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- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. Introduction
- II. Identification of incompatibility
- III. Possibilities for action
- IV. Relationship between para. 1 and para. 2
- V. Procedural Provisions
- Materials
- Bibliography
I. Introduction
1 Whereas Art. 58 of the Act regulates the provisions regarding jurisdiction and the procedure for determining the facts of the case, Art. 59 of the Act deals with the possibilities for the EAER to act when an incompatibility is determined by the body provided for in the international agreement. In other words, this article deals with how a restriction of competition that is incompatible with the international agreement in question can be eliminated domestically. Art. 59 KG provides for two possible courses of action: An incompatibility can be eliminated by means of an amicable settlement within the meaning of para. 1 or, if an amicable settlement cannot be reached in time, the EAER can take further measures pursuant to para. 2. However, before the EAER can eliminate an incompatibility at all, the bodies appointed in the international agreement must first establish such an incompatibility, which is analysed in the following section.
II. Identification of incompatibility
2 In order to apply Art. 59 of the Act, the first step is to determine whether the restriction of competition is incompatible with the substantive rules of the international agreement in question. The material rules provided for in the relevant international agreement are decisive for the determination of an incompatibility. "Incompatibility" is not to be equated with illegality. According to Art. 23 para. 1 FTA, for example, restrictions on competition are considered incompatible with the good functioning of this agreement if they are "likely to affect trade in goods between the Community and Switzerland." Art. 18 para. 1 FTA also stipulates that those practices are incompatible with the Agreement which "frustrate the benefits to be expected from the Agreement." From these two examples, it is clear that Art. 59 TCA is largely aimed at eliminating harmful behaviour, reducing trade benefits or even nullifying them altogether. M.a.w., the term "incompatibility" refers to restrictive conduct that affects trade benefits flowing directly or indirectly from the international agreement and thus jeopardises the functioning of effective competition.
3 The competence of the legal clarification of incompatibility is solely incumbent on the body provided for in the relevant agreement (e.g. in the form of a Council or a Joint Committee). Specifically, the competent bodies must determine whether there is a restriction of competition within the meaning of the agreement and whether the restriction is incompatible with the agreement. Since such bodies are often composed of representatives of all contracting parties, it can be assumed that in the event of a conflict, Switzerland would also allow the findings of the preliminary investigation pursuant to Art. 58 para. 1 PCA to flow into the decision-making of the body.
4 If an incompatibility with the international agreement is identified by the competent bodies, it is then up to the Swiss authorities to examine whether and with what measures this can be eliminated. In other words, once an incompatibility is identified, the assessment of the facts and the effects of the conduct in terms of competition and trade policy depends exclusively on the Swiss authorities. Once the incompatibility has been identified by the bodies provided for in the international agreement, there is thus a shift of competences from the bodies to the EAER.
III. Possibilities for action
5 If incompatibility of the restrictive conduct with the international agreement in question is established, the EAER has the following options for action:
A. Mutual agreement (para. 1)
6 Pursuant to Art. 59 para. 1 of the Act, the EAER may, in agreement with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), propose an amicable settlement to the parties involved. The agreement of the FDFA is assumed, since foreign policy aspects are always affected in these cases, for which the FDFA is sometimes responsible.
7 The term "parties involved" used in Art. 59 para. 1 and in Art. 58 para. 2 refers primarily to the companies that have brought about the restriction of competition, as is also the case under Art. 29 KG. The interpretation of the term "involved parties" results from the fact that only these undertakings can remove the restriction of competition. However, part of the doctrine is of the opinion that the parties harmed by the restrictive conduct are also to be considered as participants.
8 As in Art. 29 KG, the legislator uses the term "amicable settlement" in Art. 59 KG. In contrast to Art. 29 para. 2 KG, however, neither the wording of Art. 59 para. 1 KG nor the messages provide for formal requirements. Accordingly, it is not presumed that the amicable settlement requires the written form. Even if for political reasons it may be understandable that a formal requirement could hinder the negotiations, for the sake of legal certainty this amicable settlement should in principle be made in writing and published.
9 With regard to the content, Art. 59 KG only states that the purpose of the amicable settlement is to eliminate the incompatibility, thereby preventing possible retaliatory measures against Switzerland. Accordingly, the amicable settlement must take into account the substantive content of the competition provision of the international agreement at issue. This generally serves the overriding goal of guaranteeing the enforcement of international obligations in the area of competition law.
10 Whether and to what extent use is made of a consensual settlement is likely to depend, among other things, on how the time limit regime of the international agreement in question is structured. In addition, the willingness of the other contracting parties to cooperate in negotiating a consensual settlement with the parties concerned is also decisive.
B. Necessary measures (para. 2)
11 If there is an urgency, i.e. if an amicable settlement cannot be adopted in time and concrete retaliatory measures are imminent, the EAER may, in agreement with the FDFA, order measures that are necessary to eliminate the restriction of competition in accordance with Art. 59 para. 2 KG. Two conditions must be met for this: (i) the deadline stipulated in the international agreement is not met and (ii) Switzerland is threatened with retaliatory measures by the contracting parties that make it impossible to settle the matter in a timely manner. These requirements must be applied cumulatively, i.e. it is not sufficient if only the formal deadline is not met but there are no indications that a contracting party will initiate retaliatory measures. Conversely, this also means that the cumulative requirement gives the affected companies the possibility to temporarily refuse to conclude a mutually agreed settlement in order to strengthen their negotiating position until the potential concretisation of the retaliatory measures. Pursuant to Art. 59 para. 2 KG, it is at the discretion of the EAER - again in consultation with the FDFA - to assess which measure it deems necessary to remove the incompatibility. However, the measure must be suitable for eliminating the incompatibility and resolving the conflict. Accordingly, not just any measure can be adopted, but only those that are necessary to eliminate an incompatibility and can avert any protective measures (for example, the suspension of trade concessions) of the contracting party. It should be clarified that even if Art. 58 and 59 KG provide for a separate procedure that differs from the ordinary procedure, in practice the same measures as under Art. 30 KG are used.
IV. Relationship between para. 1 and para. 2
12 Since Art. 59 para. 1 KG is an "optional provision", there is no obligation to eliminate the restrictive conduct by a friendly settlement. If an amicable settlement is not concluded in time or Switzerland is threatened with retaliatory measures by the contracting party, the EAER may, in agreement with the FDFA, take the measures necessary to eliminate the restriction of competition (Art. 59 para. 2 KG). It can be deduced from this that the amicable settlement pursuant to Art. 59 para. 1 KG generally takes precedence over the measures within the meaning of Art. 59 para. 2 KG. This also follows from the 1994 Dispatch KG, according to which para. 2 actually only applies if there is a temporal urgency that requires other protective measures to keep the situation in check.
V. Procedural Provisions
13 According to Art. 1 para. 2 lit. a VwVG, the provisions of the VwVG are applicable to the procedure of the EAER. The order issued by the EAER is a formal order within the meaning of Art. 5 VwVG. Pursuant to Art. 33 lit. d of the Administrative Procedure Act, it may be appealed to the Federal Administrative Court.
Materials
Botschaft zu einem Bundesgesetz über Kartelle und ähnliche Organisationen (KG) vom 13.5.1981, BBl 1981 S. 1293 (zit. Botschaft KG 1981).
Botschaft zu einem Bundesgesetz über Kartelle und andere Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen vom 23.11.1994, BBl 1995 I S. 468 (zit. Botschaft KG 1994).
Bibliography
Baldi Marino, Die Wettbewerbsbestimmungen internationaler Abkommen der Schweiz und die Art. 42/43 des Kartellgesetzes (KG), in: Zäch Roger (Hrsg.), Kartellrecht auf neuer Grundlage, Bern et al. 1989, 279–308.
Beuret Carla, Kommentierung zu Art. 59 KG, in: Zäch Roger et al. (Hrsg.), KG Kommentar, Kartellgesetz, Zürich 2018 (zit. Dike Kommentar-Beuret).
Borer Jürg, Orell Füssli Kommentar, Wettbewerbsrecht I: Schweizerisches Kartellgesetz (KG) mit den Ausführungserlassen sowie einschlägigen Bekanntmachungen und Meldeformularen der WEKO, 3. Aufl., Zürich 2011 (zit. OFK-Borer).
Drolshammer Jens Ivar, Wettbewerbsrecht: Vom alten (KG 85) zum neuen Recht (KG 95), Bern 1996.
Ducrey Patrik, Kommentierung zu Art. 59 KG, in: Homburger Eric/Schmidhauser Bruno/Hoffet Franz/Ducrey Patrik (Hrsg.), Kommentar zum schweizerischen Kartellgesetz vom 6. Oktober 1995 und zu den dazugehörenden Verordnungen, Zürich 1997 (zit. Kommentar KG-Ducrey).
Ducrey Patrik/Carron Benoît, Kommentierung zu Art. 59 KG, in: Martenet Vincent/Bovet Christian/Tercier Pierre (Hrsg.), Commentaire Romand, Droit de la concurrence, 2. Aufl., Basel 2013 (zit. CR-Ducrey/Carron).
Freund Benedikt, Kommentierung zu Art. 59 KG, in: Zäch Roger et al. (Hrsg.), KG Kommentar, Kartellgesetz, Zürich 2018 (zit. Dike Kommentar-Freund).
Mamane David/Amberg Karin, Kommentierung zu Art. 59 KG, in: Amstutz Marc/Reinert Mani (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Kartellgesetz, 2. Aufl., Basel 2021 (zit. BSK-Mamane/Amberg).
Merkt Benoît/Metzger Philippe, Kommentierung zu Art. 59 KG, in: Martenet Vincent/Bovet Christian/Tercier Pierre (Hrsg.), Commentaire Romand, Droit de la concurrence, 2. Aufl., Basel 2013 (zit. CR-Merkt/Metzger).
Nüesch Sabina, Kommentierung zu Art. 59 KG, in: Amstutz Marc/Reinert Mani (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Kartellgesetz, 1. Aufl., Basel 2010 (zit. BSK-Nüesch).
Reinert Peter, Kommentierung zu Art. 59 KG, in: Baker & McKinzey (Hrsg.), Stämpflis Handkommentar, Kartellgesetz, Zürich 2007 (zit. SHK-Reinert).
Schürmann Leo, Kommentierung zu Art. 59 KG, in: Schürmann Leo/Schluep Walter (Hrsg.), Orell Füssli Kommentar, Kartellgesetz und Preisüberwachungsgesetz (KG + PüG), Zürich 1988 (zit. OFK-Schürmann).
Sturny Monique, Der Einfluss des EU-Rechts auf das schweizerische Kartellrecht, Bern 2013.
Zirlick Beat/Tagmann Christoph, Kommentierung zu Art. 59 KG, in: Amstutz Marc/Reinert Mani (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Kartellgesetz, 2. Aufl., Basel 2021 (zit. BSK-Zirlick/Tagmann).