of the federal administration must be adhered to. Other points covered by these regulations concern the topics of employee recruitment, information protection and travel.
26 no. 4 – Assessment of operational independence: Finally, the internal regulations contain provisions on review and escalation. According to these provisions, the Financial Inspectorate of the General Secretariat of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FISP) periodically reviews the operational independence of MROS, prepares a report on the matter and, if necessary, makes recommendations. Furthermore, FISP also acts as an assessment authority in cases of ambiguity regarding independence issues.
27 The adoption of the internal regulations has provided MROS and fedpol with clear demarcation criteria regarding MROS's activities. The adoption of the internal regulations was deemed positive in an Egmont Group audit that took place in 2022.
2. Implementation of international requirements in national law
28 The FATF assessed Switzerland for the fourth time in 2016 and conducted a follow-up in 2020. In both reports, the FATF stated that MROS is compliant with Recommendation 29 on operational independence. The SFAO also came to a similar conclusion in its report: "MROS is appropriately integrated into fedpol's structures and processes. The SFAO did not identify any situation in which fedpol violated the necessary operational independence of MROS."
29 Only the Egmont Group expressed a certain criticism of MROS's independence in its on-site review conducted in 2022. Although it also concluded that MROS was compliant with the relevant Egmont principles, However, it also stated that the lack of budget authority for the reporting office, the lack of clear allocation of human resources in favor of the reporting office, and the lack of specific rules for the appointment and dismissal of the head of the reporting office should be considered problematic from the point of view of the independence of an FIU. This harbors a notorious potential for conflict between the reporting office and fedpol.
30 The question of independence will be on the agenda again during the upcoming fifth FATF mutual evaluation, which will be carried out from the end of 2026 to the end of 2028. In contrast to the last mutual evaluation in 2016, the focus will not only be on the technical implementation of Recommendation 29 in national law, but also on its effective implementation. Operational independence will therefore be measured by the activities of the reporting office, in particular the free interaction of the reporting office with other national authorities, foreign partner agencies and the financial industry.
B. Analysis of suspicious activity reports – “Intelligence” (para. 2)
1. Principle
31 The core task of the reporting office is the analysis of the incoming suspicious activity reports. Financial intermediaries under Art. 2 AMLA, the supervisory authorities entrusted with the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (FINMA, FGB, FOCG, SFAMA) and para-statal supervisory bodies (SROs and supervisory organizations) as well as dealers under Art. 2 para. 1 let. b in conjunction with 8a AMLA and their auditing bodies (see Art. 1 para. 2 lit. a MGwV). The group of reporters is therefore limited. There is no reporting option for third parties (e.g. concerned citizens, companies, media, etc.) – the reporting office is not authorized to accept reports from such parties and to deal with their content.
32 Switzerland has a qualitative reporting system, i.e. a report is based on reasonable suspicion and not on quantitative thresholds that trigger an automatic transmission to the reporting office when they are exceeded. The financial intermediaries and other reporting agents are an integral part of the suspicious activity reporting system in that they check, evaluate and process potentially suspicious transactions before passing them on to the reporting office. The Reporting Office should not be inundated with insufficiently substantiated SARs. It can therefore be assumed that the reporting persons have complied with the minimum formal requirements according to Art. 3 and 3a MLO and that the facts submitted are substantiated to a certain extent (see Art. 3 para. 1 let. h MLO). MROS rejects formally flawed and unfounded reports for improvement. It confirms receipt of a report only after receiving all the information and documents required by Art. 3 and 3a MGwV – a report is therefore only considered to have been submitted once the acknowledgement of receipt has been issued by MROS.
33 The primary goal of MROS's analysis work is to clarify whether or not the suspicions that led to the report are substantiated. In addition, MROS is tasked with supporting the downstream prosecuting authorities by providing concise analysis reports and thus generating added value – financial intelligence. In this so-called operational analysis, available and obtainable information is used to identify specific targets (e.g. persons, assets, criminal networks and associations), to follow up leads on certain activities or transactions and to establish connections between these targets and possible proceeds of crime, money laundering, predicate offences or terrorist financing. The starting point is always a report from a financial intermediary or a report (spontaneous information or request) from an international partner office (foreign FIU). This means that a triggering piece of information is needed. MROS has no authority to act on its own initiative – for example, on the basis of media reports.
34 If trigger information is available, MROS can take up the “red thread”, use the information available in its own data processing system goAML and use the tools to obtain further information. The options under Article 11a AMLA to obtain additional information from the reporting financial intermediary and from third-party institutions that are presumably involved are central here. In addition, there are other instruments for gathering information, such as national administrative assistance, retrieving information from judicial and police databases, obtaining information via the Egmont Network and OSINT (see no. III.B.2 below).
35 The FATF standard requires that MROS conduct strategic analysis in addition to operational analysis. In strategic analysis, available and obtainable information, including data that can be provided by other authorities, is used to identify trends, methods and patterns related to money laundering and terrorist financing. This information is then used to identify threats and vulnerabilities in the defense mechanism and to trigger countermeasures. The benefits are not limited to MROS alone – the information obtained should equally serve the other authorities and the financial industry.
36 Strategic analysis is enshrined in Art. 1 para. 2 let. f of the Financial Intelligence Act. Until the Financial Intelligence Act was amended on January 1, 2016, neither the AMLA nor the Financial Intelligence Act contained an explicit reference to strategic analysis. Today, MROS conducts strategic analysis primarily in the area of preparing sectoral and national risk analyses. Furthermore, it also addresses specific phenomena. One example is the “Alert” on terrorist financing that MROS addressed to the financial sector in late fall/winter 2023. Starting in January 2025, MROS plans to make anonymized case constellations available to the financial sector by means of a public and web-based typology database. Another field of activity for strategic analysis is the public-private partnership (PPP), which began operating under the name “Swiss FIPPP” in November 2024. The latter is geared towards exchanging information on trends, methods and typologies.
2. Analytical tools – MROS toolbox
37 In order to provide as complete a picture as possible of the transactions and networks involved in a case, MROS needs to have access to as much additional information as possible, in addition to the report that triggered its analysis. MROS can access certain additional information in two ways. Firstly, it has access to several databases. Secondly, it can request information from financial intermediaries and from domestic and foreign authorities under certain conditions.
a. Information from financial intermediaries
38 In addition to the initial information – the SAR – other key elements of a transaction analysis include further financial information which MROS can request from the reporting financial intermediary and third-party intermediaries under Art. 11a AMLA. Today, criminal networks are present internationally with complex structures and across institutions. In order to create a complete picture, it is essential for MROS to access the complete information available from the financial intermediaries and to take it into account in its analysis. MROS can now obtain information from financial intermediaries in three ways:
39 Art. 11a para. 1 AMLA allows MROS to request additional information from the reporting institution. The duty to produce information extends to all information that MROS requires for its analysis and that is available at the financial intermediary. The information available is deemed to be that which is available or can be obtained in the entities of an undertaking that are subject to Swiss jurisdiction. In the opinion presented here, MROS's right to demand disclosure extends beyond simply requesting additional information from reports that have been submitted incompletely. This is already clear from the wording of the legal provision and from FATF Recommendation 29, which speaks of “additional information from reporting entities”. In addition, however, it must be possible for MROS to request additional information from the reporting institution based on an analysis it has initiated, which then also includes information from other sources and not only information from the SAR. Any other interpretation would run counter to MROS's task of conducting in-depth analyses.
40 Art. 11a para. 2 AMLA stipulates that MROS can also demand information from the third-party intermediary if the analysis shows that the third-party intermediary is or was involved in the transaction or business relationship under investigation in some way. The prerequisite is that the indication that the third-party intermediary is affected comes from a suspicious activity report received by MROS. The scope of the disclosure obligation in para. 2 corresponds to that in para. 1.
41 Art. 11a para. 2bis AMLA finally stipulates that the reporting office may also demand information from financial intermediaries on the basis of information from its foreign partner authorities. In this context, it is irrelevant whether the information from the foreign FIU is a request or spontaneous information. It is also irrelevant whether a report has already been submitted to MROS by a reporting person in the same context. The scope of the duty to disclose is also the same for para. 2bis as for para. 1 and para. 2.
b. Access to police and judicial databases
42 For the operational analysis of suspicious activity reports, the reporting office primarily relies on its own data application goAML, i.e. it searches its own data for links and further clues, which then lead to further analysis steps and queries. In addition, the Reporting Office also has access rights to various official databases in order to check whether the natural and legal persons mentioned in the information received are already known to the authorities.
43 Art. 35a para. 1 AMLA authorizes the Reporting Office to access the following police and judicial databases in retrieval procedures and to check whether the persons in question are listed (“hit/no hit”): (1) National Police Index; (2) Central Migration System (ZEMIS); (3) Automated Criminal Records (VOSTRA); (4) State Security Information System (ISIS – transferred to IASA INDEX [NDB]); (5) Personal, File and Business Management System in the Area of Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (TROVA).
44 Art. 35 para. 2 AMLA allows the Reporting Office further access to the information systems mentioned in para. 1, insofar as the provisions applicable to the respective information system provide for this. For example, the Reporting Office can access all the information contained in the police index. For ZEMIS and VOSTRA, IASA INDEX (NDB) and TROVA, specific or different rights of access apply, i.e. only part of the data can be accessed in each case.
45 MROS can also access other information systems on the basis of special legal provisions (e.g. RUMACA). At present, MROS has varying degrees of access to 15 police and judicial databases.
c. Information from international administrative assistance
46 An important source of information for MROS's operational analyses are its foreign partner FIUs. A large proportion of the reports of suspicious activity have an international connection. MROS can make requests to foreign FIUs. MROS also benefits from spontaneous information and requests from abroad, which often contain valuable clues and information that can advance an analysis already in progress. The exchange of information between MROS and its foreign counterparts is governed by Art. 30 AMLA and the Egmont Principles. In all cases, the exchange of information must be in line with the principles of specialty (for analysis purposes only), reciprocity and confidentiality. Furthermore, the information received is subject to a dissemination proviso, i.e. the foreign authority determines to whom the information may be forwarded.
d. Information from national administrative assistance
47 Information from national administrative assistance can also complete the picture of an analysis or make it possible in the first place. MROS has seen a steady increase in the amount of information received in this regard since 2020. In principle, information can be exchanged with any Swiss authority provided the conditions set out in Art. 29, 29a and 29b AMLA are met.
48 Art. 29 para. 1 and 29b AMLA govern national administrative assistance between MROS and the various supervisory authorities and bodies. The authorities named in the law can provide each other with “all information” that they require for the “application of the AMLA”. This is an optional provision. The authority concerned by the request from the reporting office decides independently whether to provide the requested information.
49 Art. 29 para. 2 AMLA stipulates that the reporting office can obtain information from all Swiss authorities that it needs for analyses in the context of money laundering, its predicate offences, organized crime or terrorist financing. In addition to financial information, this also includes information relating to criminal, administrative penal and administrative proceedings, including those from pending proceedings. In contrast to para. 1, there is an obligation to release information here on the part of the requested authorities. In practice, however, cantonal and municipal authorities in particular are very reluctant to release information. They are not very familiar with Art. 29 para. 2 AMLA.
50 Art. 29a AMLA finally requires that the prosecuting authorities forward to the Reporting Office all rulings issued on the basis of a report filed under Art. 23 para. 4 AMLA. The provision also requires that the Reporting Office be informed of pending proceedings and that it be sent judgments and discontinuation orders, together with the reasons for them, provided that there is a connection to money laundering, its predicate offenses, organized crime or terrorist financing.
e. OSINT and other information sources
51 In the context of the global and continuously increasing availability of data and its networking, transaction and network analyses of open source intelligence (OSINT) are becoming more and more important. OSINT involves the collection, analysis and dissemination of information from publicly accessible sources, with a view to a specific question or analysis. OSINT sources include: traditional media, social media, websites, dark web, commercially available databases, official registers, archives, published statistics from authorities and private individuals, etc. Today, MROS also makes targeted use of OSINT information. In principle, MROS can use any publicly available information and data. The data protection requirements and restrictions that apply to MROS also apply to OSINT.
3. Risk-based approach
52 MROS's modus operandi has changed considerably in recent years. Due to the drastic increase in the number and volume of reports, MROS can no longer analyze and process all the information in the same level of detail. The Reporting and Analysis Office sets priorities and focuses. Since the introduction of the goAML data application on 1 January 2020, the Reporting and Analysis Office has been taking a 'risk-based approach' to receiving and processing suspicious activity reports: the incoming suspicious activity reports are categorized by risk using a 'triage matrix', prioritized and then analyzed to varying degrees based on this classification. MROS focuses on combating serious crime, with a particular emphasis on organized crime, terrorist financing and certain forms of economic crime. In doing so, MROS also aligns itself with the strategies of the law enforcement authorities, operates in a success-oriented manner and takes into account potential reputational risks for the Swiss financial center.
53 In 2023, one in five reports was thoroughly analyzed. The remaining 80% of the suspicious activity reports were processed in stages or with holistic analysis procedures (e.g. clustering methods). Some of the reports were already sorted out upon receipt, so-called “filtered”. This means that the report and the information it contains are no longer followed up, but are available for later use in the goAML data application. In its 2023 annual report, the reporting office states that its analyses tend to contain more information than in the past, i.e. they are composed of various suspicious activity reports and additional information obtained, which has also increased their complexity. Likewise, suspicious activity reports that had already been filtered at an earlier stage could be reactivated due to information added later. The risk-based approach means that the Reporting Office is moving away from the traditional processing approach of “one report equals one report to the prosecution authorities” towards active “intelligence” and the networking of existing information. It is no longer the report of suspicion as such, but rather its information content that is the focus of the analysis.
C. Information system (para. 3)
1. Use of the software application “goAML”
54 To fulfil its tasks, the Reporting Office is obliged to operate its own data processing system. The software application goAML, developed by UNODC, has been in use since 1 January 2020, replacing the previous GEWA system. The goAML application is a fully integrated software solution developed specifically for use by FIUs and is now in use in over 60 countries worldwide. The application is continuously being developed and new features are being added by UNODC in collaboration with the FIUs. The Reporting Office switched to version 5.2 in 2023; a transitional period is currently in effect for financial intermediaries until the end of 2024 at the latest to make the necessary adjustments to their interfaces and processes.
55 goAML allows the electronic receipt of suspicious activity reports. Financial intermediaries have three different transmission options: (1) fully automatic transmission via XML file, (2) a semi-automatic solution in which only the accounts and transactions are transmitted via XML file and the remaining information is entered via a web interface, and (3) fully manual entry of the data via the web interface. Around 60% of reports are submitted entirely via XML. This method of submission is less prone to errors than the others. 75% of the reports rejected by MROS upon receipt are due to manual input errors. Requests in accordance with Art. 11a AMLA can also be processed entirely via goAML. MROS can also communicate with the authorities via goAML. All reports in accordance with Art. 23 para. 4 AMLA, including the transmission of analysis reports to the prosecuting authorities, as well as a large proportion of outgoing spontaneous information in accordance with Art. 29 AMLA, are now transmitted via the goAML channel.
2. Processing principles
56 The use of an information system is not an end in itself, but is based on the list of tasks and the competencies of the reporting office and should enable and facilitate it in fulfilling its tasks. Accordingly, the information system can be used for the three core tasks of intelligence, cooperation (national and international administrative assistance) and prevention (Art. 14 MGwV). The data stored in the information system comes from the information sources that the reporting office can access. These are mainly the reports of suspicious activity and the information from the inquiries based on Art. 11a AMLA. However, it also contains all information that comes from national and international administrative assistance, as well as the clarifications and analyses of the reporting office as such (Art. 15 MGwV).
57 MROS processes particularly sensitive data within the meaning of Art. 3 FADP. This involves processing personal data in connection with suspicious transactions and natural and legal persons suspected of money laundering, their predicate offences, organized crime or terrorist financing (Art. 16 para. MGwV). Furthermore, information on third parties may also be entered into the information system if it is relevant to the purpose of the reporting office (Art. 16 para. 2 MGwV).
58 Access to the information system is reserved exclusively for employees of the reporting office and, for system-related reasons, for maintenance personnel (Art. 20 MGwV). This is in line with the consistent implementation of the requirement for independence in accordance with the FATF and the Egmont Group.
59 The data stored in the information system is kept for a maximum of 10 years from the date of entry by the reporting office and then individually deleted (Art. 28 para. 1 MGwV). The same applies to the clarifications and analyses prepared by MROS.
D. Reporting to the law enforcement agencies (para. 4)
60 If, on the basis of its analysis, the Reporting Office comes to the conclusion that there is a suspicion of money laundering, its predicate offences, organized crime, terrorist financing or a lack of due diligence in financial transactions, it is obliged to report the matter immediately to the competent law enforcement authority.
61 The term “law enforcement authorities” refers to authorities as defined in Art. 12 of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code (CrimPC). This means that reports can be made to both the public prosecutor's office and the police. As a rule, MROS reports to the public prosecutor's office, as only they have the authority to extend the legal freeze period in accordance with Art. 10 AMLA. In this regard, the police authorities are dependent on the cooperation of the public prosecutor's office. In view of the short decision period of only five days, the police authorities are hardly in a position to decide in good time whether to uphold the asset freeze.
62 The material jurisdiction is based on Art. 22 et seq. CrimPC. Cantonal jurisdiction is the rule, with federal jurisdiction the exception. The offenses subject to federal jurisdiction are listed in Art. 23 para. 1 and Art. 24 CrimPC. These include the classic state security offenses, i.e. offenses that are primarily directed against the federal government or that strongly affect its interests. It also includes complex intercantonal or international cases of organized crime, including terrorism and its financing, money laundering and corruption. As part of an optional federal authority, economic crime with a national or international dimension also falls under the federal authority.
63 MROS decides independently and conclusively which prosecuting authority to forward its analysis reports or complaints to. Based on practical considerations, MROS has long based its decisions on the location of the business relationship, since the place where the money laundering offence was committed is the main factor. Furthermore, information from different reports relating to the same facts are processed in an analysis report and sent to the same public prosecutor. This gives the prosecutor a better overview of the extended facts, which can serve as a basis for assessing whether to open proceedings.
64 The Reporting Office does not withdraw any reports or parts thereof. This procedure could lead to practical problems in connection with the freezing of assets in accordance with Article 10, para. 1 AMLA and with the notifications to the financial intermediaries in accordance with Article 23, para. 5 AMLA. If a prosecution authority considers itself to be not competent to prosecute a report from MROS, it refers the matter to the public prosecutor's office that it considers to be competent, in application of Art. 39 para. 1 CrimPC, for the initiation of a court of jurisdiction procedure.
65 The act of reporting an offence in accordance with Article 23, para. 4 AMLA is generally one-time and one-sided. Once a report has been made, any further exchange with the prosecuting authorities in the same matter is based on Article 29 AMLA. In particular, the public prosecutor's requests may then only be answered according to the principles of national administrative assistance. MROS may exchange information orally with the prosecuting authorities before filing a report in order to clarify any questions of jurisdiction and transmission modalities or to consider whether a transmission makes sense at all.
66 Regarding the scope of the report to the prosecuting authorities, Art. 8 para. 1 MGwV states that the information transmitted by MROS must not contain any information identifying the person who filed the report or provided the information. This provision came into force on January 1, 2020, as part of the partial revision of the MLLCA, after the last country evaluation criticized the MROS's protection of sources as insufficient. As a result of this restriction, MROS no longer explicitly comments on the degree of involvement of the financial intermediary when a report is sent to the law enforcement authorities. Although this does not prevent conclusions from being drawn about the person submitting the report or providing the information, the prosecution authorities need a minimum of context in order to be able to start their investigations and take the necessary action, in particular to freeze the accounts. The protection of sources should therefore not be understood as absolute, but is limited to the fact that MROS must disclose the necessary information to the competent prosecution authority so that it can even begin its work.
E. Notification of the financial intermediary (para. 5)
67 Para. 5 stipulates that the Reporting Office informs the reporting financial intermediary when it transmits the reported information to a prosecuting authority. This applies to both mandatory reporting (Art. 9 AMLA) and voluntary reporting (Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC). In both cases, the information to the financial intermediary triggers a legal freeze of the reported assets for five working days, in accordance with Art. 10 para. 1 AMLA, which is to be carried out by the financial intermediary.
68 Para. 5 in its current form came into force on January 1, 2023. Previously, para. 5 was linked to a 20-day processing period, during which the reporting office had to report to the reporting financial intermediary under Art. 9 para. 1 let. a AMLA (reporting obligation) whether or not it was forwarding the report to a law enforcement agency. MROS thus had to inform the financial intermediary of the fate of his report. The revision of Art. 5 was necessary for several reasons:
69 Due to the increasing number of reports, MROS had no longer been able to meet the 20-day processing deadline for several years. There was not enough time, especially for reports that required in-depth analysis and entailed requests for information from foreign FIUs or further financial intermediaries in accordance with Art. 11a para. 2 AMLA.
70 Furthermore, the observance of the processing period was no longer appropriate in view of the intelligence approach applied by MROS. It was only the abolition of the processing period that gave the reporting office the necessary leeway to triage suspicious activity reports, prioritize or defer them and treat them with varying degrees of depth and focus.
71 Ultimately, the systematic information as to whether or not the information was forwarded to the prosecution authorities was also not very helpful, as it could be misinterpreted and lead the financial intermediary to draw false conclusions. For example, a financial intermediary could conclude from the non-transmission that his report was unfounded or that the reported assets were of lawful origin. Such information could also play a role for a financial intermediary when considering whether or not to maintain the reported business relationship. However, it is wrong to draw certain conclusions from MROS's decision not to forward information from a report to a law enforcement agency. It is not uncommon for MROS to forward information to a foreign reporting office. In such cases, a report is not necessarily forwarded to a Swiss law enforcement agency. Furthermore, information contained in a report may only later, in combination with other information, give rise to a suspicion and thus justify a report to a law enforcement agency. In accordance with the intelligence approach adopted by the Reporting Office, it is not the report as such that is crucial but the information contained in it. Financial intermediaries should therefore not draw any false conclusions from a non-transmission, neither regarding the appropriateness of their report nor regarding the lawful origin of the reported assets.
72 With the revision of para. 5, para. 6 was also deleted. The duty of MROS to provide information to the financial intermediaries was thereby standardized and the reports according to Art. 9 AMLA and Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC were placed on an equal footing.
Bibliography
Ackermann Jürg-Beat/Zehnder Stephanie, in: Ackermann Jürg-Beat (Hrsg.), Kommentar Kriminelles Vermögen – Kriminelle Organisationen: Einziehung, Kriminelle Organisationen, Finanzierung des Terrorismus, Geldwäscherei, Band II, Zürich/Basel/Genf 2018 (zitiert KV-KO-Ackermann/Zehnder).
BAK Economics, Volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung des Schweizer Finanzsektors – Studie im Auftrag der Schweizerischen Bankiervereinigung SBVg und des Schweizerischen Versicherungsverbandes SVV, Ergebnisse 2024, abrufbar unter https://www.svv.ch/sites/default/files/202411/BAK_Economics_Bedeutungsstudie_Finanzsektor_2024.pdf (zitiert BAK Economics).
Berger Corinne, Kommentierung zu Art. 23 GwG, in: Hsu Ch. Peter/Flühmann Daniel (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar Geldwäschereigesetz (GwG), Basel 2021.
Beuret Arnaud, Kommentierung zu Art. 29 GwG, in: Kunz Peter V./Jutzi Thomas/Schären Simon (Hrsg.), Stämpflis Handkommentar (SHK) Geldwäschereigesetz (GwG), Bern/Zürich 2017.
Derungs Corsin/Gmünder Eliane, Kommentierung zu Art. 23 GwG, in: Kunz Peter V./Jutzi Thomas/Schären Simon (Hrsg.), Stämpflis Handkommentar (SHK) Geldwäschereigesetz (GwG), Bern/Zürich 2017.
Gaul Caroline/Isler Michael/Vasella David, Kommentierung zu Art. 35a GwG, in: Hsu Ch. Peter/Flühmann Daniel (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar Geldwäschereigesetz (GwG), Basel 2021.
Hutzler Doris, in: Ackermann Jürg-Beat (Hrsg.), Kommentar Kriminelles Vermögen – Kriminelle Organisationen: Einziehung, Kriminelle Organisationen, Finanzierung des Terrorismus, Geldwäscherei, Band II, Zürich/Basel/Genf 2018 (zitiert KV-KO-Hutzler).
International Monetary Fund & World Bank, Financial Intelligence Units – An Overview, Washington D.C. 2004, abrufbar unter https://doi.org/10.5089/9781589063495.069 (zitiert IMF/WB, FIUs – An Overview).
Luchsinger Roland J., Kommentierung zu Art.11a GwG, in: Kunz Peter V./Jutzi Thomas/Schären Simon (Hrsg.), Stämpflis Handkommentar (SHK) Geldwäschereigesetz (GwG), Bern/Zürich 2017.
Naef Franceso, Soft Law und Gewaltenteilung – Über die Kunst der Legiferierung durch die Katzenklappe, AJP 2015, S. 1109–1121.
Naegeli Vera, Kommentierung zu Art. 11a GwG, in: Hsu Ch. Peter/Flühmann Daniel (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar Geldwäschereigesetz (GwG), Basel 2021.
Naegeli Vera, Kommentierung zu Art. 29 GwG, in: Hsu Ch. Peter/Flühmann Daniel (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar Geldwäschereigesetz (GwG), Basel 2021.
Ordolli Stiliano, § 34 Die Schweizerische Meldestelle für Geldwäscherei und ihre Tätigkeit, in: Sester Peter/Brändli Beat/Bartholet Olivier/Schildknecht Reto (Hrsg.) Finanzmarktaufsicht und Finanzmarktinfrastrukturen: St. Galler Handbuch zum Schweizer Finanzmarktrecht, Zürich 2017.
Taube Tamara, Die Schwarze Liste der FATF – was droht der Schweiz wirklich?», recht 2014, S. 210–217.
Thelesklaf Daniel, Kommentierung zu Art. 11a GwG, in: Thelesklaf Daniel/Wyss Ralph/van Thiel Mark/Ordolli Stiliano (Hrsg.), Orell-Füssli-Kommentar GwG/AMLA, 3. Aufl., Zürich 2019.
Thelesklaf Daniel, Kommentierung zu Art. 23 GwG, in: Thelesklaf Daniel/Wyss Ralph/van Thiel Mark/Ordolli Stiliano (Hrsg.), Orell-Füssli-Kommentar GwG/AMLA, 3. Aufl., Zürich 2019.
Thürer Daniel, «Soft Law» – eine neue Form von Völkerrecht?, Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht (ZSR) 104 I, S. 429–453.
Materials
Bericht der Eidgenössischen Finanzkontrolle: Prüfung der Aufgabenerfüllung der Meldestelle für Geldwäscherei, 20.12.2021, abrufbar unter https://www.efk.admin.ch/wpcontent/uploads/publikationen/berichte/sicherheit_und_umwelt/justiz_und_polizei/20146/20146be-endgueltige-fassung-v04.pdf, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Bericht EFK).
Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die Sperrung und die Rückerstattung unrechtmässig erworbener Vermögenswerte ausländischer politisch exponierter Personen vom 21.5.2014, BBl 2014 5265 ff. abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2014/1134/de, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Botschaft SRVG 2014).
Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei im Finanzsektor (Geldwäschereigesetz, GwG) vom 17.6.1996, BBl 1996 III 1101 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1996/3_1101_1057_993/de, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Botschaft GwG 1996).
Botschaft zur Änderung des Geldwäschereigesetzes vom 26.6.2019, BBl 2019 5451 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2019/1932/de, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Botschaft GwG 2019).
Botschaft zur Änderung des Geldwäschereigesetzes vom 27.6.2012, BBl 2012 6941 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2012/1031/de, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Botschaft GwG 2012).
Botschaft zur Genehmigung und zur Umsetzung des Übereinkommens des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus mit dem dazugehörigen Zusatzprotokoll sowie zur Verstärkung des strafrechtlichen Instrumentariums gegen Terrorismus und organisierte Kriminalität vom 14.9.2018, BBl 2018 6427 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2018/2301/de, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Botschaft Verhütung Terrorismus 2018).
Botschaft zur Umsetzung der 2012 revidierten Empfehlungen der Groupe d’action financère (GAFI) vom 13.12.2013, BBl 2014 605 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2014/100/de, besucht 30.11.2024 (zitiert Botschaft GwG 2014).
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units Charter, 2013 (revised 2023), abrufbar unter https://egmontgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Egmont-Group-Charter-Revised-July-2023-Abu-Dhabi-UAE.pdf, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Egmont Charter).
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, Support and Compliance Process, 2014, abrufbar unter https://egmontgroup.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/Egmont_Group_of_Financial_Intelligence_Units_Support_and_Compliance_Process.pdf, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Egmont Compliance Process).
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units: Understanding FIU Operational Independence and Autonomy, Toronto (CAN) 2018, abrufbar unter https://egmontgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2018_Understanding_FIU_Operational_Independence_and_Autonomy.pdf, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Understanding FIU Operational Independence and Autonomy).
Egmont Group, Principles for information exchange between financial intelligence units, October 2013 (revised April 2023), abrufbar unter https://egmontgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/2.-Principles-Information-Exchange-With-Glossary_April2023.pdf, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Egmont Principles Exchange).
Erläuterungen zur Teilrevision der MGwV, 27.11.2019, abrufbar unter https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/dam/fedpol/de/data/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/vo-anpassung/erlaeuterungen-mgwv-d.pdf.download.pdf/erlaeuterungen-mgwv-d.pdf, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Erläuterungen Teilrevision MGwV 2019).
Fourth Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Switzerland, December 2016, abrufbar unter https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/images/mer/mer-switzerland-2016.pdf, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert MER 2016).
Geschäftsordnung fedpol/MROS vom 1.11.2022, abrufbar unter https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/dam/fedpol/de/data/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/geschaeftsordnung-mros.pdf.download.pdf/geschaeftsordnung-mros-d.pdf, besucht am 30.11.2024.
International Standards on Combating Money laundering ans the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation – The FATF Recommendations, Paris 2012 (revised November 2023), abrufbar unter fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/recommendations/FATF Recommendations 2012.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert FATF-Empfehlung[en]).
Jahresberichte der Meldestelle für Geldwäscherei (MROS), abrufbar unter https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/fedpol/de/home/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/publikationen.html, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert Jahresbericht MROS, jeweiliges Jahr)
Strategie MROS 2024–2027, abrufbar unter https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/dam/fedpol/de/data/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/strategie-mros.pdf.download.pdf/strategie-mros-d.pdf, besucht am 30.11.2024.
Third Enhanced Follow-up Report & Technical Compliance Re-Rating, January 2020, abrufbar unter https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Fur3-switzerland-2020.html, besucht am 30.11.2024 (zitiert FUR 2020).