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- Art. 5a FC
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- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
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- Art. 11 CO
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- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
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- Art. 6 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
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- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
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- Art. 35 FADP
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- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
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- Art. 42 FADP
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- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
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- Art. 60 FADP
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- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
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- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. Para. 1 - Lack of due diligence in financial transactions
- II. Para. 2 - Reporting law
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. Para. 1 - Lack of due diligence in financial transactions
A. Introduction
1. Purpose
1 In order to prevent the fight against money laundering from coming to nothing from the outset, a standard is required that imposes enforceable identification, documentation and record-keeping obligations on persons working in the financial sector. Since 1990, Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC has provided criminal law protection for a central obligation in the fight against money laundering - that of establishing the identity of the beneficial owner. When the Anti-Money Laundering Act came into force in 1998, further obligations were standardized by law under threat of criminal sanctions.
2 The introduction of the money laundering offense (Art. 305bis SCC) took place in the same year as Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC and led to a potential dilemma for financial intermediaries. If accounts were blocked and criminal charges filed due to a suspicion of money laundering, the financial intermediary risked a breach of the duty of confidentiality. As a result, a justification for this was created in 1994 with the reporting right standardized in Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC. This opened up the possibility for persons working in the financial sector to file criminal charges without hesitation if, for example, a suspicion of money laundering arises in connection with investigations under Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC.
3 Historically, Art. 305ter SCC was not included in the Criminal Code for the purpose of combating money laundering. Although Art. 305ter SCC was introduced as part of the money laundering legislation, it was intended to serve the enforcement of a central financial regulatory concern (Know Your Customer, KYC). The nexus to the fight against money laundering was only later established by the FATF by qualifying the identification obligation as a global minimum standard for combating money laundering.
2. Type of offense
4 Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC is an abstract endangering offense that serves to enforce the identification obligation and thus to protect the paper trail. Accordingly, the nature of Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC is not a money laundering offense in the narrower sense. Whether the assets associated with the duty to identify are of a legal or illegal nature is irrelevant with regard to criminal liability under Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC.
5 According to prevailing doctrine and case law, the administration of justice is the legal interest to be protected by Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC, as a failure to identify the beneficial owner jeopardizes the state's claim to confiscation. Pieth denies this and rightly qualifies the offense as an "atypical administrative criminal law norm inserted into the SCC to enforce transparency in the customer relationship".
3. Practical significance
6 The topics of tax law and combating money laundering have become increasingly explosive in the recent past, not least due to various revelations by the international consortium of investigative journalists. The question of the actual beneficial owners of assets, which is closely linked to these two topics, has also come to the fore. The identification of the beneficial owner is considered the most important instrument in combating the abuse of offshore financial centers. Against this background, the importance of a criminal provision to enforce this identification obligation should not be underestimated from a crime prevention perspective.
7 However, in view of the due diligence obligations set out in the AMLA with regard to identification and detection, it is clear that the obligation standardized in Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC could also have been enforced exclusively by means of financial supervisory law and administrative criminal law. Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC criminalizes anyone who fails to comply with the obligation to identify the beneficial owner set out in Art. 4 AMLA. The fact that the criminal liability of failing to identify the beneficial owner has nevertheless been standardized in the SCC since 1990 has to do with the lack of general financial supervision law at the time and the solution proposed by the Federal Council to enforce the duty to identify independently under criminal law instead of criminalizing negligent money laundering, as demanded by some scholars. Accordingly, Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC is a "stopgap provision". According to the first report of the interdepartmental coordination group on the national assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing risks in Switzerland from 2015, convictions under Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC have stabilized at a very low level compared to those under Art. 305bis no. 1 SCC.
B. Objective elements of the offense
1. Subject of the offense
8 According to Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC, anyone who "professionally accepts, holds, invests or helps to transfer assets belonging to others", i.e. anyone who acts as a financial intermediary, is liable to prosecution. Accordingly, this is a genuine special offense that should oblige the entire financial sector to maintain the same level of identification. According to the legislator and case law, Art. 305ter SCC is not intended to cover just any business people who, for example, accept third-party assets as part of their professional activities. The scope of application is typically limited to sectors that are susceptible to abuse, including transactions with liquid or very easily liquidated assets. The decisive factor is whether the professional activity is attributable to the financial sector, which is also evident from the marginal phrase in Art. 305ter SCC - "lack of due diligence in financial transactions".
9 According to prevailing doctrine, Art. 2 AMLA can be used to clarify the question of which activity is specifically considered financial intermediation, although the non-exhaustive list in Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA does not provide the necessary clarity. Furthermore, the dispatch on the revision of the SCC published in 1989 with regard to the introduction of Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC states that in addition to banks, trustees, investment advisors, financial managers, money changers, precious metal dealers and business lawyers are also included in the group of offenders. The Federal Council also added that case law must circumscribe the fringes of the field of offenders. The vagueness of the definition of perpetrators is criticized by scholars. For example, the distinction between a business lawyer and a traditional lawyer's activity already presents difficulties. According to Pieth and Schultze, jewelers with regard to their sales activities, real estate dealers, antique dealers, coin dealers and gallery owners are not covered by Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC.
10 According to Stratenwerth and Bommer, the definition of the criminal conduct of "accepting", "storing", "investing" or "transferring", which are typical actions of a financial intermediary, does not further restrict the group of offenders. In contrast, the criterion of "professional" represents such a limitation. The 1989 dispatch on the SCC revision states that the activity must be a full-time or part-time occupation, whereby the resulting regular income must not merely constitute insignificant ancillary income. In Art. 7 AMLO, the Federal Council has defined the term "professional activity" in concrete terms. A financial intermediary is deemed to be carrying out such an activity if one of the four conditions set out in Art. 7 para. 1 AMLO is met. An activity is classified as professional if gross proceeds of more than CHF 50,000 are generated per calendar year or if there is unlimited power of disposal over third-party assets that exceed CHF 5 million at any given time. Furthermore, an activity qualifies as professional if a financial intermediary enters into business relationships with more than 20 contracting parties per calendar year that are not limited to a one-off activity, or maintains at least 20 such relationships per calendar year. Finally, a financial intermediary is deemed to be acting in a professional capacity if transactions are carried out with a total volume exceeding CHF 2 million per calendar year.
2. Offense
11 There is disagreement among scholars as to whether Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC should be qualified as a genuine offense of omission or a simple offense of activity, although according to Pieth and Arzt this problem hardly plays a role in practice. According to various doctrinal opinions, it is rather the specification of the requirements of the offence that is important, as it lacks the necessary clarity. For example, ambiguities arise in connection with the term "beneficial owner", which is taken from the CDB. The decisive factor in the allocation of assets is an economic approach. According to Zulauf, the focus is on who has "an identifiable and lasting interest" in the assets in question. According to the dispatch, the "beneficial owner" in Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC is to be understood in a broader sense, i.e. going beyond the wording of the provision, there is an obligation to identify the contractual partner and - if not identical - the effective beneficiary of the assets represented by him. Following this approach, Pieth argues that the AMLA and the CDB presuppose the identification of the contractual partner as a matter of course and that it can therefore be assumed that the identification of the contractual partner is covered by Art. 305ter SCC in accordance with the ratio legis. According to the opinion expressed here, in the light of legal certainty and taking into account the economic perspective, the decisive criterion is to follow Zulauf's explanations.
12 The duty of care is based "onthe circumstances". This serves to enforce the principle of proportionality and thus regulates the limit of reasonable investigations. The applicable minimum standard for the identification of clients is regulated by administrative and private money laundering law - primarily the AMLA, AMLO, AMLO-FINMA and CDB 20 - which is binding for criminal courts. As already mentioned, the purpose of Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC is to determine the beneficial owner. According to previous Federal Supreme Court case law, a financial intermediary who correctly identifies the beneficial owner but does not exercise sufficient diligence is not subject to Art. 305ter SCC. The duty of identification under Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC is limited to the basic elements (surname, first name, date of birth, nationality). The basic elements must be checked for plausibility. Sufficient diligence is not exercised by those who, despite inconsistencies, are satisfied with the declarations of the contractual partner and do not carry out any further clarifications.
13 As part of the most recent revision of the AMLA, the question of whether there is an obligation to verify identity in connection with Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC that goes beyond the mere obligation to establish identity should have been clarified. According to the revised Art. 4 para. 1 AMLA, in addition to establishing identity, the financial intermediary must now also verify it "in order to ascertain who the beneficial owner is." With regard to the recently codified verification obligation, the dispatch states the following: "The aforementioned obligation is not fulfilled by merely requesting a copy of the identity card of the beneficial owner for the files".
14 Thus, the declarations received from the contracting partner must now not only be checked for plausibility in the event of inconsistencies, but must always be verified (materially and risk-based). According to the Federal Supreme Court, the CDB forms have increased credibility. They constitute documents within the meaning of Art. 110 no. 4. Accordingly, the contracting party may be guilty of forgery of documents under Art. 251 SCC if it makes false statements to the financial intermediary regarding the origin of the funds. Nevertheless, the financial intermediary may not rely on the fact that the information received from the contracting partner is correct. It should be noted, however, that he cannot be expected to carry out the same depth of investigation as the criminal prosecution authorities, especially as the responsible employees of a financial intermediary have a different set of tasks than the public prosecutor's office.
C. Subjective offense
15 Only those who act intentionally are liable to prosecution. The perpetrator must deliberately violate the duty of disclosure, whereby contingent intent is sufficient. According to the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, a lack of professional diligence is sufficient to infer intent. Anyone who fails to take the measures to clarify the identity that diligent bank employees would have taken on the basis of specific circumstances is acting with intent. It should be noted that intent must relate to all objective elements of the offense. The perpetrator must therefore be aware of his function as a person subject to a duty of identification and recognize that he must comply with this duty due to the specific situation. In addition, the perpetrator must intentionally violate the duty to ascertain despite recognizing the possibility of action.
D. Penalty and statute of limitations
16 The law provides for a custodial sentence of up to one year or a fine (misdemeanor). In the event of a conviction, the offender is recorded in the criminal register.
17 According to the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, Art. 305ter para. 1 SCC is a continuing offense. The limitation period begins to run as soon as the criminal conduct ends. This is the case on the day on which the business relationship is terminated or on which the financial intermediary has put an end to the unlawful situation by establishing the identity of the beneficial owner of the assets.
E. Competition
18 In principle, Art. 305ter SCC takes precedence, although the FCC has assumed genuine competition in one case. Although both offenses protect the same legal interest, Art. 305ter SCC is aimed at a narrower group of persons and sanctions the violation of certain duties of care regardless of whether the assets are of legal or illegal origin. Accordingly, this lack of due diligence should be punished as such and not be regarded as a kind of non-punishable preparatory act for money laundering. Taking into account the legislative history of the norm, the court's decision appears logical. There is also genuine competition with Art. 160 SCC and Art. 305 SCC.
II. Para. 2 - Reporting law
A. Introduction
1. Purpose
19 As mentioned in the introduction, the right to report codified in Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC constitutes a criminal law justification for the violation of professional secrecy obligations, under which information giving rise to suspicion can be forwarded to MROS.
20 The right to report thus complements the duty to report. According to this, the financial intermediary must report to MROS immediately if it knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect that the assets involved in the business relationship are connected with a criminal offense under Art. 305ter SCC (Art. 9 para. 1 AMLA). In the case of circumstances that have not (yet) reached the threshold of reasonable suspicion, the person entitled to report would find themselves in a dilemma without the right to report, because if they did not report, they could be guilty of money laundering (by omission) if the circumstances were subsequently assessed as reportable. The threshold for negligent or even intentional failure to report (Art. 37 para. 1 and 2 AMLA) would be reached more quickly due to the broad interpretation of the term "reasonable suspicion". However, if the person authorized to report were to report a suspicion that does not actually meet the threshold of reasonable suspicion, they could breach their professional duty of confidentiality (bank client confidentiality pursuant to Art. 47 BankG, professional secrecy pursuant to Art. 321 SCC, business secrecy pursuant to Art. 162 SCC or postal secrecy pursuant to Art. 321ter SCC). Reporting law solves this dilemma.
2. Practical significance
21 The practical significance of the right to report is not only due to the justification of money laundering reporting. In legal reality, the right to report becomes a reporting obligation for the financial intermediary, as it is not only a matter of being accused of possibly intentionally receiving criminally obtained funds, but also of protection against possible administrative criminal law consequences with regard to Art. 37 AMLA, which may result from the absence of a report, a late report or an incomplete report to MROS.
22 Absence of a report: If the right to report were abolished, as was discussed during the deliberations on the most recent revision of the AMLA, then the person authorized to report would more easily fall under the criminal provisions of Art. 37 AMLA. The threshold for negligent failure to report under Art. 37 para. 2 SCC would then be reached more quickly due to the broad interpretation of the term "reasonable suspicion".
23 Delayed reporting: In contrast to the reporting obligation, a report under the reporting law does not have to be made immediately according to the wording of the provision. However, if the financial intermediary mistakenly fails to submit a report immediately under the right to report, even though he should have submitted the report under the duty to report, he may be accused of a breach of the duty to report within the meaning of Art. 37 AMLA. It is therefore advisable to submit a report in accordance with Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC as soon as possible.
24 Incomplete report: An incomplete money laundering report may also constitute a breach of the reporting obligation within the meaning of Art. 37 AMLA. The information and documents to be submitted to MROS are governed by Art. 3 AMLO.
25 The right to report is only independent of the duty to report if the respective suspicion thresholds can be clearly distinguished. However, the distinction between the right to report and the obligation to report is blurred.
26 The practical significance of the right to report is given. However, it would be welcome to move the right to report from the Criminal Code to the Anti-Money Laundering Act. This proposal was not implemented as part of the most recent revision of the AMLA, but some gaps between the right to report and the obligation to report were closed.
B. Persons entitled to report
27 The group of persons entitled to report under Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC is identical to the group of offenders under para. 1. In practice, these are compliance officers of banks and other financial intermediaries, trustees, investment advisors, financial administrators, money changers or precious metal dealers.
28 Lawyers who also act as financial intermediaries are at risk of falling into a criminal liability trap in practice. This is because if a suspicion of money laundering arises from a lawyer's activity, which is therefore protected by professional secrecy under Art. 321 SCC, they have neither a duty to report under Art. 9 para. 2 AMLA nor a right to report under Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC. A money laundering report may only be made if the acceptance of the potentially incriminated assets took place in an activity that is not subject to professional secrecy. Such a non-professional activity is, for example, asset management and investment.
29 Traders pursuant to Art. 2 para. 1 lit. b AMLA do not have a right to report, but only a duty to report pursuant to Art. 9 para. 1bis AMLA, as they explicitly do not belong to the group of financial intermediaries.
C. A suspicion justifying the report
1. Subject of the suspicion
30 According to the wording of the law, the suspicion (only) relates to the origin of the assets from a crime (Art. 10 para. 2 SCC) or from a qualified tax offense pursuant to Art. 305bis no. 1bis SCC. The reporting obligation pursuant to Art. 9 para. 1 AMLA includes other suspicious circumstances (criminal offence pursuant to Art. 260ter SCC or Art. 305ter SCC; power of disposal of a criminal or terrorist organization; terrorist financing pursuant to Art. 260quinquies para. 1 SCC).
31 Tax fraud within the meaning of Art. 186 DBG (direct federal tax) and Art. 59 StHG (direct tax of the cantons and municipalities) is considered a qualified tax offense. This consists of tax evasion by means of a documentary offense. The amount of tax evaded must also be at least CHF 300,000 per tax period. The financial intermediary must therefore also check the assets deposited with him for tax purposes.
32 If the predicate offense was committed abroad, it must be punishable there and constitute a crime or a qualified tax offense in Switzerland in order to qualify as a predicate offense to money laundering.
2. Lower threshold and "simple suspicion"
33 According to the wording of the law, "perceptions" may be reported. But what does this mean? According to the dispatch, insinuations or vague impressions are not sufficient. Rather, it is a matter of clues, concerns or inconsistencies, simply circumstantial evidence that points to a criminal origin of the assets and is capable of being corroborated by the prosecution authorities.
34 The right to report should not be stretched and interpreted arbitrarily. With regard to the assets in question, there must at least be the appearance that they could be of criminal origin.
35 The right to report may be invoked even if there is only one indication of money laundering. It is not necessary for several such indications to result in a "reasonable suspicion" or even certainty. A "simple suspicion" is also sufficient according to MROS practice.
3. Upper threshold and "reasonable suspicion"
a. Federal Supreme Court on "simple doute"
36 With its decision of November 27, 2008, the Federal Supreme Court caused ongoing confusion and criticism. It held that a simple suspicion or doubt ("simple doute") is sufficient for a reporting obligation pursuant to Art. 9 para. 1 AMLA: "De l'avis de la doctrine, un soupçon est fondé s'il repose sur des circonstances insolites qui ont été recueillies avec soin par l'intermédiaire financier. If this person has a simple suspicion that, for example, the patrimonial assets originate from a criminal act, he must also make a communication to the MROS".
37 It would be more accurate to use the French term "soupçon" rather than "doute" for the German word "Verdacht", if the wording of the French version of Art. 9 AMLA is taken as a guide. The sources on which the Federal Supreme Court relies have also not been carefully interpreted, as the argumentation chosen by the Federal Supreme Court is not applied in the same way by De Capitani and Thelesklaf. As Kuster points out, according to Thelesklaf, a suspicion is only justified if it is based on careful investigations in accordance with Art. 6 para. 2 AMLA. Luchsinger points out that the recommendation of the authors cited by the Federal Supreme Court that, in case of doubt, a report under Art. 9 AMLA should be submitted, does not imply a lowering of the threshold for the reporting obligation.
38 In its ruling of March 18, 2015, the Federal Criminal Court clarified the triggering of the reporting obligation to the effect that a suspicion is always justified if the special investigations pursuant to Art. 6 AMLA cannot rebut the presumption that the assets are connected to a criminal offence. This is because, once the investigations have been carried out, it is clear that either the transaction that appears suspicious has been checked for plausibility and is in order, or the financial intermediary's suspicion is well-founded and must be reported to MROS in accordance with the reporting obligation. In its ruling of 21 March 2018, the Federal Supreme Court relied on this clarification of the Federal Criminal Court: "If the suspicion cannot be dispelled in the course of background investigations pursuant to Art. 6 para. 2 AMLA ... it is deemed to be justified without further ado". This recent case law clarifies the misunderstanding that arose from the ruling of November 27, 2008. In its ruling of January 11, 2021, the Federal Supreme Court held that the concept of "reasonable suspicion" is certainly open to discussion and interpretation and that it cannot be disputed that the case law had interpreted the wording of Art. 9 AMLA progressively. However, the Federal Supreme Court recalled the original concept and also pointed out that the idea was already expressed in the 1996 dispatch on the AMLA that suspicions that cannot be dispelled after the conclusion of the investigation procedure must be reported. This approach corresponds to the logic of the AMLA, in particular with regard to Art. 6 AMLA, as well as the purpose of the law to enable the detection and confiscation of the assets concerned.
39 The most recent case law of the Federal Supreme Court is (now) also in line with FINMA's interpretation according to its 2017 annual report: "Reasonable suspicion exists if the results of these special investigations [pursuant to Art. 6 para. 2 AMLA] cannot rebut the presumption that the assets originate from a crime. The financial intermediary must report such business relationships to the Money Laundering Reporting Office (reporting obligation under Art. 9 AMLA; see decisions of the Federal Criminal Court SK 2017.54 of December 19, 2017 and SK.2014.14 of March 18, 2015, E. 4.5.1.1). If the requirements for a reporting obligation are unclear, the financial intermediary may nevertheless submit a report (right to report under Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC)."
b. Parliamentary consultation on the inclusion of a definition
40 In the federal parliamentary consultation, it was pointed out that willful disregard of the reporting obligation can lead to a fine of up to CHF 500,000 (Art. 37 para. 1 AMLA) or a ban from the profession (Art. 33 FINMASA) for the financial intermediary concerned. This is precisely why reasonable suspicion must be defined by the legislator. In cases of doubt, the financial intermediary decided to report money laundering to MROS, which overburdened MROS.
41 Various strict variants were discussed with regard to the specific definition. In the end, the current practice of the Federal Supreme Court was followed. The financial intermediary must submit a report if there are concrete indications that he cannot dispel his justified suspicions by means of additional clarifications. This would involve disproving the indication or concrete evidence of money laundering.
42 It was emphasized that the financial intermediary must carry out appropriate investigations within the framework of the means and resources available to him, as he would have no police or investigative powers. This is to be agreed with. He must pass on relevant observations. Nevertheless, it cannot be expected to carry out the same depth of investigation as the criminal prosecution authorities. The financial intermediary or the compliance officer working for him is not a public prosecutor.
c. Definition pursuant to Art. 9 para. 1quater revAmLA
43 In the run-up to the most recent revision of the AMLA, scholars agreed that the blurred distinction between the right to report and the duty to report as well as the various levels of suspicion require clarification. Various approaches were presented regarding the implementation of this clarification. Thelesklaf called for the term "justified" codified in Art. 9 AMLA to be deleted. According to Luchsinger, a new, clear definition of the requirements for the duty to report and, if necessary, the right to report is essential. Zulauf and Hutzler were in favor of abolishing the right to report and splitting the reporting obligation into primary and secondary reporting.
44 In the end, the right to report was retained and the following new para. 1quater was codified:
In the cases referred to in paragraph 1, a reasonable suspicion exists if the financial intermediary has a concrete indication or several indications that paragraph 1 letter a may be fulfilled for the assets involved in the business relationship and this suspicion cannot be dispelled on the basis of additional clarifications in accordance with Article 6.
d. Assessment of the legal certainty of the new definition
45 The latest revision of the AMLA now codifies that a suspicion based on a concrete indication or several indications leads to a reporting obligation if the suspicion cannot be dispelled by means of additional investigations.
46 In fact, a sufficient legal basis leads to more legal certainty for the financial intermediary, which is why a definition based on Art. 20 para. 1 AMLO is to be welcomed.
47 On the other hand, the financial intermediary is still entitled to make a report in accordance with Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC if the conditions for a reporting obligation are unclear and a certain degree of unease remains in this sense. With the new definition and the most recent case law of the Federal Supreme Court, the importance of the right to report has decreased.
D. Prohibition of information
48 The most recent revision of the AMLA also affected the prohibition of information pursuant to Art. 10a AMLA. The revised paragraph 3 reads as follows:
The financial intermediary may also inform another financial intermediary subject to this Act that he has madea report under Article 9 of this Act or under Article 305ter paragraph 2 SCC, insofar as this is necessary to comply with the obligations under this Act and provided that both financial intermediaries:
a. provide joint services for a client in connection with the client's asset management on the basis of a contractually agreed cooperation; or
b. belong to the same group.
49 The notification pursuant to Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC is now also explicitly mentioned. The financial intermediary may therefore, under certain circumstances, provide information on reports based on both the duty to report and the right to report.
50 The addition to the reporting law closes a gap that is relevant from a practical point of view. There was always uncertainty among financial intermediaries within the same group as to whether, how and what information they may share in the event of a report under Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC.
E. Reporting on termination of the business relationship
51 From a practical point of view, the question often arises as to what leeway the financial intermediary has to separate from his contractual partner without violating the reporting obligation or the reporting law.
52 As a result of the most recent revision of the AMLA, the AMLO and AMLO-FINMA were also revised accordingly with regard to obligations in the event of suspected money laundering. The provisions on the termination of the business relationship pursuant to Art. 32 AMLO-FINMA were set out by the Federal Council at AMLO level.
53 Once a report has been made, the financial intermediary may not break off the business relationship on its own initiative (Art. 12a para. 1 AMLO, Art. 32 para. 3 AMLO-FINMA) and must continue to execute client orders (Art. 9a para. 1 AMLA). Only if MROS does not inform the financial intermediary within 40 working days that it will forward the reported information to a prosecution authority may the business relationship be terminated (Art. 9b para. 1 AMLA in conjunction with Art. 12a para. 1 AMLO). The MROS must be informed immediately of the termination of the business relationship and the date of termination (Art. 9b para. 3 AMLA). The withdrawal of significant assets must then only be permitted in a form that allows the prosecution authorities to trace them (Art. 9b para. 2 AMLA). This obligation also applies in the event of non-reporting in accordance with reporting law (Art. 12b para. 2 AMLO).
54 The financial intermediary is also prohibited from terminating a dubious business relationship (for which he decides not to make use of the right to report even though the requirements are met) and from allowing the withdrawal of significant assets if there are concrete indications that official freezing measures are imminent (Art. 12a para. 2 AMLO; Art. 32 para. 2 aMLO-FINMA).
55 The preparation of a so-called no-AML report is now regulated in Art. 22a para. 2 AMLO-FINMA (Art. 31 AMLO-FINMA): If the financial intermediary does not submit a suspicious activity report based on the right to report (Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC) because he was able to dispel the suspicion on the basis of additional investigations in accordance with Art. 6 AMLA, he must document the investigations carried out and his conclusions in an appropriate manner (Art. 7 AMLA). In doing so, he must record why he has dispelled the suspicion and waived his right to report. Such a no-AML report must now be drawn up for all dubious business relationships, not just those with significant assets.
56 Once the business relationship has been terminated, the question arises as to whether the obligation to report and the right to report continue and, if so, for how long.
57 The obligation to report in accordance with Art. 9 para. 1 AMLA also ends with the business relationship. In this regard, Ivell rightly refers to the wording of the standard and "the assets involved in the business relationship". Accordingly, a reporting obligation after termination of the business relationship would require an explicit legal basis. In addition, according to Reinle, a different result would lead to an unreasonable burden for the financial intermediary in view of Art. 37 para. 2 AMLA (negligent breach of the duty to report) and thus to a disruptive result.
58 The right to report under Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC, on the other hand, continues to exist even after the termination of the business relationship (for an unlimited period of time). Here too, the wording of the provision must first be taken into account. The assets do not have to be involved in a business relationship. Ivell also points out that time limits would not be compatible with the concept of voluntary reporting.
F. Addressee and form of the notification
59 The addressee of the report is MROS at the Federal Office of Police (fedpol), which receives reports from the various financial market players, carries out investigations into the reported transactions and decides whether and which of the reported information is to be forwarded to the prosecution authorities (Art. 23 AMLA; Art. 1 para. 2 AMLO).
60 On January 1, 2020, MROS introduced the online portal "goAML" for communication with the Reporting Office (e.g. submitting money laundering reports). Anyone who does not submit reports via this information system must use the form provided and submit the report securely (Art. 3a para. 3 AMLO). Reporting forms by post are therefore still possible, but goAML must be used for subsequent reporting of information (Art. 11a AMLA). In the explanatory notes to the partial revision of the AMLO, the financial intermediary is recommended to use goAML to submit the initial report as well.
61 As part of the next revision of the AM LA, the Federal Council is proposing a new Art. 23 para. 7 AMLA with the following wording: "Communication with the Reporting Office shall take place via the data processing system in accordance with para. 3. The Federal Office of Police (fedpol) shall determine the data standard of the information transmitted via the data processing system". In order to further improve data quality, only goAML should be used and MROS should be allowed to determine the data standard.
G. Deadline for analyzing the reports
62 The old law provided for different deadlines for the analysis of reports by MROS. This led to uncertainties for financial intermediaries when (further) dealing with business relationships for which they had made use of the right to report.
63 Art. 23 para. 5 AMLA stipulated that MROS must inform the financial intermediary within 20 working days whether or not it will forward the report to a prosecution authority in accordance with Art. 9 para. 1 lit. a AMLA. However, according to Art. 23 para. 6 aMLA, MROS had no deadline for analyzing a report under Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC.
64 MROS was also not satisfied with the regulation at the time. The response time of MROS was 27 working days on average, not including the time for preparation and evaluation. It should also be noted that MROS may have to obtain additional information in accordance with Art. 11a AMLA, possibly even from counterparties abroad.
65 In order to take better account of reality and to give MROS the necessary leeway to prioritize serious suspicious activity reports, the deadline has been extended to 40 working days, also in view of the increasing number of reports per year. At the same time, the uncertainties of financial intermediaries with regard to the reporting law have been eliminated in that MROS now also has a deadline of 40 working days to analyze a report in accordance with Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC (Art. 9b para. 1 AMLA in conjunction with Art. 23 para. 5 AMLA).
This commentary merely reflects the interpretations and views of the authors. No conclusions can be drawn about the practice of the authors' employers.
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Materials
Beratungen des Ständerats vom 10.3.2021, abrufbar unter: https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=52177, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Beratungen des Ständerats vom 10.3.2021).
Beratungen des Nationalrats vom 1.3.2021, abrufbar unter: https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=51792, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Beratungen des Nationalrats vom 1.3.2021).
Beratung des Nationalrats vom 27.11.1989, abrufbar unter: https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/verhandlungen-89043-1989-d-f.pdf, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Beratung des Nationalrats vom 27.11.1989).
Erster nationaler Bericht über die Risiken der Geldwäscherei und der Terrorismusfinanzierung, Bericht der interdepartementalen Koordinationsgruppe zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei und Terrorismusfinanzierung (KGGT) vom 5.6.2015, abrufbar unter: https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-57750.html, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Bericht KGGT 2015).
Zweiter nationaler Bericht über die Risiken der Geldwäscherei und der Terrorismusfinanzierung, Bericht der interdepartementalen Koordinationsgruppe zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei und Terrorismusfinanzierung (KGGT) vom 29.10.2021, abrufbar unter: https://www.sif.admin.ch/sif/de/home/dokumentation/fachinformationen/bericht_kggt.html, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Bericht KGGT 2021).
Botschaft zur Änderung des Geldwäschereigesetzes vom 26.6.2019, BBl 2019 5451 ff., abrufbar unter: www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2019/1932/de, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Botschaft GwG Revision 2019).
Botschaft über die Änderung des Schweizerischen Strafgesetzbuches und des Militärstrafgesetzes (Revision des Einziehungsrechts, Strafbarkeit der kriminellen Organisation, Melderecht des Financiers) vom 30.06.1993, BBl 1993 III 277 ff., abrufbar unter: www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1993/3_277_269_193/de, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Botschaft Melderecht 1993).
Botschaft über die Änderung des schweizerischen Strafgesetzbuches (Gesetzgebung über Geldwäscherei und mangelnde Sorgfalt bei Geldgeschäften) vom 12.6.1989, BBl 1989 II 1061, abrufbar unter: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1989/2_1061_961_837/de, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Botschaft StGB 1989).
Erläuternder Bericht zur Eröffnung des Vernehmlassungsverfahrens betreffend das Bundesgesetz über die Transparenz juristischer Personen und die Identifikation der wirtschaftlich berechtigten Personen, 30.8.2023, abrufbar unter: https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/82297.pdf, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Erläuternder Bericht Transparenzregister 2023).
Erläuterungsbericht der FINMA zur Teilrevision GwV-FINMA, 8.3.2022, abrufbar unter: https://www.finma.ch/de/~/media/finma/dokumente/dokumentencenter/anhoerungen/laufende-anhoerungen/20220308---gwv---finma/20220308_anhoerung_gwv_finma_erlaeuterungsbericht.pdf?sc_lang=de&hash=15FE08B10BBB36D0162234C261E4B949, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Erläuterungsbericht zur Teilrevision der GwV-FINMA 2022).
Erläuternder Bericht zur Vernehmlassungsvorlage zur Änderung der GwV, 1.10.2021, abrufbar unter: https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/68406.pdf, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Erläuternder Bericht zur Änderung der GwV 2021).
Erläuterungen zur Teilrevision der MGwV, 27.11.2019, abrufbar unter: https://www.ejpd.admin.ch/dam/fedpol/de/data/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/vo-anpassung/erlaeuterungen-mgwv-d.pdf.download.pdf/erlaeuterungen-mgwv-d.pdf, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Erläuterungen Teilrevision MGwV 2019).
Erläuterungsbericht der FINMA zur Teilrevision der GwV-FINMA, 4.9.2017, abrufbar unter: https://www.finma.ch/de/~/media/finma/dokumente/dokumentencenter/anhoerungen/laufende-anhoerungen/rs-gwv/20170904-eb-gwv-finma.pdf?sc_lang=de&hash=1E297912C77FB5F8594C2B1A86E6D26B, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Erläuterungsbericht zur Teilrevision der GwV-FINMA 2017).
Jahresbericht der MROS 2022, abrufbar unter: https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/dam/fedpol/de/data/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/jabe/jb-mros-2022.pdf.download.pdf/jb-mros-2022-d.pdf, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert: Jahresbericht MROS 2022).
Jahresbericht der FINMA 2017, abrufbar unter: https://www.finma.ch/~/media/finma/dokumente/dokumentencenter/myfinma/finma-publikationen/geschaeftsbericht/20180327-jahresbericht-2017.pdf, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert: Jahresbericht FINMA 2017).
Jahresbericht der MROS 2017, abrufbar unter:https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/dam/fedpol/de/data/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/jabe/jb-mros-2017-d.pdf.download.pdf/jb-mros-2017-d.pdf, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert: Jahresbericht MROS 2017).
Praxis der MROS, Eine Zusammenfassung der Praxis seit 2004, März 2016, abrufbar unter: https://www.fedpol.admin.ch/dam/fedpol/de/data/kriminalitaet/geldwaescherei/praxis-berichte/mros-die-praxis-d.pdf.download.pdf/mros-die-praxis-d.pdf, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert: Praxis MROS 2016).
Stellungnahme der Schweizerischen Bankiervereinigung (SBVg) zur Änderung des Bundesgesetzes über die Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei und der Terrorismusfinanzierung (GwG) vom 14.9.2018, abrufbar unter: https://www.swissbanking.ch/_Resources/Persistent/d/c/6/3/dc634cc6fd7cd84dc93989e67f3d253a6584b5dd/SBVg_Stellungnahme_Revision_GwG.pdf, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Stellungnahme SBVg).
Vernehmlassungsvorlage betreffend das Bundesgesetz über die Transparenz juristischer Personen und die Identifikation der wirtschaftlich berechtigten Personen (Gesetz über die Transparenz juristischer Personen; TJPG), 30.8.2023, abrufbar unter: https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/82295.pdf, besucht am 5.8.2024 (zitiert Vernehmlassungsvorlage Transparenzregister 2023).