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- Art. 3 FC
- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 13 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 26 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 31 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 45 FC
- Art. 51 FC
- Art. 52 FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 69 FC
- Art. 74 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 81 FC
- Art. 96 para. 1 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 119a FC
- Art. 122 FC
- Art. 123a FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 130 FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 164 FC
- Art. 166 FC
- Art. 170 FC
- Art. 176 FC
- Art. 178 FC
- Art. 189 FC
- Art. 191 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 97 CO
- Art. 98 CO
- Art. 99 CO
- Art. 100 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 633 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 710 CO
- Art. 713 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Art. 795 CO
- Art. 795a CO
- Art. 795b CO
- Art. 795c CO
- Art. 808c CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 60 PRA
- Art. 60a PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 64 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 73 PRA
- Art. 73a PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Art. 1 IMAC
- Art. 1a IMAC
- Art. 3 para. 1 and 2 IMAC
- Art. 8 IMAC
- Art. 8a IMAC
- Art. 11b IMAC
- Art. 16 IMAC
- Art. 17 IMAC
- Art. 17a IMAC
- Art. 32 IMAC
- Art. 35 IMAC
- Art. 47 IMAC
- Art. 48 IMAC
- Art. 54 IMAC
- Art. 56 IMAC
- Art. 55a IMAC
- Art. 63 IMAC
- Art. 65 IMAC
- Art. 67 IMAC
- Art. 67a IMAC
- Art. 74 IMAC
- Art. 74a IMAC
- Art. 80 IMAC
- Art. 80a IMAC
- Art. 80b IMAC
- Art. 80c IMAC
- Art. 80d IMAC
- Art. 80h IMAC
- Art. 80k IMAC
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 4 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. c FADP
- Art. 5 lit. d FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 para. 3-5 FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 18 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 21 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 28 FADP
- Art. 29 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 52 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 55 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 1 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 16 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 18 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 27 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 28 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
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- Art. 2 para. 1 AMLA
- Art. 2a para. 1-2 and 4-5 AMLA
- Art. 2 para. 2 AMLA
- Art. 2 para. 3 AMLA
- Art. 3 AMLA
- Art. 7 AMLA
- Art. 7a AMLA
- Art. 8 AMLA
- Art. 8a AMLA
- Art. 9 AMLA
- Art. 11 AMLA
- Art. 14 AMLA
- Art. 15 AMLA
- Art. 20 AMLA
- Art. 23 AMLA
- Art. 24 AMLA
- Art. 24a AMLA
- Art. 25 AMLA
- Art. 26 AMLA
- Art. 26a AMLA
- Art. 27 AMLA
- Art. 28 AMLA
- Art. 29 AMLA
- Art. 29a AMLA
- Art. 29b AMLA
- Art. 30 AMLA
- Art. 31 AMLA
- Art. 31a AMLA
- Art. 32 AMLA
- Art. 33 AMLA
- Art. 34 AMLA
- Art. 38 AMLA
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
FEDERAL ACT ON DIRECT FEDERAL TAX
MEDICAL DEVICES ORDINANCE
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
COMMERCIAL REGISTER ORDINANCE
FEDERAL ACT ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
FEDERAL ACT ON MEDICINAL PRODUCTS AND MEDICAL DEVICES
TAX HARMONISATION ACT
BANKING ACT
- I. General Information
- II. Objective Elements of the Offense
- III. Subjective Elements of the Offense
- IV. Unlawfulness (Para. 4)
- V. Concurrent Offenses and Reservations (Para. 5)
- VI. Penalty
- Bibliography
- Materials
I. General Information
A. Historical Background
1 Art. 321ter of the SCC was incorporated into the core criminal law of the SCC with the enactment of the new Telecommunications Act of April 30, 1997. Until January 1, 1998, criminal law protection of the secrecy of postal and telecommunications communications was found in supplementary criminal law: the confidentiality of postal correspondence was enshrined in Art. 57 of the Postal Traffic Act of October 2, 1924 (aPVG), while the confidentiality of telecommunications had been enshrined since 1991 in Art. 53 in conjunction with Art. 15 of the then-current Telecommunications Act (aFMG). With the liberalization of the postal and telecommunications markets, the relevant criminal provisions were transferred to the core criminal law without any significant substantive changes. The Federal Council justified this change by citing the “growing importance of telecommunications secrecy.”
2 With the end of the PTT monopoly and the authorization of private providers, the duty of confidentiality—and the criminal penalties associated with it—had to be extended to a significantly broader group of addressees. The provision thus covers all employees of both licensed and unlicensed providers, insofar as they provide postal or telecommunications services. In relation to professional secrecy, Art. 321ter of the SCC constitutes a specialized extension that places the protection of telecommunications at a level comparable to that provided by Art. 321 SCC under criminal law.
B. Protected Legal Interest
3 Art. 321ter of the SCC ensures both the institutional protection of postal and telecommunications traffic as a system and the privacy of the individual participants in such communications. In BGer 6B_182/2018, the Federal Supreme Court explicitly states that the provision protects “in accordance with Art. 321 of the SCC […] also the privacy” of the communicating parties.
4 The object of protection is “information regarding customers’ postal, payment, or telecommunications traffic.” This wording encompasses information regarding both the content and the communication or payment behavior in equal measure. By including postal payment transactions, the legislature—going beyond the core constitutional provision on the secrecy of telecommunications (Art. 13 para. 1 of the FC)—has aligned the provision with banking secrecy under Art. 47 of the BankG.
5 The criminal provision provides a criminal law counterpart to the protection of correspondence, postal communications, and telecommunications guaranteed by para. 1 of Art. 13 of the FC. In its case law on criminal procedural surveillance, the Federal Supreme Court has clarified that the constitutional right to telecommunications secrecy also covers email communications and that any interference—specifically the collection of metadata—requires a legal basis and judicial authorization. In BGE 144 I 126, the Federal Supreme Court confirmed these principles with regard to telecommunications metadata and held that protection extends “not only to the content of the communication; rather, the metadata of the communication process is also covered.”
6 The protection afforded by Art. 321ter covers, first and foremost and without dispute, the content data of the communication and the financial transaction. Equally clearly covered are the metadata—that is, information regarding the communication process itself (sender, recipient, type, duration, and frequency of contacts). Rehberg had already deduced from the phrase “information regarding the […] customer traffic” that connection or supplementary data also fall under the criminal provision. More recent legal scholarship unanimously follows this view, and the Federal Supreme Court has expressly confirmed the constitutional basis for this in BGE 144 I 126, para. 4.1.
7 The treatment of subscriber data (subscriber identification, line ownership, static address database) is more challenging. According to Hansjakob and Simmler, subscriber data is not covered by telecommunications secrecy and thus by Art. 321ter of the SCC, provided that it does not concern data on the actual telecommunications traffic—i.e., a communication—but rather only data regarding the contractual relationship between the data subject and a telecommunications service provider. This distinction can pose difficulties in practice. Simmler illustrates this using the example of IP addresses: The IP address used for registration with a telecommunications service provider is a subscriber data, whereas the IP address used for subsequent communication with a third party via the telecommunications service is a traffic data. However, there is also a third case: the IP address through which a person most recently accessed the telecommunications service: If the access is related to the administration of the user account, it constitutes inventory data; in the case of communication with a third party, however, it constitutes peripheral data. Telecommunications surveillance measures that request information about the last access but indirectly lead to the surveillance of peripheral data without judicial authorization are therefore problematic in relation to the protection of telecommunications secrecy.
8 Following Simmler’s distinction, we take the following position: To the extent that inventory data merely concern the assignment of a connection or a transmission to a person without providing information about a specific communication transaction, they fall outside the scope of “customer traffic” protected under Art. 321ter, and their protection is primarily provided by general data protection law under the FADP. However, as soon as inventory data is linked to a specific communication event—such as who is the sender of a particular transmission or the subscriber of an identified connection—it becomes metadata and is covered by the protection of Art. 321ter.
9 In this context, reference should be made to the Federal Supreme Court’s ruling in BGE 144 I 126 regarding the constitutionality of the six-month retention of metadata without cause under the Interception of Telecommunications Act (BÜPF). The Federal Supreme Court states that the mere collection and storage of data by entities subject to the obligation to cooperate does not yet constitute surveillance requiring judicial authorization within the meaning of the CrimPC; law enforcement authorities cannot “directly access the data collected by telecommunications service providers,” but only at the subsequent stage of actual surveillance—and even then, only subject to judicial approval. This separation between private data collection and state access is open to criticism: The obligation to cooperate originates from a state order, meaning that the infringement of fundamental rights is attributable to the state as early as the collection phase—shifting the starting point of protection to the later act of access obscures this attribution. Final clarification is likely to come from Case No. 47351/18 (Glättli et al. v. Switzerland), currently pending before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), brought by members of the Digitale Gesellschaft association. However, this reservation does not impose any restrictions on the application of Art. 321ter under criminal law: As long as providers collect data on the basis of a sufficient legal foundation, the retention itself does not constitute an offense; however, the disclosure of the collected metadata to third parties outside the scope of the statutory rules on the provision of information continues to violate Art. 321ter of the SCC. It should be noted that only content data and metadata are covered by the protection afforded by Art. 321ter of the SCC. The provisions of the Telecommunications Surveillance Act (BÜPF) regarding inventory data do not alter this, even though the disclosure of such data is subject to special procedures under Articles 15, 21, and 22 of the BÜPF.
C. Relationship to Related Provisions
10 Article 321ter of the SCC is closely related to other provisions concerning confidentiality and interference with privacy. Within the SCC, Art. 320 SCC (official secrecy), Art. 321 SCC (professional secrecy), Art. 179 SCC (violation of the confidentiality of correspondence), and Art. 179bis et seq. SCC (technical surveillance) constitute the most important points of reference. In the area of ancillary criminal law, Art. 43 and Art. 49 et seq. of the Telecommunications Act (FMG) and the provisions of the Interception of Communications Act (BÜPF) also apply. The duty of confidentiality under Art. 43 FMG establishes the professional duty of confidentiality for the telecommunications sector; the Postal Act does not provide for such a duty of confidentiality, yet violations of both are penalized under Art. 321ter of the SCC.
II. Objective Elements of the Offense
A. Scope of Perpetrators
11 Art. 321ter of the SCC is a genuine special offense. Only a public official, employee, or auxiliary agent of an organization that provides postal or telecommunications services qualifies as a perpetrator. The wording does not distinguish between licensed or registration-required providers on the one hand and purely private service providers on the other; thus, according to prevailing legal doctrine, the criminal provision applies to all employees in the field of postal and telecommunications services—regardless of the legal classification of the company.
12 Rehberg has pointed out that extending the confidentiality of mail to the staff of organizations that offer non-reserved services and are not subject to a licensing or registration requirement is constitutionally questionable (Art. 36, para. 4 of the former Federal Constitution; now Art. 13, para. 1 of the FC). In particular, the criminal law obligation of confidentiality is questionable for employees of private courier services and of distribution organizations for unaddressed mail. The majority of recent legal scholarship does not follow this restrictive interpretation and instead relies on the broad wording of the provision.
13 In accordance with other confidentiality obligations protected under criminal law, a violation of postal and telecommunications secrecy remains a criminal offense even after the termination of official or employment status.
B. Offense (para. 1)
14 Para. 1 covers (i) the disclosure of “information […] concerning customers” to a third party, (ii) the opening of a sealed mail item or the investigation of its contents, and (iii) the provision of such an opportunity to a third party. The manner in which the information is disclosed—orally, in writing, electronically, by presenting files, or by granting access to IT systems—is irrelevant.
15 It should not be inferred from the second form of the offense (“opening a sealed mail item”) that the disclosure of the contents of an unsealed mail item—such as a postcard—by employees of a postal organization is not punishable. Rather, this scenario is covered by the first form of the offense (disclosure of “information regarding […] customer correspondence”).
16 According to established legal doctrine, the third variant of the offense (“or provides a third party with the opportunity”) also covers the failure to intervene against attempts by third parties to discover confidential information. In this respect, Art. 321ter of the SCC includes a provision for breach-of-duty inaction that is absent from Art. 320 SCC and Art. 321 SCC.
C. Indirect Perpetration (para. 2)
17 In the case of true special offenses, an outsider (Extraneus) who lacks the special duty cannot, as a rule, be held criminally liable as a direct perpetrator. In the case of genuine special offenses, the outsider (extraneus) cannot be punished as an indirect perpetrator even if he uses the intraneus—who is bound by a duty of confidentiality—as an unwitting instrument, for example through deception; he lacks the special status required for the offense. Unlike Art. 320 SCC and Art. 321 SCC, para. 2 expressly closes this loophole with respect to the violation of postal and telecommunications secrecy: Anyone who induces the person bound by a duty of confidentiality to violate that confidentiality through deception is subject to the same penalty as the intraneus.
18 If the perpetrator subject to the obligation under para. 1 is induced to commit an intentional act, this constitutes incitement, which is to be assessed according to the general rules (Art. 24 in conjunction with Art. 321ter SCC). Para. 2 applies only if the deception precludes the intent of the principal offender and the accessory thereby acts as an indirect perpetrator.
III. Subjective Elements of the Offense
19 Only intentional commission is punishable, whereby conditional intent suffices.
IV. Unlawfulness (Para. 4)
20 Para. 4 declares the violation of postal and telecommunications secrecy to be non-punishable to the extent that it is necessary to identify the authorized party. The primary practical application is the opening of undeliverable mail whose recipient or sender cannot otherwise be identified.
21 Until June 30, 2023, para. 4 additionally covered the “prevention of harm.” This expansion had been criticized in legal scholarship as inconsistent with the system and too vague, because it established a blanket justification clause beyond the general rules on necessity (Art. 17 et seq. SCC). With the harmonization of sentencing ranges in 2021–2023, the legislature deleted this clause, thereby addressing the criticism from legal scholarship—the Federal Council had explicitly stated in its explanatory memorandum that relevant scenarios were “already covered by the general rules on necessity (Art. 17 and 18 SCC).” To the extent that circumstances outside the scope of this narrow “authorized persons” clause in para. 4 are at issue, recourse must be made to the general grounds for justification and the balancing of interests developed in that context.
V. Concurrent Offenses and Reservations (Para. 5)
A. Concurrent Offenses
22 As a specialized extension of the protection of the secrecy of correspondence, Art. 321ter of the SCC takes precedence over the general offense of violating the secrecy of written correspondence (Art. 179 SCC), provided that the perpetrator acts as an employee of a postal or telecommunications organization. Unlike Art. 179 of the SCC, Art. 321ter of the SCC does not require that the mail be opened with the intent to read its contents.
23 If the perpetrator is a public official within the meaning of Art. 110 para. 3 of the SCC, Art. 321ter StGB takes precedence over the official secrecy provision (Art. 320 SCC) as lex specialis.
24 Genuine concurrence exists with Art. 162 (Violation of manufacturing or trade secrets), 179novies (Unauthorized acquisition of personal data), and 283 SCC (Violation of voting and election secrecy), as well as with offenses involving misappropriation.
B. Reservation in Favor of Art. 179octies and the Duty to Testify and Provide Information
25 Para. 5 clarifies that Art. 179octies, as well as the federal and cantonal provisions on the duty to testify and provide information, remain unaffected. For state surveillance of postal and telecommunications traffic, Art. 269 et seq. of the CrimPC and the Federal Act on the Surveillance of Postal and Telecommunications Traffic (BÜPF); in BGE 126 I 50, the Federal Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental distinction between state powers of intervention and the protection afforded by Art. 321ter of the SCC, which is aimed at safeguarding professional duties. The reservation does not have an independent justifying effect; it merely refers to the relevant procedural rules governing state intervention.
VI. Penalty
26 This is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to three years or a fine (para. 1). Art. 321ter of the SCC is an officially prosecuted offense; therefore, a criminal complaint is not required, and prosecution is initiated ex officio. Attempts and complicity are governed by Art. 22 et seq. of the SCC.
Bibliography
Hansjakob Thomas, Überwachungsrecht der Schweiz, Kommentar zu Art. 269 ff. StPO und zum BÜPF, Zürich et al. 2018.
Isenring Bernhard, Kommentierung zu Art. 321ter StGB, in: Donatsch Andreas/Heimgartner Stefan (Hrsg.), StGB JStG. Kommentar zum StGB, JStG und OBG sowie in Auszügen zum SVG, BetmG und AIG, 22. Aufl., Zürich 2026 (zit.: OFK-Isenring, Art. 321ter StGB N. yy).
Oberholzer Niklaus, Kommentierung zu Art. 321ter StGB, in: Niggli Marcel Alexander/Wiprächtiger Hans (Hrsg.), Strafrecht. Basler Kommentar, Bd. II: Art. 137–392 StGB, JStG, 4. Aufl., Basel 2019 (zit.: BSK-Oberholzer, Art. 321ter StGB N. yy).
Rehberg Jörg, Änderungen im Strafgesetzbuch durch das neue Fernmeldegesetz, AJP 1998, Heft 5, S. 562–568.
Simmler Monika, Working Paper VÜPF Revision, Universität St. Gallen, November 2025, https://www.doi.org/20.500.14171/124767, besucht am 28.4.2026.
Trechsel Stefan/Lehmkuhl Marianne Johanna, Kommentierung zu Art. 321ter StGB, in: Trechsel Stefan/Pieth Mark (Hrsg.), Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch, Praxiskommentar, 4. Aufl., Zürich et al. 2021 (zit.: PK-Trechsel/Lehmkuhl, Art. 321ter StGB N. yy).
Wohlers Wolfgang, Kommentierung zu Art. 321ter StGB, in: Wohlers Wolfgang/Godenzi Gunhild/Schlegel Stephan, Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch – Handkommentar, 5. Aufl., Bern 2024 (zit.: SHK-Wohlers, Art. 321ter StGB N. yy).
Werly Stéphane, Kommentierung zu Art. 321ter StGB, in: Macaluso Alain/Moreillon Laurent/Queloz Nicolas (Hrsg.), Commentaire romand, Code pénal II, 2. Aufl., Basel 2025 (zit.: CR CP II-Werly, Art. 321ter StGB N. yy).
Materials
Botschaft zum revidierten Fernmeldegesetz vom 10.6.1996, BBl 1996 III 1405, abrufbar unter https://fedlex.data.admin.ch/eli/fga/1996/3_1405_1361_1297, besucht am 27.8.2026 (zit.: Botschaft 1996, S. xxx).
Botschaft zur Änderung des Strafgesetzbuches und des Militärstrafgesetzes (Harmonisierung der Strafrahmen und Anpassung des Nebenstrafrechts an das geänderte Sanktionenrecht) vom 25.4.2018, BBl 2018 2827, abrufbar unter https://fedlex.data.admin.ch/eli/fga/2018/1154, besucht am 27.8.2026 (zit.: Botschaft 2018, S. xxx).