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- Art. 3 FC
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 73 PRA
- Art. 73a PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
I. Subject of the regulation
1 Art. 57 CC (“Use of assets”) is linked to Art. 58 CC (“(Asset) liquidation”). The interaction of these two provisions regulates (although in reverse order) the process of dissolving legal entities with asset liquidation. The procedures standardized in the FusG (merger, division, transformation and asset transfer) regularly do not include asset liquidation and in certain cases not even the dissolution or liquidation of all participating legal entities. The dissolution of a legal entity due to bankruptcy is also not the subject of Art. 57 CC.
2 The grounds for dissolution themselves are not outlined in CC Art. 57, but are assumed by the provision as a constituent element. The conditions for the annulment or dissolution of the individual legal entities are to be found, on the one hand, in the respective normative complexes; on the other hand, legal grounds for annulment are conceivable, such as statutory time limits (e.g. in an association or in a foundation for a limited period) or resolutory conditions. In principle, except for foundations (see Art. 88 para. 1 CC), freedom of dissolution prevails due to private autonomy. In legal doctrine, it is argued with good reason that although Art. 57 para. 3 CC regulates the use of assets for an immoral or unlawful purpose, the corresponding grounds for dissolution are only explicitly standardized for legal entities under the CC (Art. 78, 88 para. 1 no. 2 CC), para. 3 could be qualified as a ground for dissolution for legal entities under the CO.
II. Use of assets
A. Normal case (paras. 1 and 2)
1. Standard content and systematic classification
3 Art. 57 para. 1 CC stipulates that the assets of a dissolved legal entity shall pass to the community to which they belonged by destination. This provision is to be read in conjunction with the corresponding foundation law requirement in Art. 84 para. 2 CC. The practical significance of the devolution of assets to the community (para. 1 and para. 2) is limited because, in the hierarchy of norms, it is a lex generalis that takes a back seat to deviating provisions in the law, statutes, foundation deed or a resolution of the competent bodies. In practice, such a statutory deviation is particularly common among tax-exempt charitable organizations because the tax authorities require the assets to be tied to the tax-exempt purpose. Consequently, the devolution to the community is usually overridden by the right of self-determination, which is why a corresponding statutory provision must be sought first. If there is no such provision, the subsidiary devolution of assets to the community applies to legal entities under the CC, with the proviso that the assets be used for a purpose that corresponds as closely as possible to the previous one (para. 2). In the case of corporate bodies under the CO, on the other hand, the respective statutory provisions for the distribution of the proceeds take precedence over Art. 57 para. 1 CC. Subject to para. 3 (see N. 8), both the legal entities of the CO and those of the CC can therefore control the use of assets in the event of dissolution by private contract.
4 Notwithstanding the clear wording, the EHRA has recently taken the position that ultimate beneficiary clauses are inadmissible under foundation law (and would lead to the full nullity of the foundation). The practice under foundation law, which provides for the use of assets in the event of the dissolution of a (family) foundation and an entitlement of the founder or his or her legal successors, is widespread. The EHRA's view can be justified neither in terms of the wording nor with regard to the telos or the history of the legislation. It is based on the intention to prevent the statutory introduction of lifetime revocation or retrieval rights for the founder – as discussed in the context of the Schiesser parliamentary initiative and rejected in view of the principle of separation. Dogmatically, such “founder's rights” are, of course, to be clearly distinguished from a final beneficiary in the event of dissolution within the meaning of Art. 57 para. 1 CC; a blanket prohibition of asset allocation clauses in the event of dissolution of the foundation under Art. 88/89 CC cannot be derived from this under any circumstances.
2. Scope of application of the standard
5 The applicability of Art. 57 paras. 1 and 2 CC to immoral or illegal legal entities subsequently recognized is undisputed. By contrast, the proprietary consequences of the declaration of nullity of a legal entity that is illegal initially (Art. 52 para. 3 CC) are convoluted and the subject of a wide range of controversial opinions. Both case law and the majority of scholars (even if dissolution ex tunc is assumed) advocate the applicability of the liquidation rules also to initially defective legal entities, provided that these have already entered into relationships with third parties. Consequently, if the initial unlawfulness of a legal entity is subsequently established, liquidation must first be carried out to satisfy the debts (see the procedure in Art. 58 CC in conjunction with Art. 913 and 739 et seq. CO, and the commentary on Art. 58 in OK-Humbel, Art. 58 CC N. 5 et seq.)
6 Furthermore, the question of whether the distribution rules under Art. 57 CC also apply to legal entities with initially unlawful or immoral purposes is also disputed. The wording of Art. 57 CC speaks of a “dissolution” (French: “personnes morales dissoutes”, Italian: “sciolta una persona giuridica”), which implies a pre-existing legal entity. There are also good reasons, with regard to the wording and the purpose of the norm, not to apply Art. 57 paras. 1 and 2 CC to legal entities with founding defects: In the case of a legal entity that never came into existence, the assets can neither be used in accordance with the statutory provisions or the resolutions of the governing bodies (para. 1) nor “as closely as possible in accordance with its previous purpose” (para. 2). Nevertheless, there are those who would like to apply Art. 57 paras. 1 and 2 CC to legal entities with formation defects as well. These legal opinions refer primarily to two individual rulings by the Federal Supreme Court that related exclusively to the applicability of Art. 57 para. 3 CC and that were issued in the specific and politically influenced context of the acquisition of real estate by persons abroad.
7 Finally, it should be noted that, according to the opinion of the supreme court, Art. 57 paras. 1 and 2 CC are also applicable to family foundations.
B. Confiscation of assets (para. 3)
1. Normative content and systematic classification
8 The confiscation rule of Art. 57 para. 3 CC is a special provision, which – as far as can be seen – does not exist in this form in Switzerland's neighboring countries and which is therefore a “Helvetian unicum”. The teleological motivation for this is that those natural or legal persons who pursue an immoral or unlawful purpose through the use of a legal entity should not be able to dispose of the corresponding assets again or simply establish a new legal entity.
9 This state asset confiscation is to be understood as a lex specialis that takes precedence over any legal or statutory provisions regarding the use of assets when a legal entity is dissolved for pursuing immoral or unlawful purposes. In view of the far-reaching intervention in the property of the legal entity concerned, confiscation is only permissible as a last resort.
10 In conjunction with paras. 1 and 2, the following order of priority must therefore be followed when reviewing the use of assets after liquidation: (i) First, the conditions for the possible application of Art. 57 para. 3 CC and the associated confiscation of assets must be examined. (ii) Then any – statutory or statutory – orders under Art. 57 para. 1 CC must be examined. (iii) Finally, a possible surplus of assets in the sense of a rescue solution falls to the community.
2. Scope of the standard in general
11 The scope of application of Art. 57 para. 3 CC is controversial, not least because of the far-reaching effects of its application. The prevailing view in legal doctrine is that a comprehensive application of Art. 57 para. 3 CC to all legal entities with defective purposes is too far-reaching.
12 The various attempts to justify a reduction of this excessive provision can be summarized in three strands, although there may also be differences within the respective lines of argument: (a) The first line of argument interprets the criterion of “illegality of the purpose” restrictively; for an application of Art. 57 para. 3 CC, for example, a particular “reprehensibility” of the act or even a violation of ordre public is required. (b) Other authors would like to use the unlawful result caused by the accrual of assets as a criterion. (c) A third view ultimately favors confiscation of the assets of the persons behind the illegal or immoral legal entity. (d) Finally, a last group of authors is of the opinion that the solution approaches in (a)–(c) would artificially redefine the concept of illegality in order to mitigate the unsatisfactory results of Art. 57, para. 3 CC. It would seem more appropriate to interpret the confiscation rule as a winding-up provision similar to the law of unjust enrichment. This should contribute to the elimination of the unlawful situation while preserving the will of the parties and the other legitimate interests to the greatest extent possible (principle of the least possible interference). A liquidation norm is not to be interpreted in isolation, but in the light of the protective purpose of the norm establishing the unlawfulness. Based on this, the measures to eliminate the unlawful situation are to be derived.
3. Applicability also to initially void legal entities
a. Legal entities in general
13 The question also arises as to whether the confiscation rule under Art. 57 para. 3 CC also applies to initially void – because unlawful or immoral – legal entities. This has long been the subject of heated controversy. As is also the case with paras. 1 and 2, the wording of Art. 57 para. 3 CC indicates that Art. 57 para. 3 CC can only be applied in the event of a subsequent illegality, since the verb “to abolish” implies that the legal entity existed prior to this. The original materials as well as those of the revision in the context of the parliamentary initiative Schiesser (00.461) point in this direction. Nevertheless, the practice of the Federal Supreme Court has extended the (analogous) application of the confiscation rule to corporations under the CO as well as to legal entities with an initially illegal or immoral purpose. These rulings were handed down in the context of joint-stock companies that were set up to circumvent the provisions of the former Federal Act on the Control of Foreigners (or the current Foreign Nationals Act, ANRA).
b. Not applicable to family foundations
14 It is unclear whether these rulings handed down in the context of joint-stock companies also apply to family foundations. In rulings related to family foundations, handed down prior to the rulings on corporations under the CO, the Federal Court had explicitly exempted family foundations with a purpose that was in conflict with Art. 335, para. 1 CC from the scope of application of Art. 57, para. 3 CC. Whether the explicit exclusion of family foundations ordered by the Federal Supreme Court continues to apply despite its more recent case law is the subject of heated debate. Although the Federal Supreme Court did not make a reservation to that effect, doctrine and cantonal practice assume that Art. 57 para. 3 CC does not apply merely because the purpose of a foundation goes beyond the limits of Art. 335 para. 1 CC. We believe this is justified for the following reasons: First and foremost, in the case of “mere” or “simple” violations of Art. 335 para. 1 CC, the “particular reprehensibility” required by some legal scholars (see above N. 12) is lacking, unless further violations of the law are added. The description of permissible purposes in Art. 335, para. 1 CC does not constitute a sufficiently strict legal framework that could justify confiscation in the light of proportionality if these are exceeded, even unconsciously. Furthermore, the restriction of purpose of Art. 335, para. 1 CC is only intended to help a legislative assessment to be accepted, but is not a penalized standard (such as the provisions of the ANRA, for example).
15 If one assumes, in line with the prevailing view, that Art. 57 para. 3 CC does not apply to family foundations, the legal consequence of initial nullity is a reversion of the assets to the original founder or founders or their heirs or descendants. In the case of a fiduciary establishment of a foundation, the assets of an invalid family foundation do not pass to the fiduciary (formal founder), but to the beneficiary (beneficial founder).
16 In this context, the question arises as to how statutory succession clauses are to be dealt with in the event of initial nullity. As far as can be seen, this question is hardly dealt with in the literature. In our opinion, in the case of an initial nullity, the statutory reversion clauses do not apply due to the lack of actual formation of the legal entity, regardless of when one would like to set the effective date of a judgment of nullity: While a reversionary clause could never take effect in the case of a judgment with an ex tunc effect, this is also the case in the case of a ex nunc liquidation or the assumption of special assets, because this could only take place for reasons of protection of trust and in the external relationship. If the foundation charter contains a provision stating that the assets are to revert to the founder's heirs upon the dissolution of the foundation, this provision is irrelevant if it is null and void. In no case does the inclusion of such a provision in the foundation charter result in the foundation's nullity, especially since it leads to the same result as the reversion of assets as postulated by the prevailing legal opinion and case law.
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