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- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
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FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
- I. Purpose of the proceedings
- II. Legal nature
- III. Substantive conditions for confiscation
- IV. Persons affected by confiscation
- V. Scope of application of the independent forfeiture procedure
- VI. Compatibility with the offender's rights of defense?
- VII. Is it compatible with the presumption of innocence?
- VIII. Is it compatible with the “ne bis in idem” principle?
- IX. Jurisdiction of Swiss criminal authorities in an international context
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. Purpose of the proceedings
1 The purpose of the independent forfeiture proceedings under Art. 376-378 CrimPC is derived from the purposes pursued by the various types of forfeiture. These are regulated in the Swiss Criminal Code (SCC).
2 The purpose of precautionary forfeiture (Art. 69 SCC) is to forfeit property that is connected to a crime and should be removed from its owner in view of the danger it poses to public legal interests. According to the practice of the Federal Supreme Court, the purpose of precautionary forfeiture is to protect the general public from the (re)use of dangerous objects that pose a danger to legal interests.
3 The purpose of the forfeiture of assets (Art. 70 SCC) is to offset the proceeds of crime. The offender (or the beneficiary) should not be allowed to keep the financial advantage gained from a criminal offense. This type of forfeiture thus serves to fulfill the socio-ethical imperative that criminal behavior should not be rewarded. The function of confiscation under SCC Art. 70 is more accurately expressed in the term 'absorption or compensatory confiscation', which is sometimes used in doctrine and case law as a synonym for the aforementioned type of confiscation.
4 Finally, the confiscation of assets belonging to a criminal or terrorist organization (SCC Art. 72) aims to remove the operating capital of such an organization. In this context, it is immaterial whether the assets in question were acquired legally or illegally. The decisive criterion for this type of forfeiture is rather the fact that the assets in question are subject to the power of disposal of a criminal or terrorist organization. The Federal Supreme Court has already referred to the protective purpose of this type of forfeiture.
II. Legal nature
A. Legal nature of confiscation
5 The question of the legal nature of confiscation is answered differently depending on the type of confiscation.
1. Protective confiscation (Art. 69 SCC)
6 In the case of protective confiscation (Art. 69 SCC), the Federal Supreme Court assumes that it is a (factual) measure without a penal character. In view of the purpose of this type of confiscation, this is to be agreed, since the aim is not to punish a specific person for a specific behavior (after the fact), but rather to (preventively) remove objects that have a connection to a crime and should be taken from their owner in view of their endangerment to public legal interests.
2. Confiscation (Art. 70 SCC)
7 There is widespread uncertainty regarding the legal nature of confiscation (Art. 70 SCC). The prevailing doctrine qualifies confiscation as a substantive measure. As such, its ordering – in contrast to personal measures – does not depend on the punishability of a specific person. It must be ordered if the legal requirements are met.
8 However, legal scholars are not in agreement as to which criteria should be used to distinguish between punishments and measures. Without going into the details of the discussion in the specialist literature, it can be generally stated that the punishment is aimed at a person. It is linked to an unlawful and culpably committed offense. The repressive function of punishment lies in the compensation for guilt and in atonement. In addition, the purpose of the penalty is to rehabilitate the offender and thus to protect society from future criminal acts. Measures, on the other hand, have no repressive or “expiatory” function, but primarily a future-oriented security function.
9 The Federal Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the confiscation of assets under Article 70 SCC as a substantive measure, but at the same time pointed out its repressive character. When assessing the legal nature of this type of confiscation, the Federal Supreme Court bases its decision on the good or bad faith of the third party concerned: According to this, the confiscation of the good-faith third party encroaches on a legal position protected by civil law and should therefore be qualified as a “sanction close to punishment”. In the case of a purchaser in bad faith, however, the confiscation does not encroach on his property rights, which is why it is not considered to be a penalty. In a recent judgment, the Federal Supreme Court referred to previous case law and the state of opinion in legal doctrine, but ultimately left open the question of whether the confiscation of assets is a measure or a penalty.
10 The lack of clarification of this question by the Federal Supreme Court and the fact that there is no agreement in the specialist literature on the legal nature of the confiscation of assets suggest that neither the category of “punishment” nor that of “measure” are suitable for satisfactorily capturing this type of confiscation. According to Scholl's correct view, the reason for this lies in the independent characteristic of the confiscation of assets. It is intended to undo the consequences of a crime – in line with its purpose – and thus restore the financial situation that existed before the crime was committed. Consequently, the confiscation of assets should be qualified as a reparative measure.
3. Confiscation of assets of a criminal or terrorist organization (Art. 72 SCC)
11 Confiscation under SCC Art. 72 is not (as with SCC Art. 70) about offsetting the advantages gained by criminal means, but about accessing the operating capital of criminal or terrorist organizations. This type of confiscation can also be ordered without having to prove whether a particular asset comes from a specific crime.
12 In view of the objective, one could assume that this type of confiscation is a preventive measure. The assets are to be confiscated because it would be too dangerous to leave them in the power of disposal of the criminal or terrorist organization. In this sense, this type of confiscation is similar to the precautionary seizure (Art. 69 SCC): The object that was used or intended to be used to commit a crime and continues to pose a danger to the public is to be equated with the working capital that is in the power of disposal of the criminal or terrorist organization.
13 However, legal literature rightly points out that this type of confiscation also has penal elements and is therefore of a repressive nature. This is supported, first of all, by the reversal of the burden of proof in Art. 72 SCC. Accordingly, in the case of assets belonging to a person who has participated in or supported a criminal or terrorist organization, the organization's power of disposition (which, according to Art. 72 sentence 1 SCC, justifies confiscation) is presumed until the contrary is proven. This type of confiscation then risks degenerating into a penalty if, as a result of the reversal of the burden of proof, assets are seized that have been legally acquired and used. Furthermore, the freezing order under Art. 72 SCC lacks the typical earmarking for preventive security measures, since – unlike the freezing order under Art. 69 SCC – there is no examination of the extent to which there is a future risk to the general public when it is ordered.
B. Legal nature of the independent forfeiture proceedings
14 Regardless of how the individual types of forfeiture are classified (penalty or measure), it should be noted that the independent forfeiture proceedings under Art. 376 et seq. CrimPC can certainly be classified as “criminal proceedings” in the broader sense. This is because it is carried out by criminal authorities in application of the CrimPC. The wording of Art. 376 CrimPC, according to which independent forfeiture is ordered “outside of criminal proceedings”, merely expresses the fact that this measure is ordered outside of criminal proceedings against a specific person or specific persons. Accordingly, independent forfeiture orders are to be qualified as decisions in criminal matters.
III. Substantive conditions for confiscation
15 The substantive conditions for ordering independent confiscation are not derived from Art. 376-378 CrimPC, but from the substantive provisions of the SCC, which govern the various types of confiscation (Art. 69 et seq. SCC).
IV. Persons affected by confiscation
16 In the context of the independent forfeiture procedure, the following may have property forfeited: the possessor of the dangerous object (Art. 69 SCC), the offender and the directly benefiting third party (Art. 70 para. 1 SCC), subsequent acquirers (Art. 70 para. 2 SCC) and participants or supporters of a criminal or terrorist organization (Art. 72 SCC).
V. Scope of application of the independent forfeiture procedure
A. Wording
17 According to the wording of Art. 376 CrimPC, an independent forfeiture procedure is carried out when a decision on the forfeiture of objects or assets is to be made “outside of criminal proceedings”. This wording has been criticized in legal doctrine. Specifically, it was argued that the independent confiscation of criminal assets by the criminal authorities is also ordered in application of the CrimPC, which is why, in the broader sense, the order is indeed issued in criminal proceedings. Furthermore, it was rightly objected that it does not follow from the wording of Article 376 CrimPC that a decision on confiscation within the meaning of Article 69 et seq. SCC must in principle be taken in the context of criminal proceedings.
B. Subsidiary character
18 Once criminal proceedings have been formally opened (see Art. 309 CrimPC), there is in principle no longer any room for the special procedure for independent confiscation regulated in Art. 376 et seq. CrimPC, which is therefore subsidiary in nature.
19 The subsidiary nature of the independent forfeiture procedure cannot be circumvented by, for example, seizing objects or assets in court shortly before the first-instance trial or the appeal hearing is held, with the indication that the court will only decide on the forfeiture after the person affected by the forfeiture has been granted a legal hearing. Firstly, such a procedure would violate the right to a fair hearing (Art. 29 para. 2 FC) of the person affected by the confiscation. Secondly, such a procedure would be tantamount to the de facto implementation of an independent confiscation procedure, which is not provided for in the CrimPC.
C. Confiscation in the event of grounds for excluding guilt
20 If it is determined in the course of ordinary criminal proceedings that the accused is not criminally liable because there are grounds for excluding guilt, the ordering of forfeiture remains possible. This is because the ordering of forfeiture does not depend on the criminal liability of a specific person. In such cases, too, the forfeiture is accessory to the criminal proceedings against the accused.
D. Object of independent forfeiture
21 In the context of independent forfeiture proceedings, a protective forfeiture (Art. 69 SCC), the forfeiture of assets (Art. 70 SCC) or the forfeiture of assets of a criminal or terrorist organization (Art. 72 SCC) may be ordered. The independent forfeiture proceedings may involve both a forfeiture in kind (Art. 70 SCC) and a confiscation by means of a compensation claim (Art. 71 SCC). The direct handover of the seized assets to the injured party (Art. 70 para. 1 in fine SCC) or the subsequent allocation to the injured party (Art. 73 SCC) can also be ordered as part of the independent confiscation procedure (see Art. 378 CrimPC).
22 Criminal proceedings include all objects and assets that are seized after formal proceedings have been opened. According to Art. 263 para. 1 let. d CrimPC, objects and assets belonging to an accused person or a third party may be seized if they are likely to be confiscated. The confiscation seizure is a conservative provisional measure. To order it, it is sufficient if there is a possibility that the objects and assets in question could be confiscated in the future. In the case of a confiscation seizure, there must be a connection between the offense and the seized objects or assets. It is the preliminary stage of a confiscation.
E. Cases of application
1. Principle: independent confiscation in the absence of criminal proceedings
23 Independent forfeiture is generally considered when criminal proceedings are not held in Switzerland for whatever reason. This is the case, for example, when:
the public prosecutor orders that the case not be pursued in accordance with Art. 310 CrimPC, e.g. because procedural obstacles (Art. 310 para. 1 let. b CrimPC) exist, which includes the statute of limitations for the offence;
no criminal complaint has been filed in the case of an offence that requires a criminal complaint to be filed (cf. Art. 30 f. SCC), which precludes criminal proceedings from being conducted against the offender due to a procedural requirement not being met;
criminal proceedings against the offender fail for objective or factual reasons, e.g. because the offender is deceased, of unknown whereabouts or identity;
the offense justifying the confiscation (but not the claim to confiscation as such) is time-barred;
criminal proceedings against the offender have already been concluded and confiscable items or assets subsequently come to light, provided that the criminal authority could not have known about the existence of the confiscable items or assets had it exercised the necessary due diligence;
in the case of foreign offences, there are assets to be confiscated in Switzerland and the predicate offence falls under Swiss jurisdiction.
24 According to case law and doctrine, there are certain exceptions to the principle of subsidiarity of the independent confiscation proceedings. These will be discussed below.
2. Exceptions to the principle of subsidiarity of the independent confiscation proceedings
a. Special nature of the object to be confiscated
25 According to the practice of the Federal Supreme Court, an independent forfeiture procedure may also be considered – beyond the wording of Art. 376 CrimPC – if criminal proceedings are in progress but a quick decision on forfeiture should be made because of the nature of the property to be forfeited, for example because the property in question is perishable or subject to rapid depreciation. This condition may be met, for example, in the cultivation of hemp in large quantities. The possibility of independent confiscation – despite ongoing criminal proceedings – should also exist if, given the nature of the seized property, maintaining the seizure proves to be complex and excessively costly.
b. Safeguarding the interests of the injured parties
26 According to the practice of the Federal Supreme Court, with a view to protecting the interests of the injured parties, there is also reason to consider the decision on confiscation not as accessory to pending foreign criminal proceedings, but in independent proceedings, even if some time has already passed since the offence was committed and it is not expected that the foreign criminal proceedings will be concluded in the near future. However, the Federal Supreme Court requires that the injured party's claim be “sufficiently liquid” before it will order the early release of the assets to the injured party. This is because, according to the Federal Supreme Court, early release is only justified if it is obvious that the assets originate from the corresponding criminal offense and that the entitled party has been harmed by this offense. Only if the legal situation is clear or provable actual circumstances are immediately available and no better claims of third parties are asserted, there is no danger of contradictory judgments in the forfeiture and criminal proceedings. If this is not the case, the claim of the injured party is not liquid and the result of the foreign criminal proceedings must be awaited, which must be consulted by the judge when deciding on the forfeiture.
27 The possibility of such early independent forfeiture proceedings is generally preferred by some legal scholars (i.e. not limited to cases in which foreign criminal proceedings are pending).
c. Blocking access to websites with criminally relevant content?
28 In legal doctrine and jurisprudence, the view is occasionally expressed that the definitive blocking of access to websites with criminally relevant content (e.g. defamatory or racist content) can be ordered as part of an independent forfeiture procedure under Art. 376 et seq. CrimPC.
29 However, it was rightly objected that such an order for blocking was already lacking the substantive legal requirements of a security forfeiture (Art. 69 SCC) due to the lack of an instrumentum sceleris, since the access infrastructure of the access providers neither serves nor is intended for the commission of the communication offenses in question.
VI. Compatibility with the offender's rights of defense?
30 As already considered, the possibility of ordering confiscation does not depend on the criminal liability of a specific person. Independent confiscation does not involve any criminal accusation of guilt against the person affected by the confiscation.
31 The procedure of independent confiscation is rightly considered problematic if and to the extent that the underlying offence justifying the confiscation is established in this procedure without the alleged perpetrator having been able to defend himself in the context of ordinary criminal proceedings, exercising the rights of defence to which he is entitled. For this reason, the independent confiscation procedure must only be carried out in strict compliance with its subsidiary character.
VII. Is it compatible with the presumption of innocence?
32 The ordering of a precautionary forfeiture (Art. 69 SCC) requires the existence of a criminal and unlawful underlying offence. The confiscation of assets (Art. 70 para. 1 SCC) also requires conduct that fulfills the objective and subjective elements of a criminal offense and is unlawful. The same conditions apply to the claim for compensation (Art. 71 SCC).
33 According to Art. 32 para. 1 FC and Art. 10 para. 1 CrimPC, everyone is presumed innocent until legally convicted. According to Art. 6 no. 2 ECHR, everyone charged with a criminal offense is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. If there is no legally binding conviction, the public prosecutor in the discontinuation order or the court in its judgment may not express the view that they consider the accused to be guilty. Art. 6 no. 2 ECHR protects persons against being treated as if they were guilty of the crimes they have been accused of in the event of acquittal or discontinuation of proceedings.
34 If a person who has not been finally convicted is unreservedly accused of committing the offence in the independent confiscation order, this is problematic from the point of view of the presumption of innocence. In the absence of a final conviction of the perpetrator of the predicate offence, the grounds of an independent confiscation order should not state that the predicate offender is criminally liable. However, since the existence of a criminal and illegal offence is a prerequisite for the ordering of a confiscation, the reasoning of the independent confiscation decision must be made with caution.
35 Regarding the confiscation of property, it follows from SCC Art. 70 para. 2 a contrario that assets acquired by criminal means can in principle be confiscated from any third party who acquires them with knowledge of the reasons for the confiscation or without equivalent consideration. According to the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, the third party cannot invoke the presumption of innocence in the confiscation proceedings. Nevertheless, the state is obliged to prove all the conditions for confiscation from the third party. If the third party claims to have provided equivalent consideration within the meaning of Art. 70 para. 2 SCC, they must cooperate in the gathering of evidence in a reasonable manner. The Federal Supreme Court has already ruled that doubts regarding the conditions for confiscation must be applied by analogy to the presumption of innocence in favor of the person concerned. However, it is questionable whether this is really an analogous application of the presumption of innocence. If there are doubts, for example, about the existence of a criminal and unlawful underlying offence, then it would be more obvious to deny the existence of such an underlying offence and thus the corresponding condition for confiscation, in application of the principle of “in dubio pro reo” (cf. Art. 10 para. 3 CrimPC), which would have to be taken into account in favor of the person affected by the confiscation.
VIII. Is it compatible with the “ne bis in idem” principle?
36 Independent forfeiture proceedings are possible, among other reasons, if forfeitable objects and assets come to light after the legally binding conclusion of the ordinary criminal proceedings. This raises the question of whether independent forfeiture is compatible with the “ne bis in idem” principle.
37 The ne bis in idem principle is regulated in Art. 11 para. 1 CrimPC. It is also enshrined in Art. 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR and in Art. 14 para. 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and, according to the Federal Supreme Court's case law, can be derived directly from the Federal Constitution. Accordingly, anyone who has been legally convicted or acquitted in Switzerland may not be prosecuted again for the same offense. Identity of the acts exists if the first and second criminal proceedings are based on identical or essentially the same facts. The legal qualification of these facts is not important. The ne bis in idem principle prohibits the repetition of criminal proceedings that have been concluded by a final judgment. It constitutes a procedural obstacle that must be taken into account ex officio at every stage of the proceedings.
38 If new objects or assets that can be confiscated come to light after the final conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the principle of ne bis in idem and the finality of the judgment in the criminal proceedings do not in principle preclude the subsequent ordering of confiscation in the independent confiscation proceedings, since the two proceedings concern different matters. In such a case, the confiscation of the objects or assets in question has not yet been decided in the criminal proceedings that have already been legally concluded, so there is no case that has been tried (res iudicata).
39 However, independent confiscation proceedings cannot be carried out if the criminal authority could have become aware of the existence of the confiscable objects or assets by applying the necessary diligence in the ordinary criminal proceedings. This also applies to future economic benefits that could have been assessed and confiscated at the time of the court judgment or the public prosecutor's decision to dismiss the proceedings.
IX. Jurisdiction of Swiss criminal authorities in an international context
40 The MAA applies in cases of the handover of assets of criminal origin for the purposes of confiscation. “Confiscation” within the meaning of this agreement refers to a penalty or measure ordered by a court following proceedings in relation to a criminal offense or several criminal offenses and which results in the final forfeiture of the asset (Art. 1 let. d MAA). Art. 13 no. 1 AMLA requires the parties to the proceedings to confiscate the assets, whether this is done by enforcing a confiscation order issued by a court in the requesting party (a) or by forwarding the request for confiscation of instrumentalities or proceeds located in their territory to their competent authorities in order to obtain a confiscation order (b). According to the dispatch, the obligation relates exclusively to criminal asset forfeiture ordered by a court of the requesting party in the context of ordinary or independent criminal proceedings.
41 According to the Federal Supreme Court's case law and prevailing doctrine, an independent forfeiture of assets in Switzerland for foreign offences requires a connecting factor under Article 3 et seq. SCC (concerning the territorial scope of application) and thus Swiss jurisdiction, or that the forfeiture is provided for under a special law or international treaty.
42 In the area of international mutual assistance in criminal matters, the handover for confiscation is regulated in Art. 74a IMAC. The handover can take place at any stage of the foreign proceedings, usually based on a legally binding and enforceable decision of the requesting state (Art. 74a para. 3 IMAC). An independent, legally binding confiscation order is sufficient.
43 In practice, it may take a considerable time for the requesting state to produce such a decision. During this period, the seized assets are to be invested by the competent Swiss criminal justice authorities, usually the cantonal public prosecutors or the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland, in the most secure, value-preserving and profitable way possible. If an entitled party asserts claims to the seized objects or assets in accordance with Art. 74a para. 4 IMAC, their release to the requesting state is postponed until the legal situation has been clarified (Art. 74a para. 5 sentence 1 IMAC). The objects or assets in dispute may only be handed over to the entitled party under certain circumstances in accordance with Art. 74a para. 5 sentence 2 IMAC, for example if the requesting state agrees (lit. a). If the requesting state does not respond, the competent Swiss criminal authorities must decide on the lifting of the seizure and, if the conditions are met, initiate independent forfeiture proceedings in Switzerland in accordance with Art. 376 et seq. CrimPC. This is to prevent assets of criminal origin from having to be handed over merely because of a lack of cooperation from the requesting state.
About the author
Dr. iur. Tommaso Caprara, attorney, CAS Forensics, is a law clerk at the Second Criminal Division of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne.
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Perrier Depeursinge Camille, Code de procédure pénale suisse (CPP) annoté, 2. Aufl., Basel 2020.
Pitteloud Jo, Code de procédure pénale suisse (CPP), Commentaire à l'usage des praticiens, Zürich/St. Gallen 2012.
Schmid Niklaus, Kommentierung zu Art. 69 StGB und zu Art. 70-72 StGB, in: Schmid Niklaus (Hrsg.), Kommentar Einziehung, Organisiertes Verbrechen, Geldwäscherei, Band I, 2. Aufl., Zürich 2007.
Schödler Sara, Dritte im Beschlagnahme- und Einziehungsverfahren, Luzern 2012.
Scholl Marcel, Kommentierung zu Art. 70 StGB, in: Jürg-Beat Ackermann (Hrsg.), Kommentar Kriminelles Vermögen - Kriminelle Organisationen, Band I, Zürich 2018.
Schwarzenegger Christian, Kommentierung zu Art. 376 StPO, in: Donatsch Andreas/Lieber Viktor/Summers Sarah/Wohlers Wolfgang (Hrsg.), Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Strafprozessordnung (StPO), 3. Aufl., Zürich 2020.
Seelmann Martin/Thommen Marc, Kommentierung zu Art. 72 StGB, in: Jürg-Beat Ackermann (Hrsg.), Kommentar Kriminelles Vermögen - Kriminelle Organisationen, Band I, Zürich 2018.
Tag Brigitte, Kommentierung zu Art. 11 StPO, in: Niggli Marcel Alexander/Heer Marianne/Wiprächtiger Hans (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Schweizerische Strafprozessordnung, 3. Aufl., Basel 2023.
Thommen Marc, Kommentierung zu Art. 69 StGB, in: Jürg-Beat Ackermann (Hrsg.), Kommentar Kriminelles Vermögen - Kriminelle Organisationen, Band I, Zürich 2018.
Tirelli Ludovic/Trajilovic Daniel, L'application du principe de la lex mitior à la confiscation de valeurs patrimoniales (art. 70 CP) et à l'infraction de blanchiment d'argent (art. 305bis CP), forumpoenale 2023, S. 350 ff.
Trechsel Stefan/Jean-Richard-dit-Bressel, Kommentierung zu Art. 70 StGB, in: Trechsel Stefan/Pieth Mark (Hrsg.), Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch, Praxiskommentar, 4. Aufl., Zürich 2021.
Weingart Denise, Das Einspracheverfahren gegen den selbstständigen Einziehungsbefehl nach Art. 377 Abs. 4 StPO, Besonderheiten und offene Fragen, in: Bopp Dominik/Kistler Alexander/Lisik Natalie/Reber Kristof (Hrsg.), Der Prozess, Zürich 2023, S. 261 ff.
Wiprächtiger Hans/Keller Stefan, Kommentierung zu Art. 47 StGB, in: Niggli Marcel Alexander/Wiprächtiger Hans (Hrsg.), Basler Kommentar, Strafrecht, Band I, 4. Aufl., Basel 2019.
Wohlers Wolfgang, Kommentierung zu Art. 70 StGB, in: Wohlers Wolfgang/Godenzi Gunhild/Schlegel Stephan (Hrsg.), Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch, Handkommentar, 5. Aufl., Bern 2024.
Materials
Botschaft vom 19.8.1992 über die Ratifikation des Übereinkommens Nr. 141 des Europarats über Geldwäscherei sowie Ermittlung, Beschlagnahme und Einziehung von Erträgen aus Straftaten, BBl 1992 VI 9 ff. (zit. Botschaft 1992).
Botschaft vom 30.6.1993 über die Änderung des Schweizerischen Strafgesetzbuches und des Militärstrafgesetzes (Revision des Einziehungsrechts, Strafbarkeit der kriminellen Organisation, Melderecht des Financiers), BBl 1993 III 277 ff. (zit. Botschaft 1993).
Botschaft vom 21.12.2005 zur Vereinheitlichung des Strafprozessrechts, BBl 2006 1085 ff. (zit. Botschaft StPO).
Botschaft vom 14.9.2018 zur Genehmigung und zur Umsetzung des Übereinkommens des Europarats zur Verhütung des Terrorismus mit dem dazugehörigen Zusatzprotokoll sowie zur Verstärkung des strafrechtlichen Instrumentariums gegen Terrorismus und organisierte Kriminalität, BBl 2018 6427 ff. (zit. Botschaft 2018).