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- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
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- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
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- Art. 38 PRA
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- Art. 40 PRA
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- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
I. History, systematics and importance of the provision
1 As indicated by its title, which is virtually identical in all three language versions, Art. 13 deals with the determination of (federal) voting results, in that it lays down a number of rules relating to the determination of such results. Like the other provisions of Title 2, art. 13 applies - as already noted - only to (federal) votes, and not to elections. The determination and recording of election results are governed by other provisions of the law.
2 The provision already existed in part, in the sense that it was much shorter, in the original version of the law in 1976, when it contained only one paragraph, virtually identical to the current paragraph 1, which dealt with blank and invalid ballot papers and which had been taken over without any change from the Federal Council's proposals.
3 Paragraph 2, which deals with the case of equal "yes" and "no" votes in a canton during a federal vote, was not introduced until some twenty years later, by a partial revision of the law on political rights, adopted on June 21, 1996 and which came into force on January 1, 1997. In this respect, the two chambers adopted the Federal Council's proposals in their entirety, without discussion.
4 Paragraph 3, which governs the recounting of votes in the event of a close result, was introduced some twenty years later in a partial revision of the law, the main purpose of which was to adapt the legislation governing elections to the National Council, but which also included a number of other amendments. This revision was adopted on September 26, 2014 and came into force on November 1, 2015. Here too, the Chambers adopted the Federal Council's proposal for a new paragraph 3 without change, but not without discussion.
5 The text of Art. 13 remains unchanged. In terms of structure, the provision comprises three paragraphs. The first deals with the fate of blank and invalid ballots, the second with the question of a possible tie between "yes" and "no" votes in a canton during a federal vote, while the third lays down a rule on the recounting of votes in the event of a close result in such a vote. We will return to each of these paragraphs in the commentary proper (section II).
6 As regards the importance of the provision in general, we refer to what has already been said in the commentary on art. 10, 10a and 11, namely that, given the significance of popular votes in the Swiss constitutional and political system, with its very high degree of direct democracy, the rules governing the organization of ballots are of fundamental importance. Reference can also be made to what was said in the commentary on art. 12: like art. 12, art. 13 must be linked to the dimension of the freedom to vote - guaranteed by art. 34 Cst. - which concerns the right that no voting result "shall be recognized if it does not express the free will of the electorate", the right, in other words, to the correct establishment and ascertainment of the results or, more precisely, in the words of the Federal Court, a "right to a regular execution of the ballot [...] as well as the right to an exact and precise counting of the votes". As already mentioned in relation to art. 12, this right gives rise to a requirement for precision in the qualification, sorting and counting of ballot papers, which must carefully distinguish and separate invalid or invalid ballot papers, blank ballot papers and valid ballot papers, as also prescribed by art. 14 LDP, to which we shall return later.
7 All cantons have provisions similar to art. 13, which deal with the fate of blank and invalid ballots, and, less frequently, with recounts in the event of a close result.
II. Commentary
A. Paragraph 1: fate of blank and invalid ballots
1. The meaning of the rule
8 Para. 1, which dates back to the original 1976 version, therefore lays down the rule that "blank and invalid ballot papers shall not be taken into consideration in determining the result of the vote". The Federal Council's message explained the ratio legis of this rule as follows:
"A constitutional amendment comes into force when the majority of voters and the majority of cantons have accepted the project (art. 123 Cst.). A federal law or decree of general application is accepted if the majority of voters have voted in favor of it. The decisive (absolute) majority is determined on the basis of the number of valid ballots cast. Blank and invalid ballots are not taken into account.
9 Expressed more precisely, the rule in art. 13 para. 1 therefore means that invalid and blank ballots are not taken into account in determining the results of a vote, but rather in determining the result, i.e. the majority that accepts or rejects the object put to the vote, with only ballots (not invalid) containing a "yes" or "no" being taken into account for this purpose.
10 A careful distinction must therefore be made between two things: the counting of invalid and blank ballots in determining the results of a vote, and the counting of invalid and blank ballots, which, as stipulated in art. 14 para. 1 LDP, both of which must be counted separately in the minutes of the vote; and, secondly, these invalid and blank ballots must be taken into account in determining and calculating the majority, which determines the outcome of the vote, i.e. the acceptance or rejection of the matter put to the vote. However, it is precisely this consideration, and this consideration alone, that art. 13 para. 1 of the LDP excludes.
11 As indicated, this rule applies only to (federal) votes, and not to elections, for which other rules exist in federal law.
12 While the rule that spoiled ballots are not taken into account in determining the results of a vote is fairly obvious, it is perhaps less so, a priori, in the case of blank ballots. At least, it is sometimes discussed or fought against, by those who campaign for the "blank vote" to be taken into account, a movement that caused a stir in France, particularly on the sidelines of the 2017 presidential election, but which also had a certain echo in Switzerland, even if the movement seems to have lost some of its momentum. The question therefore deserves a brief detour.
2. Excursus: the question of how to take the "white vote" into account
13 Activists in favor of recognizing the blank vote, which they see as a protest vote, believe that blank ballots should be taken into account in voting and election results. Such an unqualified demand calls for a number of comments.
14 First of all, if it is simply a question of counting blank votes or ballots and announcing their number with the proclamation or publication of the results, the demand is not problematic. In Switzerland, as we have seen, it has already generally been put into practice. In fact, at federal level, the law on political rights stipulates, for both votes and elections to the National Council, that the minutes must indicate "the number of blank ballots", respectively "the number of blank [...] ballots" and "the number of blank votes". The number of blank ballots, like the number of invalid ballots, is mentioned, by canton and globally, in the publication of voting results, and always has been.
15 If, on the other hand, the aim is to take blank votes into account when establishing the result itself, the demand is only partially admissible and likely to be put into practice: it is without too much difficulty in two-round majority elections, where it is quite possible to take blank votes into account when calculating the absolute majority in the first round, which has the effect of raising this absolute majority and thus making it more difficult to achieve. This is a political choice, which some cantons have made for the election of their government, or indeed for all elections, by a two-round majority system. This is the case, for example, in the cantons of Vaud and Geneva. But, as we have seen, this is not the case for the Confederation for the election of the Federal Council, even though such a consideration had been requested, by way of a motion, subsequently withdrawn, in 2015-2016.
16 It seems much more delicate - not to say inadmissible - to take blank ballots into account in other elections (first-past-the-post, where a relative majority is sufficient, or proportional representation), and it is even less admissible in votes on a concrete object, votes whose outcome is, by definition, binary and results in a yes or a no. If blank votes were to be taken into account in determining the result, they could only be counted as either "no" or "yes" votes, which not only fails to reflect the will of those who voted blank, but also runs counter to the principle of equality between "yes" and "no" votes. Alternatively, as is sometimes proposed, a certain percentage of blank votes should have the effect of cancelling the ballot, thereby consolidating the status quo or, in the case of elections, creating blocking mechanisms.
17 It must therefore be admitted - and this seems obvious - that, for votes at least, people who vote "blank" (or "invalid") do indeed participate in the vote, but only formally, and not materially: their vote can and must be counted as such, but it cannot be taken into account in determining the result. This is the case under federal law.
18 It is also the case in almost all cantons, with one exception worth noting. In the canton of Valais, art. 106 of the Constitution of March 8, 1907, which requires "an absolute majority of the citizens having taken part in the vote" for constitutional amendments, is still interpreted today as meaning that blank votes are to be considered as "no" votes, which is problematic from the point of view of the freedom and equality of the vote. After initially adopting the same rule, the Valais Constituent Assembly finally abandoned it, returning to the "absolute majority of valid votes" solution in its draft of the new cantonal constitution of April 25, 2023.
B. Paragraph 2: the case of equal "yes" and "no" votes in a canton
19 The second paragraph of Art. 13, added in 1996 and taken over unchanged by the Chambers from the Federal Council's proposals, stipulates that "[i]f an object receives an equal number of "yes" and "no" votes in a canton, that canton shall be deemed to have rejected that object". The Federal Council's message commented on this new provision as follows:
"Paragraph 2 (new) is intended to clarify that, if a text submitted to a vote receives an equal number of yes and no votes in a canton, the canton is considered to have rejected the object. For the record, the Federal Assembly, in connection with the results obtained by the Canton of Schwyz in the popular vote of May 4, 1913 on the constitutional article on epidemics and epizootics - 1074 yes votes to 1074 no votes - felt authorized to declare the result null and void (FF 1913 III 479 and RO 29 [1913] 177 ff.), whereas it should have adhered to the meaning of the constitution and counted the Canton of Schwyz among the cantons that rejected the text. Article 123, paragraph 1, Cst. requires that a majority of the cantons have accepted a revision of the constitution."
20 The rule or clarification thus enshrined in law - as a result of a much earlier error on the part of the Federal Assembly - was in fact unnecessary insofar as, as the Federal Council points out, Art. 123 para. 1 of the old Federal Constitution already provided that a constitutional revision could only come into force if it was accepted by a double majority of the people and the cantons. The new Constitution is even more explicit and exhaustive, in Art. 142, specifying that "[a]cts submitted to a vote of the people shall be accepted by a majority of the voters" (para. 1) and that "[a]cts submitted to a vote of the people and the cantons shall be accepted when a majority of the voters and a majority of the cantons approve them" (para. 2), it being understood that, in this case, "[t]he result of the popular vote in a canton represents the vote of that canton" (para. 3). Insofar as the majority required in such a case of a vote on a specific subject, i.e. an absolute majority, implies half plus one of the votes (validly) cast, a situation where there is an equality of "yes" and "no" votes in a canton means, by definition, that the said majority has not been reached, and the subject submitted to the vote must therefore be considered as rejected in the canton in question.
21 It should also be remembered that the situation is the same in double-majority votes when the votes of the cantons are equal at federal level, i.e. when an object put to the vote is accepted by 11 ½ cantons and rejected by 11 ½ cantons: in this case, as the absolute majority (of the cantons) is not reached, the object is rejected, a situation that has occurred twice in history to date, in 1866 and 1975.
22 Finally, it should be remembered that the situation is different in the event of a tie in an election, where a draw is often foreseen, which is not the case in voting.
C. Paragraph 3: the question of recounts
23 The third paragraph of art. 13 was added, as mentioned, in 2014. The aim and purpose of this addition was to lay down a new rule on the recounting of votes in the event of a close or very close result in a vote. As is clear from the Federal Council's message, the innovation was in fact intended to react to - and counteract - the equally new case law of the Federal Supreme Court, which in a 2009 ruling, based on a number of legal writings, considered that "a very close vote result [should] be treated as an 'irregularity' within the meaning of art. 77 para. 1 let. d LDP". In other words, according to this ruling, which concerned the federal vote of May 17, 2009 on the biometric passport, a very close result in a vote was to lead to a recount, automatically as it were, without the need to make it likely that irregularities had occurred in establishing the results. The Federal Supreme Court's ruling thus represented a reversal of the practice hitherto followed by the federal authorities, and by the Federal Supreme Court itself, according to which a close result alone did not constitute an "irregularity" within the meaning of art. 77 of the LDP, requiring a recount, a practice that was confirmed when the new law on political rights was adopted in 1976.
24 The idea of the new paragraph 3 added in 2014 was therefore to go back on this case law and allow "a return to the will of the historic legislator" and thus "eliminate the legal uncertainty linked to the Federal Court ruling", which moreover "did not specify the limit between a 'close result' and a 'very close result'". The Federal Council's message also emphasized the conceptual and practical difficulties that could arise from the Federal Court's new ruling:
"A very close result, whether at cantonal or federal level, shows that a project is highly controversial. To deduce that it is the result of irregularities is to ignore the fact that it is precisely highly controversial issues that make polling station officials and scrutineers mutually more attentive to possible manipulation. In such circumstances, the media are equally vigilant. Moreover, it may well be that a very close result at federal level is the sum of clear but very contrasting cantonal results. How can the recount be centralized in such a case? Who should do it, and when? The personnel, time and space required for a recount should not be underestimated. It should be carried out at the same time throughout Switzerland, and partial results should be communicated at the same time, to avoid a cascade of doubts, speculation and suspicions that could only trigger further appeals. What's more, how can the cantons that have adopted a militia system for the vote count summon sufficient personnel in such a short space of time? Otherwise, the outcome of the vote would remain uncertain for weeks. According to art. 5, para. 2 of the Constitution, state activity must be proportionate. A recount of the result of a close cantonal ballot by the federal authority in the absence of indications suggesting an irregularity would therefore only be compatible with this principle if the result were extremely close at federal level too."
25 In light of this argument, the Federal Council also stated:
"The Political Institutions Committee of the National Council did not wish to follow the Federal Court in its attempt to equate a 'very close' election result with an irregularity [...]. On the contrary, it wants to ensure that the will expressed by the historic legislator (votes are only recounted if there is convincing evidence to suggest an irregularity) is respected. We want to ensure that the same will apply in the future. In view of the Federal Court's ruling, it would therefore be appropriate to explicitly enshrine the legislator's wishes in law. In addition, a legal basis must be created for the observation of the proper conduct of elections (see below, commentary on art. 85 of the LDP).
26 In fact, the 2013 draft revision also provided for the introduction of a new art. 85 of the Political Rights Act, on the "Observation of ballots", in parallel with and as a sort of compensation for the tightening of the rule on recounts. This provision was intended, among other things, to oblige the cantons to lay down rules on the observation of ballots. However, despite lengthy opposition from the Council of States, which wished to follow the Federal Council's lead and only agreed to the deletion after lengthy debate and lip service in the third round, the chambers did not adopt the provision, following the majority of the National Council Commission, which had proposed deleting it.
27 Academic opinion was divided on the issue of the recount, as well as on this "return to previous practice", decided by the Federal Assembly and considered by some to be questionable from a constitutional point of view, more specifically in terms of its conformity with art. 34 para. 2 of the Constitution. The solution does not appear unreasonable, however, insofar as close or very close results in popular votes are not an uncommon phenomenon, especially in recent times: according to statistics compiled by one author in 2021, of the 637 federal votes held between 1848 and 2020, five produced a result between 49.9% and 50.1% (all between 2000 and 2020), eleven between 49.5% and 50.5% and fourteen between 49% and 51%. Yet, as this author points out, "[t]he corollary of the democratic process is the possibility that votes may produce close results, which must be accepted without being questioned on the basis of even the slightest difference in votes".
28 In any case, a few months before the new paragraph 3 came into force on November 1, 2015, the Federal Supreme Court had the opportunity to rule once again on the issue, in a decision of August 19, 2015, concerning another federal vote, that of the referendum on the Radio and Television Act, put to the vote on June 14, 2015. At that time, it also went back - referring in particular to the new art. 13 para. 3 LDP already adopted, but not yet in force - and clarified that an obligation to recount in the event of a very close result follows directly from art. 34 para. 2 of the Constitution only if the citizen complaining is able to point to concrete evidence of an erroneous count or of conduct contrary to the law by the authority; the mere fact that the result is (very) close is not enough.
29 In federal law, therefore, the situation is now clear: a close or very close result is not, in itself, grounds for a recount: it is still necessary, as the text of art. 13 para. 3 states, that "it has been made likely that irregularities have occurred and that their nature and extent could have significantly influenced the result at federal level".
30 This is not always the case in the cantons, some of which recognize a right to a recount in the event of close or very close results, irrespective of the existence of indications or suspicions of irregularities. Thus, for example, art. 27 of the Political Rights Act of the Canton of Berne provides that "votes shall be recounted if the result of a vote [...] is very close" (para. 1) and specifies that "the result of a vote is deemed to be very close when the difference between the yeas and the nays is less than or equal to 0.1 percent of the votes validly cast [...]" (para. 2). [...]" (para. 2, 1st sentence). A few other cantons (e.g. Graubünden, Schaffhausen, Zurich and St. Gallen) have similar regulations, sometimes with different thresholds (often between 0.1 and 0.3%), sometimes without specifying a threshold; the majority of cantons, however, adhere to a rule similar to that in federal law, namely that a close or very close result is not sufficient, as evidence of irregularity(ies) is required to justify a recount.
31 Under federal law, therefore, to justify a recount, there must be evidence or suspicion of irregularities, and the nature and extent of these irregularities must have had a significant influence on the federal result. According to case law, the irregularities in question are those affecting the counting of votes, for which there must be "concrete evidence of an erroneous count or of unlawful conduct on the part of the competent body". The Federal Court has made it clear that the closer the outcome of the vote, the less stringent the requirements for proof of such irregularities. In any case, however, even when the result is close, mere references to errors that have already been corrected are not sufficient to justify a recount, provided that these errors remain within the scope of the usual minor counting and reporting errors that exist in any recount, and do not point to any particular events that might have influenced the result.
32 With regard to the nature, or seriousness, and extent of these irregularities, which must be such as to have "significantly influenced the result at federal level", the question of a recount must be distinguished from those of the repetition of a vote that took place in an assembly or a Landsgemeinde, as well as from the annulment of a vote, again, in both cases, due to irregularities found. As far as the annulment of votes is concerned, it should be remembered that, according to case law, "[w]here irregularities are found in the counting of votes, the vote is annulled only on the twofold condition that the violation found is serious and that it may have had an influence on the outcome of the vote. In particular, the difference in votes, the seriousness of the procedural defects and their impact on the vote as a whole must be taken into account. If the possibility of a different result had the procedure not been flawed is so slight that it cannot be seriously considered, the vote should not be annulled; otherwise, the flaw should be considered serious and the vote annulled. When the difference in votes is very clear, only serious irregularities are likely to call into question the validity of the result of the vote".
33 As far as the recount is concerned, and in the case of a federal vote, any irregularities must, as specified in art. 13 para. 3 of the LDP, have been such as to influence the outcome of the vote "at federal level". In other words, even if such irregularities could in themselves justify a recount in a canton (or in two or more cantons), where the result was presumably close, there is no need, under art. 13 para. 3, for a recount if the result is clear at federal level. This brings us back to the aforementioned idea of proportionality: a recount of "the result of a close cantonal ballot by the federal authority [...] would [...] only be compatible with this principle [of proportionality] if the result were also extremely close at federal level".
34 Nonetheless, this provision raises a slight difficulty of interpretation with regard to art. 79 of the LDP, especially paragraphs 2 and 2bis, provisions which predate the introduction of art. 13 para. 3 and which deal with the competences and powers of the first-instance appeal authority, i.e. the cantonal government, in disputes concerning votes. According to art. 79 para. 2, which dates back to the original version of the law in 1976, "[w]hen it finds irregularities as a result of an appeal or ex officio, [the cantonal government] shall, as far as possible before the close of the election or vote, take measures to remedy the defects found". Paragraph 2bis, introduced with the revision of March 18, 1994, already specified that, however, "the cantonal government shall reject the appeal without examining the case further if it finds that the irregularities invoked are neither of such a nature nor of such importance that they could have decisively influenced the main result of the vote or election" (para. 2bis). Although not explained in the message, this provision was undoubtedly already based on the idea of proportionality. The question remains, however, whether art. 13 para. 3 governs only cases of recount by the federal authority and whether, on the basis of art. 79 para. 2, a cantonal government could not, or even should not, order a recount if it finds serious or massive irregularities in the canton, likely to undermine citizens' confidence in the canton, even if there seems to be no doubt about the outcome of the vote at federal level. Or if, on the contrary, art. 13 para. 3 alone, in addition to art. 79 para. 2bis, further restricts the powers of the cantonal government and also rules out a recount by the cantonal authority in such a case.
35 It should also be pointed out that, according to the jurisprudence of the Federal Court in cantonal voting matters, when the result of a vote is very close but a recount is not or no longer possible, due to the destruction of (part of) the ballot papers, for example, the vote must be repeated.
36 In the case of a federal vote, the legal remedies for a possible recount are those set out in articles 77 and 80 of the LDP, i.e. an appeal to the cantonal government concerned within three days of discovery of the grounds for appeal (but no later than the third day after publication of the results in the canton's official gazette), followed by an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court against the cantonal decision, an appeal in matters of public law, within five days, in accordance with articles 82 let. c, 88 al. 1 let. b and 100 al. 3 let. b LTF.
The author would like to thank Mr. Beat Kuoni, legal expert in the Political Rights Department of the Federal Chancellery, for his careful review of this contribution and his valuable suggestions.
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