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- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
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- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
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- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
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- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
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- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. Overview
- II. Content of the payment order (para. 1)
- III. Rent/leasehold freeze (para. 2)
- Bibliography
I. Overview
1 Art. 152 SchKG regulates two things:
After receipt of the debt enforcement request, the debt enforcement office issues the payment order without undue delay (Art. 69 para. 1 and Art. 152 para. 1 SchKG) in order to serve it on the debtor being pursued and on any co-debtors (Art. 153 SchKG; see also Art. 71 para. 1 SchKG). The content of the payment order is primarily determined in accordance with Art. 69 para. 2 SchKG; Art. 152 para. 1 SchKG provides for some special features for the enforcement of a pledge (see the marginal note; N. 2 et seq.).
If there are rental or lease agreements on the pledged property, the enforcing pledgee can apply for a so-called rent/leasehold freeze; the tenants/leaseholders must be notified of this (Art. 152 para. 2 SchKG; n. 23 et seq.).
II. Content of the payment order (para. 1)
A. Preliminary remarks
2 Art. 69 para. 2 and Art. 152 para. 1 SchKG govern the content of the order for payment. First of all, the order for payment must contain the details of the debt enforcement application (Art. 69 para. 2 no. 1 SchKG): Art. 67 and Art. 151 para. 1 SchKG specify to the enforcing pledgee what information she must include in the request (in detail OK-Paydar, Art. 151 SchKG N. 21 et seq.); in particular, the enforcing party must specify the object of the pledge (see N. 5 et seq.) and the persons involved (enforcing pledgee, enforced debtor and any third-party pledgees). Furthermore, the order for payment must contain the request that the debtor being pursued must satisfy the debtor for the claim and debt enforcement costs within a certain period of time (Art. 69 para. 2 no. 2 SchKG); in deviation from the ordinary initiation procedure, the law stipulates longer payment periods for debt enforcement for the realization of liens (Art. 152 para. 1 no. 1 SchKG; see n. 7 et seq.). The order for payment must also state that the debtor may lodge an objection within ten days of service of the order for payment (Art. 69 para. 2 no. 3 SchKG). Finally, the order for payment must contain the threat that the pledged property will be realized if the debtor does not comply with the order for payment or does not lodge an objection (Art. 152 para. 1 no. 2 SchKG; see n. 16 f.).
3 The debtor can complain about deficiencies in the content of the payment order by means of an appeal in accordance with Art. 17 SchKG. In exceptional cases, a defect may lead to the order for payment being null and void.
4 Model form no. 3a (realization of pledge) or 3b (realization of mortgage) must be used for the payment order.
B. Object of the pledge
5 The enforcing pledgee must describe the object of the pledge as precisely as possible in its debt enforcement request (see OK-Paydar, Art. 151 SchKG N. 24) so that the debt enforcement office can incorporate this information into the order for payment. If the order for payment lacks information on the pledged object, its subsequent realization is inadmissible.
6 In principle, the debt enforcement office does not examine the material existence of the alleged lien (see also OK-Paydar, Art. 151 SchKG N. 25).
C. Payment deadlines (para. 1 no. 1)
1. Preliminary remarks
7 In ordinary debt enforcement proceedings, the payment period to be set is twenty days (Art. 69 para. 2 no. 2 SchKG). The law provides for longer payment periods in debt enforcement proceedings for the realization of liens (Art. 151 para. 1 no. 1 SchKG):
one month in the enforcement of liens (cf. Art. 37 para. 2 SchKG)
six months for the realization of real property liens (cf. Art. 37 para. 1 SchKG)
8 The longer payment periods in debt enforcement for lien realization are justified by the fact that the period between service of the payment order and the realization stage is shortened (the attachment stage is omitted in lien realization proceedings). The debtor should also have sufficient time to pay off the claim of the enforcing creditor and thus avert the realization of the pledged object. Accordingly, the debt collector cannot take any further enforcement action before the payment deadline (cooling-off period) has expired. In other words, the application for realization is only admissible after the deadline has expired (see Art. 154 para. 1 SchKG; see also n. 14).
2. Start of the time limit
9 Service of the payment order triggers the payment period (see also Art. 154 para. 1 SchKG). The start of the time limit is generally determined in accordance with Art. 142 para. 1 and 2 CPC (Art. 31 SchKG). Since these are monthly time limits, Art. 142 para. 2 CPC applies exclusively - at least according to the view expressed here (detailed N. 10); the time limit therefore generally begins to run on the day the payment order is served. The following should be added:
According to the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, the service of the payment order is a debt enforcement act within the meaning of Art. 56 SchKG. Therefore, service during the grace period (or blocking period; see the list in Art. 56 SchKG) only takes legal effect on the first day after its expiry (deferred effectiveness); therefore, according to the view expressed here, the period begins to run on the first day after expiry of the grace period (Art. 142 para. 2 CPC; example: service of the payment order on Sunday - effectiveness of the service and start of the period on Monday). The above does not apply to the cases regulated in Art. 57 SchKG (the debtor is in military, protective or civilian service) and in certain constellations of Art. 59 SchKG; in these cases, acts of debt collection during the legal standstill are null and void. If the legal standstill has already lasted three months, the payment order must still be served in the realization of the lien (Art. 57b para. 2 SchKG), i.e. the time limit can begin to run during the legal standstill in these cases.
If, contrary to the view expressed here, a cumulative application of Art. 142 para. 1 and 2 CPC is affirmed - as argued by some scholars (see n. 10), not only the daily time limits but also the monthly time limits begin to run on the day after service of the payment order (e.g.: service on February 15, 2023 - start of time limit on February 16, 2023). The start of the time limit also falls on the day after service if this day (the first day of the time limit period or the day after service) is a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday recognized by the state. For service on a Sunday or a nationally recognized public holiday (with the exception of Saturdays, which are not covered by Art. 56 no. 1 SchKG) or during other grace periods, the aforementioned lemma applies: unless the act of debt enforcement is null and void, service during the grace period does not take legal effect until the day after its expiry; consequently, the time limit - according to this part of the doctrine - begins to run on the second day after the end of the grace period (Art. 142 para. 1 CPC; e.g.: service of the order for payment on Sunday - effectiveness of service on Monday - start of time limit on Tuesday).
If subsequent service is made on a third-party lien holder or - in the case of a family home/joint residence - on a spouse/registered partner, the service of the last payment order is decisive for the start of the time limit (see Art. 98 para. 1 and Art. 100 para. 1 VZG; see OK-Paydar, Art. 151 SchKG N. 35).
3. End of the time limit
10 The payment periods under Art. 152 para. 1 no. 1 SchKG are structured as monthly periods (one month or six months). Accordingly, the period ends in the last month on the day that bears the same number as the day on which the period began to run (Art. 142 para. 2 CPC and Art. 31 SchKG; see also N. 9). This requires the following clarification:
The calculation of monthly time limits is disputed in doctrine and - in the context of Art. 142 CPC - has not (yet) been conclusively clarified by the highest courts. On the one hand, the wording of Art. 142 paras. 1 and 2 CPC suggests an accumulation of these paragraphs: If the order for payment (in the enforcement of a lien) is served on February 15, 2023, for example, the one-month period begins on February 16, 2023 (para. February 2023 (para. 1; "Time limits [...] shall begin to run on the following day.") and ends on March 16, 2023 at midnight (para. 2; "it [the time limit] shall end in the last month on the day bearing the same number as the day on which the time limit began to run."). On the other hand, the system points in a different direction: In Swiss law, the last day of the monthly time limit usually bears the same number as the day of the event triggering the time limit (e.g. Art. 77 para. 1 no. 3 CO, Art. 31 SCC, Art. 45 BGG and Art. 38 ATSG); thus, in the above example, the time limit would already end on March 15, 2023 at midnight. This calculation of the time limit is also in line with the European Convention on the Calculation of Time Limits (SR 0.221.122.3) and is supported by the teleological interpretation element: A cumulative application of Art. 142 para. 1 and 2 CPC would lead to an extension of the one-month time limit by one day, which does not correspond to the meaning and purpose of this standard. Both the calculation rules contained in para. 1 and para. 2 of Art. 142 CPC are intended solely to ensure that only days that are fully available are counted for time limits; cumulation would therefore lead to an inappropriate privilege in the case of monthly time limits - compared to time limits determined by days. Since there are no indications to the contrary in the legislative history, the conclusion that can be drawn here is that cumulation should be rejected; in the above example, the deadline therefore correctly ends on March 15 (not 16), 2023 at midnight.
If the last day of a time limit falls on a Saturday, Sunday or nationally recognized holiday, the time limit ends on the next working day (Art. 142 para. 3 CPC). However, this only applies if the end of the time limit does not also fall during the debt enforcement vacations or the legal standstill (see the following lemma). For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the closed periods within the meaning of Art. 56 no. 1 SchKG (namely Sundays and nationally recognized public holidays) are not covered by the scope of application of Art. 63 SchKG; this means that the deadline is not extended by three days if the deadline ends on a Saturday, Sunday or nationally recognized public holiday.
If the end of the time limit falls during the debt enforcement vacation or legal standstill, the time limit is extended until the third day after the end of the vacation or legal standstill; Saturdays, Sundays and nationally recognized public holidays are not counted when calculating the time limit (Art. 63 SchKG). In other words, the time limit is extended "until the end of the third working day." If the last day of the debt enforcement vacation or the legal standstill is a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday recognized by the state, there is no cumulative application of Art. 63 SchKG and Art. 142 para. 3 CPC (see above). Therefore, a debt enforcement vacation and legal standstill can also end on a Saturday, Sunday or state-recognized holiday, with the result that the additional period runs from the next working day. Example: If the debt enforcement vacations end on Saturday, the additional time limit runs from Monday (not Tuesday) and ends on Wednesday.
4. Compliance with the time limit
11 Compliance with the time limits is governed by Art. 143 CPC (Art. 31 SchKG). This means that the debtor being pursued must pay the amount claimed (including debt enforcement costs; Art. 68 SchKG) by the last day of the deadline (by midnight) at the latest in order to meet the payment deadline. In the case of a bank payment, the account must be debited on the last day of the deadline in order to meet the deadline (see Art. 143 para. 3 CPC). Two things should be added:
The debtor can pay the amount claimed (including debt enforcement costs) to the creditor or to the debt enforcement office for the creditor's account (Art. 12 para. 1 SchKG) and thus settle the claim. Only in the latter case does the payment lead to the immediate termination of the debt enforcement proceedings (Art. 12 para. 2 SchKG); in the case of payment to the creditor, however, the debtor must apply to the court for the debt enforcement proceedings to be set aside in accordance with Art. 85/85a SchKG in the event of a dispute. Payment to the debt enforcement office incurs a fee (Art. 19 GebV SchKG), which forms part of the debt enforcement costs and is therefore to be borne by the debtor (Art. 68 SchKG).
If the debtor does not pay before the payment deadline expires, this has no immediate consequences for him. They can continue to repay their debts after the payment deadline has expired and cause the debt enforcement proceedings to be terminated (Art. 12 para. 2 SchKG) or annulled (Art. 85 and 85a SchKG). However, the following should be noted: The payment deadlines (Art. 152 para. 1 no. 1 SchKG) correspond to the minimum deadlines for realization (Art. 154 SchKG; the suspension of deadlines regulated therein does not apply to the minimum deadlines). Accordingly, if the payment order is legally binding, the creditor can submit the application for realization as soon as the payment or minimum deadline for realization has expired. Once the deadline has expired, there is therefore only a short period of time to prevent the realization of the pledged property.
5. Binding nature of the deadline
12 The payment or minimum time limit (Art. 154 or Art. 152 para. 1 no. 1 SchKG; cf. no. 11 on the interaction of these two time limits) serves solely the interests of the debtor being pursued. Therefore, the debtor - in contrast to the enforcing creditor (see below) - is not bound by these time limits (see Art. 33 para. 3 SchKG). If the debtor is also the lien holder, he/she can request the realization of the pledge even before the expiry of the payment or minimum period (Art. 124 para. 1 in conjunction with Art. 156 para. 1 SchKG); this is also possible in the realization of the mortgage, but (additionally) requires the express consent of all attachment and mortgage creditors (Art. 133 para. 2 in conjunction with Art. 156 para. 1 SchKG).
13 Third-party lien holders and spouses/registered partners are free to waive compliance with the payment or minimum deadline for realization in the event of subsequent service (within the meaning of Art. 100 para. 1 VZG).
14 In contrast, the enforcing creditor is bound by the payment or minimum deadline for realization. It is therefore not entitled to submit the application for realization before the deadline expires. If it nevertheless submits the request before expiry, the debt enforcement office will return the request with the remark "premature, not admissible until ..." (Art. 9 para. 2 VFRR). This does not apply to enforcement requests that reach the debt enforcement office no more than two days too early: The debt enforcement office accepts these; however, the date of receipt is deemed to be the date from which the request is admissible (Art. 9 para. 3 VFRR). If the debt enforcement office complies with an enforcement request made too early, the debtor is entitled to appeal in accordance with Art. 17 SchKG (no nullity). By failing to lodge an appeal, the debtor in possession waives compliance with the time limits.
15 The payment and minimum time limits for realization are cooling-off periods that can neither be extended nor restored (see Art. 33 SchKG).
D. Threat of realization of the pledge (para. 1 no. 2)
16 The debtor being pursued must be threatened in the order for payment that the pledged asset will be realized if he neither complies with the order for payment nor files an objection (for systemic reasons, Art. 69 para. 2 no. 4 SchKG contains a different provision for ordinary debt enforcement proceedings). As soon as the enforcing creditor has obtained a legally binding payment order in pending debt enforcement proceedings and complies with the minimum and maximum time limits pursuant to Art. 154 SchKG, it can submit the request for realization.
17 Consequently, the debtor can avert realization by satisfying the creditor (by paying the debt enforcement claim; see N. 11) or by filing an objection within the deadline (Art. 74 SchKG). The following should be added to the latter:
In debt enforcement proceedings for the realization of a lien, the legal objection may be used to contest not only "the existence, scope or due date of the claim but also the existence of the lien". Unless otherwise stated in the legal proposal, the legal proposal relates to both the claim and the lien (cumulative). This provision is expressly set out in Art. 85 para. 1 VZG for the realization of liens on real property. There is no such provision for the realization of liens. However, due to the similarity of interests, it is justified to apply Art. 85 para. 1 VZG analogously in the realization of liens; a similar idea is contained in Art. 74 para. 2 SchKG, which is why an (analogous) application of this provision leads to the same result. If an analogous application is denied, in my opinion there is a natural/actual presumption that the legal proposal relates to the claim and the lien.
If the debtor wishes to contest either only the lien or the claim (alternatively), he must expressly refer to this in the objection (see Art. 74 para. 2 SchKG).
In addition to the debtor being pursued, any co-debtors may also lodge an objection (Art. 153 para. 2 and 2bis SchKG).
E. For the pledgee: reference to restriction on disposal (Art. 90 VZG)
18 In debt enforcement proceedings for attachment, the debtor is prohibited under penalty of punishment from disposing of the attached assets without the authorization of the debt enforcement office (Art. 96 SchKG). There is no corresponding provision in debt enforcement proceedings for the realization of pledges. Consequently, the pledge holder can dispose of the pledged property without restriction even after the initiation of debt enforcement proceedings for realization of the pledge. In the case of lien enforcement, the reservation of a restriction on disposal in the land register (Art. 960 para. 1 no. 1 CC) provides - at least partial - relief: Under certain conditions (see para. 20 below), the lienor conducting the enforcement proceedings can request the debt enforcement office to register a restriction on disposal with the land register office for reservation (Art. 90 para. 1 VZG). The debt enforcement office must inform the debtor of this option in the order for payment (Art. 90 para. 2 VZG). This requires explanation in four respects:
19 (i) Art. 90 VZG governs the optional restriction on disposal. This must be distinguished from the mandatory restriction on disposal under Art. 97 VZG. As soon as the debtor has filed the request for realization, the debt enforcement office must ex officio register a restriction on disposal pursuant to Art. 960 CC for priority notice in the land register (Art. 97 para. 1 VZG) - subject to the proviso that there is not already a priority notice pursuant to Art. 90 VZG (Art. 97 para. 2 VZG). The optional restriction on disposal therefore comes into play in cases in which the debtor seeks a restriction on disposal before the six-month payment or minimum period (Art. 152 para. 1 no. 1 SchKG; Art. 154 para. 1 SchKG) has expired. This may be necessary if the pledge holder wishes to sell the pledged property during the ongoing debt enforcement proceedings in order to delay the proceedings (see Art. 88 and 100 VZG; see n. 21 and OK-Paydar, Art. 151 SchKG n. 33 et seq.).
20 (ii) The debtor can only demand the priority notice of a restriction on disposal in the context of debt enforcement proceedings for the realization of a lien on real property; the realization of a lien on property does not provide such protection. In addition, the following is a prerequisite (alternative):
The (co-)operated parties have not lodged a legal objection or they have not lodged the legal objection in due form or time (Art. 90 para. 1 no. 1 VZG).
The validly lodged objection has been finally disposed of by judgment (proceedings for the opening of legal proceedings or ordinary proceedings) or by withdrawal (Art. 90 para. 1 no. 2 VZG). Provisional opening of legal proceedings is also sufficient; it is irrelevant whether the twenty-day period for the action for revocation is still running or whether such an action is already pending (Art. 83 para. 2 SchKG). In other words, a priority notice can be requested in the case of a granted provisional legal opening even if there is no legally binding payment order.
21 (iii) The restriction on disposal is "given effect by the priority notice against any rights acquired later" (Art. 960 para. 2 CC). However, this does not mean that the registered restriction on disposal prevents the owner from disposing of his property (in contrast to the land register block); accordingly, the priority notice is not intended to secure the liability substrate. On the other hand, if a restriction on disposal is registered, a third party who acquires rights to the pledged property must accept the continuation of the debt enforcement proceedings. This is advantageous for the debtor insofar as - in terms of time - a disposal of the pledged property during the ongoing debt enforcement proceedings has no effect. This needs to be explained:
In principle, the third-party lien holder is deemed to be a co-operator. The payment order must therefore be served on him, against which he can lodge an objection (Art. 153 para. 2 lit. a SchKG). In principle, it does not matter whether the third-party lien relationship already existed before the debt enforcement proceedings were initiated or was only established subsequently (see the exception below). As long as the debt enforcement office has not executed the realization (i.e. even after the application for realization has been filed), the order for payment can be served on the third-party lien holder at a later date (see Art. 88 para. 1 and Art. 100 para. 1 VZG; see OK-Paydar, Art. 151 SchKG N. 33 et seq.). However, subsequent service can lead to major delays: On the one hand, the payment order issued at a later date must also become legally binding before enforcement can take place. On the other hand, the six-month minimum period (Art. 154 para. 1 SchKG) only begins to run when the last payment order is served (Art. 98 para. 1 VZG).
However, subsequent service of the payment order is only required if there is no registered restriction on disposal (Art. 88 para. 2 VZG; Art. 100 para. 2 VZG). If a third party acquires the pledged property after the restriction on disposal has been noted in the land register, this third party is not to be treated as a co-owner. The (new) third-party lien holder and - if it is a family home/joint residence - their spouse/registered partner can therefore not raise a legal objection and must accept the continuation of the debt enforcement proceedings (see Art. 960 para. 2 CC).
In the case of the subsequent establishment of a family home/shared apartment ("change of use"), however, it is disputed whether or not the spouse/registered partner is one of the co-occupants in the case of a registered restriction on disposal. The middle solution advocated by Kren Kostkiewicz is convincing: as long as a request for realization has not been filed, any "conversion of use" must be taken into account; i.e. the debt enforcement office must subsequently serve the spouse/registered partner with a payment order. If a "change of use" occurs after the application for realization has been filed, no subsequent service on the spouse/registered partner is required.
22 (iv) Prior notices that violate Art. 90 or 97 VZG are not null and void, but can only be contested with an appeal pursuant to Art. 17 SchKG.
III. Rent/leasehold freeze (para. 2)
A. Overview
23 The scope of the lien (to be distinguished from the scope of the security; see OK-Paydar, Art. 151 SchKG N. 6 f.) deals with the question of which objects/claims form the basis of the lien and can therefore be realized in the event of the debtor's default. In the case of mortgages, the scope of the lien is determined in accordance with Art. 805 et seq. CC: First and foremost, the security right over real property comprises the property together with its components and appurtenances (Art. 805 para. 1 CC). In the case of rented/leased properties (see N. 25), the lien also extends to the rent/leasehold interest claim "that has accrued since the commencement of proceedings for the realization of the mortgage or since the opening of bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor until realization" (Art. 806 para. 1 CC). However, this is not unconditional: the lienor must expressly request the debt enforcement office to extend the lien (Art. 152 para. 2 sub-sentence 1 SchKG; N. 28) and make an advance on costs (N. 30). If the requirements are met, the debt enforcement office notifies the tenants/leaseholders (or other interest debtors; see N. 25) of the extension of the debt enforcement and instructs them to pay the rent/leasehold interest that falls due to the debt enforcement office (so-called rent/leasehold interest freeze; Art. 152 para. 2 sub-sentence 2 SchKG; see N. 39).
B. Scope of application
24 (i) Outside of bankruptcy or probate proceedings, the lienor can only demand that the lien be extended to claims for rent/leasehold interest in debt enforcement proceedings for the realization of real property (see Art. 41 SchKG). The following should be added:
In principle, there is no provision for an extension of the lien and interest freeze in debt enforcement proceedings for the realization of a lien on real property (cf. Art. 152 para. 2 SchKG, which relates to real property). Thus, by law, the security right of lien only covers natural fruits; civil fruits (namely rental/lease interest) are not covered by the lien (see Art. 892 para. 2 CC). However, it is permissible to contractually extend the lien to the civil fruits; whether an interest freeze can also be ordered in these cases is unclear. In my opinion, there are no apparent reasons that would exclude an analogous application of Art. 152 para. 2 SchKG in the enforcement of a pledge from the outset.
If the parties have established a lien on a mortgage note (so-called indirect security), debt enforcement proceedings for the realization of a pledge must generally be initiated; in this case, no interest freeze can be ordered (see above). However, the parties can reach a different agreement in the pledge agreement (right of collection and termination) so that the pledgee has the option of directly initiating debt enforcement for realization of the mortgage; this opens the way for an interest freeze to be ordered.
An extension of the lien under Art. 806 CC is excluded in debt enforcement proceedings for seizure. However, it should be noted that the current rent and leasehold interest is deemed by law to be attached together with the property (see Art. 102 SchKG and Art. 14 and Art. 15 para. 1 lit. b VZG); in this case, however, all attachment creditors benefit from the accruing rent and leasehold interest.
25 (ii) Art. 805 CC makes natural fruits subject to lien; Art. 806 CC regulates the same for civil fruits. The law expressly mentions rent and leasehold interest as civil fruits. However, the statement that an extension is only possible if there is a rental or lease agreement is imprecise. This requires clarification in several respects:
First and foremost, the extension of lien concerns the rental/leasehold interest income earned by the lien holder under a rental/leasehold agreement (Art. 253 et seq. and Art. 275 et seq. CO). Only the interest actually payable is covered by the lien. The lien even extends to rent/leasehold interest claims that violate statutory provisions (e.g. Art. 269 et seq. CO) as long as the tenant/leaseholder has not obtained a (court) reduction of the interest.
The remuneration paid for the granting of a right of use in rem also constitutes civil fruits within the meaning of Art. 806 CC; the lien can therefore also be extended to this income. In particular, this includes income from usufruct (Art. 745 et seq. CC), residential rights (Art. 776 et seq. CC) and building rights (Art. 779 et seq. CC; building right interest). The explanations on rent/leasehold interest therefore also apply mutatis mutandis to the remuneration for rights of use in rem (for reasons of readability, no terminological differentiation is made below).
A loan for use pursuant to Art. 305 et seq. CO is naturally free of charge; accordingly, an extension of the lien is out of the question. The reimbursement of costs owed by the borrower (Art. 307 para. 1 CO) is not a civil fruit within the meaning of Art. 806 CC, which is why an extension is excluded. If the debtor uses the pledged property himself, an extension is also not possible.
According to the Federal Supreme Court, claims of the hotel owner against his hotel guests and restaurant visitors are not subject to lien. Whether this also applies to other mixed legal relationships is questionable. Nevertheless, it can be stated that it will generally be possible to exclude the rent component (see Art. 93 para. 2 VZG).
The situation is unclear in the case of sub- and third-party relationships: According to the minority opinion, the lien also includes the subtenancy/sublease interest, whereby the mortgagee can nevertheless not have double recourse to the interest payment; the tenant/sublandlord "whose sublease income is confiscated by the creditor of his head landlord can bring a corresponding claim for damages to offset against his rent debt" (same result for the sublease relationship). Another part of the doctrine takes the opposite view and denies the extension to subletting/subleasehold interest. According to the Federal Supreme Court, the hotel owner's claims against the gerant who manages the hotel for the landowner (third-party relationship) are not subject to lien liability.
26 (iii) The lien only covers - from a temporal perspective - the current rent/lease interest (but see n. 29). Those rental/leasehold interests that accrue before the realization of the lien or after the realization (or after the conclusion of the realization of the lien; cf. n. 37) are not covered by the lien (cf. Art. 806 para. 1 CC).
27 (iv) From a personal point of view, only the enforcing mortgagee has the privilege to demand the extension of the lien. A non-enforcing mortgagee is not entitled to do so; accordingly, she is not entitled to any interim payments (see Art. 95 para. 1 VZG; see n. 42).
C. Prerequisites
28 Two things are required - in addition to the existence of rental/lease income (or other civil fruits; see N. 25) - in order for an extension of the lien and ultimately a rent/leasehold interest freeze to occur in the debt enforcement proceedings for realization of the lien (see N. 24):
29 (i) Request of the enforcing lienor: The enforcing party must expressly request the extension of the lien; the extension does not take place - in the enforcement for realization of the lien - by operation of law. It can already do this in the application for debt enforcement, but it is also permissible to make the request for extension at a later date. This requires explanation:
If the debtor requests the extension in the debt enforcement request, the rent/lease interest falling due from that point in time is subject to the lien (see Art. 91 para. 1 VZG; but see the comment under the 4th lemma regarding overdue interest).
If the debtor submits the request at a later date, there is no retroactive effect. The extension only takes effect from the time at which the debtor requests the extension; consequently, the lien only covers the rent/lease interest that becomes due after the time of the request (see above). It is therefore advisable for the debtor to apply for the extension at an early stage - ideally together with the application for debt enforcement.
The debtor can only request the extension at a later date if he has not irrevocably waived it. A waiver can be express or implied, whereby the lack of a request in the debt enforcement application alone does not constitute an (irrevocable) waiver. In other words, the debtor has the option of waiving the extension only for the time being. As soon as the extension of the lien has taken place, the debtor can only waive the extension for future rent/lease interest.
The question arises as to whether the lien can also be extended to cover rent/leasehold interest that was already due before the application was filed but has not yet been paid by the debtor - who is in default (overdue rent/leasehold interest). Dürr is of the opinion that the ratio legis of Art. 91 para. 1 VZG would allow the lien to be extended to overdue rent/lease interest. However, this is contradicted by the clear wording of Art. 91 para. 1 VZG, which is why an extension to overdue rent/leasehold interest should be rejected.
There are isolated references in the doctrine to the effect that the lien on rent/leasehold interest can be asserted independently - i.e. without realizing the property - in the enforcement of the lien. This does not mean that a request for lien enforcement that only relates to the rent/leasehold interest is admissible; the statutory lien on the rent/leasehold interest must be asserted together with the underlying lien in the context of a lien enforcement (so-called accessoriness; see Art. 806 para. 1 CC and N. 24). Correctly, "independent" can only (but still) mean that it is not mandatory for the encumbered property to be realized so that the mortgagee can satisfy itself from the accrued rent/leasehold interest (see n. 37). If the rental/lease interest received (and/or other income) is already sufficient to cover the debt enforcement claims and costs, there is no need to realize the pledged property; this is also important in connection with the payments on account pursuant to Art. 95 VZG (see n. 42 et seq., in particular n. 44). Reference should be made to Art. 111 para. 2 VZG, according to which even if the property is realized without result, the rental/leasehold interest income is allocated to the lien claimant.
30 (ii) Payment of the advance on costs: The previous version of Art. 91 para. 1 VZG explicitly required the payment of an advance on costs for the rent/leasehold interest freeze. There is no such reference in the current version of Art. 91 para. 1 VZG. Nevertheless, according to the view expressed here, the payment of an advance on costs is a prerequisite for ordering the rent/leasehold freeze. This follows from the general rule of Art. 68 para. 1 SchKG: According to this, the debt collector must advance the debt collection costs; if it does not comply with this advance payment obligation, the debt collection office can temporarily refrain from taking the debt collection action. The debt enforcement costs include in particular the fees for the determination of tenancy and leasehold relationships (Art. 17 GebV SchKG; see N. 32) and for the administration of real estate (Art. 27 GebV SchKG; see N. 41).
D. Procedure
31 After the enforcing lienor has submitted the request for extension and paid the required advance on costs (see above), various procedural steps follow:
32 (i) Determination of rental/lease agreements: The debt enforcement office determines "immediately upon receipt of the request for debt enforcement whether and which rental or lease agreements exist on the property" (Art. 91 para. 1 VZG). The debt enforcement office will question the debtor and/or the third-party lien holder; both are obliged to provide information about any rental/lease agreements, otherwise they are liable to prosecution (Art. 91 SchKG; Art. 323 f. SCC). If the debt enforcement office establishes that the pledged property is rented/leased (or a comparable situation exists; see N. 25), the proceedings continue. Otherwise, the following procedural steps are superfluous - the debt enforcement office cannot impose an interest freeze.
33 (ii) Notification to tenant/lessee (Art. 152 para. 2 SchKG and Art. 91 para. 1 VZG; form VZG No. 5, Art. 7 SchKK): The debt enforcement office then immediately informs the tenant/lessee of the increase in the debt enforcement proceedings. In the notification, it instructs the tenant/leaseholder - pointing out the risk of double payment - to pay the rent/leasehold interest due to the debt enforcement office (rent/leasehold interest freeze). Only with this notification does the interest freeze take effect for the tenant/leaseholder (Art. 806 para. 2 CC); after receiving the notification, the tenant/leaseholder can no longer make payments to the landlord/lessor (usually the lien holder) with discharging effect (see N. 39 and N. 48). The following should be added:
The debt enforcement office is responsible for the notification; a purely private notification (e.g. by the mortgagee) has no blocking effect.
In order for the debt enforcement office to be able to notify the tenant/lessee or order an interest freeze, the debt enforcement proceedings must first be initiated - by serving the payment order on the debtor (Art. 38 para. 2 SchKG). An order for payment served during the grace period (Art. 56 SchKG) only takes effect on the first day after the end of the grace period; it is therefore necessary to wait until the end of the grace period before the debt enforcement office can order the interest freeze. However, it is irrelevant for the ordering of the interest freeze whether this takes place during the debt enforcement vacations (Art. 56 para. 2 SchKG) or during a legal standstill granted to the debtor or lien holder (Art. 56 para. 3 SchKG) - as long as the debt enforcement office serves the payment order before the start of the debt enforcement vacations or the legal standstill, the debt enforcement office must pronounce the interest freeze (Art. 91 para. 2 VZG). This provision has been criticized by some scholars: as the interest freeze requires prior service of the payment order, there can sometimes be considerable delays (debt enforcement vacations and legal standstill) before the interest freeze takes effect. For understandable reasons, this part of the doctrine therefore argues that an interest freeze should be ordered as soon as the application for debt enforcement is submitted; any grace periods would then have no influence on the interest freeze. In this way, the purpose of the interest freeze - the provisional securing of rent/lease interest - can be achieved in the best possible way.
The attachment of a property includes in particular the current rent/leasehold interest (Art. 102 para. 1 SchKG; Art. 14 para. 1 VZG). For this reason, the debt enforcement office must also notify the tenant/leaseholder in the debt enforcement proceedings for attachment "that in future they can only legally pay the rent (lease) interest to the debt enforcement office" (Art. 15 para. 1 lit. b VZG; cf. Art. 102 para. 2 SchKG). In this case, no additional notification to the tenant/leaseholder is required in a subsequent debt enforcement for realization of the lien (Art. 91 para. 2 sentence 2 sub-sentence 1 VZG). The same applies if a new application for enforcement of a lien is made or the property is seized (Art. 91 para. 2 sentence 2 sub-sentence 2 VZG).
34 (iii) Notification of the lien holder (Art. 92 para. 1 VZG; Form VZG No. 6, Art. 8 SchKK): At the same time as the notification to the tenant/lessee (N. 33), the debt enforcement office informs the lien holder (debtor or third party owner) of the extension of the lien. The debt enforcement office informs the lien holder that he is prohibited from accepting interest payments or concluding legal transactions on them under penalty of prosecution (Art. 292 SCC).
35 (iv) Objection by the lien holder: The lien holder (debtor or third party owner) may lodge an objection with the debt enforcement office within ten days of service of the notice (Art. 92 para. 1 VZG; N. 34). With this objection, he can assert that the lien does not extend to the rent/leasehold interest or that it only extends to part of it (Art. 93 para. 2 VZG). The debt enforcement office must inform the lien holder separately of this possibility of objection in the notification (Art. 92 para. 2 VZG). The following must be observed when raising an objection:
According to the wording of the law, the objection must be made "stating the reasons and [...] the disputed partial amounts" (Art. 92 para. 2, last sentence VZG). However, the debt enforcement office must not place too high demands on these reasons.
The ten-day period is triggered by the notification within the meaning of Art. 92 para. 1 VZG. Since the notification must be made to the lien holder and the tenant/lessee at the same time (Art. 92 para. 1 sub-sentence 1 VZG), the debt enforcement office must - with a view to Art. 91 para. 1 VZG (see n. 33) - also make the notification during the closed period (Art. 56 SchKG). However, this does not answer the question of when the ten-day period begins to run if the notification is made during the closed period. According to the view expressed here, the notification to the lien holder - analogous to the service of the attachment document (Art. 274 SchKG) and in contrast to the notification to the tenant/leaseholder - is a debt enforcement act within the meaning of Art. 56 SchKG; accordingly, the notification only takes effect on the first day after the end of the grace period (event triggering the period). The time limit begins to run on the following day (Art. 31 SchKG in conjunction with Art. 142 para. 1 CPC). If the time limit ends during the grace period, Art. 63 SchKG (not Art. 145 CPC) applies. Compliance with the time limit is governed by Art. 143 CPC (in conjunction with Art. 31 SchKG).
The objection within the meaning of Art. 92 para. 2 VZG must be distinguished from the legal objection to the lien. If the objections of the debtor relate to the scope of the lien (i.e. the extension of the lien to the rental/lease interest), the lien holder must raise the objection. If, on the other hand, the debtor wishes to dispute the existence, scope or due date of the claim or the existence of the lien, he must assert this with a legal objection (see Art. 85 VZG; see also N. 36). Whether the lien holder raises the objection and/or the objection has an influence on the subsequent proceedings: The debtor can remove the objection in the legal opening proceedings or in the ordinary proceedings (Art. 153a SchKG; Art. 93 para. 1 VZG), whereas the debtor creditor only has recourse to the ordinary proceedings if the objection is raised (Art. 93 para. 2 VZG; see also N. 36).
If a third party asserts that it is entitled to the rent/leasehold interest, the objection procedure (Art. 106 et seq. CO) must be initiated (detailed N. 47); only the lien holder (debtor or third party owner) is entitled to the objection within the meaning of Art. 92 para. 2 VZG.
36 (v) Action for declaratory judgment by the enforcing pledgee: If the pledgee has raised the defense pursuant to Art. 92 para. 2 VZG, this is reported to the enforcing party (VZG form no. 8, Art. 13 and 14 SchKK). In this case, the debtor has the option of filing an action for declaratory judgment (action for determination of the disputed lien) within ten days of notification (Art. 93 para. 2 VZG). If it does not comply with this request, the debt enforcement office will lift the interest freeze (Art. 93 para. 3 and 4 VZG; see also Art. 153a para. 3 SchKG). This requires explanation:
According to the view expressed here, the notification to the debt collector is not an act of debt enforcement within the meaning of Art. 56 SchKG, because the notification to the debt collector does not interfere with the legal position of the debtor. This means that the notification takes effect immediately, even during the grace period; the ten-day period begins to run on the day after the notification (Art. 142 para. 1 CPC in conjunction with Art. 31 SchKG). In the absence of an act of debt enforcement, Art. 63 SchKG does not apply either, but in my opinion the court vacations pursuant to Art. 145 CPC must be observed.
If the debtor raises the objection within the meaning of Art. 92 para. 2 VZG and the legal proposal at the same time (see n. 35), the interest freeze is enforced as follows (see below the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, which is criticized by some scholars; see also VZG form no. 8): The debtor must decide between two courses of action within ten days of notification (Art. 153a para. 1 SchKG; Art. 93 para. 1 and 2 VZG). On the one hand, the debtor has the option of bringing an action for recognition (Art. 79 SchKG) and/or an action for declaratory judgment (Art. 93 para. 2 VZG; objective accumulation of claims within the meaning of Art. 90 CPC). On the other hand, the debtor has the option of initiating legal proceedings (Art. 80 et seq. SchKG). If the debtor chooses the second option, they can wait until the court has ruled on the legal opening before filing an action for declaratory judgment. If the court rejects the legal opening, the creditor must initiate an action for recognition within the meaning of Art. 79 SchKG and an action for declaratory judgment within the meaning of Art. 93 para. 2 VZG within ten days of the legally binding rejection (Art. 93 para. 1 VZG). If, on the other hand, the application to open legal proceedings is approved, the debt collector must bring an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to Art. 93 para. 2 VZG; the debt collection office sets a deadline of ten days for this. Any action for revocation (Art. 83 para. 2 SchKG) has no influence on this deadline.
If the debt collector misses one of the aforementioned deadlines, the debt enforcement office will revoke the interest freeze (Art. 93 para. 3 and 4 VZG; Art. 153a para. 3 SchKG). If the tenant/leaseholder has already paid rent/leasehold interest to the debt enforcement office in such cases, the interest will be paid to the interest creditor (Art. 93 para. 3 VZG). Irrespective of this, the debtor still has the option of eliminating the legal proposal and/or the objection within the two-year enforcement period (Art. 154 para. 1 SchKG).
37 (vi) If the debtor succeeds in eliminating the legal proposal (or if there is no legal proposal), it can apply for the realization of the pledged property (Art. 154 para. 1 SchKG). The following must be observed:
If the debt collector does not submit the request for realization within the statutory period of two years, the debt enforcement expires (Art. 154 para. 2 SchKG); the debt enforcement office lifts the interest freeze. In such a case, the debt enforcement office pays the interest received to the interest creditor (landlord/lessor) - at least according to some doctrine. In my opinion, an allocation of the interest received to the enforcing pledgee - as demanded by part of the doctrine - is only permissible if this interest is sufficient to settle the debt enforcement claim and costs and therefore a realization of the pledged property does not appear necessary (cf. hereafter 3rd lemma).
The timely filing of the application for realization generally leads to the public forced sale of the property (Art. 156 in conjunction with 133 et seq. SchKG). When the property is knocked down to the successful bidder (see Art. 126 in conjunction with Art. 156 and 142a SchKG) - i.e. when the realization of the lien is completed - the lien expires in accordance with Art. 806 CC. Up to this point in time, the rent/lease interest accrued is due to the lienor enforcing the lien - thereafter to the successful bidder (see n. 26).
However, in order for the enforcing mortgagee to be able to obtain satisfaction from the accrued rent/leasehold interest, the pledged property does not necessarily have to be realized: If the rent/leasehold interest received by the debt enforcement office (and/or other income) is sufficient to cover the debt enforcement claims and costs, there is no need to realize the pledged property; it goes without saying that in this case there is no need to file a request for realization. This can also be combined with payments on account within the meaning of Art. 95 VZG (see n. 42 et seq., in particular n. 44).
If the property cannot be realized due to insufficient bids (loss of lien pursuant to Art. 158 SchKG), the lienor shall nevertheless receive the rent/leasehold interest received by the debt enforcement office (Art. 111 para. 2 VZG). If the bid is accepted but the proceeds do not fully cover the claim, the same applies.
E. Legal consequences
38 The rent/leasehold freeze has various consequences. On the one hand, the tenant/leaseholder must pay the interest to the debt enforcement office (Art. 806 para. 2 CC); at the same time, the debt enforcement office prohibits the lien holder from accepting any interest payments (Art. 92 para. 1 VZG). On the other hand, the administrative powers over the pledged property are (partially) transferred to the debt enforcement office. In detail:
39 (i) Tenant/leaseholder: as soon as the debt enforcement office has notified the tenant/leaseholder of the increase in the debt enforcement (N. 33), the latter can no longer make payments with discharging effect to the interest creditor, but only to the debt enforcement office (Art. 806 para. 2 CC; Art. 91 para. 1 VZG). Consequently, the interest debtor exposes himself to the risk of double payment if he continues to pay the interest to the interest creditor (see Art. 91 para. 1 VZG; see also N. 48). Notices of termination and complaints must henceforth be addressed to the debt enforcement office (VZG form no. 5), as the latter has administrative powers (see n. 41).
40 (ii) Lien holder: Once the interest freeze has been issued, the lien holder is prohibited from accepting rent/lease payments or concluding legal transactions in this regard under penalty of prosecution (Art. 292 SCC) (Art. 92 para. 1 VZG). If the tenant/leaseholder nevertheless transfers the interest to the lien holder (e.g. due to an unadjusted standing order), the lien holder must immediately hand over the amount to the debt enforcement office, otherwise he could be liable to prosecution. Furthermore, the interest freeze has the consequence that the administrative powers of the lien holder over the property are restricted (see below); in particular - after the interest freeze has been issued - the right to terminate and expel the property falls within the exclusive remit of the debt enforcement office.
41 (iii) Administration of the pledged property: Once the interest freeze has been issued, the debt enforcement office - in place of the debtor or pledgee - must take all measures necessary to secure and collect the rent/leasehold interest (Art. 94 para. 1 VZG). It is permissible to transfer these administrative powers to a third party (Art. 94 para. 2 VZG). This needs to be supplemented in several respects:
Art. 94 para. 1 VZG contains a non-exhaustive list ("measures [...] such as") of administrative measures that fall within the remit of the debt enforcement office (or the appointed third party) once the interest freeze has been ordered. However, the administrative powers are limited: in principle, they only include urgent security measures. The debt enforcement office (or the appointed third party) only has comprehensive administrative powers from the time the application for realization is filed (Art. 154 SchKG) (Art. 101 VZG; see also Art. 17 f. VZG).
The debt enforcement office may transfer the administrative powers to a third party that appears most suitable for this purpose (e.g. real estate management; Art. 94 para. 2 VZG). Transfer to the debtor being pursued is also permitted. The Federal Supreme Court classifies the transfer of administrative powers as a mandate or sui generis contract; Art. 394 et seq. of the CO apply in both cases. The relationship between the debt enforcement office and third parties is of a public law nature.
If the debt enforcement office (or the commissioned third party) exceeds its powers under Art. 94 VZG, the corresponding administrative act can be challenged with an appeal under Art. 17 SchKG. Any liability is governed by Art. 5 SchKG and not by civil law.
In order for the debt enforcement office to make use of its administrative powers, the pledged property must be rented/leased or otherwise covered by the scope of application of Art. 152 para. 2 SchKG (N. 25).
The debtor must submit the request for realization within the statutory period, otherwise the debt enforcement will lapse (Art. 154 para. 2 SchKG). The administrative powers of the debt enforcement office (or the commissioned third party) lapse when the debt enforcement proceedings expire.
F. Individual questions
1. Payment on account
42 First and foremost, the rental/leasehold income must be used to cover administrative expenses and administrative costs as well as any maintenance contributions to the debtor and his family (Art. 103 para. 2 SchKG) (Art. 94 para. 1 VZG). In addition, the enforcing mortgagee can demand that the debt enforcement office makes so-called interim payments from the rent/leasehold interest received - even before the application for realization is filed. However, the debt collector must be able to prove that the debt enforcement claim has been recognized or legally established (Art. 95 para. 1 VZG). Any legal proposals and defenses within the meaning of Art. 92 para. 2 VZG must be removed by the debt collector before payment is made (for the procedure, see N. 36). Two things must be made clear:
Non-enforcing mortgagees are not entitled to interim payments (see Art. 95 para. 1 VZG).
A payment on account is excluded if the debt collector is unable to prove that the debtor has a recognized or legally established claim; the debt enforcement office has no discretionary power. The debtor's consent (alone) to the payment on account is not sufficient. The case is different if the debtor recognizes the claim in the amount of the rent/lease interest received; according to Art. 95 para. 2 VZG, recognition entitles the debtor to make an interim payment.
43 If there are several mortgagees (concerning the same property), an interim payment is only permissible in two cases: It requires either the consent of all claimants or the establishment of a schedule of claims pursuant to Art. 157 para. 3 SchKG and the prior imposition of the list of liens (Art. 95 para. 2 VZG).
44 In the case of smaller claims, the interim payment enables the mortgagee to be satisfied without having to realize the property. During the two-year liquidation period (Art. 154 para. 2 VZG), the mortgagee can allow the interest freeze to continue without making a request for liquidation; during this time, the mortgagee's claim is gradually repaid by the payments on account (cf. n. 37 for the whole).
45 If the lienor is declared bankrupt, Art. 96 VZG must be observed.
2. Multiple lienors
46 If several lienors file a debt enforcement request with an application for an extension of the lien, the preferential right with regard to the rent/leasehold interest claims is based on the respective ranking of their liens (Art. 114 para. 2 VZG; see Art. 813 et seq. CC). This only applies without restriction after the application for realization has been filed - before that, the legal situation is different: in this case, the decisive factor is whether the respective mortgagee has applied for the extension of the lien (see Art. 114 para. 1 VZG and Art. 806 CC). Specifically, this means the following: Primarily, the first mortgagee is entitled to the rent/lease interest that has fallen due - until such time as a mortgagee with a higher ranking requests the extension of the lien. From then on, the newly due rent/leasehold interest shall accrue to the senior mortgagee as long as no other mortgagee with an (even) better ranking requests the extension of the lien.
3. Disputes about the entitlement to the rent/lease claims
47 The lienor (debtor or third-party lienor) can use the defense under Art. 92 para. 2 VZG to argue that the lien does not extend at all or only to part of the rent/leasehold interest (see N. 35). The tenant/leaseholder and other third parties are not entitled to this defense. However, they have recourse to the objection procedure (Art. 106 et seq. SchKG) if they do not agree with the extension of the lien to the rent/lease payments. Disputes about the entitlement to interest claims may arise, particularly in connection with Art. 806 para. 3 CC. The following should be added:
If the tenant/leaseholder (or another third party claimant) disputes that the lien extends to the rent/leasehold interest, the debt enforcement office must initiate an objection procedure. The debt enforcement office then decides, at its discretion, who is to decide whether the alleged claims are better justified; depending on this, it sets a deadline for the tenant/leaseholder (or another third party claimant), the mortgagee, the owner of the property or the debtor to file an objection.
Contrary to some doctrine, the dispute over the rent/leasehold claims must be dealt with in the objection proceedings even if the mortgagee has filed the application for realization (see Art. 106 para. 2 SchKG).
As long as the competent court has not made a decision in the objection proceedings, the interest freeze continues (see Art. 93 para. 3 and 4 VZG). The interest debtor is therefore still required to make payment to the debt enforcement office, otherwise he risks having to pay the interest a second time.
4. Double payment case
48 If the interest debtor (tenant/lessor) continues to pay the interest to the interest creditor (landlord/lessor) despite the interest freeze, there is a risk that the interest debtor will have to make a further payment to the debt enforcement office (see N. 39). If this double payment occurs, the question arises as to whether the interest debtor has a repayment claim against the interest creditor. According to the view expressed here, this must be affirmed: the interest debtor has a claim under the law of enrichment against the interest creditor (Art. 62 et seq. CO). However, it should be noted that the interest debtor bears the collection risk due to the double payment and may not be able to enforce its claim for enrichment against the interest creditor.
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Jaeger Carl/Walder Hans Ulrich/Kull Thomas M., Das Bundesgesetz über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs (SchKG), Erläutert für den praktischen Gebrauch, Art. 89–158 SchKG, 5. Aufl., Zürich 2006.
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Marchand Sylvain, Kommentierung zu Art. 57b SchKG, in: Dallèves Louis/Foëx Bénédict/Jeandin Nicolas (Hrsg.), Commentaire Romand, Poursuite et faillite, Basel 2005.
Merz Barbara, Kommentierung zu Art. 142 ZPO, in: Brunner Alexander/Gasser Dominik/Schwander Ivo (Hrsg.), ZPO Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, Kommentar, 2. Aufl., Zürich 2016.
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Nordmann Francis/Oneyser Stéphanie, Kommentierungen zu Art. 31 und 33 SchKG, in: Staehelin Daniel/Bauer Thomas/Lorandi Franco (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Bundesgesetz über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs, 3. Aufl., Basel 2021.
Penon Ilija/Wohlgemuth Marc, Kommentierungen zu Art. 56, 57b und 63 SchKG, in: Kren Kostkiewicz Jolanta/Vock Dominik (Hrsg.), Schulthess Kommentar (SK) zum Bundesgesetz über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs (SchKG), 4. Aufl., Zürich 2017.
Rüetschi Sven/Domenig Benjamin, Kommentierungen zu Art. 152, 153a und 154 SchKG, in: Kren Kostkiewicz Jolanta/Vock Dominik (Hrsg.), Schulthess Kommentar (SK) zum Bundesgesetz über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs (SchKG), 4. Aufl., Zürich 2017.
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Schmid Jean-Daniel/Bauer Thomas, Kommentierungen zu Art. 56, 57 und 63 SchKG, in: Staehelin Daniel/Bauer Thomas/Lorandi Franco (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Bundesgesetz über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs, 3. Aufl., Basel 2021.
Schmid Jörg/Hürlimann-Kaup Bettina, Sachenrecht, 6. Aufl., Zürich 2022.
Schmid Jürg/Arnet Ruth, Kommentierung zu Art. 960 ZGB, in: Geiser Thomas/Wolf Stephan (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Zivilgesetzbuch II, 7. Aufl., Basel 2023.
Schmid-Tschirren Christina, Kommentierungen zu Art. 805 und 806 ZGB, in: Geiser Thomas/Wolf Stephan (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Zivilgesetzbuch II, 7. Aufl., Basel 2023.
Sievi Nino, Kommentierungen zu Art. 88 und 102 SchKG, in: Staehelin Daniel/Bauer Thomas/Lorandi Franco (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Bundesgesetz über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs, 3. Aufl., Basel 2021.
Spühler Karl/Dolge Annette, Schuldbetreibungs- und Konkursrecht I, Betreibungs- und Arrestrecht, 8. Aufl., Zürich 2020.
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Weber Rolf H., Berner Kommentar, Art. 68–96, 2. Aufl., Bern 2004 (zit. BK-Weber).
Weingart Denise, Kommentierung zu Art. 12 SchKG, in: Kren Kostkiewicz Jolanta/Vock Dominik (Hrsg.), Schulthess Kommentar (SK) zum Bundesgesetz über Schuldbetreibung und Konkurs (SchKG), 4. Aufl., Zürich 2017.
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