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- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
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- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 para. 3-5 FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 16 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
- I. General information on Art. 142–149 CPC
- II. Commencement of the time limit (Art. 142 para. 1 CPC)
- III. Service by ordinary mail (Art. 142 para. 1bis CPC)
- IV. Calculation of time limits (Art. 142 para. 2 CPC)
- V. End of the time limit (Art. 142 para. 3 CPC)
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. General information on Art. 142–149 CPC
A. Time limits in the CPC
1 Time limits are the periods of time within which the parties and other participants in the proceedings must take procedural action, exercise a right, or make a declaration of intent. They thus serve to ensure the orderly conduct and expeditious completion of civil proceedings. In addition to the deadlines in civil proceedings, there are also a number of deadlines to which the deadline law of the CPC does not apply. For example, the calculation of the limitation and forfeiture periods under federal civil law is governed by the CC or the CO, and in proceedings before the Federal Supreme Court, the time limits under Art. 44–50 BGG apply (for more details, see Chapters I.C.2 and 3).
2 The CPC distinguishes between statutory and judicial time limits. A statutory deadline cannot generally be extended and its duration is determined by law. This contrasts with judicial deadlines, the duration of which is set by the court in each individual case and which can also be extended for sufficient reasons.
3 A further distinction is made between peremptory and dilatory deadlines. This distinction relates to the consequences of missing deadlines. In the case of peremptory deadlines – also known as exclusion periods – failure to meet the deadline results in forfeiture, i.e., any procedural action not taken within the deadline is invalid. A prime example of this is the deadline for appeals. Dilatory deadlines, on the other hand, do not result in a loss of rights, but do entail other legal disadvantages. For example, a first failure to meet the deadline for paying the advance on costs or providing security for the party's compensation does not immediately result in the dismissal of the action or the application, but merely in the setting of a grace period. In contrast to civil procedure law, public procedural law uses the terms peremptory and dilatory deadlines as synonyms for a statutory or judicial deadline.
4 The term “deadline in the broader sense” encompasses, on the one hand, the deadline in the narrower sense, i.e., the deadline measured in a specific period of time (by days, weeks, months, or years), but also, on the other hand, the deadline fixed on a specific calendar day (also known as a fixed deadline). Art. 142 para. 1 and 2 CPC are naturally not applicable to deadlines, but Art. 142 para. 3 CPC and Art. 143 ZPO must also be observed in this context.
B. Scope of application
5 Articles 142–149 CPC are generally applicable to all procedural deadlines within the scope of the CPC (Art. 1 f. CPC). Since January 1, 2025, this also includes the time limit under Art. 53 para. 3 CPC for exercising the right of reply, which is derived from Art. 29 para. 1 and 2 FC and Art. 6 no. 1 ECHR.
6 Due to the reference in Art. 31 SchKG, the provisions of the CPC also apply to the calculation, observance, and running of the deadlines of the SchKG, unless the SchKG provides otherwise. Special features – in particular for judicial matters under the SchKG – arise from this reservation with regard to the extension (Art. 33 para. 2 SchKG, only for parties to the proceedings residing abroad or in the case of public notification), restoration (Art. 33 para. 4 SchKG, only in the absence of fault) as well as the suspension of legal proceedings and the consideration of debt enforcement holidays (Art. 56 ff. SchKG and Art. 63 SchKG).
7 With regard to the time limits for bringing an action under the SchKG, the provisions of the CPC regarding their calculation, duration, and observance must also be taken into account on the basis of Art. 31 SchKG, subject to the deviations just mentioned, which result from the SchKG. With the revision of Art. 145 para. 4 CPC and Art. 56 para. 2 SchKG, the coordination of the suspension of time limits between the SchKG and the CPC will be improved by stipulating in both provisions that the provisions of the CPC on the suspension of time limits apply to all actions under the SchKG that are to be brought before a court. In simplified terms, only the provisions of the CPC are now applicable to all proceedings before a court and the provisions of the SchKG to all proceedings before an administrative or supervisory authority. For more details, see the commentary on Art. 145 CPC.
8 In international relations, the law applicable to procedural issues is in principle determined by the place of the court (lex fori processualis). Accordingly, the provisions of the CPC on time limits also apply to proceedings with a foreign connection. The same applies to appeals against declarations of enforceability (known as exequatur) under the Convention of October 30, 2007, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (LugÜ; SR 0.275.12), where the time limits of the state of enforcement apply. Within the framework of the Convention of October 25, 1980, on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (HKÜ; SR 0.211.230.02), Switzerland also applies the time limits set out in the CPC, as the HKÜ itself does not contain any specific provisions on the modalities of the running of time limits.
9 In addition to the provisions of the CPC, the European Convention of May 16, 1972, on the Calculation of Time Limits (EuFrÜb; SR 0.221.122.3) must be observed in both international and domestic cases (due to its nature as a directly applicable provision of international law, a so-called “self-executing” norm). In relation to Art. 142 CPC, the Convention contains only additions and no deviations in content.
C. Distinctions
1. Improper deadlines (procedural deadlines)
10 Deadlines in the CPC can be divided into actual and non-actual deadlines depending on their purpose and target audience. Actual deadlines are addressed to the parties (or third parties) and are set for them to perform a specific procedural act, exercise a right, or submit a declaration of intent (see Chapter I.A above). Non-proper deadlines (also known as procedural deadlines) are addressed to courts and other judicial bodies, whereby the law prescribes certain periods of time for them to perform official acts. An example of such a non-proper deadline is Art. 203 para. 1 CPC. This provision stipulates that the conciliation hearing must take place within two months of the conciliation request being filed. In the absence of procedural law, the seven-day collection period pursuant to Art. 138 para. 3 lit. a CPC after an unsuccessful delivery attempt is also considered an administrative deadline.
11 The deadline law of the CPC does not apply to improper deadlines. The only exception is probably the provision of Art. 142 CPC on the calculation of deadlines. Time limits cannot therefore be extended, nor do they stand still during certain periods.
2. Time limits in federal court proceedings
12 In proceedings before the Federal Supreme Court, it is not the time limits set out in Art. 142–149 CPC that apply, but the time limits set out in Art. 44–50 BGG. This must be taken into account in particular with regard to time limits for appeals to the Federal Supreme Court.
13 The time limits under the CPC were largely aligned with the previous federal court system. Art. 142 para. 1 CPC corresponds to Art. 44 para. 1 BGG, and Art. 142 para. 3 CPC corresponds almost word for word to Art. 45 para. 1 BGG. The same applies to Art. 143 para. 1 CPC, which corresponds to Art. 48 para. 1 BGG. The relevant commentaries on the Federal Supreme Court Act can therefore be consulted.
3. Substantive law deadlines
14 The calculation of a deadline is generally based on the law that sets the deadline. The calculation of the limitation periods and forfeiture periods under federal civil law is therefore not based on the provisions of the CPC, but on the CC or CO (unless the CPC is applicable by reference (analogously), e.g., in child and adult protection on the basis of Art. 450f CC). Such substantive legal deadlines include, for example, the one-month deadline for challenging association resolutions that violate the law or the articles of association (Art. 75 CC), the two-year separation period (Art. 292 para. 1 lit. a CPC in conjunction with Art. 114 CC), the relative and absolute limitation period for actions to contest the validity of a will (Art. 521 para. 1 CC), the probationary period under Art. 335b OR, and the two-month period for challenging resolutions of the general meeting of a stock corporation (Art. 706a para. 1 CO). Subject to statutory exceptions, they cannot be extended or reinstated, nor do they pause during court recesses.
15 Otherwise, there are only minor differences in the commencement, calculation, and observance of time limits (e.g., the relevance of public holidays at the place of residence or registered office of the plaintiff). However, according to Federal Supreme Court case law, time limits should be calculated using the same method, regardless of whether they arise from substantive law or procedural law. The decisive factor for compliance with substantive legal time limits for bringing an action is again the establishment of lis pendens in accordance with the CPC.
II. Commencement of the time limit (Art. 142 para. 1 CPC)
16 Time limits under civil procedure law are triggered by a notification or the occurrence of an event and begin to run on the following day.
A. Notifications triggering deadlines
17 With a “notification” within the meaning of Art. 142 para. 1 CPC, the court or the person entrusted with conducting the proceedings sets a deadline for the parties or participants in the proceedings, which is triggered immediately. Notifications triggering deadlines constitute procedural orders. These must be duly brought to the attention of the parties or their representatives, otherwise the deadline will not begin to run. In the case of effective representation, it is generally the representative's acknowledgment that is decisive, and not that of the represented party.
18 For proper notification, the order must be correctly served and, in the case of written service, delivered to the parties in a legally valid manner in accordance with Art. 138 ff. CPC. Written notifications require receipt but not acceptance. The decisive factor is therefore the time of arrival in the sphere of control of the addressee; actual receipt or acknowledgment is not required. In the case of multiple deliveries, the first legally compliant notification is generally considered to trigger the deadline.
19 The content that a (written) procedural order must have, or the formal requirements that must be met for a (written) procedural order to be served correctly, cannot be derived conclusively from Art. 238 CPC. The Federal Supreme Court has so far left open the question of whether the provisions of Art. 238 CPC also apply to procedural orders. However, an order may also be served orally (during a hearing).
20 Examples of notifications triggering the deadline: Setting a deadline for the payment of advances and securities (Art. 101 para. 1 CPC); Setting a deadline for responding to a claim or counterclaim and for any second exchange of documents (Art. 222 para. 1 CPC, Art. 224 para. 3 CPC, Art. 225 CPC); Setting of a grace period (Art. 101 para. 3 CPC, Art. 131 CPC, Art. 132 CPC, Art. 223 para. 1 CPC).
B. Occurrence of an event
21 As a rule, the party concerned is the first to become aware of an event triggering a deadline before bringing the matter before the court. Often, only the party itself knows the time of the event triggering the deadline and must therefore prove this and compliance with the deadline in the relevant proceedings.
22 Examples of events triggering deadlines: Knowledge of a reason for recusal triggers the deadline for filing a recusal request (Art. 49 para. 1 CPC); Withdrawal of a submission due to lack of jurisdiction or service of a decision not to hear the case triggers the deadline for resubmitting a submission (Art. 63 CPC); The occurrence of deemed service triggers the deadline for appealing against the decision in question (Art. 138 para. 3 lit. a CPC); The cessation of the reason for default triggers the deadline for filing a motion for reinstatement (Art. 148 para. 2 CPC); The discovery of a ground for review triggers the deadline for filing a motion for review (Art. 329 para. 1 CPC); The publication of the collocation plan triggers the deadline for filing a collocation action (Art. 250 para. 2 SchKG). In addition, the (certain) occurrence of a future event may also be used to trigger a court deadline (e.g., setting a deadline for commenting on a document that has yet to be edited).
C. Other circumstances triggering deadlines
23 Legal doctrine and case law are partly disagreeing as to whether a particular circumstance triggering a deadline should be classified as a notification or as the occurrence of an event. However, due to the uniform regulation of the start of the deadline for both notifications and events triggering deadlines, the dogmatic debate has no practical implications.
D. First day of the deadline
24 The day on which the notification triggering the deadline is made or a specific event triggering the deadline occurs is not taken into account when calculating the deadline. According to Art. 142 para. 1 CPC, the period does not begin to run until the following day. In this context, it is irrelevant whether this day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a recognized public holiday at the place of jurisdiction. However, the suspension of the period pursuant to Art. 145 CPC must be observed.
25 In the case of the EuFrÜb, however, the day on which the period begins to run (known as the “dies a quo”) coincides with the day of notification or the event triggering the period. Because the period begins at midnight (24:00) on the dies a quo, the day on which the period begins (dies a quo) is not included in the calculation (“dies a quo non computatur”). This corresponds to a basic principle of deadline law originating in Roman law, according to which deadlines are calculated in calendar days, i.e., periods between midnight and midnight (known as civil computation). Consequently, only days that are fully available (i.e., 24 hours) are counted. As a result, the provisions of Art. 142 para. 1 CPC and Art. 3 para. 1 EuFrÜb are not contradictory.
III. Service by ordinary mail (Art. 142 para. 1bis CPC)
26 In order to resolve the problem of delivering a notice triggering a deadline on a Saturday by “A-Post Plus” – and thus a deadline beginning on Sunday – the legislature has introduced a new delivery rule in Art. 142 para. 1bis CPC (in force since January 1, 2025). According to this, the delivery of notices triggering a deadline on a weekend or public holiday is only deemed to have taken place on the next working day. The deadline therefore begins to run on the following day, i.e., the first day after this working day. However, it is unclear to what extent this delivery rule is relevant for calculating deadlines under the CPC in the ordinary course of business of courts and other authorities. This is because, according to Art. 138 para. 1 CPC, the delivery of (procedural) orders – as with notifications triggering deadlines – is only permissible by registered mail or by other means against confirmation of receipt, which is not the case with the “A-Post Plus” shipping method.
IV. Calculation of time limits (Art. 142 para. 2 CPC)
A. Monthly time limits
27 The CPC only expressly regulates the calculation of monthly time limits. The number of months must be added to the month in which the time limit begins. The time limit ends on the last day of the month that has the same number as the day on which the time limit began. If there is no such day, the deadline ends on the last day of the month.
28 In legal doctrine and cantonal case law, there was controversy as to which day the monthly deadline begins to run, i.e., how paragraphs 1 and 2 of Art. 142 CPC are to be interpreted: According to the prevailing view, in accordance with the wording and structure of Art. 142 para. 2 CPC in conjunction with Art. 142 para. 1 CPC and Art. 2 and 4 no. 2 of the EuFrÜb, the date to be used is the date that corresponds numerically to the day following the notification or event that triggered the deadline. However, a few authors and the Cantonal Court of Schwyz considered Art. 142 para. 2 CPC in isolation from Art. 142 para. 1 CPC and regarded the event or notification triggering the deadline as decisive for determining the expiry of the deadline. Otherwise, in the case of one-month deadlines, the day on which the deadline begins would be counted twice and a deadline of one month plus one day would effectively be granted, which, among other things, would not be logical and would defeat the purpose of Art. 142 para. 2 CPC. The monthly deadline should therefore expire on the day that corresponds numerically to the day of the notification or event triggering the deadline.
29 In its decision BGE 150 III 367, the Federal Supreme Court clarified for the first time the question of calculating a deadline determined by months in accordance with Art. 142 para. 2 CPC, after the Federal Supreme Court's case law had long been inconsistent in this regard. In doing so, the Federal Supreme Court concurred with the minority opinion. Accordingly, Art. 142 para. 2 CPC is to be interpreted in the sense that the “day on which the period began to run” is not governed by Art. 142 para. 1 CPC, but refers to the day of the event triggering the period. For the calculation of a time limit in months, the relevant reference point for the start of the time limit is therefore the date of the event or the date of the notification triggering the time limit itself.
30 Example: If the notification triggering the period is delivered on January 15, a three-month period begins on the same day and ends on April 15, provided that this is not a Saturday, Sunday, or recognized public holiday (Art. 142 para. 3 CPC) and no suspension of the period is to be taken into account (Art. 145 CPC). If the notification triggering the deadline or the event triggering the deadline takes place on August 31, a three-month period ends on November 30, provided that this is not a Saturday, Sunday, or recognized public holiday and no suspension of the period is to be taken into account.
31 Finally, it should be noted that a one-month period is not to be equated with or confused with a 30-day period (see Chapter IV.B below).
B. Daily deadlines
32 Daily deadlines are set more frequently than monthly deadlines. Neither the CPC nor the EuFrÜb contain any explicit provisions on how to calculate deadlines determined by days. According to doctrine and case law, the start of the deadline defined in Art. 142 para. 1 ZPO must be used as a basis, and the individual days must then be counted. Every day is counted, i.e. including Saturdays, Sundays, and recognized public holidays. However, a suspension of the deadline must also be taken into account during the current deadline (Art. 145 CPC).
33 Example: A court injunction was announced on April 2 and posted on the property. The 30-day period for lodging an objection with the court therefore begins on April 3 and ends on May 2 (day 30), provided that this is not a Saturday, Sunday, or recognized public holiday (Art. 142 para. 3 CPC) and no suspension of the period is to be taken into account (Art. 145 CPC).
C. Hourly, weekly, and annual deadlines
34 Hourly deadlines rarely occur in civil proceedings, unlike in criminal proceedings. Otherwise, the exact number of hours must be added to the start of the deadline, which generally begins at midnight on the day in question.
35 Example: A 12-hour deadline set by the court begins at midnight on the day of service of the relevant procedural order and ends at 12 noon on the following day, provided that this is not a Saturday, Sunday, or recognized public holiday (Art. 142 para. 3 CPC) and no suspension of the deadline is to be taken into account (Art. 145 CPC).
36 The calculation of weekly deadlines is also not expressly regulated in the CPC. The court may nevertheless set a weekly deadline. As with the monthly deadline, this ends on the day of the last week that has the same name as the day of the notification or event triggering the deadline.
37 Example: If the legally valid notification of a court-set period of two weeks was delivered on a Monday, the period begins on the same day and ends two weeks later, again on a Monday, provided that this is not a recognized public holiday (Art. 142 para. 3 CPC) and no suspension of the period is to be taken into account (Art. 145 CPC).
38 Annual deadlines are rare in the CPC (e.g., Art. 329 para. 2 CPC) and have therefore presumably not been subject to any legal regulation regarding their calculation. In the case of an annual deadline, the exact number of years is added to the dies a quo (analogous to Art. 142 para. 2 CPC for the calculation of monthly deadlines). According to the latest Federal Supreme Court case law, the last day of an annual period bears the same number as the day of the notification or event triggering the period.
39 Example: The ten-year revision period under Art. 329 para. 2 CPC is triggered on the day a substantive decision becomes final. If the decision became final on April 10, 2022, the period ends on April 10, 2032, provided that this is not a Saturday, Sunday, or recognized public holiday (Art. 142 para. 3 CPC) and no suspension of the period is to be taken into account (Art. 145 CPC).
V. End of the time limit (Art. 142 para. 3 CPC)
40 Procedural time limits end at midnight (12 a.m.) on the last day, unless otherwise specified and no suspension of the time limit is to be taken into account (Art. 145 CPC). Court deadlines may also be set for a specific time of day (e.g., a specific time on a specific day or the start of a specific hearing). This may be particularly useful in super-provisional measures proceedings (Art. 265 CPC).
41 Art. 142 para. 3 CPC contains a statutory extension of time: if the last day of a statutory or judicial deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a public holiday recognized by federal or cantonal law at the place of the court, it ends on the next working day. This also applies if the end of a judicial deadline has been expressly (and erroneously) set on a specific date on a weekend or public holiday. However, Saturdays, Sundays, or recognized public holidays only affect the end of a deadline; if the deadline is ongoing, they must be counted and do not extend the deadline. The same principle is also contained in Art. 5 EuFrÜb, although the EuFrÜb itself does not specify any public holidays.
42 Public holidays must be recognized by the state at the place of jurisdiction in order to extend the end of a deadline. The only public holiday recognized by federal law is August 1. Cantonal public holidays require an explicit basis in cantonal law in the form of a general abstract norm of public law. However, Art. 142 para. 3 CPC includes not only statutory public holidays, but also days that are treated as statutory public holidays under cantonal law. A basis in municipal law alone is not sufficient. Local celebrations (at municipal or district level) can only influence the deadline (including in Federal Supreme Court proceedings) if they are expressly recognized by cantonal law or if their recognition under municipal law is based on an explicit cantonal enabling provision (e.g., found in the respective cantonal public holiday or court organization laws). To date, there has been no such cantonal recognition or authorization for the afternoons of Sechseläuten and Knabenschiessen in the city of Zurich or for Güdismontag in the city of Lucerne, which is why these local celebrations do not extend a running deadline.
43 The list of “Public holidays and days treated as public holidays in Switzerland” (as of January 1, 2011) compiled by the Federal Office of Justice on the basis of Art. 11 EuFrÜb provides an overview of the relevant public holidays in the cantons. However, according to the majority opinion, the list only has declaratory effect. As a precaution, it is therefore advisable to check with the relevant authority, especially as there are also differences within certain cantons (e.g., in the canton of Solothurn due to St. Joseph's Day (March 19) and the patron saint's day celebrations, or in the canton of Fribourg with regard to Corpus Christi, Assumption Day (August 15), All Saints' Day (November 1), and the Immaculate Conception (December 8).
Bibliography
Abbet Stéphane, Kommentierung zu Art. 142 ZPO, in: Chabloz Isabelle/Dietschy-Martenet Patricia/Heinzmann Michel (Hrsg.), Petit commentaire Code de procédure civile, Basel 2020.
Amstutz Kathrin/Arnold Peter, Kommentierung zu Art. 44 und 45 BGG, in: Niggli Marcel Alexander/Uebersax Peter/Wiprächtiger Hans/Kneubühler Lorenz (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Bundesgerichtsgesetz, 3. Aufl., Basel 2018 (zit. BSK-Amstutz/Arnold).
Benn Jurij, Kommentierung zu Art. 142 ZPO, in: Spühler Karl/Tenchio Luca/Infanger Dominik (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, 4. Aufl., Basel 2024 (zit. BSK-Benn).
Ernst Wolfgang/Oberholzer Serafin/Sunaric Predrag, Fristen und Fristberechnung im Zivilprozess (ZPO – BGG – SchKG), 2. Aufl., Zürich/St. Gallen 2021.
Frei Nina J., Kommentierung zu Art. 142 ZPO, Berner Kommentar, Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, Art. 1–149 ZPO, Band I, Bern 2012 (zit. BK-Frei).
Fuchs Nicolas, Kommentierung zu Art. 142, 143 und 144 ZPO, in: Sutter-Somm Thomas/Lötscher Cordula/Leuenberger Christoph/Seiler Benedikt (Hrsg.), Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), 4. Aufl., Zürich 2025 (zit. ZK-Fuchs).
Gasser Dominik/Rickli Brigitte/Josi Christian, Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung Kurzkommentar, 3. Aufl., Zürich/St. Gallen 2024.
Hoffmann-Nowotny Urs H./Brunner Katrin, Kommentierung zu Vorb. zu Art. 142–149 ZPO und zu Art. 142 ZPO, in: Oberhammer Paul/Domej Tanja/Haas Ulrich (Hrsg.), Kurzkommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, 3. Aufl., Basel 2021.
Honegger-Müntener Patrick/Rufibach Matthias/Schumann Julius, Die Revision der ZPO, AJP 10 (2023), S. 1157–1180.
Jenny Reto M./Abegg Mike, Kommentierung zu Art. 142 ZPO, in: Gehri Myriam A./Jent-Sørensen Ingrid/Sarbach Martin (Hrsg.), Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung, 3. Aufl., Zürich 2023 (zit. OFK-Jenny/Abegg).
Leuch Georg/Marbach Omar/Kellerhals Franz/Sterchi Martin, Die Zivilprozessordnung für den Kanton Bern, 5. Aufl., Bern 2000.
Spühler Karl, Kommentierung zu Art. 142 ZPO, in: Spühler Karl (Hrsg.), Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung Kurzkommentar, Zürich/Genf 2023.
Staehelin Daniel/Von Mutzenbecher Florence, Die Revision der ZPO vom 17.3.2023, SJZ 119 (2023), S. 815–833.
Sutter-Somm Thomas/Seiler Benedikt, Kommentierung zu Art. 142 ZPO; in: Sutter-Somm Thomas/Seiler Benedikt (Hrsg.), Handkommentar zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung, Zürich 2021 (zit. CHK-Sutter-Somm/Seiler).
Tanner Martin, Kommentierung zu Art. 142, 145 und 146 ZPO, in: Brunner Alexander/Schwander Ivo/Vischer Moritz (Hrsg.), Kommentar Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, Art. 1–196 ZPO, 3. Aufl., Zürich/St. Gallen 2024.
Tappy Denis, Kommentierung zu Art. 142 ZPO, in: Bohnet François/Haldy Jacques/Jeandin Nicolas/Schweizer Philippe/Tappy Denis, Commentaire romand Code de procédure civile, 2. Aufl., Basel 2019 (zit. CR-Tappy).
Weber Philipp, Monatsfristen nach ZPO: Dörfs es bitzeli meh sii?, Juslettter 19.3.2012.
Materials
Protokoll der Sondersession des Nationalrats vom 10.5.2022 (Zweitrat), Amtliches Bulletin 2022 S. 669 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=56920, besucht am 14.9.2025.