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- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. General Information on Chapter 6
- II. Instruments of Formal Cooperation
- III. Instruments of Informal Cooperation
- Materials
- Bibliography
I. General Information on Chapter 6
1 Cross-border economic traffic is protected by international cooperation - and thus the conclusion of international agreements. In this context, the implementation of international agreements must be monitored and any incompatibilities with a restriction of competition must be eliminated. Chapter 6 of the Cartel Act aims precisely at this and provides for concrete measures to eliminate an incompatible restriction of competition in the event that such a restriction is identified during the execution of an international agreement. More precisely, it has a diplomatic purpose, or rather, it aims to promote international cooperation and ensure the domestic implementation of competition norms in international agreements that are not directly applicable, thereby avoiding trade policy conflicts.
A. Scope of application and delimitation
2 Art. 58 and 59 of the Act come into play when companies engage in unlawful practices that restrict competition in Switzerland but have effects only or for the most part abroad - in other words, restrictions of competition that have an effect abroad. However, Chapter 6 does not apply to situations in which unlawful restrictions of competition take place abroad and have an effect on Switzerland; in such cases, Art. 2 para. 2 of the Act is to be applied. For the purposes of delimitation, the principle of impact (Art. 2 para. 2 CO) is briefly presented below, before the scope of application of international agreements and in particular free trade agreements is discussed.
1. Demarcation from the impact principle
a. Definition
3 In Swiss law, Art. 2 para. 2 CO defines the local scope of application by means of the so-called effects doctrine. It entitles the national competition authority to apply its jurisdiction to any facts that have an effect on its territory, even if the anti-competitive practice does not take place on its own territory. Accordingly, Swiss antitrust law is applied extraterritorially when a restriction of competition has domestic effects. In approach, this can lead to an encroachment of sovereignty in the foreign state, which in turn can degenerate into diplomatic conflicts between the states concerned or even into a trade war. In order to avoid conflicts in the case of extraterritorial application of national competition law, states can draw up bilateral or multilateral agreements under international law on the application of national competition norms.
4 The question thus arises to what extent a state's national competition law can exert control over cross-border business activities. This is because transnational companies operate in a tension of national dependencies and it is difficult for a national authority to control activities that go beyond the borders of that state. Moreover, the extraterritorial application of national antitrust law can - depending on the state - be very different. In such transnational situations, economically and politically weaker states can hardly demand the enforcement of their own legal system (extraterritorial application) against more important or stronger states.
b. The problem of limited administrative cooperation
5 The problem with the extraterritorial application of national competition law is the limited cooperation of the authorities or the geographically limited possibility of investigation by the competition authorities. This is due, among other things, to the fact that the exchange of confidential information between competition authorities is generally not permitted. According to the principle of sovereignty, the investigation of a competition violation is the responsibility of the national competition authority of the state in which the competition restriction was initiated. If the initiating state wishes to seek investigations abroad, it can only do so by way of mutual legal assistance. If the competition authority involved only cooperates insufficiently or refuses mutual assistance, the initiating state must discontinue the proceedings due to a lack of sufficient information about the entrepreneurial conduct or due to a lack of proof of the restrictive effects of the conduct on competition. For this reason, it is all the more important that international cooperation mechanisms are in place to guarantee the exchange of factual and procedural information.
c. Relationship of the Impact Principle to Chapter 6
6 Chapter 6 does not refer to the application and enforcement of national competition rules to restrictions of competition with foreign effect in terms of the impact principle. As a rule, the impact state will sanction the competition restriction or the foreign competition authority will apply its national competition law directly and extraterritorially against companies domiciled in Switzerland without resorting to the consultation mechanisms provided for in international agreements. This raises the question of the usefulness of Art. 58-59 CPC, which will be analysed in the following section.
2. Violation of competition rules in international agreements
7 In addition to restrictive conduct in Switzerland with effects abroad, it must be examined whether there is a violation of indirectly applicable competition norms.
a. Competition norms in international agreements
8 Art. 58 and 59 of the Swiss Competition Act do not constitute substantive competition law, but merely support the enforcement of substantive competition rules in international agreements or free trade agreements that aim to reduce barriers to trade. Prominent examples are the EFTA Convention, Switzerland's free trade agreements with the European Economic Community (FTA) and the WTO trade agreements. These agreements often include rules against private restraints of competition, which have only a limited scope. This is due to the fact that these rules have no direct effect under substantive law and also do not allow for genuine international cooperation under procedural law, as they do not permit the exchange of confidential information between competition authorities. However, it is recognised that state treaties which do not contain competition rules in the sense of the Cartel Act, but instead list anti-dumping rules or general protective provisions on non-discriminatory competition, also fall under Chapter 6.
b. General exclusion of directly applicable competition law
9 Chapter 6 allows the Swiss authorities to investigate and take measures against restrictions of competition that originate in Switzerland and violate the competition rules contained in international agreements. It primarily targets non-self-executing norms, i.e. those that cannot be directly enforced in court. The scope of application thus includes parts of international agreements that require a special mechanism to be enforced. In addition, Art. 58-59 of the CPC also do not apply if joint bodies are provided for in the (free trade) agreement, which both apply the substantive competition rules and regulate the enforcement of these rules under national law. This is because, as Ducrey clearly puts it, no statutory implementing provisions are necessary for directly applicable international competition law, since it is already applied by the domestic authorities.
10 M.a.W. the WEKO is competent to respond to self-executing rules. If anti-competitive behaviour is found in Switzerland with effects abroad, which is not based on self-executing competition rules, the WEKO's hands are tied and according to Art. 58-59 of the Competition Act, the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER) must intervene.
B. Diplomatic objective
11 Competition law is an integral part of a state's economic policy and aims to protect the competitive mechanism from the endogenous dangers of economic freedom. First and foremost, freedom must not be used to eliminate competition in markets. In bilateral and international agreements, the contracting states undertake to comply with substantive antitrust provisions and to enforce them domestically. Art. 58 and 59 are intended to ensure that Switzerland, as a contracting party to such agreements, complies with its obligations; for as a consequence of any failure to act, it is threatened with retaliatory measures.
12 In assessing the purpose of Chapter 6, it must be borne in mind that the legislature originally designed the special procedure for the execution of international agreements to improve the enforcement of the then relevant international agreements in the former CP-62. For this reason, it introduced the provisions Art. 42 and 43 into the KG-85. With the agreement of the Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), the EAER was to be given negotiating leeway in order to be able to intervene diplomatically if an amicable settlement with the State Party was not reached in a timely manner and Switzerland was threatened with retaliatory measures. The provisions were further adapted in the 1995 revision and specified in Art. 58-59 of the CPC.
13 In summary, Art. 58-59 CPC come into play when Switzerland wants to pursue a diplomatic objective on its own initiative and promote international cooperation. But if the primary objective is for the EAER to intervene diplomatically, the question arises why it should be reserved only for the non-self-executing provisions. For example, if the Competition Commission would not intervene in the case of a restrictive practice with foreign effects, non-compliance with competition rules in international agreements may lead to international disgruntlement or even retaliatory measures by other states, which may require the intervention of the EAER. Furthermore, the application of Art. 58-59 CPC should not depend on the randomness of whether the Federal Supreme Court declares a rule directly applicable or not. Indeed, this criterion of application seems to be left to arbitrariness.
C. Practical relevance due to limited scope of application
14 Critically, e.g. Mamane and Amberg note that the scope of application of Chapter 6 is limited to cases "(i) where the de facto effects of conduct occur only abroad, as well as cases where the conduct caused in Switzerland, which has effects at home and abroad, either (ii) does not qualify as restrictive of competition under Swiss antitrust law, or (iii) qualifies as restrictive of competition but cannot be stopped."
15 As already mentioned, Art. 58 and 59 of the CPC (Art. 42-43 CPC-85) were originally enacted for the purpose of being able to address domestic conduct with foreign effect that violates competition provisions of international agreements and in particular free trade agreements by means of domestic competition law. However, this purpose has lost much of its relevance due to the increasing extraterritorial application of other national cartel laws and the extensive harmonisation of Swiss cartel law with European provisions, as well as the increased convergence of the cartel law practices of the most important trading nations.
16 The fact that the norms are hardly used can probably also be explained by the fact that "the parties to a state treaty resolve any problems informally among themselves instead of initiating a generally cumbersome procedure". It can therefore be assumed that Art. 58 and 59 CPC will hardly gain in practical relevance in the future, unless the scope of application would be extended to self-executing norms or Switzerland would conclude new treaties.
17 With only two cases of application, the subordinate importance of Art. 58-59 CPC is also reflected in the case practice. The former Art. 42 and 43 CPC-85 were applied for the first time in 1990 when an Italian sanitary ware producer complained about the behaviour of Swiss competitors and based his complaint on the obstruction of the free movement of goods. The European Commission then followed the procedure provided for in the FTA and remedied the anti-competitive behaviour by means of an amicable settlement pursuant to Art. 42-43 CPC-85. In 1995, another case arose: the Competition Commission received complaints regarding a potential ban on the export of Volkswagen Group cars to Switzerland, which was not compatible with the FTA. Unlike the first case, the primary issue here was the application of the competition law norms of the FTA and not Articles 58-59 of the PCA. The import restrictions were eventually eliminated by an amicable settlement between the Competition Commission and the Swiss car importers.
II. Instruments of Formal Cooperation
18 After the scope of application of Chapter 6 has been defined, the individual international agreements with non-self-executing competition rules must be discussed. Art. 58 and 59 of the CPC primarily complement the instruments of formal and informal cooperation. Bilateral agreements between the EU and Switzerland as well as other free trade agreements that contain both substantive and procedural competition rules are relevant here.
A. Cooperation agreements between Switzerland and the EU
19 For cross-border matters that take place in the European region, it is essential that Switzerland cooperates with the EU. To this end, they have concluded a cooperation agreement. For example, Regulation EC 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty regulates administrative cooperation within the EU, in particular through Articles 12 and 15. However, this regulation does not apply to the Switzerland-EU relationship; rather, the L 347/3 Agreement of 3 December 2014 between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on cooperation in the application of their competition laws governs the exchange of information between Switzerland and the EU.
B. EFTA Convention
20 The competition rules in the EFTA Convention are found in Chapter VI. They address the tension between trade and competition policy and define anti-competitive behaviour for this purpose. Specifically, Member States must ensure that undertakings refrain from practices which have the effect of protecting domestic production and which would be incompatible with the EFTA Convention (Art. 18(1)(a) EFTA Convention). In addition, discrimination (in trade on grounds of nationality) by undertakings which frustrates the benefits expected from the EFTA Convention is to be prohibited (Art. 18(1)(b) EFTA Convention).
21 If a member state considers its benefits from the Agreement to be at risk, it can initiate a dispute settlement procedure (Art. 46-48 EFTA Convention). The first step is to seek a consensual interpretation and application of the Agreement (Art. 47 para. 1 EFTA Convention). As a second step, the consultation procedure (Art. 47 para. 2 in conjunction with Art. 43 para. 2 EFTA Convention) is intended to provide a remedy if the informal route fails. If the consultation procedure does not lead to a solution either, the member state can initiate arbitration proceedings after 45 days (Art. 48 para. 1 EFTA Convention).
C. Free Trade Agreement between Switzerland and the European Economic Community (FTA)
22 The Free Trade Agreement of Switzerland with the European Economic Community (FTA) aims to guarantee the free circulation of goods under fair conditions of competition within the EU and Switzerland and contains antitrust provisions in Art. 23 FTA to protect competition in the movement of goods. Thus, private agreements or concerted practices between companies that have the purpose or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition with regard to production and the movement of goods are incompatible with the objectives of the agreement (Art. 23 para. 1 no. i FTA). Also incompatible with the objectives of the Agreement is the abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position over all or a substantial part of the territory of the Parties (Art. 23 para. 1 item ii FTA); in other words, abuse of dominant position. Even though these two provisions are close to Art. 101 and Art. 102 TFEU, they differ from European law firstly because of their legal nature and function. Secondly, it should also be specified that the abusive practices mentioned only apply in the area of trade in goods and not to the services or infrastructure sector. Thirdly, any state aid that distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is prohibited (Art. 23 (1) (iii) FTA). Sturny also points out that when the FTA was concluded in 1972, "it also covered facts that did not fall within the scope of application of the then Swiss Act, in particular vertical agreements between individual companies (individual contracts) and export bans.
23 If a contracting party is of the opinion that the conduct of a company violates Art. 23 para. 1 FTA and endangers the treaty objectives of the FTA, it can take appropriate measures in accordance with the conditions and procedures laid down in Art. 27 FTA (Art. 23 para. 2 FTA). Specifically, the contracting party can initiate the dispute settlement mechanism provided for in the FTA by referring the matter to the Joint Committee (Art. 27 para. 2 FTA), which is composed of representatives of Switzerland and the EU. The contracting parties shall provide the Joint Committee with all relevant information and assistance necessary to examine the case and, where appropriate, to remedy the practice complained of (Art. 27 para. 3 let. a FTA).
24 If the Joint Committee determines that the conduct of a company is incompatible with the FTA, the initiating state - on whose territory the offending practice takes place - must put a stop to it. If the initiating state does not act within the time limit set by the Joint Committee or does not put an end to the practice in question, or if no agreement is reached within three months of the matter being referred to the Joint Committee, safeguard measures may be taken, such as the withdrawal of tariff concessions, in order to remedy the serious difficulties arising from the practices in question (Art. 27 (3) (a) FTA).
D. Air transport agreement
25 The prohibition of agreements on competition (Art. 8 FTA) and the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position (Art. 9 FTA) are taken verbatim from Art. 101 and 102 TFEU. They are directly applicable and do not require Articles 58 and 59 TCA in order to be invoked in the event of a possible violation of the aforementioned competition rules. The form of cooperation between the Member States is defined in the procedural provisions (Art. 19 FCA). These stipulate that all necessary information is to be transmitted to the contracting parties and that the member states are to assist each other in the investigation of possible infringements.
E. WTO Agreement
26 Finally, the compatibility of practices with WTO agreements must also be examined. The WTO was established in 1995 as the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) concluded in 1948. It forms the institutional framework for various multilateral agreements and, in addition to the rules on trade in goods contained in the GATT, also includes the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). WTO rules are to be understood as indirect competition rules in that they aim at taking trade policy measures against state actions that restrict or distort foreign competition in the market for goods or services.
1. GATT
27 The GATT agreement - which was established in 1948 as a precursor to the WTO - served primarily as an instrument for trade liberalisation. In this context, rules were enacted within the framework of the GATT, which primarily served to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers and to secure international trade relations and which have been further developed over the years. Today it includes, among other things, the prohibition of import monopolies (Art. II para. 4 GATT), equal treatment of domestic goods with regard to taxation and other legal provisions (Art. III GATT) and quantitative import restrictions (Art. XI GATT). The GATT and the GATS, discussed below, provide only limited protection against discrimination under competition law.
2. GATS
28 The GATS also contains indirect competition rules against state actions that may restrict foreign competition in the services market. M.a.w., the GATT provides certain provisions that allow for the challengeability of private restraints of competition if they are covered by the state and impede foreign competitors' access to the domestic market. For example, according to Art. VIII GATS, for example, member states must ensure that domestic companies comply with the most-favoured-nation principle (Art. I GATT) when providing services under exclusive rights and do not engage in anti-competitive behaviour outside the respective monopoly area. In addition, Art. IX (1) GATS declares that service suppliers may engage in other business practices that may restrict competition. By invoking Art. IX para. 2 GATS, a Member State may then initiate consultations in this context in order to remedy anti-competitive practices in the Party State.
3. TRIPS Agreement
29 The TRIPS Agreement aims to harmonise intellectual property rights. To this end, the agreement obliges its contracting parties to respect industrial property rights and to respect monopoly rights, thereby creating incentives to create and disseminate knowledge. The agreement is thus not primarily aimed at clarifying the highly complex relationship between competition law and intellectual property law. Nevertheless, the relevance of the Agreement to competition law is unmistakable.
30 Art. 8 TRIPS Agreement, for example, shows the importance of prohibiting anti-competitive situations that may arise from the use of intellectual property rights. For this reason, Art. 8.2 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that contracting parties may take appropriate measures if such measures are necessary to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by the right holder or the resort to practices that unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology. However, the standard does not specifically define restrictive conduct.
31 Also of relevance to competition law is Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, which is dedicated to compulsory licensing, which according to its title can lead to other use without the consent of the right holder. According to the article, the granting of compulsory licences is a way to deal with cases where anti-competitive practices may occur in connection with the use of patents.
32 Finally, Art. 40 TRIPS addresses the issue of licensing of intellectual property and recognises in para. 1 that restrictive licensing practices may affect trade and hinder the transfer and dissemination of technology. For this reason, Article 40.2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement empowers the Parties to take appropriate countermeasures consistent with the other provisions of the Agreement.
III. Instruments of Informal Cooperation
33 In addition to the formal instruments, there are also more informal cooperation mechanisms that can promote cooperation between different competition authorities and provide an opportunity for exchange. However, these instruments do not establish a requirement for Member States, but are only intended to be supportive. They primarily serve to further develop competition law and to discuss global as well as national challenges in plenary.
A. OECD
34 The OECD's primary purpose is to promote economic cooperation and development. Among other things, it provides an important forum for the (further) development and effective enforcement of national competition law and plays a central role in the debate on the internationalisation and harmonisation of competition law. For example, in 2001 it founded the Global Forum on Competition to bring together the world's antitrust authorities. In addition, the Competition Committee of the OECD regularly issues non-binding recommendations and repeatedly deals with highly topical issues that pose new challenges to competition law (such as digitalisation). These recommendations receive a lot of attention in the field of antitrust law and are generally regarded as authoritative sources, whether by antitrust authorities, practitioners or academics.
B. ICN
35 The International Competition Network (ICN) was established in 2001 and serves as an informal forum where national as well as multinational competition authorities from around the world can exchange views on their competition policies and achieve a degree of convergence on fundamental issues of competition law application and enforcement. The exchange of experience focuses on the discussion of practical problems that may arise in particular in international competition cases. In this context, the ICN working group regularly publishes non-binding recommendations in the form of "Recommended Practices" or "Guiding Principles", which are often used as guidelines by competition authorities and thus contribute to a convergence in the application practice of the competition authorities. The Competition Commission is also part of the network and regularly participates in conferences such as the Annual ICN Conference.
Materials
Botschaft des Bundesrates zur Genehmigung der GATT/WTO-Übereinkommen (Uruguay-Runde) vom 19.9.1994, BBl 1994 IV S. 1 ff. (zit. Botschaft WTO 1994).
Botschaft zu einem Bundesgesetz über Kartelle und ähnliche Organisationen (KG) vom 13.5.1981, BBl 1981 S. 1293 (zit. Botschaft KG 1981).
Botschaft zu einem Bundesgesetz über Kartelle und andere Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen vom 23.11.1994, BBl 1995 I S. 468 (zit. Botschaft KG 1994).
Evaluationsgruppe Kartellgesetz, Evaluation gemäss Art. 59a KG: Zusammenarbeit mit ausländischen Wettbewerbsbehörden, Projektbericht P8, 23.12.2008 (zit. Evaluationsgruppe Kartellgesetz).
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