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- Art. 3 FC
- Art. 5a FC
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- Art. 29a FC
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- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
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- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
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- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
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- Art. 10a PRA
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- Art. 32a PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
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- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
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- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
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- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. History of origin
- II. Context
- III. Commentary in the narrow sense
- Recommended further reading
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. History of origin
1 With the federalism reform on the "Reorganization of the financial equalization and division of tasks between the Confederation and the cantons" (NFA), Section 1 in Chapter 1 of Title 3 on the tasks of the Confederation and the cantons received a new provision in Art. 43a FC on the principles for the allocation and fulfilment of state tasks. While para. 1 of this provision essentially takes over the previous Art. 42 para. 2 FC - which was repealed at the same time - para. 2 to 5 introduce new principles for the fulfillment and allocation of tasks under constitutional law. The people and the cantons approved the constitutional amendment on November 28, 2004; the norm came into force on January 1, 2008.
2 The Federal Council was of the opinion that the concretization of the principle of subsidiarity in the previous Art. 42 para. 2 FC would systematically fit better into the provision of Art. 43a FC, since the essential principles for the allocation and fulfilment of tasks are now laid down there. Art. 42 para. 2 FC still stated that the Confederation shall assume those tasks that require uniform regulation. With the new Art. 43a para. 1 FC, the Federal Council proposed supplementing this provision to the effect that the Confederation also assumes those tasks that exceed the power of the cantons. With paras. 2 to 5 FC, the Federal Council wanted to introduce new "guidelines (of a non-justiciable nature)" for the fulfillment of tasks.
3 The Council of States recommended adding the words "only" and "by the Confederation" to the wording of the principle of subsidiarity in Art. 43a para. 1 FC. The adverb "only" was already the subject of discussion when Art. 42 para. 2 FC was created, but was ultimately deleted there. Furthermore, the Council of States argued in favor of inserting the word "shall" in paras. 2 and 3 of the new Art. 43a FC in order to soften the "economy-heavy" wording of the Federal Council and to express that the principle of fiscal equivalence enshrined therein does not apply absolutely. While para. 4 of the Federal Council's draft stipulated that all persons can make use of the benefits of the basic provision "in the same way", the Council of States wanted to amend this provision to the effect that the benefits of the basic provision are available to all persons "in a comparable way". The Council of States also wanted to replace the word "must" in para. 5 with "should" in order to relativize the principle and thus, once again, weaken the economic focus of the Federal Council's version.
4 With regard to para. 1 of the new Art. 43a FC, the National Council agreed with the Council of States. The opinion of a minority, according to which the two criteria "strength of the cantons" and "uniform regulation" must be cumulative, did not prevail. The divergent versions of para. 2 and 3 by the Federal Council and the Council of States were considered a matter of taste in the National Council. As with para. 5, the National Council then followed the Federal Council. In the wording of para. 4, however, the National Council agreed with the Council of States, arguing in favor of "must" instead of "shall".
5 In the procedure for the revision of differences, the Council of States accepted a quick agreement on the National Council's version of paras. 2 and 3, as this would not change anything in terms of content. The Council of States also agreed to the modal verb "must" in paras. 4 and 5, but at the same time confirmed that these principles would not become justiciable.
II. Context
6 Art. 43a FC is found together with Art. 42 FC on the "Tasks of the Confederation" and Art. 43 FC on the "Tasks of the Cantons" in the section on the "Tasks of the Confederation and the Cantons". Together with Art. 3 FC as the key norm in terms of competences and Art. 5a FC on the general principle of subsidiarity, these constitutional norms form the basis for the distribution of tasks and competences in the federal state. Since 2008, Art. 43a FC has laid down the principles according to which state tasks are to be allocated and fulfilled in the federal state. The word "allocation" in the margin is misleading insofar as the tasks are not allocated to the cantons. Rather, they are responsible for all areas that are not constitutionally assigned to the Confederation on the basis of the subsidiary general competence under Art. 3 FC (in conjunction with Art. 42 FC).
7 Art. 43a FC combines four principles for the allocation and fulfillment of tasks: the principle of subsidiarity (para. 1), the principle of fiscal equivalence (paras. 2 and 3), the principle of equal treatment in basic services (para. 4) and the principle of needs-based and economic fulfillment of tasks (para. 5). These tetras are intended to guide the allocation of state tasks and thus ensure a sensible division of tasks within the federal state as well as continuity.
8 The four principles are heterogeneous in terms of both their content and their objectives. They deal with the question of which level in the federal state is best suited to fulfill a state task (para. 1) and who bears the costs and decisions incurred (paras. 2 and 3). At the same time, the provision requires the fulfillment of tasks that treats all persons equally with regard to basic services (para. 4) and generally follows economic principles (para. 5). The subsidiarity principle of para. 1 is aimed at the vertical distribution of state tasks between the Confederation and the cantons, while the principles of paras. 2 to 5 are also relevant for the horizontal fulfillment of tasks (in particular for contracts between the cantons in accordance with Art. 48 FC).
9 Art. 43a FC has a broad target group. On the one hand, according to the Federal Council Dispatch, the provision is addressed directly to the constitutional legislator. For the latter, the provision contains guidelines for the allocation of tasks under constitutional law. The constitutional legislator must be guided by these principles when allocating new state tasks; however, it is not bound by them. It can therefore entrust the Confederation with new tasks, even if these could have been performed by the cantons thanks to their "strength". Accordingly, popular initiatives that provide for an allocation of tasks that contradicts the principle of subsidiarity in Art. 43a para. 1 FC are also valid. On the other hand, as the dispatch further confirms, the principles of Art. 43a FC are directed at the legislator and the federal and cantonal executive authorities.
10 Opinions differ in the literature on the necessity and importance of enshrining these principles of task allocation and fulfillment in constitutional law. First and foremost, the unclear legal scope is criticized, arguing that these principles are largely "symbolic" and are difficult to reconcile with the requirement of constitutional clarity. They would lead to more problems than they solve. Since the principle of subsidiarity is generally classified as non-justiciable (see n. 19), the added value of its concretization in Art. 43a para. 1 FC compared to Art. 5a FC is also questionable. Furthermore, it can rightly be criticized that this provision mixes principles on the distribution of tasks and the fulfilment of tasks. Nevertheless, it is recognized that Art. 43a FC takes into account a "modern, differentiating federalism". In this sense, the Federal Council also emphasizes in its dispatch that the distribution of tasks and competences in the federal state is "of great importance" and that a clear allocation of tasks is a "fundamental principle of Swiss federalism". As a result, Art. 43a FC underlines the strong position of federalism in the Confederation. However, it has not yet had any particular impact.
III. Commentary in the narrow sense
A. Para. 1: Principle of subsidiarity
11 The central concern of the federalism reform was to enshrine the principle of subsidiarity in constitutional law. Until then, Art. 42 para. 2 FC stipulated that the Confederation shall assume those tasks that require uniform regulation. This provision was repealed with the entry into force of Art. 43a FC and replaced by its para. 1. Art. 5a FC came into force at the same time as Art. 43a FC. While the "Germanized" version of the principle of subsidiarity prevailed in the parliamentary deliberations on Art. 42 para. 2 FC, it is now mentioned literally in Art. 5a FC. Art. 43a FC serves as a concretization of the subsidiarity principle of Art. 5a FC, but - in contrast to the latter - is limited to the relationship between the Confederation and the cantons.
12 The origin of the principle of subsidiarity can be traced back conceptually to the Latin noun "subsidium" and in terms of the history of ideas to the philosophical ideas of Aquinas, Plato and Aristotle, among others. The principle became particularly well known through Catholic social teaching. According to the papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno from 1931, "what the individual can achieve on his own initiative and with his own strength should not be taken away from him and assigned to social activity [...]", as it is contrary to justice that "what the smaller and subordinate communities can achieve and bring to a good end should be claimed for the wider and higher community". In this sense, the principle of subsidiarity can generally be applied to the relationship between state and society as well as to the relationship between different communities.
13 In federally structured states, the principle of subsidiarity focuses on the vertical relationship between the higher and lower levels. Nevertheless, the principle of subsidiarity is not mandatory for the regulation of responsibilities; these can also be distributed without the application of such a principle. In the federal state, however, subsidiarity proves to be a sensible federal structural principle in that the federal government is assigned all those tasks that cannot be dealt with by the member states. According to the encyclical (cf. n. 12), the lower level is to be assigned those tasks that it can fulfill on its own. The presumption in favor of the lower level applies here; the upper level must justify its responsibility. The principle of subsidiarity thus promises an optimal distribution of tasks. In addition, the guiding principle is that tasks should be performed as close to the citizens as possible.
14 The principle of subsidiarity plays an important role in the European Union - alongside the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Federal Council also recognized this when it referred to European Community law in the NFA Dispatch. There, the principle of subsidiarity has been enshrined in primary law since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Not as a rule for the allocation of competences, but as a rule for the exercise of competences (cf. Art. 5 para. 1 TEU), this principle stipulates that the Union may only take action in areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence "if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional or local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level" (Art. 5 para. 3 TEU). Accordingly, two criteria must be met cumulatively for the Union to take action: firstly, a measure must not be achievable at Member State level (negative or insufficiency criterion); secondly, the Union's action must offer added value (positive or efficiency criterion). The principle of subsidiarity under Union law can be judicially reviewed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and politically by the national parliaments of the Member States.
15 The subsidiarity principle of the Federal Constitution is both a competence allocation and a competence exercise maxim. This applies not only to Art. 5a FC, but also to Art. 43a para. 1 FC, as can be seen from the marginal note to the latter, and the wording does not argue against such a reading. Accordingly, Art. 43a para. 1 FC requires, on the one hand, that new tasks be assigned to the level that is best able to fulfill them. The object is therefore the allocation of a competence; Art. 43a para. 1 FC does not provide a basis for the competence itself. Secondly, the principle of subsidiarity requires the federal legislator to exercise its powers with care. It must not "unduly extend" its federal competence.
16 According to Art. 43a para. 1 FC, the principle of subsidiarity under federal constitutional law covers two alternative criteria: The Confederation shall assume state tasks if these either "exceed the power of the cantons" or if "uniform regulation by the Confederation" is required. While the repealed Art. 42 para. 2 FC only contained the latter criterion, the principle of subsidiarity in Art. 43a para. 1 FC was supplemented by the first alternative, although this had already been rejected once during the total revision of the Federal Constitution. What both criteria have in common is that the Confederation should not take on any tasks that the cantons can fulfill "just as well". They reinforce the preference in favor of the cantons contained in the principle of subsidiarity. Moreover, according to the wording of Art. 43a para. 1 FC, the Confederation should "only" assume those tasks that fulfill one of these two criteria. This formulation, which goes back to the Council of States, was already the subject of parliamentary deliberations on Art. 42 para. 2 FC (cf. N. 3); however, it has no independent normative significance (especially since the parliamentary debate does not reveal the underlying reason).
17 The term "force" contained in the first alternative of Art. 43a para. 1 FC can be traced back to Catholic social teaching (cf. n. 12). The French and Italian language versions speak of "possibilités" and "capacità". The criterion "power of the cantons" leaves fundamental questions unanswered. On the one hand, it does not say whether the strength of individual cantons or the strength of all cantons as a whole is decisive. Secondly, it is unclear whether it is a question of the economic or political capacity of the cantons. The dispatch assumes that a task exceeds the strength of the cantons if they are "obviously not in a position" to fulfill the task. Plausibly, this is always the case if the cantons can only perform a task with disproportionate effort. It is very difficult to measure all of this objectively.
18 According to the second alternative of Art. 43a para. 1 FC, a task should be assumed by the Confederation if uniform regulation is necessary. With regard to the subject matter to be regulated, it is important to carefully examine whether a uniform regulation by the Confederation appears justified or whether different cantonal solutions are possible. The decisive factor here could be whether the benefit of the regulation should affect the entire country or whether a uniform solution serves to ensure equal opportunities or is required for technical reasons. Apart from this, it should be sufficient if a harmonizing federal regulation is not imposed, but rather a harmonizing federal regulation.
19 The Federal Council and Parliament clearly rejected the justiciability of the principle of subsidiarity from the outset. This would not be in line with the "Swiss understanding of the state". The Federal Supreme Court also understands the principle of subsidiarity as "little more than a maxim of state policy"; the Federal Administrative Court also denies its justiciability. In any case, this applies to the constitutional legislature, which is required to observe subsidiarity when distributing new tasks between the Confederation and the cantons, but is not legally obliged to do so. With regard to the legislator, on the other hand, judicial enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity could be justified. Finally, the principle of subsidiarity in Art. 5a FC is substantiated by Art. 43a para. 1 FC - even if the exact standard of review is difficult to determine in individual cases (see n. 17 f.). However, (constitutional) provisions should not be denied judicial enforceability from the outset because they are subject to interpretation. The equally vague principle of subsidiarity of Union law is also subject to judicial review (cf. n. 14). Although the ECJ has so far exercised great restraint in this regard, the prevailing view in the literature is that it is responsible for reviewing whether the European legislator has fulfilled its duty to state reasons and has not manifestly exceeded its discretionary powers. Such a - restrained - control mandate could also include the principle of subsidiarity under federal constitutional law of Art. 5a in conjunction with Art. 43a BV. Art. 43a FC (whereby the possibilities for review are limited due to the restricted constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 190 FC). However, the principle of subsidiarity is primarily in the hands of the legislator anyway. It is particularly at the political level that it is necessary to decide which level of the federal state can best fulfill a specific task.
20 The normative power of the principle of subsidiarity is therefore evident in procedural terms: the federal legislator is subject to a duty to justify or provide reasons. As early as 2016, two parliamentary initiatives called for a detailed justification of the principle of subsidiarity in the Federal Council's dispatches and consultation reports. In the meantime, the Parliament Act and the Consultation Act have been amended accordingly. Since November 2018, the Federal Council has had to justify "compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in the allocation and fulfillment of state tasks" in its dispatches on draft decrees. Accordingly, it states in one of its drafts that the federal government must "make careful use of its powers and leave the cantons sufficient scope to fulfill their tasks". An obligation to provide reasons with regard to the principle of subsidiarity also applies to the explanatory reports on consultation drafts. The legislative concretization of the principle of subsidiarity has a parallel in Union law, where the European Commission is obliged to justify in its draft legislative acts the extent to which the principle of subsidiarity (and proportionality) is complied with.
B. Paras. 2 and 3: Principle of fiscal equivalence
21 Art. 43a para. 2 and 3 FC contain the principle of fiscal equivalence. Together with the principle of subsidiarity, this principle, according to the Federal Council Dispatch, forms the basis for the structure of state tasks and competences within the framework of the NFA. With it, economic task criteria have found their way into constitutional law. However, their practical and legal significance for the distribution and fulfillment of state tasks is still unclear. This is why it is sometimes (rightly) criticized that such a principle belongs in a textbook, but not in a constitution. Elsewhere, it is more generously recognized as a "sensible directive" for the distribution of costs between the Confederation and the cantons.
22 The principle of fiscal equivalence originates from the financial sciences. There it describes the result of a distribution of public services based on institutional congruence, i.e. on a political process in which the circle of beneficiaries, the circle of decision-makers and the circle of taxpayers are congruent. Institutional congruence is considered essential for federalism in particular.
23 The Federal Council sees Art. 43a para. 2 and 3 FC as realizing precisely this principle of fiscal equivalence. An essential prerequisite for this is the following institutional congruence: the beneficiaries, cost bearers and decision makers of the state benefit should be the same. Para. 2 of Art. 43a FC requires the congruence of beneficiaries and cost bearers, according to which the costs must be borne by the community in which the benefit of the service accrues. Para. 3 of this provision grants the authority to make decisions to the municipality that bears the costs, thus addressing the congruence of cost bearers and decision makers. The two postulates can be summarized as follows: "Those who consume should have to pay for it, and those who have to pay should also be allowed to command."
24 The term "commonwealth" is not used a single other time in the entire Federal Constitution outside of Art. 43a para. 2 and 3 FC. It is ambiguous insofar as it also allows the principle to be applied to the relationship between the canton and the communes. For example, the Federal Supreme Court has used the principle of fiscal equivalence within the meaning of Art. 43a FC for the interpretation of a question on the distribution of costs between the canton and the commune. In contrast, the systematic location of Art. 43a para. 2 and 3 FC under the chapter heading "Relationship between the Confederation and the cantons" or under the section heading "Tasks of the Confederation and the cantons" argues for a restriction to the relationship between the Confederation and its constituent states. Finally, the concretization of the principle of subsidiarity in para. 43a para. 1 FC refers expressis verbis only to these two levels of government - in contrast to the general principle of subsidiarity in Art. 5a FC (cf. n. 11).
25 According to the Federal Council, the principle of fiscal equivalence pursues several objectives. These include strengthening the responsibility for financing, because it is assumed that decisions are made with greater budgetary consideration if the decision-makers and the cost-bearers are identical. The congruence of beneficiaries, cost bearers and decision makers also avoids "spillovers", i.e. the use of public services by non-residents without them being financially responsible for them. This in turn is intended to optimize the supply side: The "relevant tasks [should] be provided in the right place, at the right time and to the right extent."
26 As part of the federal system of competences, the principle of fiscal equivalence merely forms a "guideline" for the allocation of tasks and resources, without superseding the other principles of competence-based regulation. The congruence of beneficiaries, cost bearers and decision makers is therefore by no means mandatory. The principle of subsidiarity pursuant to Art. 5a in conjunction with Art. Art. 43a para. 1 FC may sometimes require a different allocation of tasks. The Federal Council's demand that only those cantons that benefit from a state service should also decide on and finance it, and that the Confederation should regulate all those services whose benefits extend to the whole of Switzerland, should therefore not be understood in absolute terms. Nor can the provision be understood to mean that one community may not financially support another if it does not also benefit from it.
27 Moreover, this economic principle primarily applies to state tasks that entail a public service. The principle of fiscal equivalence under Art. 43a para. 2 and 3 FC should therefore not apply to many areas of state responsibility. In general, it must be possible to draw a circle of beneficiaries for its applicability, which is mainly possible if the benefit is geographically limited. As examples, the Federal Council cites the installation of a sewage treatment plant or - remarkably in view of the geographical scope - the area of national defense. The applicability of the principle becomes more complicated in those (numerous) cases in which a service benefits several communities. In such cases, it is likely to require a corresponding distribution of costs.
28 The principle of fiscal equivalence is unanimously denied justiciability. Nevertheless, the Dispatch Guidelines of August 2020 insist that the Federal Council include statements on compliance with the principle in its dispatches on drafts relating to the division or fulfillment of tasks by the Confederation and the cantons. Corresponding examples can be found: In its dispatch on the amendment of the Federal Act on Regional Policy, for example, the Federal Council considers the principle of Art. 43a para. 2 FC to be respected because "fiscal equivalence is observed with regard to the congruence of cost bearer and decision maker".
C. Para. 4: Principle of equal treatment in basic care
29 Art. 43a para. 4 FC lays down a specific principle of equal treatment: in the area of basic services (for this term, see n. 31), state benefits must be available to all persons in a comparable manner. The Federal Council's proposal was slightly different: the basic services should have been provided in such a way that every person could make use of them in the same way. The Council of States would have preferred the modal verb "should" instead of "must", but conceded that the principle would not be justiciable even with the first formulation, with which the National Council ultimately prevailed. Thus, this third principle of Art. 43a FC is also denied justiciability by the Federal Council and the literature. Such an understanding is, of course, not compelling, especially since the provision clearly states that everyone is entitled to comparable treatment in the area of basic services. The Federal Council's view that para. 4 does not establish any enforceable rights is more justifiable. As the provision is located in the chapter on the federal system of competences, it would be difficult to argue that this provision confers subjective rights.
30 The provision imposes obligations on the Confederation and the cantons. In any case, the municipalities are not likely to be directly bound by the principle, as it is systematically embedded in the allocation and fulfillment of tasks by the Confederation and the cantons in Art. 43a FC (cf. n. 24). The cantonal organizational autonomy of Art. 47 para. 2 FC also speaks against a direct obligation of the municipalities. However, the Confederation and the cantons are only bound by the principle of equal treatment to the extent that they act within the scope of their competences. The provision does not provide a separate basis of competence for federal action. Nor does it stipulate a specific way in which the Confederation and cantons should ensure equal treatment. According to the Federal Council, self-coordination by the cantons, intercantonal agreements, federal regulations with cantonal enforcement or federal regulations with federal enforcement are conceivable.
31 Although the term "basic care" is also used elsewhere in the Federal Constitution and in federal legislation, it is not defined in more detail here or there. In addition, even the Federal Council recognizes that the French and Italian terms "service universel" and "servizio universale" have a different emphasis: These expressions would emphasize the focus of services on the entire population, while the German term "Grundversorgung" accentuates the basic foundation of services. He defines basic services as "the politically definable goal of ensuring that the population has access to the goods and services it needs. For the state, [basic services] have the meaning of a mandate to act to achieve this goal." "Goods" could include, for example, water, food, medicines and energy; "services" could include, for example, telecommunications services, transportation services and medical treatment. In the European Union, this is referred to as "services of general interest" and "universal service", in Germany as "services of general interest". However, these terms are also vague and not fully clarified. The service areas covered therefore result less from the terminology than from the specific formulation in the respective legal system. The Federal Constitution contains a number of provisions that are "relevant to basic services", namely, among others, Art. 81a para. 1 (public transport), Art. 89 para. 1 FC (energy supply), Art. 92 para. 2 FC (postal and telecommunications services), Art. 102 para. 1 FC (national supply of essential goods and services), Art. 104a FC (food security) and Art. 117a para. 1 FC (basic medical care).
32 According to Art. 43a para. 4 FC, basic services are to be provided to all persons "in a comparable manner". This wording is reminiscent of the general equality of rights in Art. 8 para. 1 FC. The Council of States also stated that the principle of equal treatment in the provision of basic services represents an "analogy to the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, to the requirement of legal equality". And after the entry into force of Art. 43a para. 4 FC, the Federal Council also stated that its wording was already contained "in a comparable manner" in the general principle of equal treatment in Art. 8 para. 1 FC. This raises the question of what added value the principle of equal treatment in Art. 43a FC has in relation to basic services. In any case, it is also unclear when the criterion of equal access for all is fulfilled. Social aspects (accessibility for the entire population regardless of living situation, age, health, education, etc.), the geographical dimension (accessibility in all areas of the country), financial factors (affordability for all) and temporal characteristics (permanent availability) appear relevant here.
33 The Federal Council's dispatch cites "equal provision of services throughout the country" as the reason for this constitutional principle of equal treatment in the area of basic services. In subsequent materials, the Federal Council emphasized that an "efficient public service [...] is a central prerequisite for the quality of life of the population and for the competitiveness of the economy" and thus makes "a significant contribution to the social and regional cohesion of Switzerland". Müller positively emphasizes that this provision means that "not only economic aspects should be taken into account when allocating tasks".
34 The importance generally attached to basic services is illustrated by the lengthy discussion about a new general constitutional provision. This began with a parliamentary initiative in 2003, which called for important principles of the universal service to be enshrined in the constitution. Subsequently, the Transport and Telecommunications Committee of the Council of States submitted a motion instructing the Federal Council to "submit a general constitutional article on the universal service", which should "supplement the recently inserted Article 43a FC with one or more standards". The Federal Council responded to the motion to the effect that the cross-sectional provision of Art. 43a para. 4 FC was sufficient. However, after both the Council of States and the National Council continued to support the motion, the Federal Council submitted a proposal for a general constitutional provision on basic services in May 2013, but at the same time stated that it still rejected such a provision. The Federal Council presented three variants for discussion: Variant A contained only a mandate for action to the local authorities, variant B contained a definition of terms in addition to the mandate for action to the local authorities, and variant C contained a mandate for action to the local authorities and a definition of terms in addition to some key principles on basic services. The long-standing discussion about a basic service standard and thus the "spook" came to an end when the National Council decided twice in 2015 not to enter into the debate. A year later, the federal popular initiative "Pro Service public", which provided for "principles for the provision of basic services by the Confederation" in a new Art. 43b FC, was equally unsuccessful. This means that the principle of equal treatment in Art. 43a para. 4 FC remains in place. In any case, the legislative level is considered to be a more suitable place for basic service regulations.
D. Para. 5: Principle of needs-based and economic fulfillment of tasks
35 Art. 43a para. 5 FC requires that state tasks are fulfilled in a needs-based and economical manner. The Federal Council's comments on this "additional requirement" are extremely brief. This suggests that there were no or only vague ideas about the concrete content of these economic requirements.
36 The requirement to meet needs and be economical not only determines the fulfillment of tasks - as could be assumed from the wording - but also the upstream allocation of tasks. This is because, according to the Federal Council Dispatch, state tasks are to be allocated to the local authority that is in a position to perform them economically and in line with requirements. However, the principle of para. 5 does not apply absolutely to the allocation of tasks or to the fulfillment of tasks. A task may not be assigned to the Confederation solely because it could perform it more efficiently in economic terms; otherwise the principle of subsidiarity would be undermined. Nor does Art. 43a para. 5 FC restrict the commitment to fundamental rights under Art. 35 FC, as confirmed by the Federal Supreme Court. Nor can economic considerations justify disregarding the equal treatment requirement of Art. 43a para. 4 FC.
37 As with Art. 43a para. 2-4 FC (cf. N. 24 and N. 30), the question arises as to the applicability of the principle of needs-based and economic fulfillment of tasks to the municipalities. In this regard, the Federal Administrative Court stated in August 2016 that the basic principles of Art. 43a para. 5 FC "must be observed throughout the entire structure of the federal state, indirectly even down to the level of the municipalities" and "have also been reflected in various cantonal decrees". In its more recent case law, the Federal Supreme Court also recognizes that this constitutional requirement is directed at the communes (and derived from this - with recourse to other cantonal provisions - a statutory duty of the cantons within the meaning of the Data Protection Act).
38 Art. 43a para. 5 FC contains two imperatives: the imperative of meeting needs and the imperative of economic efficiency. According to the Federal Council, the term "needs-based" claims a "fundamental correspondence between needs and benefits". However, this only applies in principle and does not mean that an increased need must automatically lead to a greater scope of services. However, the aim must always be to align the range of services with the needs of the population. Meeting demand also means taking into account the different needs of the various population groups. According to the Federal Council, the term "economical" requires that, on the one hand, "the intended effects are actually achieved" and, on the other hand, "the provision of services is also carried out at the lowest possible economic cost". The public authorities are therefore required to use the "financial resources efficiently" and "to keep the costs for the general public as low as possible".
39 Art. 43a para. 5 FC - like the other paragraphs of this provision - has had little legal and practical significance to date. This is mainly due to the fact that it is generally considered not to be justiciable and certainly not to convey individual entitlements. As primarily economic guidelines, it is difficult to review needs-based justice and economic efficiency on the basis of clear and predictable criteria. Even without the constitution explicitly calling for this, the state can be expected to perform its tasks in line with need and as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. In any case, economic efficiency is also required by Art. 126 FC, according to which expenditure and revenue must be kept in balance in the long term, and is a criterion for parliamentary oversight under Art. 170 FC.
About the author
Dr. iur. Christina Neier, Bsc., is a postdoctoral researcher at the Faculty of Law of the University of Zurich. She studied law, economics and social sciences in Vienna and obtained her doctorate at the University of Zurich. Her dissertation dealt with European citizenship. She is currently working on her habilitation thesis on solidarity in the European Union and in European federal states, including Switzerland. She is financially supported by the UZH Alumni FAN (Ernst Göhner Foundation Fellowship) and the UZH Postdoc Grant (incl. Suslowa Postdoc Fellowship). She is also a lecturer for European law and public law at various Swiss universities. Since 2020, she has been Managing Editor of the journal Swiss Review of International and European Law (SRIEL). She can be reached at christina.neier@ius.uzh.ch.
Recommended further reading
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FIDE (Fédération International pour le droit européen), XVIe congrès, Rom 1994, Vol. 1: Le principe de subsidiarité.
Gamper Anna, Subsidiarität und Kompetenztheorie, in: Gamper Anna/Bussjäger Peter (Hrsg.), Subsidiarität anwenden: Regionen, Staaten, Europäische Union/La sussidiarietà applicata: Regioni, Stati, Unione Europea, Wien 2006, S. 109–134.
Häberle Peter, Das Prinzip der Subsidiarität aus der Sicht der vergleichenden Verfassungslehre, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 119 (1994), S. 169–206.
Isensee Josef, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Verfassungsrecht. Eine Studie über das Regulativ des Verhältnisses von Staat und Gesellschaft, Berlin 2001.
Richli Paul, Zum rechtlichen Gehalt und zur Prozeduralisierung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips, ZSR 126 (2007) I, S. 47–83.
Riklin Alois/Batliner Gerard (Hrsg.), Subsidiarität. Ein interdisziplinäres Symposium. Symposium des Liechtenstein-Instituts. 23–25. September 1993, Vaduz 1994.
Schweizer Rainer J./Müller Lucien, Art. 43a BV, in: Ehrenzeller Bernhard/Schindler Benjamin/Schweizer Rainer J./Vallender Klaus A. (Hrsg.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St. Galler Kommentar, 3. Aufl., Zürich 2014.
Stadler Hans, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Föderalismus. Ein Beitrag zum schweizerischen Staatsrecht, Fribourg 1951.
Waldmann Bernhard, Subsidiarität und fiskalische Äquivalenz als Garanten für einen substanziellen Föderalismus?, Newsletter IFF 4 (2015).
Walther Reto, Art. 5a BV, in: Schlegel Stefan/Ammann Odile (Hrsg.), Onlinekommentar zur Bundesverfassung – Version: 17.1.2023: https://onlinekommentar.ch/de/kommentare/bv5a, besucht am 22. März 2023.
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Materials
Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesverfassung 1998 zur Reform der Bundesverfassung – Ständerat, abrufbar unter: https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/de/home/staat/gesetzgebung/archiv/bundesverfassung.html besucht am 15.2.2024, (zit. AB 1998 SR)
Amtliches Bulletin zur Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs 2002 – Ständerat, abrufbar unter https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=4979, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. AB 2002 SR).
Amtliches Bulletin zur Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs 2003 – Nationalrat, abrufbar unter https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=4979, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. AB 2003 SR).
Amtliches Bulletin zur Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs 2003 – Ständerat, abrufbar unter https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=4979, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. AB 2003 SR).
Amtliches Bulletin zur Motion 05.3232, 08.9.2015, «Verfassungsbestimmung über die Grundversorgung», abrufbar unter https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=35078, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. AB 2015 NR).
Bericht des Bundesrates «Grundversorgung in der Infastruktur (Service public)» vom 23.6.2004, BBl 2004 4569 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2004/767/de, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Bericht Grundversorgung).
Bericht des Bundesrates in Erfüllung des Postulats Malama 10.3045 vom 03.3.2010, Innere Sicherheit. Klärung der Kompetenzen, vom 02.3.2012, BBl 2012 4459 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2012/603/de, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Bundesrat Postulat Malama).
Bericht des Bundesrates vom 12.9.2014 in Erfüllung des Postulats 12.3412 (Stadler Markus) vom 29.5.2012, abrufbar unter https://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/36476.pdf, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Bunderat Postulat Stadler).
Botschaft zur zur Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs und der Aufgaben zwischen Bund und Kantonen (NFA) vom 14.11.2001, BBl 2002 2291 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2002/316/de, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Botschaft NFA 2001).
Botschaft zur Festlegung des Ressourcen-, Lasten- und Härteausgleichs sowie zum Bundesgesetz über die Änderungen von Erlassen im Rahmen des Übergangs zur NFA vom 08.12.2006, BBl 2007 645 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2007/88/de, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Botschaft NFA 2006).
Botschaft zu einer allgemeinen Verfassungsbestimmung über die Grundversorgung vom 08.5.2013, BBl 2013 3407 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2013/744/de, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Botschaft Grundversorgung).
Botschaft zum Bundesgesetz über die Entlastung der Unternehmen von Regulierungskosten (Unternehmensentlastungsgesetz; UEG), vom 09.12.2022, BBl 2023 166 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2023/166/de, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Botschaft UEG).
Botschaft zum Investitionsprüfgesetz vom 15.12.2023, BBl 2024 124 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2024/124/de, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Botschaft Investitionsprüfgesetz).
Eidgenössische Volksinitiative, «Grundsätze für die Leistungen der Grundversorgung durch den Bund», hierzu Botschaft BBl 2014 3805 ff., Volksabstimmung vom 05.6.2016, abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2014/921/de, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Volksinitiative Grundversorgung).
Leitfaden zum Verfassen von Botschaften des Bundesrates, hrsg. von der Bundeskanzlei, 5. Aufl., August 2020, abrufbar unter https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/dokumentation/sprachen/hilfsmittel-textredaktion/leitfaden-fuer-botschaften-des-bundesrates.html, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Leitfaden Botschaften).
Motion 05.3232, «Verfassungsbestimmung über die Grundversorgung», vom 12.5.2005, abrufbar unter https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20053232, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Motion Grundversorgung).
Parlamentarische Initiative 03.465 Maissen Theo, «Service Public. Verfassungsbestimmung über die Grundversorgung», vom 19.12.2003, abrufbar unter https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20030465, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Parlamentarische Initiative Maissen).
Parlamentarische Initiative 16.446 Caroni Andrea, «Mehr Föderalismus in den bundesrätlichen Botschaften», vom 16.6.2016, abrufbar unter https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20160446, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Parlamentarische Initiative Caroni).
Parlamentarische Initiative 16.497 Burgherr Thomas, «Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip stärken», vom 16.12.2016, abrufbar unter https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20160497, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Parlamentarische Initiative Burgherr).
Stellungnahme des Bundesrates vom 10.6.2005 zur Motion 05.3232, «Verfassungsbestimmung über die Grundversorgung», abrufbar unter https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20053232, besucht am 19.2.2024 (zit. Bundesrat Motion Grundversorgung).