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- Art. 734f CO
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- Art. 788 CO
- Art. 808c CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
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- Art. 3 para. 1 and 2 IMAC
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- Art. 80h IMAC
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 4 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. c FADP
- Art. 5 lit. d FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 para. 3-5 FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
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- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 16 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 18 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 27 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 28 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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- Art. 2 para. 1 AMLA
- Art. 2a para. 1-2 and 4-5 AMLA
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FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
- I. History
- II. Context of the provision. At the same time, on the significance and rationale of extradition
- III. Specific content of the provision
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. History
1 Art. 32 IMAC came into force on January 1, 1983, with the Mutual Assistance Act. It has remained unchanged since then.
2 The extradition of suspected or convicted offenders from one sovereign (today: state) to another, which is the subject of Art. 32 ff. IMAC, is the original form of mutual assistance in criminal matters and has a long history, of which only the modern part will be outlined here. Particularly well known, although not the first of its kind, is the principle of “aut dedere aut punire” (either extradite or punish) postulated by Grotius in the 17th century. From the 18th century onwards, European countries began to conclude extradition treaties among themselves, which served as the legal basis for such extraditions. In the 19th century, the first extradition laws were introduced to prevent states from becoming places of refuge for criminals. Switzerland passed such a law in 1892, which remained in force until the IMAC came into effect.
3 Art. 1 of the Extradition Act of 1892 can be regarded as the predecessor provision to Art. 32 IMAC. In its 1976 message, the Federal Council appears to have assumed that Art. 28 E-IMAC (later Art. 32 IMAC) would not bring about any change compared to the previous law.
II. Context of the provision. At the same time, on the significance and rationale of extradition
4 Art. 32 IMAC marks the beginning of the second part of the Mutual Assistance Act, which regulates extradition. As recently as 1976, the Federal Council stated that it was “to be regarded as the most important form of international cooperation.” This explains its prominent position among the forms of mutual assistance in the IMAC system. Extradition continues to play an important role in Swiss mutual assistance practice. It is also the most drastic measure in the area of mutual assistance for the person concerned and is unique to mutual assistance in criminal matters: mutual assistance in civil and administrative matters does not involve the compulsory transfer of a person to another state. Only the seriousness of the alleged criminal behavior (above a certain threshold) can justify it. It is therefore no coincidence that extradition is also referred to as “major mutual legal assistance.”
5 The rationale behind extradition is, on the one hand, the same as for other forms of mutual assistance in criminal matters: to support other states in the fight against crime. Of course, this is not purely altruistic, as reciprocal assistance is also required in return (see Art. 8 IMAC), i.e., corresponding assistance is expected in cases of need (do ut des). Secondly, extradition is specifically in Switzerland's own interest, as it does not want to harbor potentially dangerous individuals who are suspected of having committed crimes abroad, nor does it want to become a popular refuge for foreign criminals. From the perspective of the state to which extradition is to take place, the procedure makes it possible to bring the offender to justice and to trigger its general preventive effects (rationale for extradition).
6 Within the second part of the IMAC, Art. 32 is at the beginning of Chapter 1, which regulates the conditions for extradition. Art. 32 IMAC takes up the domestic privilege under extradition law in Art. 7 para. 1 IMAC, in that according to its wording, only “foreigners” can be extradited (see N. 13 ff.), and specifies the ground for extradition of a specific offense (extraditable offense) as specified in Art. 35 IMAC (see N. 22 ff.).
7 Like all other procedures of international legal assistance in criminal matters, extradition is subject to the general provisions of the Mutual Assistance Act (Art. 1 ff. IMAC).
8 Note the relationship between Art. 32 IMAC and provisions under international treaties and cantonal law. According to Art. 1 para. 1 lit. a IMAC, provisions in international agreements (mutual assistance or extradition treaties) take precedence over the second part of the IMAC and thus also over Art. 32. Art. 32 ff. IMAC, in turn, take precedence over cantonal law (Art. 49 para. 1 FC).
III. Specific content of the provision
9 Art. 32 IMAC can be said to have two functions: on the one hand, the provision helps to clarify the concept of extradition in current law (A.), and on the other hand, it sets out the initial requirements for extradition (B.), which are supplemented by the subsequent articles of the Mutual Assistance Act.
10 Art. 32 IMAC is formulated as a “discretionary provision”; it does not establish an obligation to extradite (for the reasons for extradition, see N. 5). Art. 32 IMAC thus reflects the principle contained in Art. 1 para. 4 IMAC, according to which no right to cooperation can be derived from the Mutual Assistance Act. However, an obligation to extradite may arise from international agreements (see N. 8).
A. Specification of the term “extradition”
11 Art. 32 IMAC allows conclusions to be drawn about the concept of extradition underlying the Mutual Assistance Act. As the Federal Council explained in its 1976 message on this law, under the 1892 Extradition Act, “extradition” meant “the transfer of the person being prosecuted to the requesting state for prosecution or enforcement of penalties for acts that are subject to the (original) jurisdiction of that state.” Under the Mutual Assistance Act, it is still a matter of handing over a person to another state for prosecution or enforcement of penalties for acts that that state can punish. However, in accordance with European conventions, extradition is now also an instrument for the (compulsory) transfer of the person being prosecuted to the state requested to take over the prosecution or enforcement of penalties. This is clear from the text of Art. 32 in fine IMAC and the related materials. The initiative for extradition to a foreign country therefore does not have to originate from that country, and its criminal jurisdiction does not have to be original (keyword: substitute criminal justice).
B. Formulation of initial requirements for extradition
12 The wording of Art. 32 IMAC sets out the following initial requirements for extradition, which are supplemented by the subsequent provisions of the law:
1. Foreign nationals
13 Firstly, the person concerned must, in principle, be a foreign national. This follows both from the heading and from the wording of Art. 32 IMAC in all three official languages. The fact that, in principle, only foreigners can be extradited – known as domestic privilege – also follows from Art. 25 para. 1, second clause, FC and Art. 7 para. 1 IMAC.
14 It can be inferred from the latter two provisions that it is not the possession of foreign citizenship (of the requesting state or another state) that is decisive for the possibility of extradition, but rather the lack of Swiss citizenship. A foreigner within the meaning of Art. 32 IMAC is therefore anyone who does not possess Swiss citizenship (within the meaning of the BüG) (purely negative term). Swiss-foreign dual or multiple citizens are therefore not foreigners within the meaning of this provision, but stateless persons and persons with a residence or settlement permit in Switzerland or refugee status are.
15 The decisive factor is the time at which the conditions for extradition are assessed or the extradition is carried out (and not, for example, the time of the offense). Anyone who lost their Swiss citizenship before the extradition decision was made can therefore be extradited, but not anyone who acquired it (even immediately) before the decision or the planned extradition. Accordingly, the acquisition or loss of Swiss nationality after the initial decision in the appeal proceedings must also be taken into account.
16 Contrary to what the wording of Art. 32 IMAC might suggest, the extradition of Swiss nationals is not excluded per se, but is possible if they consent to extradition (Art. 25 para. 1 second clause FC; Art. 7 para. 1 IMAC; see also Art. 54 IMAC). In this case, the same conditions apply to extradition.
17 Other cases in which Swiss nationals may be handed over to foreign countries include transfer to the International Criminal Court (see Art. 16 para. 3 of the Federal Act on Cooperation with the International Criminal Court [ZISG]), transit (Art. 7 para. 2, Art. 20a IMAC), return (Art. 7 para. 2 IMAC) and – temporarily limited – transfer pursuant to Art. 70 IMAC, whereby in the latter case safe conduct must be granted (Art. 70 para. 1 IMAC). Art. 101 IMAC also refers to transfer in the context of the transfer of criminal enforcement to another country, although there is no apparent reason not to refer to extradition in this case. While transit and return are traditionally understood as special types of extradition, legislators and the majority of legal scholars want to clearly distinguish the transfer to the International Criminal Court from extradition in terms of terminology and concept. This is apparently primarily to circumvent the constitutional requirement that Swiss citizens may not be extradited without their consent (Art. 25 para. 1 FC).
2. Transfer to another state
18 Secondly, the transfer must be made to another state. According to the wording of the law, no “extradition” within the meaning of the IMAC is possible to Swiss domestic authorities – as the title and context of the IMAC suggest – to communities not constituted as states or to inter- or supranational organizations (see, however, N. 20 on such organizations). However, in TPF 2008 61, the Federal Criminal Court approved extradition to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. This was a special case in that the said authority had administrative power over Kosovo (including the judiciary).
19 According to the three-element doctrine recognized under international law, constitution as a state requires a state territory, a state people, and state authority. According to Swiss practice, it is not necessary for the requesting state to be internationally recognized as a state; Switzerland does not even have to recognize it as such, because recognition has only a declaratory effect.
20 The amendment to Art. 1 IMAC, which came into force on June 1, 2021, raises the question of whether Art. 32 IMAC also applies mutatis mutandis to international courts or other intergovernmental or supranational institutions (cf. Art. 1 para. 3bis and 3ter IMAC). The message accompanying this amendment supports this view: “The opening up of Article 1 IMAC has [...] the effect of not only making other forms of mutual assistance more flexible, but also cooperation in the area of ‘extradition’ [...].” With regard to the International Criminal Court, however, the ZISG must be observed as lex specialis. The surrender of a person by Switzerland to the International Criminal Court is governed exclusively by this more specific law and therefore does not constitute extradition, but rather a transfer (see N. 17).
21 By referring to “surrender”, Art. 32 IMAC implicitly assumes that the person concerned is in Switzerland.
3. Offense
22 Thirdly, the surrender must be based on an act that the other state can punish. While the Italian wording of the law refers to acts with “atti”, as does the German wording, the French wording already includes the breach of law with “infraction,” but is more open-ended with regard to the nature of the breach, as it can also include omissions. However, the “acts” or “atti” in Art. 32 IMAC are also to be understood in a broad sense, encompassing both actions and omissions. This interpretation is in line with Art. 35 IMAC, which specifies the characteristics that the predicate offense must have and refers to “offenses” and “acts” (‘infractions’/“reati”) without limiting them to acts committed.
23 Insofar as Art. 32 IMAC requires that the other state “can punish” (“a le droit de connaître de”/“può reprimere”) the act in question, this means that it must have criminal jurisdiction (punitive power) over it in both senses of the word: First, it must have the right under international law to prosecute the act (ius puniendi), i.e. it must be able to base this on a connecting factor recognized under international law (territoriality principle, flag or registration principle, active or passive personality principle, state protection principle or universality principle) or another basis recognized under international law (in particular the principle of vicarious criminal jurisdiction). This is best expressed in the French wording of Art. 32 IMAC, which expressly refers to entitlement rather than mere ability, and corresponds to the traditional and applicable concept of extradition (see N. 11). In addition, the other state must actually prosecute this act (in accordance with its criminal law).
24 In principle, it is irrelevant on which basis under international law the other state invokes its criminal jurisdiction, e.g. whether on the principle of territoriality or the principle of state protection (see on the principle of universality N. 28 ff.). However, it follows from the principle of reciprocity that it must be one on the basis of which Switzerland could request extradition from it.
25 Fiolka concludes from the requirement of an “act that the other state can punish” that the act must be punishable under the law of the other state, that this law must be applicable to it, and that the foreign authorities must be responsible for “punishing” the act. This appears to require clarification: the former is only clear from Art. 35 para. 1 lit. a IMAC. It may also happen that the other state claims criminal jurisdiction but declares foreign criminal law (e.g. as lex mitior) to be applicable; however, this should not preclude extradition. Finally, the internal jurisdiction of the foreign authority does not need to be examined.
26 Case law applies a cautious standard of assessment. According to this, mutual legal assistance or extradition is to be refused (only) if the other state's lack of criminal jurisdiction is so obvious that its request appears abusive or its affirmation of its own jurisdiction appears arbitrary. However, if this restraint is justified on the grounds that it is a question of “interpreting the law of the requesting state,” which is “primarily a matter for its authorities,” this falls short, as foreign criminal jurisdiction must also be based on applicable international law (see N. 23).
27 The aforementioned standard applied by case law, which is very favorable to mutual legal assistance, has the consequence that only in cases where there is no connection between the requesting state and the offense or no basis in international law for its criminal jurisdiction over the offense is extradition to be refused for lack of a suitable offense within the meaning of Art. 32 IMAC. International agreements may, of course, provide for a different standard.
28 How should an extradition request be dealt with in which the requesting state invokes the principle of universality (world law principle) to justify its criminal jurisdiction? Two scenarios must be distinguished.
29 If the alleged offender was not previously in the territory of the requesting state, this is clearly a case of the so-called unrestricted principle of universality (also known as the absolute, pure, or genuine principle of universality), according to which the presence of the offender in the territory of the prosecuting authority is not required. This principle cannot currently be considered recognized under international law. Although it has been adopted by individual legal systems (e.g., Germany, New Zealand), it remains highly controversial, and the threshold for its recognition under customary international law does not appear to have been crossed.
30 What is particularly interesting about the constellation at issue here is that, in the event of extradition, the requesting state would no longer have to invoke the unrestricted principle of universality, but could now prosecute the extradited person on the basis of the restricted principle of universality, which is recognized under international law. However, Art. 32 IMAC does not require that the other state could punish the offense, but that it can punish it. An obvious interpretation is that the other state must already possess criminal jurisdiction under international law and that it is not sufficient for it to acquire such jurisdiction through extradition (in other words, hypothetical or suspensive criminal jurisdiction is not sufficient). However, it can be argued that the last part of Art. 32 IMAC mentions the assumption of criminal prosecution or enforcement by the other state at the request of Switzerland, thus alluding to the vicarious administration of criminal justice, in which the other state does not initially have criminal jurisdiction under international law. Thus, it seems sufficient for Art. 32 IMAC if the other state can punish the offense after extradition.
31 In addition, there is the following point of view: even if – as in the constellation discussed here – the requesting state cannot ultimately base its criminal jurisdiction on existing international law, the more controversial this is (here: the scope of the principle of universality), the less its request will appear to be abusive. Applying the Federal Supreme Court's very favorable standard for mutual legal assistance—which is, admittedly, not convincingly justified (see N. 26)—a request based on the unrestricted principle of universality could therefore still be granted.
32 If the alleged perpetrator was initially on the territory of the requesting state, which initiated an investigation against him, and then left that state's territory, it can be argued that this is a case of the restricted principle of universality. Whether this principle actually covers this case in international law or whether criminal jurisdiction expires when the person leaves the territory of the state requires an examination of customary international law, which cannot be carried out here. In any case, the extradition request appears even less abusive in this constellation and will be granted simply because Switzerland itself exercises criminal jurisdiction in the same constellation and submits extradition requests to other countries.
33 Finally, it should be mentioned at this point that the act in question must have been committed by the person concerned themselves (or be attributable to them). We will return to this point shortly (N. 34).
4. Purpose of the surrender: criminal prosecution or enforcement of a custodial sentence
34 Fourthly, the surrender must be for the purpose of criminal prosecution or the enforcement of a custodial sentence. This refers back to Art. 1 para. 1 lit. a IMAC. Any other purpose, such as the conduct of civil or administrative proceedings or the hearing of evidence in other criminal proceedings (against third parties) in the foreign country concerned, is not taken into consideration. The criminal prosecution or penalty to be enforced must therefore be directed at the act committed by the person concerned (or attributable to them).
35 Extradition for criminal prosecution serves to arrest and surrender a person accused in foreign criminal proceedings so that the foreign judicial authorities can conduct criminal proceedings against them. The prerequisite is that criminal proceedings against the person are at least being prepared abroad.
36 It follows from Art. 35 para. 1 lit. a IMAC that, even in the case of criminal prosecution (and not only in the case of the enforcement of sanctions), the offense must be of a certain severity. The provision requires an offense that is punishable under the law of both Switzerland and the requesting state with a custodial sentence of at least one year or a more severe penalty.
37 Extradition for the enforcement of a custodial sentence is intended to arrest and transfer to another state a person against whom there is a final and enforceable foreign decision to enforce a custodial sentence. Custodial sentences (see Art. 11 para. 2 IMAC) are understood to mean prison sentences and inpatient measures. “Restrictive of liberty” is therefore synonymous with “depriving of liberty,” as is most clearly evident from the French version (“sanction privative de liberté”).
38 The law does not specify a minimum duration for the penalty to be enforced. According to the message on the IMAC, it is “self-evident that extradition no longer appears proportionate if the remaining period of deprivation of liberty is less than approximately three months.” Such cases are likely to be subsumed under Art. 4 IMAC. Various extradition treaties expressly regulate the minimum duration of penalties to be enforced in order for the contractual obligation to extradite to apply (e.g., Art. 2 no. 1 EEA: four months; Art. 2 no. 1 AVUS: six months).
39 According to the case law of the Federal Supreme Court in the context of the EEA, extradition for the enforcement of a suspended prison sentence is only possible if the suspended sentence is revoked (suspensive condition). There is no obligation to apply this case law to the context of the IMAC, especially since, unlike the EEA, there is no obligation to extradite in this case. Rather, a proportionality test is required in each individual case, whereby it is clear that both the remaining sentence and the remaining probationary period must not fall below the minimum applicable to unconditional sentences (see N. 38).
5. Request
40 Fifth, the other state must either request extradition (cf. Art. 27 ff. IMAC) or, at the request of Switzerland, take over the prosecution or enforcement of the criminal judgment (cf. Art. 88 f., 100 ff. IMAC). The latter two options also require the express consent of the other state to the extradition. In practice, they are likely to be rarely used.
Acknowledgements:
The author would like to thank the editors of the online commentary and an anonymous reviewer.
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Materials
Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, 1977, Bd. 5, Wintersession, Ständerat, Sitzung vom 29.11.1977 zum Geschäft Nr. 76.033, S. 612–637, abrufbar unter https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc/20006302.pdf?id=20006302, besucht am 24.8.2025.
Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, 1979, Bd. II, Sommersession, Nationalrat, Sitzung v. 12.6.1979, Geschäft Nr. 76.033, S. 647–664, abrufbar unter https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc/20007652.pdf?ID=20007652, besucht am 24.8.2025.
Botschaft des Bundesrathes an die Bundesversammlung zum Entwurf des Bundesgesetzes betreffend die Auslieferung gegenüber dem Ausland vom 9.6.1890, BBl 1890 III 316 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1890/3_316_193_/de, besucht am 17.8.2025.
Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung zu einem Bundesgesetz über internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen und einem Bundesbeschluss über Vorbehalte zum Europäischen Auslieferungsübereinkommen vom 8.3.1976, BBl 1976 II 444 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1976/2_444_430_443/de, besucht am 17.8.2025.
Botschaft über das Römer Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs, das Bundesgesetz über die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof und eine Revision des Strafrechts vom 15.11.2000, BBl 2001 391 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2001/133/de, besucht am 17.8.2025.
Botschaft zur Änderung von Artikel 1 des Rechtshilfegesetzes vom 6.11.2019, BBl 2019 7413 ff., abrufbar unter https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2019/2683/de, besucht am 17.8.2025.