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- Art. 3 FC
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 73 PRA
- Art. 73a PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
I. History of origin
1 The Federal Act of January 27, 1892 on the Procedure for Petitions and Votes concerning the Revision of the Federal Constitution did not yet recognize the right to withdraw a popular initiative. Nevertheless, in practice, the authors of popular initiatives often reserved the right to withdraw by means of a withdrawal clause on the signature sheet, even at the beginning of the 20th century. The authorities accepted this procedure. One reason for this was that at the cantonal level, specifically in the Canton of Zurich, the right of withdrawal was recognized. In legal doctrine, its admissibility was disputed. For Stüssi, it was in the nature of things that a popular initiative cannot be withdrawn. Burckhardt and, following him, Büeler and Waldkirch were also of the opinion that a popular initiative that had come into being must be put to a referendum; a “conditional submission” was inadmissible due to the lack of a sufficient legal basis. In contrast, Fleiner/Giacometti argued that “the initiators cannot reasonably be expected to insist on an initiative that they no longer want retrospectively.”
2 The revision of October 5, 1950, amended the aforementioned federal law to the effect that “[t]he initiators of a popular petition [...] may authorize certain signatories to withdraw the popular petition in favor of a counter-proposal of the Federal Assembly or to withdraw it unconditionally” (rev. Art. 4 para. 4). Contrary to the Federal Council's proposal, the Federal Assembly decided that the signatories authorized to make the declaration of withdrawal should be indicated on the signature sheet (rev. Art. 4 para. 2 no. 2). It did not provide for the authorization of an “initiative committee”, since, as was argued in the Council of States, “aucune disposition de loi ne prévoyait l'existence de ce comité, sa nature juridique et son fonctionnement. An initiative could even be launched without the assistance of a committee.” Furthermore, the authority of the authorized signatories after the submission of the popular initiative should be limited to its withdrawal. In the absence of a legal regulation, it remained unclear what majority was required for the decision to withdraw.
3 With the decision of March 23, 1962, the matter was transferred to two new federal laws. The provisions concerning the consideration of initiatives by the Federal Assembly were incorporated into the “Business Transactions Act”. The “Initiative Act” was created for the provisions that specifically “interest citizens as initiators”. It was made clear that a possible withdrawal clause had to be listed on each signature sheet, including the names and addresses of the persons authorized to withdraw (Art. 4 para. 3). A two-thirds majority of those entitled to do so was required for the decision to withdraw (Art. 4 para. 3). In addition, the admissibility of a withdrawal was limited to the period between the Federal Council setting the date of the vote and the Federal Assembly's approval of a popular initiative in the form of a general proposal and the decision to approve it (Art. 4 para. 4).
4 With the introduction of the PRA on December 17, 1976, the Federal Assembly simplified the option for the initiative committee – which is now mandatory – to withdraw a popular initiative by reducing the quorum: a simple majority was now sufficient (Art. 73 para. 1). In addition, a signature list had to contain an unconditional withdrawal clause (Art. 68 let. c).
5 The provision was given its current wording with the partial revision of the PRA of June 21, 1996. At the suggestion of the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly clarified that membership of an initiative committee requires the right to vote (Art. 73 para. 1), since the withdrawal of an initiative is a political right. In addition, the wording should clarify the determination of the majority required for withdrawal in the event that members leave the initiative committee. Furthermore, the Federal Chancellery has been obliged in future to invite each committee of a fully formulated popular initiative in writing to decide on the withdrawal of the initiative before the Federal Council sets the date for the popular vote (Art. 73 para. 2).
II. Significance of the provision
A. General
6 Anyone who submits an initiative should also be allowed to withdraw it. The main reason for this is the possibility that parliament will accommodate the initiators with a direct counter-proposal or an indirect counter-proposal. Historically, this aspect was in the foreground, since the procedure with the ban on a double yes disadvantaged the popular initiative in the event of a counter-proposal. The right of withdrawal enables the dialogue between parliament and the initiative committee, which is typical of the Swiss system of direct democracy, to find a compromise. In view of the unpredictability of referendums, this can still be in the interest of parliament, the initiators and, ultimately, in particular, the voters. Withdrawal of a popular initiative can also take account of changed legal and political circumstances (lack of relevance) and prevent votes from being held in vain. Although not originally intended, the right of withdrawal became established accordingly.
7 Since the right of withdrawal cannot be exercised by all the individual initiators (supporters of the popular initiative), the initiative committee is authorized by law to withdraw the popular initiative. As has been developed in practice, a withdrawal clause must be added to the signature form (see Art. 68 para. 1 let. c and e PRA), which authorizes the initiative committee to withdraw the initiative.
8 The right to withdraw is the most important right of the initiative committee. It enables the committee to enter into negotiations with parliament regarding possible compromises with the popular initiative as a bargaining chip. The political role of the initiative committee after the submission of the popular initiative depends largely on the right to withdraw; as soon as it can no longer exercise the right to withdraw, its role as representative of the initiative ends. This does not mean, however, that the members of the initiative committee cannot exert political influence on the subsequent implementing legislation; anyone who has brought about a popular initiative should also be able to launch a referendum against the relevant implementing legislation.
9 According to the statistics of the Federal Chancellery, a total of 108 federal popular initiatives had been withdrawn by November 1, 2024, 29 of which were in favor of a counter-proposal, 46 in favor of an indirect counter-proposal, and 33 for other reasons. Since 2000, a total of 41 popular initiatives have been withdrawn, 10 of which were in favor of a counter-proposal, 19 in favor of an indirect counter-proposal, and 12 for other reasons.
B. Comparative law
10 A right of withdrawal is typically also granted by law or constitutionally for popular initiatives at the cantonal and municipal level. This can vary, especially with regard to the legal entity (one or more '[first] signatories'; person(s) named on the signature form). In some cases, the authors of the initiative may even provide for their own withdrawal procedure on the signature sheet; in particular, the quorum for a declaration of withdrawal is likely to be affected by the freedom of regulation. Most cantons stipulate that a popular initiative must have a withdrawal clause. Provided that such a clause is not prohibited by cantonal or municipal law, it is permissible.
III. Commentary
A. Para. 1
1. Any popular initiative
11 “Any popular initiative” can be withdrawn, i.e. both those for a total revision (Art. 138 FC) and those for a partial revision of the FC (Art. 139 FC). The form of the popular initiative (general proposal or detailed draft) is irrelevant. In the case of a total revision of the FC, the withdrawal concerns the preliminary vote on whether a total revision procedure should be initiated.
12 The withdrawal of a popular initiative requires that it has come into being. From a dogmatic point of view, the signatures provided can be withdrawn before an initiative has come into being, but after that only the popular initiative itself. However, for pragmatic reasons, it is not necessary for the coming into being to be certain in order to withdraw a submitted initiative in accordance with Art. 73 PRA. Furthermore, the popular initiative does not have to be declared valid in order to be withdrawn; the somewhat peculiar systematic classification of the right of withdrawal before the provision on the examination of the validity of the popular initiative (Art. 75 PRA) is likely to be related to this consideration.
2. The initiative committee
13 The initiative committee is authorized by law to withdraw “its” popular initiative. The initiative committee consists of at least seven and at most 27 “authors of the initiative” who are eligible to vote and whose names and addresses are listed on the signature list. This binding determination of its composition and the granting of the right of withdrawal suggest that the initiative committee should be qualified as a public-law association of persons.
3. The right of withdrawal
14 The political right to submit a proposal for a democratic decision-making process in the form of a popular initiative includes the right to withdraw this proposal (the popular initiative). The withdrawal is the counter-contract to the submission of a popular initiative. Art. 73 PRA authorizes the initiative committee as such (by majority vote) to withdraw “its” popular initiative on behalf of the signatories. The right of withdrawal is therefore a political right in the sense of Article 34, para. 1 FC.
15 The right to withdraw a submitted popular initiative is “a very extensive right, the legitimizing and legal basis of which is weak”: the initiative committee can decide whether or not to pursue the popular initiative and thus exercise a political right of at least 100,000 eligible voters. This justifies a restrictive interpretation of this right. The Federal Chancellery is obliged to check very carefully whether the conditions for withdrawal are met in each case.
16 In principle, the initiative committee is politically free to decide whether to withdraw its proposal. Accordingly, the signatories have no right to demand that the supported popular initiative not be withdrawn. At the same time, the initiative committee cannot be obliged to withdraw the popular initiative. In my opinion, based on Article 34 FC, all voters have a right to expect that the members of the initiative committee are truly free to make the decision to withdraw. In my opinion, a withdrawal can even be an abuse of rights – for example, if it is made in return for advantages in favor of members of the initiative committee. In contrast, the prevailing doctrine – probably also in view of the difficulties associated with providing the relevant evidence – points to the political freedom of the initiative committee.
17 It is not possible to partially withdraw a popular initiative (e.g. merely a paragraph of the proposed FC article), because this would constitute an impermissible intervention in the text of the initiative. This rules out any haggling between parliament and the initiative committee over the wording of the initiative text; compromises must be sought through the direct counter-proposal or the indirect counter-proposal of parliament.
18 Since a popular initiative for a total revision of the Federal Constitution concerns the initiation of a revision procedure and not a proposal for a specific substantive provision, it may be supported for a variety of reasons, including contradictory ones. In this context, the authorization to withdraw in favor of the initiative committee appears to be particularly weakly supported.
4. The declaration of withdrawal
19 In order to be able to legally withdraw 'its' popular initiative, the initiative committee must issue a declaration of withdrawal. The draft of the declaration of withdrawal is provided by the Federal Chancellery. The declaration of withdrawal must be signed by an absolute majority of the members of the initiative committee who are still eligible to vote at the time the decision is taken. This rules out stalemate situations, and qualified majorities are no longer necessary.
20 The declaration of withdrawal is addressed to the Federal Chancellery. The withdrawal must take place unconditionally (exception: conditional withdrawal in favor of an indirect counter-proposal in accordance with Art. 73a para. 2 PRA). Reasons for the withdrawal are not to be mentioned and are generally legally irrelevant.
21 If the withdrawal in a declaration of withdrawal is made dependent on different conditions than those in favor of an indirect counterproposal, the relevant declaration of withdrawal is invalid. If a member of the initiative committee agrees to the withdrawal under such different conditions, in my opinion this is also invalid – which only affects the declaration of withdrawal if the absolute majority of consenting members is lost as a result.
B. Para. 2
1. Point in time
22 In order to give the initiative committee the political freedom of action for as long as possible while still ensuring legal certainty with regard to the organization of the referendum, the withdrawal may take place up to the point at which the referendum is set by the Federal Council or up to the expiry of the period granted before that. A later declared withdrawal would be irrelevant.
23 If the Federal Supreme Court sets aside a federal vote on a popular initiative, the right of withdrawal also lapses until a new voting date is set; this is because Article 34 FC does not give voters the right to a new referendum, nor does it protect them from the withdrawal of a popular initiative. This occurred in the case of the vote on the popular initiative 'For marriage and family – against the marriage penalty', which was annulled by the Federal Supreme Court due to a lack of information that was only recognized after the fact. As a result, the initiative committee withdrew its popular initiative, making the holding of a second referendum unnecessary.
2. Procedure
24 Before the Federal Council sets the date for the popular vote, the Federal Chancellery sends the initiative committee a form with a draft of a declaration of withdrawal, including a signature form. A template for such a draft can be found in the appendix to the Ordinance on Political Rights of May 24, 1978 (VPR; SR 161.11). The initiative committee is not obliged to use this template for the declaration of withdrawal. The declaration of withdrawal must in any case show that the requirements for withdrawal have been met.
25 The initiative committee must submit its decision to withdraw to the Federal Chancellery within ten days, together with all the necessary signatures of its members.
26 A legally valid withdrawal is irrevocable. It has the effect of rendering the popular initiative without object for the authorities and terminating the procedure that it has initiated.
27 The current regulation has the disadvantage that it cannot guarantee that at the time of submission, or indeed at any earlier time, the required majority of the members of the initiative committee have supported the withdrawal. It must therefore be possible for the members to revoke their support of the withdrawal as long as it has not yet been submitted. The receipt of the declaration of withdrawal should be immediately notified to the members of the initiative committee so that they can react to possible manipulation.
28 The withdrawal is published in the Federal Gazette.
C. Para. 3
29 If the Federal Assembly approves a popular initiative in the form of a general proposal, it takes on the implementation mandate and is thus obliged to implement the initiative request faithfully. The approval of the Federal Assembly of a popular initiative in the form of a general proposal is binding and final; the Federal Assembly can neither go back on nor withdraw its decision in this regard.
30 From this point on, there is no longer any leeway for negotiating compromises with the initiative committee; rather, the initiative committee has fulfilled its task with the approval of the popular initiative by the Federal Assembly and can no longer dispose of it. Accordingly, the initiative committee also no longer has the option of withdrawing the popular request, as Art. 73 para. 3 PRA expressly states.
31 The same must apply if the electorate has accepted a popular initiative in the form of a general proposal in the preliminary vote. In this case, the mandate to implement is given by the electorate; the authorization of the initiative committee is limited to the withdrawal on behalf of the signatories of the popular initiative and therefore does not extend to the electorate.
D. Special questions: the withdrawal as the subject of an appeal in electoral matters
32 The Federal Supreme Court infers from Article 29a FC and Article 189 para. 1 let. f FC that, despite the lack of a basis in the PRA, the withdrawal of a popular initiative can also be the subject of an appeal in electoral matters before the Federal Supreme Court. Article 80 para. 2 and 3 PRA apply by analogy. It has not been determined whether the initiative committee's decision to withdraw or the publication of the Federal Chancellery regarding the withdrawal, which can be qualified as a ruling, can be challenged. According to the view represented here, both are contestable based on Art. 82 lit. c BGG, since both are based on public law and concern the right to vote: With the withdrawal, the initiative committee exercises a political right; the ruling of the Federal Chancellery establishes and officially publishes the valid exercise of the right of withdrawal. If Art. 73 PRA is not complied with, this can therefore violate the political rights of those eligible to vote and must be contestable. In practice, this question is rarely relevant due to the object of the challenge, since most voters and thus those entitled to appeal are unlikely to be aware of the withdrawal until the declaration of withdrawal is published in accordance with Art. 77, para. 2 PRA, which means that this act would trigger the deadline.
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