Kommentar zu Art. 145 OR

Ein Kom­men­tar von Jean-Pas­cal Stoll

Her­aus­ge­ge­ben von Chris­toph Hur­ni und Mir­jam Eggen

Zitier­vor­schlag

Jean-Pas­cal Stoll, Kom­men­tar zu Art. 145 OR, in: Chris­toph Hur­ni / Mir­jam Eggen (Hrsg.), Online­kom­men­tar zum Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht, https://onlinekommentar.ch/or145/, 1. Aufl., N. XXX zu Art. 145 OR (besucht am XXX). 

Kurz­zi­tat: OK-Stoll, N. XXX zu Art. 145 OR.

Art. 145 CO

1 A joint and several deb­tor may rai­se against the credi­tor only tho­se objec­tions that are based eit­her on his per­so­nal rela­ti­ons­hip with the credi­tor or on the natu­re of or collec­ti­ve rea­son for the joint and several obligation.

2 Each joint and several deb­tor is liable to the others if he fails to rai­se the objec­tions which all of them are enti­t­led to raise.

Art. 145 OR

1 Ein Soli­dar­schuld­ner kann dem Gläu­bi­ger nur sol­che Ein­re­den ent­gegensetzen, die ent­we­der aus sei­nem per­sön­li­chen Ver­hält­nis­se zum Gläu­bi­ger oder aus dem gemein­sa­men Ent­ste­hungs­grun­de oder In­hal­te der soli­da­ri­schen Ver­bind­lich­keit hervorgehen.

2 Jeder Soli­dar­schuld­ner wird den andern gegen­über ver­ant­wort­lich, wenn er die­je­ni­gen Ein­re­den nicht gel­tend macht, die allen gemein­sam zustehen.

Art. 145 CO

1 Un débi­teur soli­dai­re ne peut oppo­ser au cré­an­cier d’autres excepti­ons que cel­les qui résul­tent, soit de ses rap­ports per­son­nels avec lui, soit de la cau­se ou de l’objet de l’obligation solidaire.

2 Il est respons­able envers ses coob­li­gés s’il ne fait pas valoir les excep­ti­ons qui leur sont com­mu­nes à tous.

Art. 145 CO

1 Il debi­to­re soli­da­le può oppor­re al credi­to­re sol­tan­to le ecce­zio­ni deri­v­an­ti o dai suoi rap­por­ti per­so­na­li col mede­si­mo o dal­la cau­sa stes­sa o dall’oggetto dell’obbligazione solidale.

2 Ogni debi­to­re soli­da­le è responsa­bi­le ver­so gli alt­ri se non fa vale­re le ecce­zio­ni comu­ni a tutti.


I. The term of the objection in Art. 145 CO

1 The term “objec­tion” in Art. 145 CO inclu­des objec­tions in the tech­ni­cal sen­se that per­ma­nent­ly or tem­pora­ri­ly pre­vent the enfor­ce­ment of a right (e.g. sta­tu­te of limi­ta­ti­ons, defer­ment). Fur­ther­mo­re, it also covers defen­ces, i.e. asser­ted facts that oppo­se the exis­tence of the right main­tai­ned by the credi­tor (e.g. set-off, nul­li­ty of the con­tract, error).[1]

II. Personal objections

A. General remarks

2 A joint and several deb­tor can only – but still – oppo­se the credi­tor with tho­se objec­tions that stem from their per­so­nal rela­ti­ons­hip with the credi­tor (Art. 145 para. 1 CO). Sin­ce the rela­ti­ons­hip bet­ween the credi­tor and the various joint and several deb­tors may be dif­fe­rent, a joint and several deb­tor may also be enti­t­led to per­so­nal objec­tions that are with­held from the others.[2] For examp­le, a credi­tor may defer or even wai­ve his claim against only one joint and several deb­tor. The cor­re­spon­ding objec­tion of defer­ment or acquit­tal is the­re­fo­re only avail­ab­le to the deb­tor in ques­ti­on and not the others.[3] Other pos­si­ble per­so­nal objec­tions are the debtor’s lack of capa­ci­ty to act or the exis­tence of a defect in con­sent.[4]

3 Rai­sing objec­tions that a joint and several deb­tor has against one of its co-deb­tors is not pos­si­ble in the exter­nal rela­ti­ons­hip.[5]

B. Individual grounds for reduction

4 If the joint and several obli­ga­ti­on is a claim for dama­ges,[6] the ques­ti­on ari­ses whe­ther a joint and several deb­tor can invo­ke the indi­vi­du­al grounds for reduc­tion under Art. 43 para. 1 and Art. 44 para. 2 CO. The court may redu­ce the obli­ga­ti­on to pay com­pen­sa­ti­on in the case of a low degree of cul­pa­bi­li­ty or finan­cial hardship of the tort­fea­sor. Howe­ver, the­se grounds for reduc­tion are oppo­sed by the pre­mi­se of Art 144 para. 1 CO that the credi­tor may gene­ral­ly demand the who­le from any joint and several deb­tor.[7]

5 The Federal Supre­me Court is extre­me­ly con­ser­va­ti­ve when app­ly­ing indi­vi­du­al rea­sons for reduc­tion in situa­tions of joint­ly and sever­al­ly liable deb­tors. In cases of per­fect joint and several lia­bi­li­ty, the sole natu­re of the joint and several obli­ga­ti­on for­bids the wea­ke­n­ing of the creditor’s posi­ti­on by limi­t­ing their claim.[8] The app­li­ca­ti­on of Art. 43 et seq. CO is only pos­si­ble – with gre­at restraint[9] – in cases of imper­fect joint and several lia­bi­li­ty in which the chain of cau­sa­ti­on bet­ween the action of the clai­med wrong­do­er is bro­ken by an action of ano­t­her wrong­do­er.[10] Howe­ver, the Federal Supre­me Court merely descri­bes this as a theo­re­ti­cal even­tua­li­ty.[11]

6 The majo­ri­ty of the legal doc­tri­ne is of the opi­ni­on that indi­vi­du­al grounds for reduc­tion are to be admit­ted as objec­tions in the exter­nal rela­ti­ons­hip.[12]

C. Liability under corporation law

7 Art. 752 et seq. CO regu­la­te the lia­bi­li­ty of per­sons towards the cor­po­ra­ti­on.[13] Accord­ing to Art. 759 para. 1 CO, in the case of mul­ti­ple joint­ly and sever­al­ly liable per­sons, each indi­vi­du­al is only liable to pay com­pen­sa­ti­on to the extent that the dama­ge is per­so­nal­ly attri­bu­ta­ble to them due to their own fault and the cir­cum­s­tan­ces (so-cal­led “dif­fe­ren­tia­ted joint and several lia­bi­li­ty”).[14]. In the exter­nal rela­ti­ons­hip, the indi­vi­du­al per­son should not be liable for more than they would have to bear as the sole respon­si­ble per­son just becau­se mul­ti­ple per­sons are liable.[15] The law the­re­fo­re expli­ci­tly allows indi­vi­du­al grounds for reduc­tion in the exter­nal rela­ti­ons­hip accord­ing to Art. 43 para. 1 and Art. 44 para. 2 CO.[16]

II. Collective objections

A. In principle

8 A joint and several deb­tor may rai­se all tho­se objec­tions that ari­se from the natu­re of or the collec­ti­ve rea­son for the joint and several obli­ga­ti­on (Art. 145 para. 1 CO). The­se are the­re­fo­re objec­tions to which all joint and several deb­tors are enti­t­led.[17] They inclu­de for­mal or sub­stan­ti­ve defects of the con­tract (Art. 12 et seq. or Art. 19 et seq. CO), mis­sing pre­re­qui­si­tes based on the claim (e.g. lack of dama­ge), cir­cum­s­tan­ces attri­bu­ta­ble to the credi­tor (Art. 44 para. 1 CO)[18] or the alrea­dy-effec­ted per­for­mance by a joint and several deb­tor (Art. 508 para. 2 ana­lo­gous­ly; cf. Art. 147 para. 1 CO).[19]

9 If a joint and several deb­tor has alrea­dy unsuc­cess­ful­ly rai­sed a collec­ti­ve objec­tion against the credi­tor ear­lier in a lawsu­it, the same objec­tion remains open to the remai­ning joint and several deb­tors.[20] The ruling and thus also the court’s assess­ment of the rai­sed objec­tion only binds the par­ties to the pro­cee­dings and not a joint and several deb­tor who was not invol­ved in the pro­cee­dings. The risk that con­tra­dic­to­ry rulings may occur is expli­ci­tly accep­ted.[21] Fur­ther­mo­re, a joint and several deb­tor can also rai­se the same collec­ti­ve objec­tions against the joint and several deb­tor taking recour­se in the recour­se pro­cee­dings.[22]

B. Liability for failure to raise the objection

10 If a joint and several deb­tor clai­med by the credi­tor does not rai­se an objec­tion even though it would have been avail­ab­le to all deb­tors collec­tively, they are liable to the other joint and several deb­tors (Art. 145 para. 2 CO). The con­se­quence is a total or par­ti­al loss of the right of recour­se.[23] The extent of the loss is deter­mi­ned by that part of the claim that the joint and several deb­tor could have denied to the credi­tor if the objec­tion had been rai­sed.[24]

11 Ana­lo­gous to Art. 502 para. 3 CO, it is requi­red that the deb­tor in ques­ti­on is at least negli­gent in fai­ling to rai­se the collec­ti­ve objec­tion. Igno­ran­ce of a collec­ti­ve objec­tion through no fault of the deb­tor is not detri­men­tal in the con­text of the com­pen­sa­ti­on claim.[25]

12 Ulti­mate­ly, a joint and several deb­tor can be held liable if they satisfy the credi­tor in who­le or part and sub­se­quent­ly fails to inform their co-deb­tors. If they pay the credi­tor again and the lat­ter ulti­mate­ly recei­ves more than they are enti­t­led to, the right of recour­se of the first-per­forming joint and several deb­tor lap­ses (Art. 508 para. 2 CO ana­lo­gous­ly).[26]


[1] BGE 63 II 133 con­sid. 2.; BK-Kratz, mn. 12 et seq. to Art. 145 CO; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 1 to Art. 145 CO; CHK-Mazan, mn. 1 to Art. 145 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 2 to Art. 145 CO; Per­ri­taz, mn. 121; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 305; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 5 to Art. 145 CO.

[2] BK-Kratz, mn. 29 et seq. to Art. 145 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 3 to Art. 145 CO; Gauch/Schluep/Emmenegger, mn. 3713; Geiss­büh­ler, mn. 1239; Per­ri­taz, mn. 127; Schwenzer/Fountoulakis, mn. 88.20; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 21 to Art. 145 CO.

[3] BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 4 to Art. 145 CO; Bucher, p. 494 fn. 39; CHK-Mazan, mn. 4 to Art. 145 CO; Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 1758; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 306. Cf. decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 4P.155/2003 of 19 Decem­ber 2003 con­sid. 5.

[4] Cf. BK-Kratz, mn. 31 et seq. to Art. 145 CO and ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 15 to Art. 145 CO for fur­ther reference.

[5] BGE 124 III 305 con­sid. 2a; CHK-Mazan, mn. 5 to Art. 145 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 5 to Art. 145 CO; Hugue­nin, mn. 2304; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 26 to Art. 145 CO.

[6] The claim for dama­ges may have its ori­gin in tort law or con­tract law (cf. Art. 99 para. 3 CO).

[7] Cf. BK-Kratz, mn. 74 to Art. 145 CO; CHK-Mazan, mn. 2 to Art. 145 CO; Gaut­schi, mn. 227; Kör­ner, mn. 467.

[8] BGE 127 III 257 con­sid. 6b.; BGE 113 II 323 con­sid. 2b.; BGE 62 II 307 con­sid. 1.

[9] BGE 93 II 317 con­sid. 2e/bb.

[10] Decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 6S.346/2005 of 2 Febru­a­ry 2006 con­sid. 2.1; BGE 127 III 257 con­sid. 6b.; BGE 93 II 317 con­sid. 2e.

[11] BGE 112 II 138 con­sid. 4a: «l’éventualité théorique».

[12] Bucher, p. 492; Casa­no­va, p. 39 et seq.; Gauch/Schluep/Emmenegger, mn. 3728; Hugue­nin, mn. 2307; Kör­ner, mn. 464; Schwenzer/Fountoulakis, mn. 88.19. Dif­fe­rent opi­ni­on BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 9 to Art. 51 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 6 to Art. 144 CO; Gaut­schi, mn. 218; Per­ri­taz, mn. 130. Cf. also BK-Kratz, mn. 78 et seq. to Art. 145 CO and ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 197 et seq. to Art. 144 CO for fur­ther reference.

[13] Name­ly the mem­bers of the board of direc­tors or the exe­cu­ti­ve board and the exter­nal auditors.

[14] BK-Kratz, mn. 166 to Art. 145 CO; Böck­li, § 18 mn. 486; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 1 to Art. 144 CO; Hab­lüt­zel, p. 50.

[15] BGE 127 III 453 con­sid. 8b; Böck­li, § 18 mn. 491.

[16] BGE 132 III 564 con­sid. 7.; BGE 127 III 453 con­sid. 8b; decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 4A_468/2011 of 4 Janu­a­ry 2012 con­sid. 1.3.; Böck­li, § 18 N 489. Cri­ti­cis­ing Hab­lüt­zel, p. 153 et seq.

[17] BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 2 to Art. 145 CO; Casa­no­va, p. 14; Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 1757; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 31 to Art. 145 CO.

[18] BGE 130 III 591 con­sid. 5.5.1; BGE 98 II 102 con­sid. 4.

[19] BK-Kratz, mn. 112 et seq. to Art. 145 CO; CHK-Mazan, mn. 6 to Art. 145 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 4 to Art. 145 CO; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 32 to Art. 145 CO.

[20] BK-Kratz, mn. 151 to Art. 145 CO; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 6 to Art. 145 CO; KUKO-Jung, mn. 3 to Art. 145 CO; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 139 to Art. 145 CO.

[21] BGE 93 II 329 con­sid. 3b.; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 6 to Art. 145 CO; CHK-Mazan, mn. 9 to Art. 145 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 6 to Art. 145 CO. The same app­lies to collec­ti­ve objec­tions rai­sed in recour­se pro­cee­dings bet­ween the joint and several deb­tors; BGE 57 II 518 con­sid. 1.

[22]  BK-Kratz, mn. 151 to Art. 145 CO; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 6 to Art. 145 CO; CHK-Mazan, mn. 9 to Art. 145 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 6 to Art. 145 CO; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 139 to Art. 145 CO.

[23] BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 5 to Art. 145 CO; Bucher, p. 494; CHK-Mazan, mn. 7 to Art. 145 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 5 to Art. 145 CO; Gauch/Schluep/Emmenegger, mn. 3748; Geiss­büh­ler, mn. 1241; Hugue­nin, mn. 2304; Per­ri­taz, mn. 135; Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 1757.

[24] BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 5 to Art. 145 CO; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 306; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 125 to Art. 145 CO.

[25] BGE 57 II 518 con­sid. 4.; cf. also BGE 108 II 490 con­sid. 3.; BK-Kratz, mn. 149 to Art. 145 CO; BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 5 to Art. 145 CO; CR-Romy, mn. 5 to Art. 145 CO; KUKO-Jung, mn. 2 to Art. 145 CO; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 306; ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 124 to Art. 145 CO.

[26] BSK-Gra­ber, mn. 5 to Art. 145 CO; CHK-Mazan, mn. 8 to Art. 145 CO; Gauch/Schluep/Emmenegger, mn. 3748; Hugue­nin, mn. 2312; KUKO-Jung, mn. 2 to Art. 147 CO; von Tuhr/Escher, p. 306 fn. 67. Dif­fe­rent opi­ni­on ZK-Kraus­kopf, mn. 134 et seq. to Art. 145 CO.

Literaturverzeichnis

Böck­li Peter, Schwei­zer Akti­en­recht, 4th ed., Zurich / Basel / Gene­va 2009

Bucher Eugen, Schwei­ze­ri­sches Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht All­ge­mei­ner Teil ohne Delikts­recht, 2nd ed., Zurich 1988

Casa­no­va Gion Chris­ti­an, Aus­gleichs­an­spruch und Aus­gleichs­ord­nung, diss., Zurich 2010

Gauch Peter / Schluep Wal­ter R. / Emmen­eg­ger Sus­an, Schwei­ze­ri­sches Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht All­ge­mei­ner Teil, Band II, 11th ed., Zurich / Basel / Gene­va 2020

Gaut­schi Alain, Soli­dar­schuld und Aus­gleich, diss., Zurich / St. Gal­len 2009

Geiss­büh­ler Gré­go­i­re, Le droit des obli­ga­ti­ons, Volu­me 1: par­tie géné­ra­le, Gene­va / Zurich / Basel 2020

Gra­ber Chris­toph K., in: Wid­mer Lüchin­ger Corin­ne / Oser David (eds.), Bas­ler Kom­men­tar, Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht I, 7th ed., Basel 2020

Hab­lüt­zel Oli­ver, Soli­da­ri­tät in der akti­en­recht­li­chen Ver­ant­wort­lich­keit, diss., Zurich / St. Gal­len 2009

Hugue­nin Clai­re, Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht All­ge­mei­ner und Beson­de­rer Teil, 3rd ed., Zurich / Basel / Gene­va 2019

Jung Peter, in: Hon­sell Hein­rich (ed.), Kurz­kom­men­tar OR, Basel 2014

Kör­ner Alex­an­dra, Haf­tung der Soli­dar­schuld­ner im Aus­sen­ver­hält­nis, diss., Zurich / Basel / Gene­va 2011

Kratz Bri­git­ta, Ber­ner Kom­men­tar, Soli­da­ri­tät, Art. 143–150 OR, Bern 2015

Kraus­kopf Fré­dé­ric, Zür­cher Kom­men­tar, Die Soli­da­ri­tät, Art. 143–150 OR, 3rd ed., Zurich / Basel / Gene­va 2016

Mazan Ste­phan, in: Fur­rer Andre­as / Schny­der Anton K. (eds.), Hand­kom­men­tar zum Schwei­zer Pri­vat­recht, Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht All­ge­mei­ne Bestim­mun­gen, 3rd ed., Zurich / Basel / Gene­va 2016

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Schwen­zer Inge­borg / Foun­tou­la­kis Chris­tia­na, Schwei­ze­ri­sches Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht All­ge­mei­ner Teil, 8th ed., Bern 2020

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von Tuhr Andre­as / Escher Arnold, All­ge­mei­ner Teil des Schwei­ze­ri­schen Obli­ga­tio­nen­rechts, Band II, 3rd ed., Zurich 1974

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