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- Art. 55 FC
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- Art. 75b FC
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- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
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- Art. 11 CO
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- Art. 701 CO
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- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
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- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
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- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
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- Art. 75 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
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- Art. 14 FADP
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- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
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- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
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- Art. 44a FADP
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- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
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- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
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- Art. 57 FADP
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- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
I. Background
1When the new Federal Constitution came into force on January 1, 2000, art. 75 of the LDP was amended. In addition to modifying the references to the Federal Constitution, this new provision formally established the possibility of partial invalidation of a federal popular initiative, and introduced the condition of compliance with the imperative rules of international law: "The references to constitutional provisions in art. 75, para. 1 of the LDP must also be adapted. Mention must also be made of the presence of binding provisions of international law. Finally, the wording of the article refers to the possibilitý of partially invalidating a popular initiative, in accordance with art. 139, para. 3, nCst. The expression "if necessary" illustrates the meaning of this possibilitý: it does not constitute an enlargement of the powers of the authorities, its purpose being solely the safeguarding of the principle of proportionalitý, also in the field of popular rights (art. 5, para. 2, nCst.)".
2It should also be noted that on January 1, 2003, its middle title ("examination of validity") was modified as part of an amendment to the law. However, this amendment did not change the scope of the provision.
II. Significance of the provision
A. General
3Art. 75 of the LDP reiterates the conditions for the validity of federal popular initiatives set out in Art. 139 of the Federal Constitution, namely compliance with (i) the unity of subject matter, (ii) the unity of form and (iii) the imperative rules of international law.
4While the conditions as such are laid down in the Federal Constitution, art. 75 of the LDP specifies three essential elements:
The principle of partial invalidation (art. 75 al 1 LDP);
The definition of the principle of unity of subject matter (art. 75 al. 2 LDP), with the introduction of the "intrinsic relationship" which permeates all federal case law on unity of subject matter;
The definition of the principle of unity of form.
5This is a provision that is materially central to the examination of the validity of a popular initiative. In practice, however, only four federal popular initiatives have been declared invalid, and one partially invalid:
In 2013, the federal popular initiative "for the effective deportation of criminal foreigners (implementation initiative)" was partially invalidated by the Federal Parliament: the sentence restrictively defining peremptory rules of international law was declared invalid: "In the end, the definition given by ch. IV, 2nd phr. P-Cst. of peremptory norms of international law would open the door to expulsions and deportations that could violate jus cogens under international law and the peremptory provisions of international law under art. 139, para. 3, Cst.
The federal popular initiative "pour une politique d'asile raisonnable" (for a reasonable asylum policy) was declared null and void by Parliament on March 14, 1996 for violating imperative provisions of public international law: "If accepted, the initiative "pour une politique d'asile raisonnable" (for a reasonable asylum policy) would violate the very substance of the main multilateral treaties in the fields of refugee law and human rights. Indeed, if applicants who have entered Switzerland illegally were to be turned back immediately without the possibilitý of appeal, it would no longer be possible to examine their case from the angle of the principle of non-refoulement. Admittedly, we would eliminate a formal contradiction between our legislation and conventional international law by denouncing the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the United Nations Convention against Torture. However, this would still constitute a violation of binding public international law, and would jeopardize fundamental rights as basic as the right to life. The Federal Council therefore shares the conviction of the communitý of states and the new doctrine; according to the latter, it is not possible, in a state founded on the rule of law, to infringe these fundamental rights by revising the constitution. This is why the Federal Council considers that the initiative "for a reasonable asylum policy" must be declared null and void".
The federal popular initiative "pour moins de dépenses militaires davantage de politique de paix" was declared null and void by the Federal Parliament on June 20, 1995 for violating the unity of the subject matter, even though the Federal Council advocated its validation: "The principle of unitý of the subject matter enshrined in the Federal Constitution requires an intrinsic relationship between the different parts of an initiative. Subjects that have no intrinsic relationship must be the subject of separate popular initiatives. In principle, such a relationship is lacking between cutting spending on national defense and allocating part of the amounts saved to the field of social securitý. In view of the current extensive practice of the Federal Council and Parliament, and given that the exercise of popular rights should only be restricted if such a measure is indisputably necessary, the validitý of the initiative is admitted despité everything."
The federal popular initiative "against high living costs and inflation" was declared null and void on December 16, 1977 by the Federal Parliament for violating the unity of the subject matter: "The 'intrinsic relationship' between the components of an initiative is taken for granted when objective reasons justify their being the subject of a single decision by the citizen." The initiative "against high living costs and inflation" does not allow this".
The federal popular initiative "for the temporary reduction of military expenditure (arms truce)" was declared null and void by the Federal Parliament on December 15, 1955, even though the Federal Council advocated its validation, while questioning only the question of respect for the unity of the subject: "It can be argued that there is an intrinsic, if not logical, at least practical relationship between, on the one hand, the reduction of the ordinary military budget in 1956 (1955 is no longer taken into account) and the prohibition of any extraordinary expenditure on armaments during the same year and, on the other hand, the allocation of the savings thus obtained to the purposes indicated (Swiss works in favour of children and construction of low-cost housing; reconstruction works in war-devastated regions in neighbouring countries). As the context also indicates, the second part of the initiative is the consequence of the first.
6These figures of 4 total invalidations and one partial invalidation should be seen in the context of the 356 popular initiatives that were successful, of which 228 were put to the vote and only 25 were accepted. The invalidation of a federal popular initiative - unlike cantonal or communal popular initiatives - thus remains very much the exception.
B. Comparative cantonal law
7Although applicable only to federal popular initiatives, the theory of the "intrinsic link", enshrined in art. 75 para. 2 of the LDP to define the unity of the subject matter, has been taken up by the Federal Supreme Court in its case law on the examination of this condition for the validity of an initiative, which is binding on the cantons in application of the guarantee of political rights. It has also been taken up by several cantonal provisions, for example in the canton of Berne (art. 141 al. 2 LDP/BE), Fribourg (art. 123 al. 2 LEDP/FR), Neuchâtel (art. 97 al. 3 LDP/NE) and Vaud (art. 113 al. 3 LEDP/VD).
8The Federal Court also points out that, while the solution of partial invalidation in the event of violation of the unity of the subject matter is enshrined in art. 75 para. 1 LDP and frequently adopted by the cantons, it is not imposed by federal law.
9Inversely, the doctrine states that the principles developed by the Federal Court on the validity of cantonal and communal initiatives must also be adopted by the Federal Parliament when examining a federal popular initiative.
III. Commentary
A. Total or partial invalidation: enshrining the principle of proportionality (para. 1)
10 According to art. 75 para. 1 of the LDP, when a popular initiative fails to comply with the principle of unity of subject matter (art. 139 para. 3 and art. 194 para. 2 of the Swiss Constitution), the principle of unity of form (art. 139 para. 3 and art. 194, al. 3, Cst.) or the imperative rules of international law (art. 139, al. 3, 193, al. 4, and 194, al. 2, Cst.), the Federal Assembly declares it null and void, in whole or in part, to the extent necessary.
11 In principle, only these conditions of validity, formally provided for by the Federal Constitution, are examined. However, it is accepted that there is an additional condition for the validity of a federal popular initiative: unenforceability. This is the only unwritten material limit to constitutional revision: "for an initiative to be invalidated on this ground, there must be manifest material reasons that render it unquestionably unenforceable".
12 Art. 75 LDP is thus a provision implementing several constitutional provisions:
Articles 139 and 194 of the Federal Constitution, which set out the conditions for the validity of a federal popular initiative for the partial revision of the Federal Constitution.
Art. 173 para. 1 let. f Cst. which confirms the competence of the Federal Parliament to rule on the validity of successful federal popular initiatives.
13 Art. 75 para. 1 LDP thus confirms that the Federal Assembly is competent to rule on the validity of a federal popular initiative. Since, in accordance with the principle of perfect bicameralism, the Federal Assembly is made up of two Councils with equal powers (art. 148 para. 2 Cst.), art. 98 para. 2 LParl applies in the event of any disagreement between them. In accordance with the in dubio pro populo principle, in the event of divergence, the initiative is deemed valid: "If the decisions of the Councils diverge as to the validity of all or part of a popular initiative, and the Council which has recognized the validity confirms its decision, the initiative or the parts in question are deemed valid" (art. 98 al. 2 LParl).
14 The Federal Assembly's decision must be limited to a purely legal review. In this respect, to facilitate its task, Parliament receives a message from the Federal Council which examines these questions (art. 97 LParl) and enables it to decide.
15 Federal law does not provide for a right to be heard for initiators before a decision is taken by the Federal Assembly, even after the Federal Council's message has been submitted. While the Federal Court has ruled that such a right does not exist in the case of parliamentary proceedings, such as before the Federal Assembly, it has recently changed its case law and confirmed that initiators should be granted a right to be heard when a cantonal executive rules on the validity of a popular initiative before the signatures have been collected. In view of the prevailing doctrinal position, which argues in favor of initiators' right to be heard, a legislative revision on this point would be desirable. However, as the law stands, and in view of BGE 123 I 63, which stipulates that the initiators can have their point of view put forward by the various forces present before Parliament, the initiators (unfortunately) have no right to be heard before the Federal Assembly takes a decision. In our view, this is problematic in view of the weight of the Federal Council's message.
16 Finally, the Federal Assembly's decision on the validity (or invalidity, partial or total) of a popular initiative is final. In particular, it is not subject to appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, as no federal law provides for this (art. 189 para. 4 Cst.). Nor, logically, is it subject to referendum (art. 141 al. 1 let. c Cst.). It therefore takes the form of a simple federal decree within the meaning of art. 29 LParl.
17 Art. 75 para. 1 LDP enshrines the application of the principle of proportionality to the invalidation of federal popular initiatives (art. 36 para. 3 Cst.). In its jurisprudence on cantonal initiatives, the Federal Supreme Court notes that even in the absence of an express provision in cantonal law, the possibility of partial invalidation of a popular initiative derives from the principle in dubio pro populo, and gives concrete expression, in terms of political rights, to the general principle of proportionality (art. 36 al. 3 Cst.). Thus, when only part of an initiative appears to be inadmissible (including unenforceable), the remaining part can remain as such, provided that it forms a coherent whole, can still correspond to the initiators' wishes, and respects superior law in its own right. The invalidity of a part of the initiative should only entail the invalidity of the whole if the text cannot be amputated without being distorted.
18 The Federal Council fully applies these principles when confronted with a federal popular initiative of which a part is invalid: "The invalidation of an initiative constitutes a serious infringement of the right of initiative; it must therefore be done in application of the principle of proportionalitý. The Federal Assembly must opt for the least drastic solution, i.e. partial invalidation, as long as the valid part retains a meaning and it can be assumed that, even amputated in this way, the initiative would have gathered the required number of signatures."
19 If the conditions for a partial invalidation are met, i.e. that the remaining part (i) still forms a coherent whole, (ii) can correspond to the will of the initiators and (iii) in itself respects higher law, the Federal Assembly is thus obliged to proceed with a partial invalidation only. It should be pointed out, however, that partial invalidation is only possible in the case of violation of peremptory norms of public international law, unenforceability, or even unity of subject matter, but not in the case of violation of unity of form. Indeed, in the latter case, the mixture of forms makes it impossible to impose any sanction other than total invalidation, as it is impossible to determine which part should be retained.
20 On the other hand, in the absence of an explicit provision to this effect, the splitting of a federal popular initiative in the event of a violation of the unity of subject matter is, in our view, impossible, even though the question is controversial in legal doctrine. The Federal Court has ruled that the splitting of a federal popular initiative may be provided for under cantonal law, but is not required under federal law. In our view, this means that the principle of proportionality does not require the splitting of a popular initiative that violates the unity of the subject matter. The split cannot therefore be made under federal law, in the absence of a legal basis authorizing it. In any case, it should be pointed out that in the event of a flagrant violation of the principle of unity of subject matter, a split - even if provided for under cantonal law - cannot be demanded.
B. Unity of subject matter: the intrinsic link (para. 2)
21 According to art. 75 para. 2 of the LDP, the unity of the subject matter is respected when there is an intrinsic link between the different parts of an initiative.
22 The requirement of unity of subject matter derives from the guarantee of political rights (art. 34 al. 2 Cst.). It prohibits the mixing, in the same subject submitted to the people, of several proposals of a different nature or purpose, which would thus force the citizen to approve or oppose the initiative as a whole, whereas he or she might agree with only part of the proposals submitted to him or her. There must therefore be an intrinsic relationship between the various parts of an object submitted to the people, as well as a unity of purpose, i.e. a relationship of connectedness which makes it appear objectively justified to combine several proposals into a single question submitted to the vote.
23 The notion of "intrinsic connection" in art. 75 para. 2 of the LDP must be interpreted as follows: the principle of unity of subject matter is inherent in the very concept of an initiative, which is intended to pose a clear question to citizens at the time of the vote. The decisive criterion is therefore whether, as proposed, the initiative enables citizens to freely express their true will.
24 The scope of the principle of unity of subject matter also varies from one field to another. As it stands, the requirements are stricter for projects stemming from a popular initiative than for those proposed by the authorities: in fact, the rule is also intended to prevent the authors of the initiative from bringing together supporters of different reforms and thus more easily achieving the required number of signatures, at the risk, however, of giving an inaccurate reflection of popular opinion.
25 A further distinction can be made: the requirement of unity of subject matter is more stringent for an initiative that has been drafted from scratch than for an initiative that has not been drafted at all, since the latter contains a general proposal that it will still be up to the legislator to put into practice.
26 Unity of subject matter is a relative concept that must be assessed according to concrete circumstances. An initiative that presents itself as a set of diverse proposals, certainly all directed towards the same goal, but covering fields as diverse as economic policy, tax reform, the development of training, the reduction of working hours, the reintegration of the unemployed, etc., violates the rule of unity of subject matter. On the other hand, a popular initiative can use a variety of means, as long as these are linked without artifice to the central idea defended by the initiators. Unity of subject matter is therefore lacking when the initiative actually presents a general political program, when there is no sufficiently close relationship between the various proposals, when they are brought together in an artificial or subjective manner, when there is no central idea but two projects of a totally distinct nature, or when there is a juxtaposition rather than a complementarity of means.
27 Thus, in practice, the criterion of intrinsic material relationship between the parts of an initiative is accepted:
An initiative dealing with a single theme;
An initiative with a single goal, but with a financing clause;
An initiative proposing a general, abstract rule, while at the same time introducing a transitional provision relating to a specific case;
An initiative with one goal, but several means to achieve it;
An initiative with several aspects, historically or practically linked together.
28 It should be noted that the approach of the federal authorities is less strict than that of the Federal Supreme Court, as they explicitly point out when they state that they have a wide margin of appreciation: "In its practice, the Federal Assembly uses this room for manoeuvre according to the principle in dubio pro populo. In case of doubt, it therefore decides in favor of popular rights and considers that the unitý of the subject matter is respected. In this way, she intends to prevent the right of initiative from being too severely restricted. With regard to the assessment of cantonal popular initiatives, the Federal Tribunal applies the criterion of material connexitý somewhat more strictly but nonetheless broadly. The Federal Tribunal's case law specifies "that the principle [of unitý of the matter] is relative in nature and must be considered in the context of the particular circumstances". The electorate cannot invoke a constitutional right to have certain parts of a project (e.g. particularly important parts) submitted to it separately. Since the assessment of federal popular initiatives is ultimately the responsibility of the Federal Assembly, the above-mentioned case law is not directly applicable".
29 For example, the Federal Assembly validated the popular initiative "Stop overpopulation - Yes to the sustainable preservation of natural resources", notwithstanding a text that mixed a limit on its resident population with international development cooperation: the existence of an intrinsic link between these two ideas is, to say the least, puzzling.
30 Interpreted in this way, the principle of unity of subject matter will only apply, at federal level, to clear violations of unity of subject matter.
31 A typical example of an inadmissible initiative is the popular initiative "political program", like the initiative "against high living costs and inflation", which provided for a package of economic measures and was declared null and void for violating the unity of subject matter: "The 'intrinsic relationship' between the components of an initiative is taken for granted when objective reasons justify their being the subject of a single decision by the citizen. The initiative "against high living costs and inflation" does not allow for this".
C. Unity of form: prohibition of mixtures (para. 3)
32 According to art. 75 para. 3 of the LDP, unity of form is respected when the initiative is submitted exclusively in the form of a proposal conceived in general terms, or exclusively in the form of a draft prepared from scratch.
33 In the case of a proposal in general terms, the legislative authority is tasked with drawing up a draft that gives concrete expression to the initiative's objective, whereas a draft prepared from scratch already contains a text that is drafted and untouchable by the authorities.
34 This provision therefore requires little elaboration. It establishes the principle of a choice between a fully drafted text or a proposal conceived in general terms. It prohibits mixing the two possibilities.
35 Academic writers point out that a violation of the unity of form is hardly conceivable in practice, since a proposal formulated in general terms is very broad. Thus, even a precise text can be qualified in this way. The only hypothesis envisaged is that of a text that "contains both elements that can only be definitive and others that cannot be, with regard to their degree of legistic perfection".
36 Only once has the Federal Assembly invalidated an initiative for violation of unity of form, in 1955, when it declared null and void the initiative "for the temporary reduction of military expenditure (arms truce)", on the grounds that it concerned several budget years. However, the doctrine points out that this was by no means a problem of unity of form.
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