Kommentar zu Art. 11 OR

Ein Kom­men­tar von Susan­ne Brütsch

Her­aus­ge­ge­ben von Chris­toph Hur­ni und Mir­jam Eggen


Susan­ne Brütsch, Kom­men­tar zu Art. 11 OR, in: Chris­toph Hur­ni / Mir­jam Eggen (Hrsg.), Online­kom­men­tar zum Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht, https://onlinekommentar.ch/or11/, 1. Aufl., N. XXX zu Art. 11 OR (besucht am XXX). 

Kurz­zi­tat: OK-Brütsch, N. XXX zu Art. 11 OR.

Art. 11 CO

1 The vali­di­ty of a con­tract is not sub­ject to com­pli­an­ce with any par­ti­cu­lar form unless a par­ti­cu­lar form is pre­scri­bed by law.

2 In the absence of any pro­vi­si­on to the con­tra­ry on the signi­fi­can­ce and effect of for­mal requi­re­ments pre­scri­bed by law, the con­tract is valid only if such requi­re­ments are satisfied.

Art. 11 OR

1 Ver­trä­ge bedür­fen zu ihrer Gül­tig­keit nur dann einer beson­de­ren Form, wenn das Gesetz eine sol­che vorschreibt.

2 Ist über Bedeu­tung und Wir­kung einer gesetz­lich vor­ge­schrie­be­nen Form nicht etwas ande­res bestimmt, so hängt von deren Beob­ach­tung die Gül­tig­keit des Ver­tra­ges ab.

Art. 11 CO

1 La vali­di­té des cont­rats n’est sub­or­don­née à l’observation d’une for­me par­ti­cu­liè­re qu’en ver­tu d’une pre­scrip­ti­on spé­cia­le de la loi.

2 À défaut d’une dis­po­si­ti­on con­tr­ai­re sur la por­tée et les effets de la for­me pre­scri­te, le cont­rat n’est val­ab­le que si cet­te for­me a été observée.

Art. 11 CO

1 Per la vali­di­tà dei cont­rat­ti non si richie­de alcu­na for­ma spe­cia­le, se ques­ta non sia pre­scrit­ta dal­la legge.

2 Ove non sia diver­sa­men­te sta­bi­li­to cir­ca l’importanza e l’efficacia d’una for­ma legalm­en­te pre­scrit­ta, dal­la osser­van­za di ques­ta dipen­de la vali­di­tà del contratto.

I. The Principle: Freedom of Form

1 In accordance with the gene­ral princip­le of free­dom of con­tract, Art. 11 para. 1 CO estab­lis­hes the free­dom of form as the default rule. Con­tracts, the­re­fo­re, only (but still) requi­re a spe­cial form if such form is express­ly requi­red by (federal) law.[1] Con­tra­ry to its wor­d­ing, the rule of Art. 11 CO not only app­lies to con­tracts but to any juri­di­cal act.[2]

2 For­mal requi­re­ments have mul­ti­ple pur­po­ses.[3] Fore­mo­st, they have a cau­tio­na­ry effect deter­ring par­ties from ent­e­ring into con­tracts has­ti­ly.[4] For­mal requi­re­ments also ser­ve to crea­te legal cer­tain­ty and to pro­vi­de clear evi­dence of the par­ties’ agree­ment in wri­ting. They incre­a­se trans­pa­ren­cy by embo­dy­ing the legal act in a phy­si­cal form, making a legal act per­cep­ti­ble and visi­ble to third par­ties (e.g. also for regis­tra­ti­on aut­ho­ri­ties).[5]

3 If for the vali­di­ty of a legal act a spe­ci­fic form is requi­red, the par­ties have to com­ply with the for­mal requi­re­ment irre­spec­ti­ve of whe­ther its pur­po­se (as descri­bed abo­ve) is other­wi­se gua­ran­te­ed in the case at hand. Adhe­rence to the for­mal requi­re­ments is to be asses­sed and exami­ned sepa­r­ate­ly and inde­pendent­ly of the sub­stan­ti­ve vali­di­ty of the legal act and its inter­pre­ta­ti­on.[6]

4 Sta­tu­to­ry for­mal requi­re­ments are to be inter­pre­ted nar­row­ly based on the princip­le of favor nego­tii.[7] Howe­ver, this does not chan­ge the fact that for­mal requi­re­ments are man­da­to­ry law and as such not sub­ject to the par­ties’ dis­po­si­ti­on.[8] Nevertheless, par­ties may agree on a stric­ter form than is pro­vi­ded for by law (cf. Art. 16 para. 1 CO).[9]

II. Types of Formal Requirements

A. Simple Written Form

5 Simp­le writ­ten form (“ein­fa­che Schrift­lich­keit”, “for­me écri­te simp­le”) is the mil­dest of all for­mal requi­re­ments. It is requi­red that the decla­ra­ti­ons of intent are made in wri­ting on a phy­si­cal object of any kind or at least that the decla­ra­ti­on is recor­ded in a way that allows per­ma­nent, unch­an­ged repro­duc­tion in the form of text.[10]

6 Fur­ther spe­ci­fic requi­re­ments are set out in an exhaus­ti­ve man­ner in Art. 12–15 CO.[11] In par­ti­cu­lar, the con­trac­tu­al docu­ment (or object) has to be signed by each par­ty, on whom it impo­ses obli­ga­ti­ons (cf. in case of an assign­ment agree­ment Art. 165 CO).

B. Qualified Written Form

7 Qua­li­fied writ­ten form (“qua­li­fi­zier­te Schrift­lich­keit”, “for­me écri­te qua­li­fiée”) neces­si­ta­tes to obser­ve addi­tio­nal for­mal or con­tex­tu­al requi­re­ments such as the signa­tu­re in manu­script of an ent­i­re text (e.g. in case of a tes­ta­ment, Art. 505 para. 1 CC) or the requi­re­ment to use spe­ci­fic forms pro­vi­ded by the aut­ho­ri­ties (e.g. when ter­mi­na­ting resi­den­ti­al or com­mer­cial lea­ses, Art. 266l para. 2 and Art. 269d CO).[12]

C. Public Certification

8 Public cer­ti­fi­ca­ti­on or nota­ri­sa­ti­on (“öffent­li­che Beur­kun­dung”, “for­me authen­tique”) is the stric­test for­mal requi­re­ment. The par­ties’ agree­ment (or the legal act) has to be recor­ded by a per­son offi­cial­ly ent­rus­ted with this task by the sta­te (e.g. a judi­cial or admi­nis­tra­ti­ve aut­ho­ri­ty or a nota­ry public) pur­suant to the app­li­ca­ble pro­ce­du­res.[13]

9 This for­mal requi­re­ment usual­ly app­lies whenever the legal act is the basis for a (man­da­to­ry) ent­ry in public regis­ters (e.g. for real esta­te tran­sac­tions) or is par­ti­cu­lar­ly sen­si­ti­ve (e.g. for mar­i­tal agree­ments or con­tracts of suc­ces­si­on).[14]

10 It is not federal but can­to­nal law that regu­la­tes the man­ner in which public deeds are drawn up in their ter­ri­to­ry (Art. 55 para. 1 of the final tit­le of the CC).[15] In terms of mini­mum stan­dards, the nota­ry will wri­te down the par­ties’ agree­ment truth­ful­ly and in full, read out aloud the recor­ded text in their pre­sence and ask for their con­sent that the text reflects their agree­ment.[16] The nota­riz­a­ti­on is com­ple­ted with the sealing and signing of the deed with place and date.[17]

III. Extent of Formal Requirements 

11 The extent to which for­mal requi­re­ments app­ly is gover­ned by federal law.[18]

12 Whe­re­as the law in some cases extends the for­mal requi­re­ments to a spe­ci­fic legal act as a who­le (e.g. for the sale of immova­ble pro­per­ty, which is sub­ject to public cer­ti­fi­ca­ti­on pur­suant to Art. 216 para. 1 CO), for­mal requi­re­ments may also only affect cer­tain parts/clauses typi­cal­ly inclu­ded in a broa­der con­trac­tu­al frame­work (e.g. non-com­pe­ti­ti­on clau­ses wit­hin employ­ment con­tracts, cf. Art. 340 para. 1 CO[19] or in case of per­so­nal suretyships, cf. Art. 493 CO).

13 That being said, only the so cal­led objec­tively or sub­jec­tively essen­ti­al parts of an agree­ment (essen­ti­alia nego­tii) are sub­ject to for­mal requi­re­ments.[20] As sta­tu­to­ry law does not pro­vi­de more gui­d­ance on this dis­tinc­tion it is main­ly case law which deter­mi­nes the (objec­tively and sub­jec­tively) essen­ti­al parts of an agree­ment with a view to its pur­po­se and legal natu­re.[21]

14 For­mal requi­re­ments also app­ly to amend­ments of the main con­tract (cf. Art. 12 CO) and may even extend to ancil­la­ry agree­ments, if such agree­ments are lin­ked to the main con­tract.[22]

A. In General

15 Com­pli­an­ce with the for­mal requi­re­ments of simp­le or qua­li­fied writ­ten form does not lead to an incre­a­sed pro­ba­ti­ve value. No con­clu­si­ons as to the accu­ra­cy of the document’s con­tent or to the authen­ti­ci­ty of the signa­tures can be drawn on the basis of this cir­cum­s­tance alo­ne.[23]

16 Howe­ver, pur­suant to Art. 9 CC, public deeds con­sti­tu­te full pro­of of the facts evi­den­ced by them, unless their con­tent is shown to be incor­rect.[24] In addi­ti­on, public deeds may, under cer­tain con­di­ti­ons, be enfor­ced like judi­cial decisi­ons pur­suant to Art. 347 CPC and the DEBA.[25]

B. In case of Failure to Comply with Form Requirements

17 Legal acts or con­tracts which fail to meet app­li­ca­ble for­mal requi­re­ments[26] are con­si­de­red inva­lid (Art. 11 para. 2 CO).[27]

18 Accord­ing to the case law of the Federal Supre­me Court inva­li­di­ty means nul­li­ty. Such nul­li­ty has to be taken into account ex offi­cio and may be invo­ked at any time (without beco­m­ing time-bar­red) and also by third par­ties which are not direct­ly invol­ved in the inva­lid legal rela­ti­ons­hip.[28] On the other hand, this strict view is chal­len­ged in legal doc­tri­ne, which advo­ca­tes a case-by-case assess­ment.[29] Still, the Federal Supre­me Court saw no need to revi­sit its case law in a recent decisi­on and did not address legal doctrine’s cri­tique.[30]

19 If only cer­tain parts of a con­tract fail to meet for­mal requi­re­ments, par­ti­al nul­li­ty may be assu­med in ana­lo­gous app­li­ca­ti­on of Art. 20 para. 2 CO (except if the par­ties would not have ent­e­red into the agree­ment at all without the inva­lid part).[31]

20 If a con­tract is (irrever­si­b­ly) inva­lid due to non-com­pli­an­ce with the for­mal requi­re­ments, no par­ty can request per­for­mance or claim com­pen­sa­ti­on (except for spe­cial cases such as cul­pa in con­tra­hen­do)[32] and the par­ties have to return to one ano­t­her what has alrea­dy been exch­an­ged or paid pur­suant to the pro­vi­si­ons of unjust enrich­ment (Art. 62 et seq. CO) or pro­per­ty law (rei vin­di­ca­tio, Art. 641 para. 1 CC).[33] This princip­le app­lies even if the con­tract its­elf was com­ple­te­ly valid (except from the for­mal requi­re­ment). In that case, a par­ty can neit­her demand ful­film­ent of the con­tract nor claim any com­pen­sa­ti­on.[34] Howe­ver, in some cases the Federal Supre­me Court affirms a claim for reli­an­ce dama­ges or cul­pa in con­tra­hen­do (“Ver­trau­ens­haf­tung”).

21 Howe­ver, should both par­ties have ful­fil­led their obli­ga­ti­ons under the con­tract des­pi­te it being inva­lid (and in full know­ledge the­re­of[35]) or should one par­ty deli­ber­ate­ly have cau­sed[36] the for­mal inva­li­di­ty of the con­tract, the sub­se­quent asser­ti­on of the contract’s inva­li­di­ty may be qua­li­fied as an abu­se of rights (cf. Art. 2 para. 2 CC). Whe­ther this is the case, needs to be asses­sed in light of all cir­cum­s­tan­ces of the spe­ci­fic case, in par­ti­cu­lar the con­duct of the par­ties at the time of and after the con­clu­si­on of the con­tract.[37]

22 Final­ly, if a for­mal­ly inva­lid legal act meets all the requi­re­ments of ano­t­her type of con­tract, it may, in some cases,[38] be rein­ter­pre­ted as such (through “con­ver­si­on”, Art. 18 CO).[39]

V. International Private Law

23 Pur­suant to the gene­ral rule of Art. 124 PILA,[40] con­tracts are valid if they meet the requi­re­ments set out in the law app­li­ca­ble to them or in the law of the place whe­re they were con­clu­ded. Howe­ver, spe­cial rules may app­ly for spe­ci­fic types of con­tracts. For instance, con­tracts regar­ding pro­per­ty are princi­pal­ly gover­ned by the lex rei sitae (cf. Art. 119, para. 3, sen­tence 1 PILA).[41]

[1] Cf. BGE 132 III 549 con­sid. 2.1.1; cf. Bucher, p. 160 et seq, for con­trac­tu­al reser­va­tions see Art. 16 CO.

[2] Cf. BGE 121 III 31 E. 2c; CR CO I‑Xoudis, mn. 6 to Art. 11 CO; cf. also various examp­les in Gauch/Schluep/Schmid, mn. 572 and 572a.

[3] Cf. BK OR I‑Müller, mn. 46 et seq to Art. 11 CO; cf. CR CO I‑Xoudis, mn. 4 et seq. to Art. 11 CO; cf. also Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 720 et seq.

[4] Cf. BGE Pra 1997, No. 150 con­sid. 1b; BGE 118 II 32 con­sid. 3d); BGE 117 II 382 con­sid. 2b; BGE 112 II 330 con­sid. 3a.

[5] Cf. BGE 82 II 48 con­sid. 1 on the writ­ten form requi­re­ment of an assign­ment, which ser­ves to enab­le third par­ties “to deter­mi­ne who is enti­t­led to the claim on the basis of a pro­cess that has been clear­ly made known”; cf. also BGE 122 III 361 con­sid. 4c); BGE 118 II 32 con­sid. 3d; BGE 140 III 200 con­sid. 4.2; cf. also Bucher, p. 161 et seq.

[6] Cf. decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 4C.110/2003 of 8 July 2003 con­sid. 3.1.

[7] Cf. BGE 89 II 185 con­sid. 3; BGE 119 II 135 con­sid. 2b; BGE 113 II 402 con­sid. 3c or BGE 112 II 23 con­sid. 4; cf. ins­tead of many CR CO I‑Xoudis, mn. 14 to Art. 11 CO or Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 716.

[8] Cf. decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 4A_420/2007 of 19 Decem­ber 2007 con­sid. 2.4.1, whe­re a con­tract in case of doubt was con­si­de­red as a per­so­nal guarantee.

[9] BSK OR I‑Schwenzer/Fountoulakis, mn. 30 to Art. 11 CO; cf. also Art. 16 CO; the Can­tons, howe­ver, are pro­hi­bi­ted from intro­du­cing form requi­re­ments regar­ding legal acts, for which federal law does not pro­vi­de for spe­cial form requi­re­ments (cf. BGE 99 II 159 con­sid. 2a).

[10] Regar­ding the text-form requi­re­ment, cf. BK OR-Mül­ler, mn. 95 et seq to Art. 11 CO or CR CO I‑Xoudis, mn. 17a to Art. 11 CO.

[11] For more examp­les, key points and spe­cial cir­cum­s­tan­ces cf. BK OR-Mül­ler, mn. 73–79 to Art. 11 CO; Gauch/Schluep/Schmid, mn. 505 et seq. or CR CO I‑Xoudis, mn. 18 to Art. 11 CO; cf. also the com­men­ta­ry to Art. 13–15 CO, which dis­cus­ses also the dif­fe­rent means and new forms of communication.

[12] Cf. BGE 118 II 130 con­sid. 2b; cf. Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 737; see for a com­pi­la­ti­on of examp­les BK OR-Mül­ler, mn. 84–90 to Art. 11 CO; see for fur­ther lite­ra­tu­re Gauch/Schluep/Schmid, mn. 523a.

[13] BGE 99 II 159 con­sid. 2a; cf. Bucher, p. 167 et seq.

[14] Cf. BSK OR I‑Schwenzer/Fountoulakis, mn 7 to Art. 11 CO; cf. a com­pi­la­ti­on of examp­les in BK OR-Mül­ler, mn. 129 et seq. to Art. 11 CO.

[15] Cf. ins­tead of many CR CO I‑Xoudis, mn. 20 et seq. to Art. 11 CO.

[16] Cf. Gauch/Schluep/Schmid, mn. 526 with references.

[17] Cf. KUKO OR-Wie­gan­d/Hur­ni, mn. 5 to Art. 11 CO; note that can­to­nal law can also pro­vi­de for the pos­si­bi­li­ty of pro­du­cing deeds in an (equi­va­lent) elec­tro­nic form, cf. Art. 55a of the final tit­le of the CC as well as the regu­la­ti­ons wit­hin the EÖBV.

[18] For public cer­ti­fi­ca­ti­on, cf. BGE 125 III 131 con­sid. 4a; BGE 113 II 402 con­sid. 2a; whe­re­as the pro­ce­du­re of public cer­ti­fi­ca­ti­on falls under the juris­dic­tion of the can­tons (cf. Art. 55 of the final tit­le of the CC, see also para II.C. above).

[19] For case law in that regard cf. BGE 145 III 365 con­sid. 3.2.

[20] BGE 90 II 34 con­sid. 2; BGE 135 III 295 con­sid. 3.2; BGE 125 III 131 con­sid. 4b; BGE 113 II 402 con­sid. 2a; cf. CR CO I‑Xoudis, mn. 24 et seq to Art. 11 CO; cf. a com­pi­la­ti­on for for­mal requi­re­ments of various legal acts in BK OR-Mül­ler, mn. 162–165 to Art. 11 CO.

[21] Cf. para I above.

[22] Cf. BGE 113 II 402 con­sid. 2a; BGE 125 III 131 con­sid. 4b.

[23] Cf. ZK OR-Jäg­gi, mn. 54 to Art. 13 CO; cf. also BGE 101 II 211 con­sid. 4b using the examp­le of a testament.

[24] Cf. BGE 127 III 248 con­sid. 3c.

[25] Cf. ins­tead of many Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 762.

[26] Cf. for dif­fe­rent types of vio­la­ti­ons Bucher, p. 168 (e.g. if an essen­ti­al ele­ment has not been publicly cer­ti­fied or not to the necessa­ry extent).

[27] Unless the­re is a con­tra­ry pro­vi­si­on, like in Art. 40d CO, whe­re the default of for­mal requi­re­ments only has the effect that the dead­line for revo­king a con­tract is not yet trig­ge­red (Art. 40e CO); cf. for more examp­les BK OR-Mül­ler, mn. 254 et seq. to Art. 11 CO; cf. for pro­per­ty purcha­se con­tracts Gauch/Schluep/Schmid, mn. 563 et seq. with many refe­ren­ces to spe­cial literature.

[28] Cf. for examp­le BGE 137 III 243 con­sid. 4.4.6; BGE 112 II 330 con­sid. 2b; BGE 106 II 146 con­sid. 3; par­ti­al­ly left open in BGE 112 II 330 con­sid. 2a, b.

[29] Cf. Gauch/Schluep/Schmid, mn. 558 et seq. with many refe­ren­ces in foot­no­te 165, cf. also BK OR-Mül­ler, mn. 184 and 207 et seq. to Art. 11 CO or CR CO I‑Xoudis, mn. 42 to Art. 11 CO and Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 756 et seq., which, amongst many others, plead for a “nul­li­ty sui gene­ris” (no abso­lu­te ex-offi­cio nul­li­ty with pos­si­bi­li­ties to reme­dy the inva­li­di­ty, e.g. through ful­film­ent of the con­tract); same view alrea­dy Bucher, p. 169 et seq.

[30] Ques­ti­on left open in BGE 140 III 583 con­sid. 3.2.2.

[31] Cf. BGE 60 II 98, p. 99 et seq.; decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 4C.175/2003 of 28 Octo­ber 2003, con­sid. 5; cf. also BGE 120 II 341 con­sid. 5 whe­re the non-use of the requi­red form for the ter­mi­na­ti­on of a ten­an­cy con­tract only led to par­ti­al nul­li­ty and not nul­li­ty of the who­le ten­an­cy; cf. for a dif­fe­ren­tia­ting view Gauch/Schluep/Schmid, mn. 581 et seq. or CR CO I‑Xoudis, mn. 35 to Art. 11 CO.

[32] Cf. BGE 106 II 36 con­sid. 5 or decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 4C.175/2003 of 28 Octo­ber 2003 con­sid. 3.2, e.g. if a par­ty has wil­ful­ly or frau­du­lent­ly vio­la­ted cer­tain coope­ra­ti­on or dis­clo­sure duties befo­re ent­e­ring into a con­tract; cf., howe­ver, the cri­ti­cal view in legal doc­tri­ne in BK OR-Mül­ler, mn 229 to Art. 11 CO; cf. for more examp­les Göksu, Prä­ju­di­zi­en­buch, mn. 25 to Art. 11 CO.

[33] Cf. BGE 90 II 34 con­sid. 5.

[34] Cf. decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 5C.96/2006 con­sid. 3.2 in fine.

[35] Cf. BGE 112 II 330 con­sid. 2b; BGE 138 III 401 con­sid. 2.3.1.; cf. also decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 4C.175/2003 of 28 Octo­ber 2003 con­sid. 3.2.

[36] Cf. BGE 88 II 24 con­sid. 5 inclu­ding refe­ren­ces; cf. also BGE 90 II 21 con­sid. 2c.

[37] Cf. BGE 138 III 123 con­sid. 2.4.2; BGE 116 II 700 con­sid. 3b; BGE 138 III 401 con­sid. 2.3.1; BGE 140 III 583 con­sid. 3.2.4; BGE 140 III 200 con­sid. 4.2, for ten­an­cy law cases cf. the sum­ma­ry of the princi­ples in the decisi­on of the Federal Supre­me Court 4A_129/2011 of 28 April 2011 con­sid. 2.3; cf. BK OR-Mül­ler, mn. 198 et seq. to Art. 11 CO, Göksu, Prä­ju­di­zi­en­buch, mn. 18 to 11 CO and Gauch/Schluep/Schmid, mn. 552 et seq.; see for other examp­les CHK-Kut, mn. 20 to Art. 11 CO or for a more in-debt ana­ly­sis CR CO I‑Xoudis, mn. 36 et seq. to Art. 11 CO; cf. also Tercier/Pichonnaz, mn. 755, which point to prac­ti­cal difficulties.

[38] Cf. BGE 93 II 439 con­sid. 5 (rein­ter­pre­ta­ti­on of a fami­ly- into a com­mon foun­da­ti­on) or BGE 76 II 8 con­sid. 5 (con­ver­si­on of a mar­ria­ge- into a tes­ta­men­ta­ry con­tract); cf. for more examp­les and some excep­ti­ons BK OR-Mül­ler, mn. 240 et seq. to Art. 11 CO.

[39] Cf. BGE 135 III 441 con­sid. 3.3; BGE 124 III 112 con­sid. 2b/bb; BGE 126 III 182 con­sid. 3b; cf. for fur­ther infor­ma­ti­on BK OR-Mül­ler, mn. 236 et seq. to Art. 11 CO; cf. for fur­ther refe­ren­ces Gauch/Schluep/Schmid, mn. 584b.

[40] Federal Act on Inter­na­tio­nal Pri­va­te Law (SR 291).

[41] Cf. ins­tead of many and for more examp­les and excep­ti­ons CR CO I‑Xoudis, mn. 54 to Art. 11 CO.

Bibliografische Angaben

Kom­men­tier­ter ArtikelArt. 11 OR
AutorBRÜTSCH, Susan­ne
Auf­la­ge1. Aufl.
Publi­ka­ti­ons­da­tum20. Febru­ar 2022
Zitier­vor­schlagSusan­ne Brütsch, Kom­men­tar zu Art. 11 OR, in: Chris­toph Hur­ni (Hrsg.), Online­kom­men­tar zum Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht, https://onlinekommentar.ch/or11/, 1. Aufl., N. XXX zu Art. 11 OR (besucht am XXX). 
Kurz­zi­tatOK-Brütsch, N. XXX zu Art. 11 OR.


Bucher Eugen, Schwei­ze­ri­sches Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht, All­ge­mei­ner Teil, 1988.

Gauch Peter/Schluep Wal­ter R./Schmid Jörg, OR AT, Schwei­ze­ri­sches Obli­ga­tio­nen­recht All­ge­mei­ner Teil, vol. I, 11. Edi­ti­on, 2020.

Gauch Peter/Stöckli Hubert: Prä­ju­di­zi­en­buch OR, die Recht­spre­chung des Bun­des­ge­richts (1875–2020), 10. Edi­ti­on, 2021 (cit. [Aut­hor], Präjudizienbuch)

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