Kommentar zu Art. 148 OR

Ein Kom­men­tar von Jean-Pas­cal Stoll

Her­aus­ge­ge­ben von Chris­toph Hur­ni und Mir­jam Eggen

Zitier­vor­schlag

Jean-Pas­cal Stoll, Kom­men­tar zu Art. 148 OR, in: Chris­toph Hur­ni / Mir­jam Eggen (Hrsg.), Online­kom­men­tar zum Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht, https://onlinekommentar.ch/or148/, 1. Aufl., N. XXX zu Art. 148 OR (besucht am XXX). 

Kurz­zi­tat: OK-Stoll, N. XXX zu Art. 148 OR.

Art. 148 CO

1 Unless the legal rela­ti­ons­hip bet­ween the joint and several deb­tors indi­ca­tes other­wi­se, each of them assu­mes an equal share of the pay­ment made to the creditor.

2 A joint and several deb­tor who pays more than his fair share has recour­se against the others for the excess.

3 Amounts that can­not be reco­ve­r­ed from one joint and several deb­tor must be bor­ne in equal shares by the others.

Art. 148 OR

1 Sofern sich aus dem Rechts­ver­hält­nis­se unter den Soli­dar­schuld­nern nicht etwas ande­res ergibt, hat von der an den Gläu­bi­ger geleis­te­ten Zah­lung ein jeder einen glei­chen Teil zu übernehmen.

2 Bezahlt ein Soli­dar­schuld­ner mehr als sei­nen Teil, so hat er für den Mehr­be­trag Rück­griff auf sei­ne Mitschuldner.

3 Was von einem Mit­schuld­ner nicht erhält­lich ist, haben die übri­gen gleich­mäs­sig zu tragen.

Art. 148 CO

1 Si le con­tr­ai­re ne résul­te de leurs obli­ga­ti­ons, cha­cun des débi­teurs soli­dai­res doit prend­re à sa char­ge une part éga­le du paiement fait au créancier.

2 Celui qui paie au-delà de sa part a, pour l’excédent, un recours con­tre les autres.

3 Ce qui ne peut être récu­p­é­ré de l’un d’eux se répar­tit par por­ti­ons éga­les ent­re tous les autres.

Art. 148 CO

1 Ove non risul­ti il con­tra­rio dal rap­por­to giurid­ico esis­ten­te fra i debi­tori soli­da­li, il paga­men­to fat­to al credi­to­re si divi­de in par­ti egua­li fra i medesimi.

2 Al debi­to­re soli­da­le che aves­se paga­to più del­la sua par­te, spet­ta il regres­so ver­so i con­de­bi­to­ri per l’importo paga­to in più.

3 Ciò che non può con­se­guir­si da uno dei debi­to­ri soli­da­li deve esse­re sop­por­ta­to in par­ti egua­li dag­li altri.


I. General remarks

1 Art. 148 and Art. 149 CO regu­la­te the inter­nal rela­ti­ons­hip of the joint and several lia­bi­li­ty. The legal con­se­quence in the inter­nal rela­ti­ons­hip – the right of recour­se – occurs if the joint and several deb­tor clai­med by the credi­tor has bor­ne more in the exter­nal rela­ti­ons­hip than their lia­bi­li­ty quo­ta in the inter­nal rela­ti­ons­hip (Art. 148 para. 2 CO).[1] The creditor’s rights are also trans­fer­red to the joint and several deb­tor wit­hin the frame­work of subro­ga­ti­on accord­ing to Art. 149 CO.[2]

II. Internal liability quota of the joint and several debtors

A. Principal of equal distribution

2 Art. 148 para. 1 CO pre­su­mes that all joint and several deb­tors have to bear the debt in equal quo­tas. The­re­fo­re, the­re is a reci­pro­cal right of recour­se for the joint and several deb­tor that has paid more than the amount of the joint and several debt divi­ded by the num­ber of co-deb­tors.[3]

3 Anyo­ne who wis­hes to devia­te from the legal princip­le of equal dis­tri­bu­ti­on and deri­ve rights from it accord­in­gly must pro­ve this in accordance with the gene­ral dis­tri­bu­ti­on of the bur­den of pro­of in Art. 8 CC.[4]

B. Exceptions

4 The legis­la­tor was awa­re that the­re may be legal rela­ti­ons­hips that impo­se a devia­ti­on from the princip­le of equal quo­ta. In rea­li­ty, une­qual lia­bi­li­ty quo­tas are more com­mon than an equal dis­tri­bu­ti­on.[5] By means of a con­trac­tu­al agree­ment bet­ween the joint and several deb­tors, for examp­le, devia­ting inter­nal lia­bi­li­ty quo­tas may be agreed upon (e.g. in the case of a simp­le part­ners­hip pur­suant to Art. 533 CO).[6]

5 Asi­de from con­trac­tu­al clau­ses, the law pro­vi­des for an excep­ti­on to the equal quo­ta in nume­rous pla­ces. First and fore­mo­st, Art. 50 et seq. CO should be men­tio­ned. Whe­ther at all and – if so – to what extent a liable tort­fea­sor can take recour­se against the other per­sons invol­ved is deter­mi­ned by judi­cial dis­cre­ti­on (Art. 50 para. 1 CO). If several tort­fea­sors are liable on dif­fe­rent legal grounds, lia­bi­li­ty is deter­mi­ned by the lia­bi­li­ty cas­ca­de accord­ing to Art. 51 para. 2 CO.[7]

6 Fur­ther devia­ti­ons by law can be found in Art. 759 para. 3 CO on lia­bi­li­ty under cor­po­ra­ti­on law, in Art. 640 para. 3 CC on recour­se to co-heirs for debts of the decea­sed[8] and in Art. 649 CC on the bea­ring of cos­ts and expen­ses among co-owners.[9]

7 Final­ly, con­stel­la­ti­ons are con­ceiva­ble in which a devia­ti­on of the legal princip­le is also to be plea­ded due to the con­cre­te cir­cum­s­tan­ces. If two spou­ses joint­ly take out a loan to finan­ce the husband’s hob­by, the wife should be gran­ted a full right of recour­se against her hus­band.[10]

III. Recourse

A. Requirements and extent

8 The right of recour­se of the joint­ly and sever­al­ly liable deb­tor pre­sup­po­ses that the deb­tor has actual­ly per­for­med to the credi­tor.[11] A mere court ruling obli­ging the per­for­mance is not suf­fi­ci­ent. In addi­ti­on, the deb­tor must have per­for­med more than their inter­nal quo­ta.[12] Both requi­re­ments must be pro­ven by the joint and several deb­tor taking recour­se.[13]

9 Con­se­quent­ly, Art. 148 para. 2 CO gives rise to an auto­no­mous right of recour­se that exists inde­pendent­ly of the legal rela­ti­ons­hip bet­ween the joint and several deb­tors.[14] The joint and several deb­tor that has been pro­se­cu­t­ed by the credi­tor can take recour­se against the other joint and several deb­tors for the amount excee­ding their fair share. This right of recour­se is always a mone­ta­ry debt. This means that a per­for­mance in kind or ser­vice must be con­ver­ted into a mone­ta­ry amount, if necessa­ry.[15]

10 Final­ly, joint and several lia­bi­li­ty among the deb­tors only com­pri­ses in the exter­nal rela­ti­ons­hip with the credi­tor. The deb­tors are not joint­ly and sever­al­ly liable to each other when facing a recour­se claim of one of their co-deb­tors. Each deb­tor is only liable for their inter­nal share.[16] An acquit­tal gran­ted by the credi­tor to only one of the deb­tors does not affect the right of recour­se in the inter­nal rela­ti­ons­hip.[17]

B. Interest and legal costs

11 The claim for recour­se beco­mes due once the pro­se­cu­t­ed joint and several deb­tor has paid more than their fair share to the credi­tor (cf. Art. 75 CO). Inte­rest is owed on the recour­se claim;[18] except as other­wi­se pro­vi­ded, the inte­rest rate accounts for 5% p.a. (Art. 73 para. 1 CO).[19]

12 If a joint and several deb­tor defends him- or herself in a lawsu­it against the creditor’s claim, they may take recour­se to the other joint and several deb­tors for the legal cos­ts incur­red. The pre­re­qui­si­te for this is that a vic­to­ry in the civil action would have led to the release of all joint and several deb­tors and that the con­te­sta­ti­on of the claim has not been deemed hopeless.[20]

C. Prescription

13 The rela­ti­ve pre­scrip­ti­on peri­od of the recour­se claim lasts three years. It begins as soon as the joint and several deb­tor against whom recour­se is sought has per­for­med to the credi­tor and gai­ned know­ledge of the other joint and several deb­tors (Art. 139 CO). This requi­res cumu­la­tively that the joint and several deb­tor enti­t­led to recour­se has con­cre­te know­ledge of the co-deb­tors and is also awa­re of all of the facts that estab­lish the lia­bi­li­ty of the other par­ties and thus enab­le legal action to be taken against them.[21]

14 Even if Art. 139 CO does not pro­vi­de for an expli­cit abso­lu­te pre­scrip­ti­on peri­od, an abso­lu­te ten-year peri­od should be assu­med by ana­lo­gy with Art. 60 para. 1, Art. 67 para. 1 and Art. 127 para. 1 CO.[22] Howe­ver, part of the doc­tri­ne rejects an abso­lu­te pre­scrip­ti­on peri­od. The main point of cri­ti­cism is that if an abso­lu­te time limit is affir­med from the time of the dama­ging event, the right of recour­se could beco­me time-bar­red even befo­re it ari­ses.[23] Howe­ver, if the begin­ning of the limi­ta­ti­on peri­od is to be set at the time of per­for­mance of the deb­tor to the credi­tor – as is advo­ca­ted here – the afo­re­men­tio­ned con­cern is without cau­se and the app­li­ca­ti­on of an abso­lu­te pre­scrip­ti­on peri­od may be appro­ved.[24]

15 Art. 139 CO is app­li­ca­ble to cases of both per­fect and imper­fect joint and several lia­bi­li­ty.[25] The law then pro­vi­des for its own pre­scrip­ti­on rules for nume­rous spe­cial-law lia­bi­li­ty pro­vi­si­ons that must be obser­ved.[26] The­se pro­vi­si­ons take pre­ce­dence over the gene­ral rule of Art. 139 CO.[27]

IV. Irrecoverable recourse claim

16 If a joint and several debtor’s inter­nal quo­ta can no lon­ger be obtai­ned in its ent­i­re­ty, the short­fall is to be bor­ne equal­ly by all of the joint and several deb­tors (Art. 148 para. 3 CO). This is the case if the deb­tor in ques­ti­on is insol­vent, the cos­ts of recour­se pro­cee­dings would be dis­pro­por­tio­na­te to the inter­nal share or if the co-deb­tor is at an unknown domic­i­le.[28]

17 If the­re should be an allo­ca­ti­on for­mu­la that devia­tes from the princip­le sta­ted in Art. 148 para. 1 CO based on a con­trac­tu­al agree­ment or the law, the short­fall of a joint and several deb­tor shall also be bor­ne in accordance with this uneven allo­ca­ti­on. Other­wi­se, the dis­tri­bu­ti­on is made accord­ing to heads.[29]

18 The law pro­vi­des in Art. 51 CO for a cas­ca­de that deter­mi­nes the lia­bi­li­ty among imper­fect joint and several deb­tors. In this case, the bea­ring of the short­fall is also deter­mi­ned accord­ing to this cas­ca­de. The­re is the­re­fo­re no appor­ti­onment if the joint and several deb­tors are on dif­fe­rent levels of the cas­ca­de.[30]


[1] CR-Romy, mn. 1 to Art. 148 CO; Per­ri­taz, mn. 184; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 4 to Art. 148/149 CO.

[2]  BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 1 to Art. 148 CO; CHK-Mazan, mn. 1 to Art. 148 CO; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 167 to Art. 148/149 CO. Cf. com­men­ta­ry on Art. 149 CO for fur­ther reference.

[3] BGE 53 II 25 con­sid. 2.; decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 4A_582/2008 of 27 Febru­a­ry 2009 con­sid. 4.2; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 2 to Art. 148 CO; Gaut­schi, mn. 156; Geiss­büh­ler, mn. 1247; KUKO-Jung, mn. 1 to Art. 148 CO; Per­ri­taz, mn. 185; Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 1767; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 62 to Art. 148/149 CO.

[4] BGE 53 II 25 con­sid. 2; decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 5A_672/2012 of 3 April 2013 con­sid. 8.3.2; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 3 to Art. 148 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 2 to Art. 148 CO; Gaut­schi, mn. 156.

[5] Schwenzer/Fountoulakis, mn. 88.29; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 69 to Art. 148/149 CO.

[6] BGE 133 III 6 con­sid. 5.3.3; BGE 116 II 316 con­sid. 2b; decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 5A_672/2012 of 3 April 2013 con­sid. 8.3.2; BK-Kratz, mn. 240 to Art. 148 CO; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 3 to Art. 148 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 3 to Art. 148 CO; Gaut­schi, mn. 154; KUKO-Jung, mn. 1 to Art. 148 CO; Per­ri­taz, mn. 186; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 312; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 57 to Art. 148/149 CO.

[7] BK-Kratz, mn. 234 et seq. to Art. 148 CO; Bucher, p. 496; CR-Romy, mn. 4 to Art. 148 CO; Gauch/Schluep/Emmenegger, mn. 3738; Gaut­schi, mn. 159; Hugue­nin, mn. 2309; Schwenzer/Fountoulakis, mn. 88.31 et seq.; Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 1767; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 75 et seq. to Art. 148/149 CO. Cf. com­men­ta­ry on Art. 50 and 51 CO for fur­ther reference.

[8] Cf. decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 5P.134/2002 of 5 Sep­tem­ber 2002 con­sid. 2.2.

[9] Cf. BK-Kratz, mn. 243 et seq. to Art. 148 CO and ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 70 to Art. 148/149 CO for fur­ther references.

[10] Schwenzer/Fountoulakis, mn. 88.34.

[11] Sur­ro­ga­te per­for­man­ces are coe­qual. Cf. com­men­ta­ry on Art. 147 for fur­ther reference.

[12] BGE 115 Ib 274 con­sid. 19b; BK-Kratz, mn. 57 and 65 to Art. 148 CO; CHK-Mazan, mn. 2 to Art. 148 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 9 to Art. 148 CO; Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 1764 et seq.; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 35 et seq. to Art. 148/149 CO.

[13] Decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 4A_73/2014 of 19 June 2014 con­sid. 3; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 5 to Art. 148 CO; CHK-Mazan, mn. 4 to Art. 148 CO.

[14] BK-Kratz, mn. 29 to Art. 148 CO; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 12 et seq. to Art. 148/149 CO.

[15] ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 41 and 67 to Art. 148/149 CO.

[16] BGE 103 II 137 con­sid. 4d; decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 2A.252/2002 of 4 Novem­ber 2002 con­sid. 3.2.2.2; BK-Kratz, mn. 91 to Art. 148 CO; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 7 to Art. 148 CO; Bucher, p. 496 et seq.; CHK-Mazan, mn. 7 to Art. 148 CO; Gauch/Schluep/Emmenegger, mn. 3741; Geiss­büh­ler, mn. 1250; Hugue­nin, mn. 23 11; KUKO-Jung, mn. 2 to Art. 148 CO; Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 1770; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 316; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 64 to Art. 148/149 CO.

[17] Cf. com­men­ta­ry on Art. 147 CO for fur­ther reference.

[18] BGE 57 II 324 con­sid. 4.; BK-Kratz, mn. 82 to Art. 148 CO; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 6 to Art. 148 CO; Bucher, mn. 497; KUKO-Jung, mn. 2 to Art. 148 CO.

[19] Bugnon, p. 99; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 71 to Art. 148/149 CO.

[20]  BGE 69 II 150 con­sid. 4d; BK-Kratz, mn. 84 et seq. to Art. 148 CO; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 6 to Art. 148 CO; Bucher, p. 497; Bugnon, p. 97; CHK-Mazan, mn. 3 to Art. 148 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 21 to Art. 148 CO; Gauch/Schluep/Emmenegger, mn. 3743; KUKO-Jung, mn. 2 to Art. 148 CO; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 314. Dif­fe­rent opi­ni­on ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 72 to Art. 148/149 CO.

[21]  BSK-Däp­pen, mn. 5 to Art. 139 CO; CR-Pichon­naz, mn. 20 to Art. 139 CO; Hugue­nin, mn. 2314a.

[22] Befo­re the sta­tu­te of limi­ta­ti­ons for the right of recour­se was regu­la­ted by law, the Federal Supre­me Court ruled in favour of the exis­tence of an abso­lu­te sta­tu­te of limi­ta­ti­ons (BGE 133 III 6 con­sid. 5.4).

[23] Cf. CR-Pichon­naz, mn. 30 to Art. 139 CO; Wer­ro, p. 28.

[24] BSK-Däp­pen, mn. 6 to Art. 139 CO; Fell­mann, p. 217; Rothen­ber­ger, p. 98.

[25]  CR-Pichon­naz, mn. 11 to Art. 139 CO; Fell­mann, p. 216; Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 1771; Wer­ro, p. 28. Dif­fe­rent opi­ni­on BSK-Däp­pen, mn. 3 to Art. 139 CO.

[26] Cf. BK-Kratz, mn. 160 et seq. to Art. 148 CO and ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 131 et seq. to Art. 148/149 CO for fur­ther references.

[27]  ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 130 et seq. to Art. 148/149 CO.

[28] BK-Kratz, mn. 280 to Art. 148 CO; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 9 to Art. 148 CO; CHK-Mazan, mn. 10 to Art. 148 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 20 to Art. 148 CO; Geiss­büh­ler, mn. 1256; Hugue­nin, mn. 2311; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 158 to Art. 148/149 CO.

[29]  BK-Kratz, mn. 278 to Art. 148 CO; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 8 to Art. 148 CO; Bugnon, p. 115; CR-Romy, mn. 19 to Art. 148 CO; Gauch/Schluep/Emmenegger, mn. 3741; Geiss­büh­ler, mn. 1258; Schwenzer/Fountoulakis, mn. 88.36. Dif­fe­rent opi­ni­on CHK-Mazan, mn. 9 to Art. 148 CO; KUKO-Jung, mn. 3 to Art. 148 CO; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 316.

[30] BK-Kratz, mn. 278 to Art. 148 CO; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 8 to Art. 148 CO; Bugnon, p. 115; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 160 to Art. 148/149 CO.

Literaturverzeichnis

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