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- Art. 5a FC
- Art. 6 FC
- Art. 10 FC
- Art. 16 FC
- Art. 17 FC
- Art. 20 FC
- Art. 22 FC
- Art. 29a FC
- Art. 30 FC
- Art. 32 FC
- Art. 42 FC
- Art. 43 FC
- Art. 43a FC
- Art. 55 FC
- Art. 56 FC
- Art. 60 FC
- Art. 68 FC
- Art. 75b FC
- Art. 77 FC
- Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC
- Art. 110 FC
- Art. 117a FC
- Art. 118 FC
- Art. 123b FC
- Art. 136 FC
- Art. 166 FC
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- Art. 11 CO
- Art. 12 CO
- Art. 50 CO
- Art. 51 CO
- Art. 84 CO
- Art. 143 CO
- Art. 144 CO
- Art. 145 CO
- Art. 146 CO
- Art. 147 CO
- Art. 148 CO
- Art. 149 CO
- Art. 150 CO
- Art. 701 CO
- Art. 715 CO
- Art. 715a CO
- Art. 734f CO
- Art. 785 CO
- Art. 786 CO
- Art. 787 CO
- Art. 788 CO
- Transitional provisions to the revision of the Stock Corporation Act of June 19, 2020
- Art. 808c CO
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- Art. 2 PRA
- Art. 3 PRA
- Art. 4 PRA
- Art. 6 PRA
- Art. 10 PRA
- Art. 10a PRA
- Art. 11 PRA
- Art. 12 PRA
- Art. 13 PRA
- Art. 14 PRA
- Art. 15 PRA
- Art. 16 PRA
- Art. 17 PRA
- Art. 19 PRA
- Art. 20 PRA
- Art. 21 PRA
- Art. 22 PRA
- Art. 23 PRA
- Art. 24 PRA
- Art. 25 PRA
- Art. 26 PRA
- Art. 27 PRA
- Art. 29 PRA
- Art. 30 PRA
- Art. 31 PRA
- Art. 32 PRA
- Art. 32a PRA
- Art. 33 PRA
- Art. 34 PRA
- Art. 35 PRA
- Art. 36 PRA
- Art. 37 PRA
- Art. 38 PRA
- Art. 39 PRA
- Art. 40 PRA
- Art. 41 PRA
- Art. 42 PRA
- Art. 43 PRA
- Art. 44 PRA
- Art. 45 PRA
- Art. 46 PRA
- Art. 47 PRA
- Art. 48 PRA
- Art. 49 PRA
- Art. 50 PRA
- Art. 51 PRA
- Art. 52 PRA
- Art. 53 PRA
- Art. 54 PRA
- Art. 55 PRA
- Art. 56 PRA
- Art. 57 PRA
- Art. 58 PRA
- Art. 59a PRA
- Art. 59b PRA
- Art. 59c PRA
- Art. 62 PRA
- Art. 63 PRA
- Art. 67 PRA
- Art. 67a PRA
- Art. 67b PRA
- Art. 75 PRA
- Art. 75a PRA
- Art. 76 PRA
- Art. 76a PRA
- Art. 90 PRA
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- Vorb. zu Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 1 FADP
- Art. 2 FADP
- Art. 3 FADP
- Art. 5 lit. f und g FADP
- Art. 6 Abs. 6 and 7 FADP
- Art. 7 FADP
- Art. 10 FADP
- Art. 11 FADP
- Art. 12 FADP
- Art. 14 FADP
- Art. 15 FADP
- Art. 19 FADP
- Art. 20 FADP
- Art. 22 FADP
- Art. 23 FADP
- Art. 25 FADP
- Art. 26 FADP
- Art. 27 FADP
- Art. 31 para. 2 lit. e FADP
- Art. 33 FADP
- Art. 34 FADP
- Art. 35 FADP
- Art. 38 FADP
- Art. 39 FADP
- Art. 40 FADP
- Art. 41 FADP
- Art. 42 FADP
- Art. 43 FADP
- Art. 44 FADP
- Art. 44a FADP
- Art. 45 FADP
- Art. 46 FADP
- Art. 47 FADP
- Art. 47a FADP
- Art. 48 FADP
- Art. 49 FADP
- Art. 50 FADP
- Art. 51 FADP
- Art. 54 FADP
- Art. 57 FADP
- Art. 58 FADP
- Art. 60 FADP
- Art. 61 FADP
- Art. 62 FADP
- Art. 63 FADP
- Art. 64 FADP
- Art. 65 FADP
- Art. 66 FADP
- Art. 67 FADP
- Art. 69 FADP
- Art. 72 FADP
- Art. 72a FADP
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- Art. 2 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 3 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 4 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 5 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 6 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 7 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 8 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 9 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 11 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 12 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 25 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 29 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 32 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 33 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
- Art. 34 CCC (Convention on Cybercrime)
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
FEDERAL LAW ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LUGANO CONVENTION
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON POLITICAL RIGHTS
CIVIL CODE
FEDERAL ACT ON CARTELS AND OTHER RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION
FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL ACT ON DATA PROTECTION
SWISS CRIMINAL CODE
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION
I. History of origin
A. First price controls
1 Switzerland already had price controls in the interwar period, during the Second World War and afterwards. This was based on economic policy. The Federal Decree of 1972 was intended to deal with the overheating of the economy at the time, which led to excess demand and thus caused considerable inflation. Without a proper constitutional basis, the period of validity of this - consequently extra-constitutional (Art. 89bis para. 1 and 3 aBV) - federal decree was limited until the end of 1975. This was followed by the next federal decree, which, however, had to cope with a changed situation: the economic situation had cooled down into a recession, while relatively high inflation still had to be brought under control.
B. Popular initiative "to prevent abusive prices"
1. Popular initiative and counter-proposal of the Federal Council
2 Inspired by the positive result of the 1975 federal decree in the referendum, the consumer protection organizations launched a popular initiative for the permanent establishment of price monitoring, not (any longer) as an economic policy measure, but as a measure motivated by competition policy. The Federal Council, on the other hand, countered the popular initiative with a counter-proposal with price monitoring motivated by economic policy and limited to inflationary phases. In the referendum on November 28, 1982, however, the majority of the people and the cantons voted in favour of the popular initiative and thus in favor of a competition policy motivation.
2. First constitutional text
3 The - then - new Art. 31septies aBV read as follows:
"In order to prevent abuses in pricing, the Confederation shall issue regulations for monitoring the prices and price recommendations for goods and services of undertakings and organizations with market power, in particular cartels and cartel-like entities, under public and private law. Such prices may be reduced if the purpose so requires."
4 The purpose of this constitutional provision was to prevent increased prices by cartels and companies and organizations with market power due to a lack of effective competition, but not to create competition. According to the dispatch, it is therefore "a kind of substitute policy for competition [...] which replaces the recognized best price supervisor", namely competition.
5 The creation of competition was reserved for the antitrust article (Art. 31bis para. 3 lit. d aBV) and the implementing legislation. This constitutional provision would also have been sufficient for the establishment of price monitoring in terms of competition policy, as it provided a basis against any form of economically or socially damaging effects of cartels and companies with market power. There was a "parallel" competence of the federal government. However, the newly created basis of Art. 31septies aBV gave the federal legislator a specific legislative mandate: to ensure the effective and rapid monitoring of prices of powerful market entities. This required a specific mandate and thus a very specific instrument.
C. Constitutional revision and new FC
6 The two separate articles were transferred to Art. 96 para. 1 and para. 2 lit. a in the FC of April 18, 1999. The latter paragraph in turn gives the federal legislator the binding mandate to use a specific competition policy instrument, namely price monitoring, in addition to the antitrust instrument. In this respect, Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC is a legislative competence with subsequent derogatory effect.
7 Based on the generally applicable rules for the interpretation of constitutional articles, it must continue to be assumed that the antitrust and price control articles are of equal importance. Thus, the total revision of the Federal Constitution has not changed the independent significance of the two articles for the Swiss economic constitution and the old legal status has been retained.
II.Commentary in the narrow sense
A. Market power and abuses in pricing (price abuse)
1. Terminology of market power
a. Constitutional evidence
8 The prerequisite for state action against abusive pricing is the market power of a company or organization. The term market power (or the adjective "market power") is only used by the FC in the aforementioned paragraph. Beyond that, however, the market is hardly mentioned and is only used in agriculture (Art. 104). The word "power" also has no parallel in the FC. It is only mentioned in connection with "power-political or military threats" in the context of national defense (Art. 102).
b. Legal indications
9 At the statutory level, the CartA repeats the concept of market power within the scope of application, but does not elaborate on it. However, it does mention "market-dominant companies" in Art. 4 para. 2 and describes their status as being able to behave independently of other market participants (competitors, suppliers or buyers) to a significant extent.
10 The Price Supervision Act (PrSA) also does not address the concept of market power in its scope of application (Art. 1 f.) and merely repeats that it applies to "companies under private and public law with market power". However, with regard to the competition policy principle of Art. 12, para. 1 contains the statement that price abuse can only occur "if the prices on the market concerned are not the result of effective competition". The connection between the concept of market power and the lack of competitive pressure or the substantive development of competition was also established by the Federal Administrative Court, which stated that, in principle, prices that are the result of effective competition are not abusive. And it went on to say: "This basic economic [s]ystematic understanding derives from the Federal Constitution. Thus, the federal government's competence to take measures against abusive prices is expressly limited to abuses in pricing by companies and organizations with market power (see Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC). This definition of competence as well as the fundamental rights of the guarantee of property (Art. 26) and economic freedom (27 FC) are based on a basic understanding of the economic system, which implies that abusive prices can only exist if there is no effective competition on the market concerned. Effective competition automatically limits the scope for price fixing to a non-abusive level [...]." Even if "effective competition" is thus regarded as the guiding principle of competition policy, the PrSA must take into account the specification that the effects of competition must relate to pricing.
11 While Art. 94 FC - the principle of economic order - protects private competition from state deformation, Art. 96 FC primarily refers to the protection of competition from private parties: The unifying element of the two constitutional norms in the common section on the economy is therefore the protection of competition (see, however, n. 12 below). The provisions cannot be separated flawlessly and complement each other. The competition policy intended by Art. 96 FC is intended to ensure a competition-oriented economic order, which means that it basically harmonizes with the principle of economic freedom (Art. 94 FC). The competition policy regulated in Art. 96 FC is also in line with the principle of economic freedom (Art. 27 FC). Thus, the former - measures motivated by competition law - can also restrict the latter - positions protected by fundamental rights: the yardstick is Art. 36 FC. This system makes it clear that competition policy within the meaning of Art. 96 FC constitutes a suitable interest pursuant to Art. 36 para. 2 FC and thus a restriction of individual rights. From this, the majority of the doctrine deduces that the paragraph on price control also protects competition and thus the protection of competition constitutes a legitimate interest within the meaning of Art. 36 para. 2 FC.
12 In my opinion, however, the price control paragraph protects the flip side of effective competition: private and commercial consumers must be protected from the consequences of a lack of competition. The paragraph on price control and consequently the PrSA apply precisely when competition is insufficient, which is primarily the case for legal (statutory monopolies, e.g. buildings insurance) or factual reasons (natural monopolies such as the gas network). However, it is irrelevant whether competition is undesirable due to overriding public interests (such as in the agricultural sector) or not (in which case the market could theoretically play a role, such as in the case of Wordline's transaction fees, see no. 17 below). Thus, the absence of effective competition is a gateway for the state to intervene pursuant to Art. 36 para. 2 FC.
2. Distinction between market power and market dominance
13 The FAC has stated that there is a small but significant difference between the price monitoring and antitrust abuse investigations. Because COMCO, unlike the price supervisor, can impose administrative sanctions for price exploitation (Art. 49a para. 1 CartA), the legislator has also "set a significantly higher threshold for intervention". For this reason, the absence of effective competition is sufficient for the price supervisor to intervene in cases of market power. Market dominance as qualified market power, on the other hand, is a prerequisite for intervention by COMCO under Art. 7 CartA. In this respect, market power within the meaning of Art. 2 para. 1 CartA is a criterion for taking action, but not for intervention. This means that the CartA applies to market power (Art. 2 para. 1), but that Art. 7 CartA only applies if there is market dominance (in addition to relative market power) in conjunction with an unlawful practice covered by the Act. This is in contrast to the PrSA, for which market power is the decisive subordination criterion and prerequisite for intervention. Market power therefore lies "between normal market influence and market dominance".
3. Abuses in pricing (price abuse)
a. Indeterminate legal term
14 Price abuse ("abuses in pricing"), which is also mentioned in the constitutional text, is an undefined legal term. As already mentioned, the PrSA does not have a legal definition of price abuse, but links it to effective competition and excludes price abuse if it exists (Art. 12 para. 1 PrSA).
b. Price - casuistry
15 The PrSA "applies to prices of goods and services, including credit. Wages and other benefits arising from the employment relationship and the lending activities of the Swiss National Bank are excluded" (Art. 1).
16 In economic terms, the price is "the exchange value of a good expressed in monetary units". It is an "indicator of scarcity". This shows that taxes, as unconditionally owed levies, cannot be prices in the sense of the constitutional norm and thus also of the PrSA. Nor, for example, is a private-law reminder fee or a fine a price. In the case of municipal taxes, the question must be clarified as to whether the fiscal portion of the levy dominates: in this case, they also do not constitute a price. On the other hand, user charges of all kinds fall within the material scope of PrSA as remuneration for the use of a service of a public enterprise, facility or institution. These include, for example, municipal supply and disposal companies (electricity plants, gas and waterworks, waste incineration and sewage plants), cabs for parking and market fees as well as transport companies or airport fees. In practice, therefore, the nature and character of the tax in question and the service in question must always be examined.
17 Finally, charges for goods and services provided by companies with market power are also deemed to be prices. Examples include letter or parcel postage from Swiss Post AG, transaction fees from Worldline Schweiz AG (before November 2021 SIX Payment Services AG) or wholesale prices from telecommunications companies such as Swisscom AG.
18 A good overview of the various prices monitored by the price supervisor can be found in the collection Competition Law and Policy (RPW), the fifth part of which contains the annual price monitoring reports.
c. Examination of abuse
19 Art. 13 PrSA provides a list of assessment elements for the abuse test when increasing or maintaining prices. This list is not exhaustive ("in particular") and the individual elements are not in a hierarchical relationship to each other. Furthermore, the price supervisor has a great deal of discretion in their selection and consideration. The "approach to the term [...] must therefore be based on the general purpose of competition policy price monitoring". This is because these criteria are also suitable for the constitutional understanding of price abuse.
20 The requirement of abuse expresses that it is a matter of a certain "exaggeration" of the price. Companies should continue to be entitled to a "reasonable profit" (Art. 13 para. 1 lit. b PrSA). According to the Federal Supreme Court, the profit must include a normal return on equity and a risk premium in line with the market. Indications of excessively high profits are the amount of provisions and reserves as well as profit distributions to investors.
d. Low prices
21 Abusively low prices, on the other hand, are not covered by the offense. These can either be an expression of a bait-and-switch policy within the meaning of the UCA or an expression of buyer power and thus fall within the scope of the KG. Consequently, buyer power cannot be subsumed under Art. 96 para. 2 lit. a FC, which is already apparent from the materials.
B. Companies and organizations under private and public law
22 As is clear from the constitutional text, the group of persons covered is extremely broad: price monitoring even includes state-controlled companies as well as the public sector and thus certain public levies (see n. 16). The wording is based on cartel law.
23 However, the powers of the price supervisor in this area are restricted by the PrSA for reasons of direct democracy. If a price is set or approved by a state authority, the price supervisor only has a more stringent right to make recommendations (Art. 14 f. PrSA).
C. Organizational form
24 The question of whether the person of the price supervisor (Art. 3 PrSA) and thus the instruments of price supervision are prescribed by the Constitution is answered inconsistently in the doctrine. Some argue that although the division of tasks has historically been established with the person of the price supervisor, this could also be abolished. The legislator is free to determine the division of tasks between COMCO and price monitoring. This is justified not least by "difficult demarcation issues", as Art. 16 para. 2 PrSA and Art. 3 para. 3 CartA, which regulate the division of tasks between the two authorities, are partially contradictory and would lead to complex parallel procedures and contradictions in the application of the law. Little or nothing of this tragedy can be felt in the day-to-day work of the authorities. For example, the price supervisor and COMCO not only work together (Art. 5 para. 1 PrSA), but also inform each other about important decisions. In this sense, the price supervisor also participates in COMCO meetings in an advisory capacity. In addition, the two authorities refer cases to each other for processing, depending on the circumstances of the case and which aspects are in the foreground.
25 In my opinion, the view that the person of the price supervisor is not required by the applicable constitutional provision is unconvincing. It is reduced to a purely grammatical interpretation. From a systematic and historical point of view, the separate function of price monitoring with the person of the price monitor at its head only becomes clear because the total revision of the Federal Constitution was not intended to make any changes in terms of content and the instrument of competition policy price monitoring was clearly defined. In contrast to other administrative areas in general and COMCO in particular, the price supervisor is a person with "great influence" who should attempt to "contribute to a consensual settlement in discussions". Art. 9 PrSA - the standard for seeking an amicable settlement between the price supervisor and the parties concerned - thus has both a preventive and an educational function. This mediating function cannot be performed by a body such as a competition authority, but requires a mediator personality. Thus, the person of the price supervisor has a special position due to his or her history. Art. 9 PrSA - the core of the PrSA - continues the principles that characterized the emergency economic policy price monitoring of 1973-1978. This shows that the focus is on the person of the price supervisor. Like a kind of delegate, they are at the center between the companies concerned and the consumers. The following aspect should also be mentioned: For the revision of the Cartel Act, which took place at the same time as the popular initiative "to prevent abusive prices" of September 9, 1981, the Commission of Experts proposed the integration of price monitoring articles and their enforcement by COMCO. Following the consultation process, however, the Federal Council deleted these articles, citing the pending popular initiative and parliamentary initiatives. In my opinion, this process underpins the fact that price monitoring should not and cannot be implemented by one body or authority (COMCO or price monitoring) alone. Even if this function could therefore - from a purely systematic point of view - only be created in the law, it is the interplay of systematics and history that prohibits this erroneous conclusion.
About the author
Dr. iur. Patricia S. Kaiser, LL.M., studied law at the Universities of Basel, Freiburg i.B. and Strasbourg. She then worked for six years at the Federal Office of Justice, where she was mainly responsible for the dossier on compulsory welfare measures and placements prior to 1981. While working, she wrote a dissertation on international law and specialized in administrative law. After completing her mediation training, she moved to the legal service of the price supervisor, which she heads today.
The author welcomes feedback on this article at patricia.kaiser@pue.admin.ch.
Recommended further reading
Aeberhard Kurt, Der Preismissbrauch im schweizerischen Kartellrecht, Diss., Bern 1979.
Bonvin Jacques/Olivier Schaller, in Martenet, Bovet, Tercier (éditeurs), Commentaire romand, Droit de la concurrence, 2e édition, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Bâle 2012, ad Art. 12 et 13 LSPr, p. 1739 ss.
Decker Christopher, Modern Economic Regulation, An Introduction to Theory and Practice Illustrated, 2. Aufl., Cambridge 2023.
Preisüberwachung, Netznutzungsentgelte, Ermittlung der risikogerechten Kapitalverzinsung der schweizerischen Elektrizitätsnetzbetreiber, Erste Fassung, Gekürzte Version ohne Vorwort, Bern 2006 https://www.preisueberwacher.admin.ch/dam/pue/de/dokumente/studien/netznutzungsentgelte.pdf.download.pdf/netznutzungsentgelte.pdf, besucht am 15.5.2023.
Preisüberwachung, Praxis des Preisüberwachers bei der Prüfung von (akut-)stationären Spitaltarifen, Aktualisierte Version Bern 2022 https://www.preisueberwacher.admin.ch/dam/pue/de/dokumente/studien/praxis_des_preisueberwachers_bei_der_pruefung_von_akut_stationaeren_spitaltarifen.pdf.download.pdf/Praxis%20des%20Preis%C3%BCberwachers%20bei%20der%20Pr%C3%BCfung%20von%20(akut-)station%C3%A4ren%20Spitaltarifen.pdf, besucht am 15.5.2023.
Preisüberwachung, Schweizer Gasmarkt und Kosten des Netzzugangs, Ermittlung der risikogerechten Kapitalverzinsung für schweizerische Gasnetze, Erste Fassung, Bern 2011 https://www.preisueberwacher.admin.ch/dam/pue/de/dokumente/studien/schweizer_gasmarktundkostendesnetzzugangs.pdf.download.pdf/schweizer_gasmarktundkostendesnetzzugangs.pdf, besucht am 15.5.2023.
Richli Paul, Erste Eindrücke von der Praxis zum Preisüberwachungsgesetz, in: Peter Nobel/Robert E. Leu (Hrsg.), Wirtschaft und Recht, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsrecht mit Einschluss des Sozial- und Arbeitsrechtes, Jg. 41, Heft 4/1989, S. 191–209.
Schluep Walter R., «Wirksamer Wettbewerb», Schlüsselbegriff des neuen schweizerischen Wettbewerbsrechts, Bern 1987.
Surveillance des Prix, Le marché suisse du gaz et la rétribution de l’utilisation du réseau, Détermination de la rémunération du capital conforme au risque pour les gestionnaires du réseau gazier en Suisse, première version, Bern 2011 https://www.preisueberwacher.admin.ch/dam/pue/fr/dokumente/studien/schweizer_gasmarktundkostendesnetzzugangs.pdf.download.pdf/le_marche_suissedugazetlaretributiondelutilisationdureseau.pdf, besucht am 15.5.2023.
Surveillance des Prix, Pratique du Surveillant des prix dans l’examen des tarifs hospitaliers des soins stationnaires (aigus), version mise à jour, décembre 2022, https://www.preisueberwacher.admin.ch/dam/pue/fr/dokumente/studien/praxis_des_preisueberwachers_bei_der_pruefung_von_akut_stationaeren_spitaltarifen.pdf.download.pdf/Pratique%20du%20Surveillant%20des%20prix%20dans%20l%E2%80%99examen%20des%20tarifs%20hospitaliers%20des%20soins%20stationnaires%20(aigus).pdf, besucht am 15.5.2023.
Surveillance des Prix, Rétribution de l’utilisation du réseau, Détermination de la rémunération du capital conforme au risque pour les gestionnaires du réseau électrique en Suisse, première version, https://www.preisueberwacher.admin.ch/dam/pue/fr/dokumente/studien/netznutzungsentgelte.pdf.download.pdf/retribution_de_lutilisationdureseau.pdf, besucht am 15.5.2023.
Toller Marco, Die Preisüberwachung als Mittel der schweizerischen Wettbewerbspolitik, Diss., Zürich 1983.
Viscusi W. Kip/Harrington Jr. Joseph E./Sappington David E. M., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 5. Aufl., Cambridge/London 2018.
Volkart Rudolf/Wagner Alexander F., Corporate Finance, Grundlagen von Finanzierung und Investition, 7. Aufl., Zürich 2018.
Bibliography
Biaggini Giovanni, Art. 96 BV, in: Biaggini Giovanni, BV Kommentar, Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, 2. Aufl., Zürich 2017.
Bovet Christian, Introduction à la Loi fédérale concernant la surveillance des prix (LSPr) du 20 décembre 1985 (RS 942.20), in : Martenet Vincent/Bovet Christian/Tercie Pierre, 2. Aufl., Basel 2013.
Dietrich Marcel/Bürgi Alexander, Abgrenzung der Zuständigkeiten von Wettbewerbskommission und Preisüberwacher, in: Amstutz Marc/Berger Mathis/Borer Jürg/Hilty Reto M./La Spada Anne-Virginie/Mathys Roland/Rigamonti Cyrill P./Thouvenin Florent/de Werra Jacques/Wild Gregor, Zeitschrift für Immaterialgüter-, Informations- und Wettbewerbsrecht, sic! 2005, S. 179–88.
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