-
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
-
- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
-
- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
-
- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
-
- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. History of origins
- II. Significance of the provision
- III. Commentary on the text of the norm
- Bibliography and Materials
I. History of origins
1 The cantonal referendum entered the Swiss legal system with the Federal Constitution of 29 May 1874. According to Art. 89 para. 2 aBV, a referendum had to be held on "federal laws as well as generally binding federal decisions" "if it is demanded by 30,000 Swiss citizens entitled to vote or by eight cantons". It is assumed that the hurdle was set at eight cantons to prevent the seven former special federal cantons from taking the cantonal referendum alone and complicating legislation.
2 The legislator first standardized the cantonal referendum in the Federal Law on Referendums on Federal Laws and Federal Decisions of June 17, 1874, Art. 6 of which stipulated the intra-cantonal competence as follows: "If Cantons request a referendum, the request must be made by the Grand Council (Cantonal Council, Land Council). The right of the people to amend such final measures under the cantonal constitution is reserved." Accordingly, the federal legislator determined that the cantonal parliaments could initiate a cantonal referendum. The cantons were free to additionally allow a referendum. A decision by the cantonal government alone, on the other hand, would not have been possible.
3 The federal law of 1874 was repealed in 1978 with the enactment of the Federal Law on Political Rights (PRA). The legislator thereby refrained from adopting the provision on the cantonal referendum without replacement. The dispatch is silent on the reasons for this, and the issue was not raised in the commissions and plenums of parliament either. One reason could have been that the provision was simply considered superfluous because no request for a cantonal referendum had ever been made up to that point. Another, that a regulation of intra-cantonal competence in a federal law should be deliberately avoided in order to avoid any encroachment on the constitutional cantonal autonomy (Art. 3 and 5 aBV). Formally, it was argued that the regulation did not belong in a law dealing with popular rights.
4 A good 20 years after the renunciation, the federal legislature decided to regulate the cantonal referendum again within the framework of a partial revision of the PRA (Art. 67-67b PRA). The Federal Council justified this step on the one hand with the now existing need to actually use the instrument. On the other hand, it saw a problem in the fact that not all cantons had defined the competences for a cantonal referendum. This would not only have an effect in those cantons with a regulatory gap, but would also make it more difficult for all cantons to reach the quorum for a cantonal referendum. A subsidiary (i.e. substitute) regulation by the federal government for all cantons was therefore necessary. In the parliamentary deliberations, Art. 67-67b PRA were uncontroversial and the Councils approved the Federal Council's draft without discussion.
5 In the total revision of the Federal Constitution in 1999, the constitutional legislator took over the cantonal referendum and the quorum of eight cantons from the Federal Constitution of 1874 in Art. 141 para. 1 FC. Accordingly, the cantonal referendum can be held against federal laws, urgently declared federal laws with a term of validity of more than one year, certain federal resolutions and certain international treaties. The total revision also finally settled the doctrinal discussion on how the six former "half-cantons" are to be counted in the cantonal referendum. Only half-cantons are taken into account exclusively in the case of proposals submitted to a vote of the people and the cantons (Art. 142 para. 2-4 FC) and in the composition of the Council of States (Art. 150 para. 2 sentence 1 FC). In the case of a cantonal referendum pursuant to Article 141 para. 1 FC, all the cantons referred to in Article 1 FC shall be counted in their entirety.
II. Significance of the provision
A. General
1. Cantonal referendum: function and criticism
6 The federal constitutional legislature introduced the optional legislative referendum in 1874 for the electorate and the cantons, among other things, to compensate for the fact that the cantons had to relinquish powers due to the total revision of the Federal Constitution. This function of the cantonal referendum was also emphasized by the Commission of Experts for the Preparation of a Total Revision of the Federal Constitution in 1977. It was an emergency brake for the cantons and, moreover, promoted the involvement of the cantonal parliaments with federal projects. However, participation is limited: Although the cantons can initiate a cantonal referendum, the decision on whether to accept or reject a bill is made solely by the voters, according to Article 141 para. 1 FC.
7 The cantonal referendum has been criticized time and again. The fact that it has hardly played a role in practice in the almost 150 years since its creation suggests either that there is only a limited need to use the instrument or that it is wrongly designed. Calls to lower the quorum of eight cantons, however, never gained traction.
8 Several authors raise fundamental and state policy concerns: Aubert and Grisel criticize that the cantons and their governments are simply not capable of conducting a federal referendum campaign. Aubert backs this up by saying that federal bills often have no cantonal or regional component. In these cases, he says, it is likely that the referendum cantons or the various authorities in a canton will not present a unified front. Grisel and Hangartner/Kley are also critical of the negative role of the cantons when they oppose a federal bill. A minority of the expert commission for the preparation of a total revision of the federal constitution also feared that the cantonal referendum could strain relations between the federal government and the cantons and hinder progressive concerns at the federal level. Wili and Kley see the cantonal referendum as a largely ineffective means of enforcing federalism.
9 As practice shows, the cantonal referendum can only fulfill its intended function as a right of participation of the cantons in the federal government to a limited extent. The cantons do not want to and cannot use the instrument regularly. However, it does have a certain significance and effect: as the one successful case of use shows, the cantonal referendum can play a role in special situations in which the federal legislature clearly fails to take sufficient account of cantonal competences or core concerns despite the various other instruments of participation. Since then, the cantons have also been granted the ability to successfully demand a vote. They could use this as leverage in the political process, but in reality they hardly ever do so.
2. Only one successful cantonal referendum since 1874
10 Since 1874, cantonal referendums have been attempted only very rarely and succeeded only once. In 2003, eleven cantons forced a vote on the so-called tax package, which was intended to amend various laws in the area of marriage and family taxation, residential property taxation and stamp duties. However, the referendum would have been passed even without a cantonal referendum, as more than 50,000 eligible voters separately filed a popular referendum. In the referendum, the electorate clearly rejected the tax package.
11 The fact that a cantonal referendum was held for the first time on the tax package had to do with the content of the bill and the process. The bill would have led to considerable tax losses for the cantons. Moreover, after the consultation process, the bill was substantially changed at the expense of the cantons and a package solution was adopted, which was rejected by many cantons. In addition, taxes were an issue in which the cantons have significant responsibilities of their own. The fact that elections to the National Council were held in 2003 also played a role. The Conference of Cantonal Governments (KdK) and the Conference of Cantonal Finance Directors (FDK) were also responsible for the success of the cantonal referendum: they accompanied and coordinated the process (forming an opinion and making a fundamental decision on how to proceed, obtaining a legal opinion, ensuring the flow of information among the cantons, drafting a model message, etc.).
3. Unsuccessful attempts
12 More recently, the cantons of Schaffhausen, Zug, Schwyz and Nidwalden took the cantonal referendum against the determination of the basic contributions of the resource equalization, but failed in 2015 at the hurdle of eight cantons.
13 In 2014, cantonal referendums against the federal decree of September 27, 2013, approving the FATCA agreement between Switzerland and the United States and against the implementation law were unsuccessful. Only the canton of Valais submitted a referendum request in each case, which is why the quorum of eight cantons was not reached.
14 The canton of Valais also attempted to launch a cantonal referendum against the Spatial Planning Act in 2012, but did not receive the necessary support from other cantons and did not submit a petition. However, the popular referendum was successful and the bill was passed in a referendum.
15 The Money Laundering Act was to be put to a cantonal referendum in 1991, but as far as can be seen, no petition was submitted.
16 In 1988, the canton of Vaud considered a cantonal referendum against the Federal Act on Private International Law and unsuccessfully asked other cantons for support.
17 In 1982, a referendum against an amendment to the penal code failed. Only the Grand Council of Ticino submitted a referendum request. It was the first cantonal referendum submitted to the Federal Chancellery since the creation of the instrument.
4. Reasons for the Rare Use of the Cantonal Referendum
18 There are several reasons why cantons rarely seize the cantonal referendum and have been successful with it only once so far.
a. High hurdle and alternative popular referendum
19 Wili describes the cantonal hurdle for a cantonal referendum as "prohibitively high." At least 8 of 26 cantons, or more than 30 percent of the cantons, must call for a cantonal referendum for it to occur. In comparison, a popular referendum pursuant to Art. 141 para. 1 FC has the same effect, but can be triggered by 50,000 voters. Today, this corresponds to only about 0.9 percent of the electorate. Accordingly, a bill must meet with relatively broad cantonal opposition for a cantonal referendum. For a popular referendum, on the other hand, it may be sufficient if a small proportion of voters are against it. If, in view of the relatively low hurdle, a popular referendum becomes apparent, e.g. because one or more parties or important interest organizations announce it, there is no longer any incentive to seek a cantonal referendum.
b. Clear violation of cantonal interests as a hurdle
20 Party-political opposition to a bill is unlikely to be sufficient on its own to provoke a cantonal referendum. They only play a weakened role in the cantonal decision-making bodies (governments, parliaments, electorate), because these are composed of mixed party politics and are rarely dominated by one party. Rather, it can be assumed that cantonal interests must be clearly violated (e.g. encroachment on cantonal core competences or concerns about enforcement by the cantons) for these bodies to seriously consider taking up the demanding cantonal referendum. In contrast, clear party-political rejection of a federal bill often leads to a popular referendum.
c. Procedural reasons
21 The deadline for filing a cantonal referendum is 100 days from the official publication of the enactment. Especially in the past, it was difficult to go through the necessary political processes in eight cantons within this time. For example, in 1988, in contrast to today, in several cantons the decision to initiate the cantonal referendum could be contested by an optional or obligatory referendum within the canton (Basel-Stadt, Waadt, Schaffhausen, Zürich). This made it difficult or impossible to meet the deadline for the cantonal referendum. In the cantons of Appenzell Innerrhoden, Geneva, St. Gallen and Thurgau, there was no cantonal regulation of competences at all at that time. Between July 1, 1978 and March 31, 1997, this could lead to ambiguities, because at that time federal law did not (subsidiarily) define the competences in the cantons. It was also difficult in the past that certain cantonal parliaments met only a few times a year for ordinary sessions at which they could decide on a cantonal referendum. Today, the frequency of meetings is higher. Nevertheless, the time for a cantonal referendum is tight: The determination that one of the many federal bills could be problematic for a canton, the assessment of the chances of success for a cantonal referendum, the coordination with other cantons, the decision of the government and/or the parliament (preparation of the basis for the decision, preliminary discussion in the commission, agenda taking into account the business load, etc.) all take time.
d. Organizational and legal reasons
22 A cantonal referendum requires intercantonal coordination. This coordination must be relatively intensive - as the one successful example shows - and accordingly requires that a lot of political capital be invested.
23 The cantons, especially in the past, did not have the experience and structures to contest referenda and referendum campaigns at the federal level, unlike the political parties and large associations. However, it is evident in more recent practice that the cantons are intervening in federal referendum campaigns with increasing frequency and in a variety of ways.
24 According to case law and doctrine, state authorities such as the cantons must exercise restraint in the run-up to votes. In particular, this applies to referendum campaigns in the superordinate community. However, cantons that initiate a cantonal referendum may present their position in any case.
e. Other channels for the cantonal pursuit of interests
25 It can be assumed that the cantons can mostly effectively present their vital interests in the pre-parliamentary and parliamentary legislative process. Because the cantons have a great deal of experience as well as credibility in enforcement and because Swiss politics generally functions in a consensus-oriented manner, strong cantonal concerns often lead to adjustments in legislative projects that make a subsequent cantonal referendum seem unnecessary or at least disproportionate. The consultation procedure is of central importance here. With the KdK, the regional intergovernmental conferences, the conferences of specialist directors and the bodies for intercantonal coordination at the administrative level, there are numerous institutions that can exert influence in the interests of the cantons. Direct contact between members of the cantonal governments and members of the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly is also an important channel. Informal contacts also play a central role, e.g. between employees of the cantonal administrations and the federal administration.
B. Legal comparison
26 Art. 67-67b PRA regulate the participation of the cantons in referenda at the federal level. Naturally, there is therefore no actual equivalent in cantonal law. The provisions on the communal referendum at the cantonal level are the most suitable for comparison. With such a referendum, municipalities can demand a vote on cantonal legal acts. The communal referendum exists in seven cantons. In the cantons of Graubünden (executive), Lucerne (legislative) and Ticino (legislative), the competent municipal body is regulated on a subsidiary basis. In the cantons of Basel-Landschaft (legislative branch), Jura (legislative branch) and Solothurn (legislative branch), on the other hand, cantonal law defines the competent body in a binding manner, despite municipal autonomy. In the canton of Zurich, the municipalities are free in their determination. Only for the cities of Zurich and Winterthur does cantonal law stipulate that the decision must come from the legislature, in the event that they take the municipal referendum alone. If the municipalities do not make a regulation, the municipal assembly or the municipal parliament is responsible.
27 The overview shows that the cantons with communal referendum have a preference for the legislature as the competent state authority. This corresponds to the approach of the Confederation in Art. 67 PRA, which also gives preference to the legislature for a referendum of the subordinate units of state - i.e. the cantons. On the other hand, the provision of Art. 67 PRA is subsidiary, while still three out of seven cantons have a binding provision and one has a partially binding provision. Accordingly, the federal legislature gives greater weight to cantonal autonomy in the case of the cantonal referendum than the seven cantonal constitutional and legislative bodies give to communal autonomy in the case of the communal referendum.
III. Commentary on the text of the norm
A. "Determines the cantonal law ..."
28 Art. 67 PRA provides that "cantonal law" may determine the competence to take the cantonal referendum. The provision does not specify at which level of cantonal law the regulation is to be made. Since this is a question of state organization, it follows from the principle of legality under federal law of Art. 5 para. 1 FC that the regulation must be contained in a law in the formal sense. However, what is considered a law in the formal sense in the respective canton is determined solely by the respective cantonal constitution due to the cantonal organizational autonomy. In practice, the regulation is found at the constitutional level everywhere except in the canton of Geneva.
B. "... nothing else ..."
29 The competence of the cantonal parliament under Art. 67 PRA applies only if cantonal law provides "nothing else". Accordingly, it is a subsidiary regulation. The cantons are allowed to provide "otherwise". In observance of federalism, the PRA leaves the determination of the competent body "free in all directions." Accordingly, the cantons could, for example, designate the cantonal parliament as the body and provide that its decision is final, subject to an optional or mandatory referendum, or subject to one of these types of referendum voluntarily by the parliament. A decision by the electorate by means of an initiative would also be conceivable, and the cantonal government could also be declared competent.
30 Auer criticizes that the subsidiary federal provision is "hardly compatible with cantonal organizational autonomy." However, this view is too strict. The cantons are entirely free to adopt a different regulation if they wish. Moreover, they are in no way obliged to take a cantonal referendum based on the federal regulation. Finally, almost all cantons today designate the cantonal parliament as the competent body on their own initiative under their own law.
31 Hangartner/Kley describe it as contrary to the system that a cantonal government can be responsible for taking the cantonal referendum. It is a legislative act that cannot be initiated by the executive, but must be reserved for the parliament or the electorate. However, this opinion is opposed by cantonal autonomy, according to which the cantons are largely allowed to organize themselves. Accordingly, it would be rather problematic if the Confederation - as in the past - were to prescribe bindingly to the cantons which body is to make the decision. In addition, there are factual reasons to designate the cantonal government, namely the high temporal urgency of the decision. However, this regulation is the great exception today.
32 The provision of Art. 67 PRA does not come into play at present, because in the meantime all 26 cantons regulate the competence for the cantonal referendum in their own law. The following table shows which body is basically responsible. In 23 cantons it is the parliament, in Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Graubünden the parliament or the government and in St. Gallen the government.
Canton | Responsibility | Legal basis |
Aargau | Parlament (Grosser Rat) | |
Appenzell Ausserrhoden | Parlament (Kantonsrat) oder Regierung bei Dringlichkeit | |
Appenzell Innerrhoden | Parlament (Grosser Rat) | |
Basel-Landschaft | Parlament (Landrat) | |
Basel-Stadt | Parlament (Grosser Rat) | |
Bern | Parlament (Grosser Rat) | |
Freiburg | Parlament (Grosser Rat) | |
Genf | Parlament (Grosser Rat) | Art. 84 Loi sur l’exercice des droits politiques du 15.10.1982 (LEDP; A 5 05) i. V. m. Art. 67 BPR |
Glarus | Parlament (Landrat) | |
Graubünden | Parlament (Grosser Rat) oder Regierung | |
Jura | Parlament | |
Luzern | Parlament (Kantonsrat) | |
Neuenburg | Parlament (Grosser Rat) | |
Nidwalden | Parlament (Landrat) | |
Obwalden | Parlament (Kantonsrat) | |
St. Gallen | Regierung | |
Schaffhausen | Parlament (Kantonsrat) | |
Schwyz | Parlament (Kantonsrat) | |
Solothurn | Parlament (Kantonsrat) | |
Tessin | Parlament (Grosser Rat) | |
Thurgau | Parlament (Grosser Rat) | |
Uri | Parlament (Landrat) | |
Waadt | Parlament (Grosser Rat) | |
Wallis | Parlament (Grosser Rat) | |
Zürich | Parlament (Kantonsrat) | |
Zug | Parlament (Kantonsrat) |
C. "... the cantonal parliament shall decide whether the cantonal referendum shall be taken."
33 In the absence of a provision in cantonal law, federal law designates the cantonal parliament as responsible for seizing the cantonal referendum. This is intended to prevent a situation where, in the absence of a regulation, a canton is prevented from seizing the cantonal referendum, thereby raising the hurdle for all cantons. By cantonal parliament is meant the legislative power of the canton (subject to the voters), which is directly elected by the people. The designation (Grand Council, Cantonal Council, Land Council or Parliament) is irrelevant.
34 The dispatch does not explicitly state why federal law designates the cantonal parliament as the fallback solution. The argument in favor of this body is that the taking of a cantonal referendum against a federal law has a certain consequence for the relationship between the canton and the Confederation and must accordingly be democratically strongly legitimized. A government resolution cannot achieve this to the same extent. In turn, the 100-day referendum period for the cantonal referendum speaks against the electorate, which makes a timely intra-cantonal vote appear difficult or impossible.
35 The question arises whether the decision of the cantonal parliament based directly on Art. 67 PRA could be subject to a referendum within the canton if cantonal law provides for this for the corresponding type of decision. This is to be denied. If the subsidiary federal regulation applies because the cantonal law does not (differently) regulate the competence for the cantonal referendum, it is to be regarded as conclusive. This is also supported by the fact that otherwise the intention of the federal legislator to lower the hurdles for the cantonal referendum for all cantons would be undermined because an intra-cantonal vote could hardly take place in time.
Acknowledgments: The author thanks Rahel Freiburghaus and Christoph Lanz for their review and valuable comments.
Author: Dr. iur. Matthias Lanz, LL.M. (Cantab.), Legal Assistant at the Department of Finance and Municipalities Graubünden, former Personal Assistant to the President of the Conference of Cantonal Governments, www.linkedin.com/in/matthiaslanz
Bibliography and Materials
Aubert Jean François, Considérations sur la réforme des droit populaires fédéraux, ZSR 113 (1994) S. 295–330 (zit.: Aubert, Réforme).
Aubert Jean-François, Kommentierung zu Art. 141 Cst., in: Aubert Jean-François/Mahon Pascal (Hrsg.), Petit Commentaire de la Constitution fédérale de la Confédération Suisse, Zürich 2003 (zit. Aubert, Art. 141 Cst.).
Auer Andreas, Staatsrecht der schweizerischen Kantone, Bern 2016.
Bapst Erich/Schmitt Nicolas, Standesreferendum (Art. 89 II i.f. BV) – Le référendum cantonal (Art. 89 II i.f. CF), Gesetzgebungs-Bulletin = Bulletin de législation 4/1994, S. VI-XV.
Baumgartner Serge, Die Standesinitiative: Eine Untersuchung der rechtlichen und politischen Funktion dieses föderalistischen Mitwirkungsrechts, Basel 1980.
Besson Michel, Legitimation zur Beschwerde in Stimmrechtssachen: Diskussion anhand der bundesgerichtlichen Rechtsprechung zur eidgenössischen Volksabstimmung über die biometrischen Pässe vom 17. Mai 2009, ZBJV 147/2011 S. 843–875.
Biaggini Giovanni, Kommentierung zu Art. 141 BV, in: Biaggini Giovanni (Hrsg.), BV Kommentar, Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, Orell Füssli Kommentar, 2. Aufl., Zürich 2017.
Botschaft betreffend die Abstimmung vom 12. Mai 1872 über die revidirte Bundesverfassung vom 24. Mai 1872, BBl 1872 II S. 358 ff., https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1872/2_358__, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Botschaft 1872).
Botschaft über eine Änderung des Bundesgesetzes über die politischen Rechte vom 30.11.2001, BBl 2001 S. 6401 ff., https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2001/1111, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Botschaft 2001).
Botschaft über eine neue Bundesverfassung vom 20.11.1996, BBl 1997 I S. 1 ff., https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1997/1_1_1_1, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Botschaft 1996).
Botschaft über eine Teiländerung der Bundesgesetzgebung über die politischen Rechte vom 1.9.1993, BBl 1993 III S. 445 ff., https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc/10052767.pdf?id=10052767, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit Botschaft 1993).
Botschaft zu einem Bundesgesetz über die politischen Rechte vom 9.4.1975, BBl 1975 I S. 1317 ff., https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1975/1_1317_1337_1313, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Botschaft 1975).
Botschaft zur Volksinitiative «Volkssouveränität statt Behördenpropaganda» vom 29.6.2005, BBl 2005 S. 4373 ff., https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2005/664, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Botschaft 2005).
Braun Canisius, Historisches Kantonsreferendum: Resultat der interkantonalen Zusammenarbeit?, LeGes 2004/1, S. 171–187.
Bundeskanzlei, Verfügung Kantonsreferendum gegen das Bundesgesetz vom 27. September 2013 über die Umsetzung des FATCA-Abkommens zwischen der Schweiz und den Vereinigten Staaten (FATCA-Gesetz): Nicht-Zustandekommen, 11.2.2014, BBl 2014 S. 1651 ff., https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2014/258, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Verfügung FATCA-Gesetz).
Bundeskanzlei, Verfügung Kantonsreferendum gegen das Bundesgesetz vom 20. Juni 2003 über die Änderung von Erlassen im Bereich der Ehe- und Familienbesteuerung, der Wohneigentumsbesteuerung und der Stempelabgaben: Zustandekommen, 10.10.2003, BBl 2003 S. 7056 f., https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2003/1171, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Verfügung Kantonsreferendum Steuerpaket).
Bundeskanzlei, Verfügung Kantonsreferendum gegen das Strafgesetzbuch (Änderung vom 9. Oktober 1981, Gewaltverbrechen); Nichtzustandekommen, 26.2.1982, BBl 1982 I S. 492 ff., https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc/10048581.pdf?ID=10048581, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Verfügung Strafgesetzbuch).
Bundeskanzlei, Verfügung Kantonsreferendum gegen den Bundesbeschluss vom 27. September 2013 über die Genehmigung des FATCA-Abkommens zwischen der Schweiz und den Vereinigten Staaten: Nicht-Zustandekommen, 11.2.2014, BBl 2014 S. 1647 ff., https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2014/257, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Verfügung FATCA-Abkommen).
Bundeskanzlei, Verfügung Kantonsreferendum gegen den Bundesbeschluss vom 19. Juni 2015 über die Festlegung der Grundbeiträge des Ressourcenausgleichs für die Beitragsperiode 2016–2019. Nichtzustandekommen, BBl 2015 S. 8340 ff., https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2015/1994, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Verfügung Ressourcenausgleich).
Bundeskanzlei, Verfügung Referendum gegen das Bundesgesetz vom 20. Juni 2003 über die Änderung von Erlassen im Bereich der Ehe- und Familienbesteuerung, der Wohneigentumsbesteuerung und der Stempelabgaben: Zustandekommen, 24.10.2003, BBl 2003 S. 7269 f., https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2003/1203, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Verfügung Volksreferendum Steuerpaket).
Bundeskanzlei, Verfügung Volksreferendum gegen das Bundesgesetz vom 18. Dezember 1987
über das Internationale Privatrecht, 1.6.1988, BBl 1988 II S. 1111 ff., https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc/10050761.pdf?ID=10050761, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Verfügung Internationales Privatrecht).
Bundesrat, Stellungnahme: Parlamentarische Initiative (Kommission 96.091 SR): Beseitigung von Mängeln der Volksrechte: Bericht vom 2. April 2001, BBl 2001 S. 6080 ff, https://fedlex.data.admin.ch/eli/fga/2001/1021, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Stellungnahme BR Volksrechte).
Bundesratsbeschluss über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung vom 16. Mai 2004, 29. Juni 2004, BBl 2004 S. 3943 ff., https://fedlex.data.admin.ch/eli/fga/2004/664, besucht am 22.8.2023 (zit. Bundesratsbeschluss Steuerpaket).
Bundi Caldelari Christina, Kommentierung zu Art. 58 KV/GR, in: Bänziger Mengiardi Toller & Partner (Hrsg.), Kommentar zur Verfassung des Kantons Graubünden, Chur et al. 2006.
Bundi Pirmin/Eberli Daniela/Bütikofer Sarah, Between Occupation and Politics: Legislative Professionalization in the Swiss Cantons, Swiss Political Science Review 23 (2016) I, S. 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12228.
Buser Denise, Kantonales Staatsrecht: Eine Einführung für Studium und Praxis, 2. Aufl., Basel 2011.
Dardanelli Paolo/Mueller Sean, Dynamic De/Centralization in Switzerland, 1848–2010, Publius: The Journal of Federalism 49 (2019) I, S. 138–165, https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjx056.
Ehrenzeller Kaspar/Nobs Roger, Kommentierung zu Art. 141 BV, in: Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Egli Patricia/Hettich Peter/Hongler Peter/Schindler Benjamin/Schmid Stefan G. Schmid/Schweizer Rainer J. (Hrsg.), Die Schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St. Galler Kommentar, 4. Aufl., Zürich / St. Gallen 2023.
Eidgenössische Finanzkontrolle, Prüfung der Wirksamkeit der interdepartementalen Koordination bei Föderalismusfragen, 12. Oktober 2021, https://www.efk.admin.ch/images/stories/efk_dokumente/publikationen/_sicherheit_und_umwelt/justiz_und_polizei/19449/19449BE-Endgueltige-Fassung-V04.pdf, besucht am 22.8.2023.
Epiney Astrid/Diezig Stefan, Kommentierung zu Art. 141 BV, in: Waldmann Bernhard/Belser Eva Maria/Epiney Astrid (Hrsg.), Schweizerische Bundesverfassung (BV), Basler Kommentar, Basel 2015.
Expertenkommission für die Vorbereitung einer Totalrevision der Bundesverfassung, Bericht, Bern 1977, https://www.bj.admin.ch/dam/bj/de/data/staat/gesetzgebung/archiv/bundesverfassung/ber-expkomm-d.pdf.download.pdf/ber-expkomm-d.pdf, besucht am 22.8.2023.
Fischer Alex, Das Kantonsreferendum: Wirkungsweise und Reformansätze, in: Vatter Adrian (Hrsg.), Föderalismusreform: Wirkungsweise und Reformansätze föderativer Institutionen in der Schweiz, Zürich 2006, S. 132–151.
Freiburghaus Rahel, Lobbyierende Kantone: Subnationale Interessenvertretung im Schweizer Föderalismus, Universität Bern, Bern 2023 (im Erscheinen).
Gassmann Jean-Luc/Schmitt Nicolas, Le référendum des cantons – «Standesreferendum», Gesetzgebungs-Bulletin = Bulletin de législation 4/2003, S. XV-XXVI.
Grisel Etienne, Initiative et référendum populaires, Traité de la démocratie semi-directe en droit suisse, 3. Aufl., Bern 2004 (zit.: Grisel, Traité).
Grisel Etienne, Kommentierung zu Art. 89 Abs. 2 aBV, in: Aubert Jean-François/Eichenberger Kurt/Müller Jörg-Paul/Rhinow René A./Schindler Dietrich (Hrsg.), Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft vom 29. Mai 1874, Basel/Zürich/Bern 1987–1996 (zit. Grisel, Art. 89 Abs. 2 aBV).
Grisel Etienne, La question des demi-cantons, ZSR 99 (1980) S. 47–78 (zit. Grisel, Demi-cantons).
Hangartner Yvo/Kley Andreas, Die demokratischen Rechte in Bund und Kantonen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, [1. Aufl.], Zürich 2000.
Hangartner Yvo/Kley Andreas/Braun Binder Nadja/Glaser Andreas, Die demokratischen Rechte in Bund und Kantonen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, 2. Aufl., Zürich 2023, https://doi.org/10.3256/978-3-03929-030-7.
Hanschel Dirk, Konfliktlösung im Bundesstaat: Die Lösung föderaler Kompetenz-, Finanz- und Territorialkonflikte in Deutschland, den USA und der Schweiz, Tübingen 2012.
Kley Andreas, Verhältnis von Föderalismus und Demokratie, in: Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz = Droit constitutionnel suisse, Diggelmann Oliver/Hertig Randall Maya/Schindler Benjamin (Hrsg.), Band I, Zürich et al. 2020, S. 621–637.
Kölz Alfred, Neuere schweizerische Verfassungsgeschichte: Ihre Grundlinien in Bund und Kantonen seit 1848, Bern 2004.
Langer Lorenz, Kantonale Interventionen bei eidgenössischen Abstimmungskämpfen, ZBl 118 (2017) S. 183–215.
Linder Wolf/Bolliger Christian/Rielle Yvan (Hrsg.), Handbuch der eidgenössischen Volksabstimmungen 1848 bis 2007, Bern 2010.
Lombardi Aldo, Kommentierung zu Art. 141 BV, in: Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Mastronardi Philippe/Schweizer Rainer J./Vallender Klaus A. (Hrsg.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St. Galler Kommentar, [1. Aufl.], Zürich/Basel/Genf/Lachen 2002.
Pedrazzini Luigi, Referendum dei cantoni contro il «pacchetto fiscale», in: Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen (Hrsg.), 20 Jahre KdK, Publikationen des Instituts für Föderalismus, Nr. 4, Bern 2013, S. 51–53.
Pirker Benedikt, Behördliche Interventionen in Abstimmungskämpfe, AJP 2017, S. 1366–1381.
Platipodis-Bätschmann Bettina, Das Behördenreferendum in den Kantonen, Zürcher Studien zum öffentlichen Recht, Band 209, Zürich 2013.
Saladin Peter, Bund und Kantone: Autonomie und Zusammenwirken im schweizerischen Bundesstaat, ZSR 103 (1984) S. 531–590.
Sciarini Pascal, More Power Balance, Less Consesus: Changes in the Decision-Making Structures over Time, in: Sciarini Pascal/Fischer Manuel/Traber Denise, Political Decision Making in Switzerland: The Consensus Model under Pressure, London 2015, S. 51–77.
Steinmann Gerold/Mattle Adrian, Kommentierung zu Art. 89 BGG, in: Niggli Marcel Alexander/Uebersax Peter/Wiprächtiger Hans/Kneubühler, Lorenz (Hrsg.), Bundesgerichtsgesetz (Basler Kommentar), 3. Aufl., Basel 2018.
Tornay Schaller Bénédicte, Kommentierung zu Art. 141 Cst., in: Martenet Vincent/Dubey Jacques (Hrsg.), Constitution fédérale, Commentaire Romand, Basel 2021.
Vatter Adrian, Das politische System der Schweiz, 4. Aufl., Baden-Baden 2020.
Wili Hans-Urs, Kollektive Mitwirkungsrechte von Gliedstaaten in der Schweiz und im Ausland: geschichtlicher Werdegang, Rechtsvergleichung, Zukunftsperspektiven: eine institutsbezogene Studie, Bern 1988