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- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
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- Art. 10a PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
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- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
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- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
I. History
A. System of the pure alternative (until 1988)
1 In its original version, valid until 1988, Art. 76 PRA structured the vote on an initiative and a counter-proposal in the form of a "pure alternative". The two proposals were put to a simultaneous vote. Each ballot paper could reject both proposals, accept one of them and reject the other, or remain blank. Approval of both proposals, on the other hand, resulted in the invalidity of the ballot paper (prohibition of double yeses). The absolute majority was calculated for both proposals together.
2 This system was the subject of much criticism, which increased in the late 1970s after three votes in which an initiative and a counter-proposal were rejected even though together they had received more votes than the status quo.
B. Subsidiary question system (since 1988)
1. Status quo in the event of disagreement between the people and the cantons (until 2003)
a. Constitutional revision
3 In 1984, in response to this criticism and demands for change, the Federal Council proposed changing the modalities of the voting procedure so that citizens could henceforth vote in favour of both the initiative and the counter-proposal (allowing a double yes vote) and indicate the ranking between the two by answering a run-off question.
4 The Federal Councillors adopt this system of double voting with a run-off question (called "Haab" after its main developer), but pass it in the form of an amendment to the Constitution (Art. 121bis aBV). This was adopted by the people and the cantons on 5 April 1987 and came into force one year later.
b. Adaptation of the PRA to the new legislation
5 Instead of revising Art. 76 PRA in line with the new Art. 121bis aBV, the Federal Assembly subsequently repealed this provision on 1 January 1989 in the course of a revision, the main subject of which was the structure of the voting procedure on an initiative and a counter-proposal in the Councils.
6 Only in 2000, on the occasion of a package of legislative amendments following the entry into force of the new Federal Constitution, did the Federal Assembly adopt a new Art. 76 PRA, which concretises the constitutional requirements (now enshrined in Art. 139b FC).
2. Rule of the highest sum of the percentages of popular and popular votes (since 2003)
a. Revision of the Constitution
7 The system of voting on an initiative and a counter-proposal undergoes a final revision in 2003 with the introduction of the so-called "sum of the percentages" rule (Art. 139b para. 3 FC). This rule is intended to prevent the stalemate that had prevailed until then if, when answering the question on the ballot, the majority of the people are in favour of the initiative and the majority of the cantons are in favour of the counter-proposal, or vice versa (cpr Art. 121bis para. 3 third sentence aBV; Art. 139 para. 6 FC as amended until 31 July 2003). In the event of a disagreement between the People and the Cantons on the run-off question, the bill that receives the highest sum of the votes of the People and the Cantons, expressed as a percentage, is now adopted (Art. 139b para. 3 FC).
b. No effect on the PRA
8 The amendment of the Constitution in the direction of the percentage rule is not transferred to Art. 76 PRA. Since this provision does not explicitly state that dissent between the people and the cantons in the run-off question thwarts the adoption of the constitutional amendment, its amendment probably seemed superfluous.
9 Art. 76 PRA underwent a slight adjustment in 2010, which was of a legal rather than a substantive nature. The Federal Assembly gave it the title "Direct counter-proposal" on the occasion of the revision of the PRA, which introduced the possibility of withdrawing an initiative on condition that an indirect counter-proposal comes into force (Art. 73a PRA).
II. Significance of the privision
A. General
1. Background
10 Art. 76 PRA is located in the 5th Title of the PRA, which is dedicated to the popular initiative. It concretises Art. 139b FC, which lays down the principles for the procedure of the popular vote on an initiative and a counter-proposal.
11 As the title indicates, Art. 76 PRA applies only to the vote on (an initiative and) a direct counter-proposal. The counter-proposal is an act adopted by the Federal Assembly as an alternative to the initiative. It is "direct" if it represents an alternative not only in terms of content but also formally, i.e. if it is opposed to the initiative in a procedure at the end of which only one legal act enters the legal order. In comparison, the "indirect" counter-proposal, which is not affected by Art. 76 PRA, proposes a substantively alternative regulation, but does not stand in a formally alternative relationship to the initiative.
12 The procedure of voting on an initiative and a direct counter-proposal only concerns initiatives that aim at a partial revision of the Constitution and are drafted from scratch. According to prevailing opinion, other initiatives (aimed at a total revision of the Constitution or formulated in general terms) cannot be the subject of a direct counter-proposal (Art. 139 para. 5 FC, identical to Art. 101 ParlG).
13 The voting procedure on an initiative and a counter-proposal according to the "Haab" system, concretised in Art. 76 PRA, is relevant if the initiative is not withdrawn after the counter-proposal has been accepted (Art. 73 PRA). The authorities are then obliged to put the initiative and the counter-proposal to the vote (cf. Art. 140 para. 1 let. a FC). In this case, Art. 139b FC orders a simultaneous vote on the two bills (para. 1), permits their double adoption and stipulates that they shall be decided by a run-off vote if they both receive a double majority of the people and the cantons (para. 2). Art. 76 PRA concretises these rules by specifying the voting questions (para. 1), the calculation of majorities (para. 2) and the determination of the result of the vote in the case of double adoption of initiative and counter-proposal (para. 3). It thus contains rules both on how citizens can express their will and on how their votes are taken into account in determining a result.
2. Functions
14 When the Federal Assembly opposes an initiative with a direct counter-proposal, the voters must vote on an alternative with three terms: Status quo, initiative or counter-proposal. Art. 76 PRA, which concretises Art. 139b FC, regulates the voting procedure on this alternative. The existence of such general-abstract rules, which set out the modalities of the vote in a sufficiently clear and precise manner, is essential to ensure that the vote can be scrutinised for regularity and that its outcome can be considered a faithful and certain expression of the will of the people (Art. 34 para. 2 FC).
15 The system established by Art. 139b FC and Art. 76 PRA ensures procedural equality between the three options of status quo, initiative or counter-proposal. In other words, it ensures that the procedure does not influence the outcome of the vote, but remains neutral in the sense that it arithmetically guarantees the same chances of success for initiative and counter-draft and does not make it more difficult to overturn the status quo than with other constitutional amendments. However, like any other constitutional amendment, both the initiative and the counter-proposal must be approved by a double majority of the people and the cantons in order to be valid (Art. 140 para. 1 let. a, 142 para. 2 FC). The procedure thus ensures compliance with federalism in connection with a vote on alternative constitutional revisions.
16 The procedure according to Art. 139b FC and Art. 76 PRA also enables citizens to vote on the initiative and the counter-proposal in such a differentiated manner that this can be considered as a (formal) expression of their (substantive) will. By combining two main votes and a run-off question, every citizen can express each of the 13 non-contradictory orders of preference that can regulate the relationship between the counter-draft, the initiative and the status quo through his or her vote. By linking the questions to each other, it is also avoided that the vote leads to a contradictory overall result. This arrangement thus serves not only the (individual) freedom of content of the vote, but also the (collective) protection of the faithful and secure expression of the will of the people, both of which derive from the guarantee of political rights (Art. 34 para. 2 FC).
B. Comparative cantonal law
17 In almost all cantons, the system of voting on an initiative and a counter-proposal corresponds mutatis mutandis (without the double majority requirement) to that of the Confederation (e.g. Art. 36 FC/ZH; Art. 60 para. 2 FC/BE; Art. 125 para. 5 PRA/FR; Art. 33 para. 3 PRA/VD; Art. 34 para. 4 FC/VS; Art. 113 PRA/NE; Art. 63 para. 3 FC/GE ). Only two cantons, Jura and Aargau, stand out on this point.
18 In the canton of Jura, the initiative and the counter-proposal are also put against the status quo independently of each other in a double, simultaneous main vote. However, if both the initiative and the counter-proposal are accepted, there is no run-off vote. The bill that received more votes is accepted (Art. 76 para. 5 Cst./JU , Art. 93 para. 2 PRA/JU ).
19 As far as the Canton of Aargau is concerned, it does provide for a simultaneous vote on the initiative and the counter-proposal, but the vote on the initiative is a main vote, whereas the vote on the counter-proposal is a contingent vote (Art. 65 para. 3 KV/AG ). The vote on the counter-proposal is only taken into account if the initiative is rejected. Thus, if both drafts achieve an absolute majority, only the initiative is accepted (§ 59 para. 2 GPR/AG ).
III. Comment
A. Questions to be voted on in a vote on an initiative and a counter-proposal (paragraph 1)
1. Uniform ballot paper
20 Art. 76 para. 1 PRA concretises the voting modalities in the case of a vote on an initiative and a direct counter-proposal by specifying that three (different) questions shall be placed on one (single) ballot paper. In doing so, it implements the first instruction of Art. 139b para. 1 FC, according to which the voters vote on the initiative and the counter-proposal in the same ballot ("simultaneously"). The aim of this simultaneity is to ensure equality of opportunity between the initiative and the counter-proposal.
21 Nevertheless, the voters vote on two different items. Each citizen votes primarily on the initiative (Art. 76 para. 1 let. a PRA) and the counter-proposal (Art. 76 para. 1 let. b PRA), and secondarily on his or her preference between the initiative and the counter-proposal if both are adopted (Art. 76 para. 1 let. c PRA). The Federal Assembly otherwise decides on the initiative and the counter-proposal in the form of two separate federal decrees (Art. 101 para. 2 PARlG).
2. Main questions (letters a and b)
a. Independent votes
22 The first two questions on the ballot paper enable each voter to express his or her opinion on the initiative and the counter-proposal as if they were submitted to them separately (Art. 76 para. 1 let. a and b PRA). Specifically, the questions are as follows: a) Do you accept the popular initiative "[title]"? b) Do you accept the federal decree of [date] concerning [thematic title of the counter-decree as counter-draft"]?
23 Both the initiative and the counter-proposal are directed against the current regulation (the status quo). In order to overthrow the status quo, both must receive an absolute majority of the votes of the people and the cantons (Art. 140 para. 1 let. a, 142 para. 2–4 FC). Otherwise, the bill is rejected.
24 The votes on the initiative and the counter-proposal are thus independent of each other. Each item can either be accepted or rejected. If both are rejected, there is no constitutional amendment. This is particularly the case if one bill is accepted by the majority of the people and the other by the majority of the cantons. If only one of the proposals is accepted, the constitution is revised in this sense. If both the initiative and the counter-proposal are adopted, an eventual run-off vote between the two proposals will decide, thus avoiding a double constitutional amendment.
b. Allowing double approval
25 Art. 76 PRA, like Art. 139b para. 2 FC, allows citizens to vote in favour of both the initiative and the counter-proposal ("[c]every voter can declare without reservation"). Thus, approval of one of the bills is no longer a prerequisite for voting on the other bill. The Federal Assembly itself can recommend dual consent (art. 102 para. 1 let. b ParlG). Specifically, the ballot papers may contain 9 combinations: Yes/Yes; No/No; Yes/No; No/Yes; White/Yes; White/No; Yes/White; No/White; White/White; White/White.
26 Thanks to the allowance of the "double yes", citizens can express their preference for one of the two revisions (initiative or counter-proposal) over the status quo. In combination with the separate calculation of the majority, this modality makes it possible to express nine preferences between the initiative, the counter-proposal and the status quo. The secondary question makes it possible to express the remaining 4 of 13 possible non-contradictory preferences.
27 By comparison, in the pure alternative system, ballots that agreed with both the initiative and the counter-proposal were invalid and consequently not taken into account in determining the result of the vote. A blank vote that referred to only one of the proposals meant de facto the rejection of that proposal. This system did not allow for a sufficiently differentiated vote, which could also have a distorting effect on the overall result of the vote and promoted the status quo beyond the common requirements for any constitutional amendment. This was because of the 13 possible orders of preference between the initiative, the counter-draft and the status quo, only 4 could actually be expressed. Under these circumstances, it was possible for the initiative and the counter-proposal to be rejected even though the majority of the electorate would have wanted a constitutional amendment.
3. Subsidiary question
a. Exclusion of a double constitutional amendment
28 Since it is permissible to vote in favour of both the initiative and the counter-proposal, it is possible - even though this has never happened before - for both proposals to receive a double majority of the people and the cantons and thus for both to be adopted (Art. 142 para. 2 FC). However, since the initiative and the counter-proposal are in a (material and formal) alternative relationship to each other, it is excluded that this double approval leads to a double constitutional amendment.
b. Expression of a preference between the initiative and the counter-proposal in the case of a double adoption
29 In order to implement this limit, Art. 139b para. 2 FC and Art. 76 para. 1 let. c and para. 3 PRA provide for the two proposals to be directly opposed to each other in a third, simultaneous, subsidiary question, separate from the main questions, which asks the citizens "which of the two texts should enter into force if the people and the cantons prefer the two texts to the one in force" (Art. 76 para. 1 let. c PRA). The question is specifically: c) If the people and the cantons adopt both the popular initiative "[title]" and the counter-proposal (federal decree of [date] on [thematic title of the decree opposed as a counter-proposal]): Should the popular initiative or the counter-proposal then enter into force?
30 In contrast to the vote on the initiative or the counter-proposal, the answers that citizens can give to the key question are not "yes" or "no" (or a blank vote), but "initiative" or "counter-proposal" (or a blank vote). The run-off question thus inevitably leads to a choice between these two proposals. If one proposal receives the majority (from the sum of the votes of the people and the cantons), the other inevitably unites only a minority. For example, if the initiative receives 51 per cent of the votes, the counter-proposal has 49 per cent. It is therefore not possible, as in the case of the main votes, for both proposals to receive a majority of the people and the cantons.
31 The answer to the key question is independent of the answers to the main questions on the initiative and the counter-proposal. It is possible not to answer it or to answer only this question (cf. also Art. 76 para. 2 sentence 2 PRA ). This system makes it possible to express the 13 possible non-contradictory orders of preference between the initiative, the counter-proposal and the status quo , including the 4 indicating a preference between the initiative and the counter-proposal if both are preferred to the status quo or vice versa if the status quo is preferred to them.
B. Calculation of majorities (paragraph 2)
1. Separate calculation
32 Art. 76 para. 2 PRA implements the system of double voting on initiative and counter-proposal with a run-off question by stipulating that votes are counted and absolute majorities are calculated separately for each subject (1st sentence) and that unanswered questions are not taken into account (2nd sentence). This means that a blank vote on one of the questions (partial blank ballot), e.g. the preference between initiative and status quo , is not taken into account when calculating the majority required to answer that question. However, it will be taken into account in calculating the majority required to answer the other questions if it expresses an opinion on those questions.
33 By way of illustration, if out of a total of 2,600,000 ballot papers in question, 50,000 ballot papers are not cast in favour of the initiative and 70,000 are not cast in favour of the counter-proposal, the absolute majority of the people is already reached at 1,275,000 votes in favour ([2,600,000-50,000] : 2) for the initiative, while for the counter-proposal it is already reached at 1,265,000 votes in favour ([2,600,000-70,000] : 2).
34 In order to make this calculation possible, the number of yes votes, the number of no votes and the number of unanswered ballot papers are indicated separately for each main question in the voting protocol, as well as the number of respective votes for the initiative or the counter-proposal and the number of blank votes for the run-off question. The number of ballot papers that are not eligible at all (completely blank or completely invalid) shall be entered in a separate item (Art. 4 para. 1 ODP and Annex 1b ODP).
2. Expression of indifference between an item and the status quo.
35 The separate calculation of the majority makes it possible to vote blank only on the initiative or the counter-proposal without this blank vote being interpreted as a rejection of that item. Thus, it is possible to agree or disagree with one item and express indifference between the other item and the status quo. Each item has the same chance of being approved as if it were put to the vote alone.
36 For comparison: In the old system, the absolute majority was calculated jointly for the initiative and the counter-proposal. Partially blank ballots were taken into account when calculating the joint majority threshold. A blank vote on only one of the proposals meant de facto that one rejected that proposal, as the ballot paper nevertheless increased the absolute majority threshold for that proposal as well. This system prevented the four orders of priority between initiative, counter-proposal and status quo, expressing indifference between the status quo and one of the items. More generally, it distorted the expression of the popular will, as partially blank ballots helped to raise the threshold for an absolute majority for an item to which, however, those ballots had given as much preference as to the status quo.
C. Result of the vote in the event of double acceptance of the initiative and the counter-proposal (paragraph 3)
1. Scope of the run-off question (1st sentence)
a. Possible scope
37 As already mentioned, the admissibility of the double adoption of the initiative and the counter-proposal means that it is possible for both of these items to be adopted by the people and the cantons. Since the Constitution cannot be revised in these two mutually exclusive directions, the current voting system directly contrasts the initiative and the counter-proposal in a run-off question that allows citizens to express their preference between these two proposals if both are adopted (Art. 139b para. 2 FC cum 76 para. 1 let. c PRA).
38 The subsidiary nature of the question of preference between the initiative and the counter-proposal already follows from the wording as formulated by Art. 76 para. 1 let. c PRA ("if the people and the cantons prefer the two texts to the system in force"). Art. 76 para. 3 first sentence. PRA confirms the possible significance of the run-off vote by stating that "if both the popular initiative and the counter-proposal are adopted, the result obtained from the answers to the third question shall carry the decision". Thus, in contrast to the main votes, the vote on the run-off question is not unconditionally taken into account. Its potential significance is only actualised if both the initiative and the counter-proposal are adopted in response to the main questions. In all other cases, only the results of the main votes are decisive. However, the result of the run-off vote shall be determined in all cases, including those in which only the main votes are decisive.
b. Additional condition for the adoption of the initiative or the counter-proposal
39 The system of the run-off question makes the adoption of a constitutional amendment conditional on its acceptance by the people and the cantons (Art. 140 para. 1 let. a FC) if both the initiative and the counter-proposal are adopted. In this case, the constitutional amendment must not only have been accepted by the people and the cantons in response to the main votes - which is a sufficient condition for the acceptance of a constitutional amendment in all other cases - but must also have been preferred in response to the run-off question.
2. Result of the run-off vote (2nd sentence)
a. (Artificial) requirement of a double majority
40 According to the will of the legislature, the preference for the initiative or the counter-proposal expressed in response to the leading question must command a double majority of the people and the cantons in order to triumph over its alternative. Art. 76 para. 3 second sentence. PRA stipulates that the bill that "attracts the largest number of electoral votes and the largest number of votes of the Estates" shall enter into force. However, this rule must be read in conjunction with Art. 139b para. 3 FC in order to grasp its scope.
41 Until 2003, no constitutional amendment was adopted if, in the answer to the run-off question, one proposal received a majority of the popular vote and the other a majority of the votes of the Estates. This blockade favoured the status quo and distorted the will of the people. To remedy this situation, Art. 139b para. 3 FC now mitigates the consequences of a divergence between the people and the cantons. As expressed in Art. 76 para. 3 second sentence. PRA ("the most electoral votes and the most cantonal votes" [emphasis added]), however, the double absolute majority of the people and the cantons remains implicitly the basic rule when answering the run-off question.
42 In our view, however, this distinction between an ordinary rule when an answer achieves a double majority and a special rule when it does not is artificial. The fact is that Art. 139b para. 3 FC dispenses with the requirement of a double majority and instead provides for another criterion – the majority of the sum of the votes of the people and the cantons – which makes it possible to decide between an initiative and a counter-proposal in all situations. Indeed, a bill that achieves a popular and cantonal majority (e.g. 51% of the popular vote and 12 cantons [52.17%]) necessarily receives the higher sum of the percentages of the popular and cantonal votes (103.17% vs. 96.83%). The absolute majority calculated according to Art. 139b para. 3 FC is therefore relevant in all cases, not only in the case of differences between the people and the cantons. Instead of the bill that collects "the most electoral votes and the most votes of the Estates" (cf. Art. 76 para. 3 sentence 2 PRA), the bill with the most electoral votes and the most votes of the Estates emerges as the winner (cf. also the Italian version: "il maggior numero di voti del Popolo e dei Cantoni").
b. (Actual) requirement of the highest sum of popular and cantonal votes.
43 It follows from the above that the outcome of the vote on the subsidiary question - if it is to unfold its scope - is determined by a special majority: The bill is adopted which gathers the highest sum of the votes of the voters and the cantons (Art. 76 para. 3 2nd sentence PRA cum 139b para. 3 FC).
44 If an answer to the run-off question attracts the majority of the popular vote and the majority of the votes of the cantons, it necessarily also attracts the majority of the sum of the popular vote and the votes of the cantons. In this case, which is the normal case according to the conception of the constitutional legislator and the legislator, no additional calculation is necessary.
45 Conversely, if one bill achieves a popular majority and the other a majority of the cantons (both bills have each achieved a double majority in answer to the main question), Art. 139b para. 3 FC prescribes a method known as the "sum of the percentages", in which the electoral and cantonal votes received by each bill are converted into percentages and then added together.
46 Under this method, each canton is worth about 4.348%, and each "half-canton" is worth about 2.174%. The total sum of the popular and the cantonal votes is equal to 200 % (100 % of the votes of the citizens and 100 % of the votes of the cantons). The absolute majority is calculated from this total. It is thus achieved by the proposal for which the sum of the votes converted into percentages exceeds 100 %, irrespective of whether this proposal received a minimum of more than 50 % of the popular votes and more than 50 % of the votes of the cantons. In other words, the winning bill is the one that receives the highest sum of popular and Estates votes expressed as a percentage.
47 As an example, one can imagine that when answering a subsidiary question with a total of 2,500,000 responses, an initiative receives 13 cantons, 4 "half-cantons" and 1,200,000 popular votes, while its counter-proposal receives 7 cantons, 2 "half-cantons" and 1,300,000 votes. Converting these results into percentages, the initiative receives approximately 65.22% of the cantonal votes and 48% of the popular votes, and the counter-draft receives approximately 34.78% of the cantonal votes and 52% of the popular votes. In total, therefore, the initiative receives 113.22 % of the popular and cantonal votes and the counter-draft 86.78 %. In this case, therefore, it is the initiative that achieves the majority, since it has received more than 100 % of the votes (and logically a higher percentage than the counter-draft).
48 The criterion of the sum of the percentages is neutral towards the initiative and the counter-proposal. It respects the equality between these two proposals and prevents the status quo from being unduly favoured, even though both the initiative and the counter-proposal were adopted by a double majority of the people and the cantons in response to the main questions. In our opinion, however, this special majority constitutes an unjustified interference with the equality of voting rights. It gives more influence to (citizens of certain) cantons than to voters (of other cantons). However, this unbalanced influence cannot be justified from a constitutional point of view at the stage of the subsidiary question. After all, the vote on the run-off question is not about whether an item is accepted (> 50%) or rejected (< 50%), but about deciding between two constitutional amendments that have already been accepted according to the modalities of a compulsory referendum. It therefore does not fall within the scope of the double majority rule (Art. 140 para. 1 let. a FC). The criterion of the highest sum of the votes of the people and the cantons also deviates from the meaning of the double majority. It is no longer a question of bringing together a minimum number of bodies that agree on a subject (Art. 142 para. 2 FC), but of granting the cantons a mathematical influence on the answer to the subsidiary question. However, such an influence of the cantons finds no justification either in the principle of federalism or in any other general principle.
49 According to the present commentary, therefore, only the majority of the people should be decisive for the outcome of the vote on the run-off question, as the authorities had also intended in the total revision of the Constitution. However, such a paradigm shift requires a revision of Art. 139b para. 3 FC and Art. 76 para. 3 sentence 2 PRA.
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